

Research Series, No. 74

Sheth Bholabhai Jeshingbhai Institute of Learning and Research

INDIAN DIALECTICS

Methods of Philosophical Discussion

Volume II

Esther A. Solomon,

M.A., Ph.D. (Bombay)

Professor of Sanskrit

School of Languages

Gujarat University

AHMEDABAD-9

*Sam gacchadhvam sam vadadhvam,
sam vo * manāmsi jānatām.*

—RV. 10.191.2

B. J. Institute of Learning and Research

GUJARAT VIDYA SABHA

AHMEDABAD

Published by
Dr. H. G. Shastri
Director
B. J. Institute of Learning and Research
R. C. Road, AHMEDABAD-380 009 (India)

First Edition : V. S. 2034
A.D. 1978

Copies : 500

80/-
Price Rs. ~~50~~-00

Printed by
K. Bhikhalal Bhavsar
Proprietor
Shri Swaminarayan Mudran Mandir
612/21, Purushottamnagar, Nava Vadaj
Ahmedabad-380013

CONTENTS

Part II—continued

Chapter 13—Is Knowledge Possible ?

Aim of dialectical criticism—problem of Truth and Reality—sceptical tendency—Sceptics and Absolutists in India—Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa—Mādhyaṃikas—Śrīharṣa and others—repudiation of the concept of validity, and of the validity of the recognised sources of knowledge—in Nāgārjuna's *Vigraha-vyāvartanī*—in Jayarāṣi's *Tattvopaplavasīmha*—in Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*—different definitions of validity repudiated—Jayarāṣi's repudiation of inference—Śrīharṣa's repudiation of inference—Is knowledge of *vyāpti* possible ? definitions of *vyāpti* criticised—*pakṣa*, *pakṣa-dharmatā*, etc. repudiated—repudiation of all concepts and categories—Is debate or dialectical criticism possible even without admitting the validity of knowledge ?—remarks—Notes. ... pp. 519–627

Chapter 14—Problem of Truth

Recognition of *pramāṇas*—their repudiation by the Sceptics and the Absolutists—Theories of truth of the Nyāya, Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, Buddhist, Jaina, Kēvalāīvaīta schools—truth and validity—are *prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya* intrinsic (*svataḥ*) or extrinsic (*parataḥ*) in respect of *utpatti*, *jñāpti* and *kārya* ?—views of the different schools—arguments of Kumārila and Udayana stated at length so as to clarify the issues involved and to illustrate the dialectical mode of exposition—remarks—Notes. ... 628–667

PART III

Chapter 15—Growth of Dialectical Criticism as noticed in Philosophical Works

In *Vedas—Brāhmaṇas—Upaniṣads*—Buddhist Canonical literature—Jaina scriptures—Eel-wrigglers—their influence on

philosophical thought—Epics—*Sūtras*—*Yoga-sūtra*—*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*—*Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*—*Brahma-sūtra*—*Nyāya-sūtra*—remarks—*Sāṃkhya-kārikā*—early commentators on the *Sūtras*—Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, Udayana—*Prāśastapāda*—Śabara, Kumārila, Prabhākara—Vyāsa, the commentator of the *Yoga-sūtra*—Māṭhara—*Yuktidīpikā*—*Tattvakaumudī*—Gauḍapāda—Śaṅkarācārya—Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa—dialectical thought in Post-*Piṭaka* Buddhist works—*Prajñā-pāramitā sūtras*—*Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*—Nāgārjuna's works—Āryadeva—Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka—Candrakīrti—Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla—dialectical modes adopted by the Mādhyamikas—Vijñānavādins—Vasubandhu—Dinnāga—Dharmakīrti—Sarvāstivāda literature—intellectual struggle between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas—*Abhidharmakośa* and its *Bhāṣya*—*Abhidharmadīpa*—*Aṭṭhasālinī* commentary—Post-Āgamic Jaina works—Kundakunda—Umāsvāti—Siddhasena—Jinabhadra—Samantabhadra—Akalaṅka—Vidyānanda—Vādi—Devasūri—Hemacandra—remarks—Notes. ... pp. 671-758

Chapter 16—Methodology of Navya-Nyāya

Stages of the development of the Nyāya-school—Udayana—Gaṅgeśa—his contribution—Navya-Nyāya a sure propaedeutic for philosophical accuracy—technique—concentration on the preciseness of definitions—technical terminology—*avacchinna-avacchedaka*—*nirūpita-nirūpaka*—*ādhāra*—*ādheyatā*—*pratīyogī-anuyogī*—*abhāṇīya-pratīyogī-anuyogī*—*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa*; *prakāra*—*īāti*, *upādhi*—*svarūpa-sambandha*—definitions of *vyāpti*, as illustrating Navya-Nyāya technique—Commentators modified these definitions to make them impregnable—the procedure illustrated—some other relations—*paryāpti* and *viśiṣṭa-nirūpitā-dhāratā sambandha*—*vyāsaṇya-vṛtti dharma*—*kālīka sambandha*—*avyāpya-vṛtti* relations—influence of Navya-Nyāya on other schools and *Śāstras*—dialectic in the works of the Navya-Nyāya school—Notes. ... pp. 759-790

Chapter 17—Dialectical Criticism in other *Vidyās*

Dialectic in works on Dharmaśāstra and Arthaśāstra—

Arthaśāstra—works on Vyākaraṇa-śāstra—*Nirukta*—*Aṣṭādhyāyī*—*Vārttikas* of Kātyāyana—*Mahābhāṣya*—*Vākyapadīya*—philosophy of grammar—influence of grammar on other schools—influence of other schools—works on Kāvyaśāstra—important problems—Bhāmaha and others—Ānandavardhana—problem of independent existence of the suggested meaning from the expressed meaning—Jagannātha—definition of poetry—different definitions quoted and repudiated—Appayya Dīkṣita—Nāgeśa—*kāvya-doṣas* comparable to *nigrahaśṭhānas*—every branch of learning has its own methodology—*Kāmasūtra*—dialectical mode essential to the development of all *Vidyās*—Notes. ... pp. 791–832

Chapter 18—Actual Debates and Controversies—Philosophical, Religious, Social

Social significance of debates—accounts of actual debates—between Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana Miśra—debates presented in *Āgamaḍambara*—accounts in the *Prabhāvakacarita*—Valabhī, Aṇahillapura, Dhārā, centres of intellectual activity—intellectual rivalry between Aṇahillapura and Dhārā—*tarka*, *sāhitya*, and *lakṣaṇa*, main subjects of study—Sūrācārya—Śāntyācārya—Vīracārya—Vādi-Devasūri and Kumudacandra—their intellectual contest related in *Mudritakumudacandra*—account in *Jalpa-kalpalatā*—dialectical duels at courts, in temples and monasteries—poetical contests—philosophical and other contests—enigmas—*brahmodyas* as related in the *Brāhmaṇas*—controversies and discussions pertaining to social problems like marriage, divorce, and other problems—legal dispute—court-scene in *Mṛcchakaṭika*—ordeals—dispute between Udayana and a Buddhist ācārya—place of debates in the cultural life of India—influence on the future career of a person or the history of a sect or school of thought—Notes. ... pp. 833–875

Résumé

The mystical or spiritual and the intellectual sides of Indian culture—inquiry into the relation of word and meaning,

and the practical importance of medical and juridical problems contributed to the growth and development of dialectic—science arises to satisfy a vital need—*jāti*s—detection of logical fallacies and aberrations other than logical—its necessity gave rise to a systematic and scientific study of logic—logic in the early stages primarily concerned with debate—growing importance of *pramāṇas*—epistemological problems—Navya-Nyāya—subtle and even hair-splitting arguments—man's vanity expressing itself in hair-splitting subtleties—sceptics and absolutists resort to reason to show its limitation!—*pramāṇas* of Indian logic—some specialities of Indian logic—scriptural testimony as a *pramāṇa*—philosophical and other problems treated dialectically—even *pramāṇas* submitted to a dialectical examination—hope of a more efficient 'organ of knowledge'. ... pp 876–886

Appendix 1—*Śāstra-vinoda* in Someśvara's *Mānasollāṣa*
... pp. 887–890

Appendix 2—Dialectical Examination of the Problem : 'Is validity intrinsic in Knowledge or is it extrinsic?'—in Abhayadeva's *Tattvabodhavidhāyini* on Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatīṭarkaprakaraṇa* .. pp. 891–941

Errata ... p. 942
Indices ... 943 ff.

ABBREVIATIONS

AdS	Advaita-siddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī
AYD	Anuyogadvārasūtra
AK	Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu
AKV	Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā of Yaśomitra
ATV	Ātmatattvaviveka of Udayana
Utd.Sū	Uttarādhyaṇa-sūtra
UH	Upāyahṛdaya
Ait. Br.	Aitareya Brāhmaṇa
KhKh	Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya of Śriharṣa
CS	Caraka-saṁhitā
TC	Tattva-cintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya
TvS	Tattva-saṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita
TŚlv	Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika of Vidyānanda
TPS	Tattvopaplavasīmha of Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa
TT	Tarka-tāṇḍava of Vyāsātirtha
TŚ	Tarka-śāstra
TS	Tarka-saṅgraha with Dīpikā of Annambhaṭṭa
TR	Tārkika-rakṣā of Varadarāja
DMS	Daśaśloki-Māhāvidyā-sūtra of Kulārka Paṇḍita
DN	Dīgha Nikāya
NK	Nyāyakandaḷi of Śrīdhara
NKC	Nyāyakumudacandra of Prabhācandra
NKu	Nyāya-kusumāñjali of Udayana
NKuP	Nyāyakusumāñjali-Prakāśa of Vardhamāna
NP	Nyāya-pariśuddhi of Veṅkaṭanātha
NyP	Nyāya-praveśa of Śaṅkarasvāmin
NyB	Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti
NyBT	Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā of Dharmottara
NB	Nyāya-bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana
NM	Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta
NV	Nyāya-vārttika of Uddyotakara
NVTT	Nyāya-vārttika-tātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati
NVTTT	Nyāya-vārttika-tātparyaṭīkā-pariśuddhi of Udayana
NyV	Nyāya-viniścaya with Vṛtti of Akalaṅka
NS	Nyāya-sūtra of Gautama
NSV	Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti of Viśvanātha
NyA	Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara

- PMS Parikṣāmukhasūtra of Māṇikyanandin
 PNTL Prāmāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra of Vādi-Devasūri
 PP Pramāṇa-paddhati of Jayatīrtha
 PM Pramāṇa-mimāṃsā of Hemacandra
 PV Pramāṇa-vārttika of Dharmakīrti
 PKM Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa of Prabhācandra
 PB Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya
 BS Bodha-siddhi or Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa of Udayana
 BP Bhāṣa-pariccheda of Viśvanātha
 MBH Mahābhārata
 MVV Mahāvidyā-daśa-śloki-vivaraṇa
 MVVT Mahāvidyā-daśa-śloki-vivarana-tippaṇa of Bhuvanasundara
 MVVi Mahāvidyā-vidambana of Vādira
 MVViD Mahāvidyā-vidambana-vyākhyāna-dīpikā of Bhuvanasundara
 MK Mādhyamika-Kārikā of Nāgārjuna
 MKV Mādhyamika-Kārikā-Vṛtti of Candrakīrti
 YS Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali
 LA Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra
 VN Vādanāyā of Dharmakīrti
 VV Vādivinoda of Śaṅkara Miśra
 ViBh Viśeṣaśāstrakabhāṣyā of Jinabhadra
 ViV Vighrahavyāvartani of Nāgārjuna
 VS Vaiśeṣika-sūtra of Kaṇāda
 Śata Br Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa
 ŚD Śāstradīpikā of Pārthasarathi Miśra
 Ślv Śloka-vārttika of Kumārila
 STT Sanmati-tarka-ṭīkā of Abhayadeva
 SDS Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha of Mādhava
 SK Sāṃkhyā Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa
 SM Siddhānta-muktāvalī of Viśvanātha
 SV Siddhiviniścaya with Vṛtti of Akalaṅka
 Sth.Sū. Sthānāṅga-sūtra
 SVR Syādvādaratnākara of Vādi-Devasūri
 HIL A History of Indian Logic—Vidyābhūṣaṇa
 HIP A History of Indian Philosophy—S. N. Dasgupta
 Materials...Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya Logic—Ingalls

CHAPTER 13

IS KNOWLEDGE POSSIBLE ?

Dialectical criticism may end in the complete rejection of a view or a theory or lead to another suggestion which, if the examination has been properly conducted, ought to approach nearer the truth.

The concepts of truth seem to vary in the different systems of thought; so we may say that dialectic helps thinkers to approach the problem of truth and reality with an open mind, with sympathy and due consideration for all possible views, especially when they are concerned with the ultimate reality of things. Most of the Indian philosophical systems * are idealistic in the sense that they do not regard the world as it is perceived by the physical eye as real unless it be related after deep inquiry to some higher reality (e.g. the *Prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga) or the ultimate reality (God or the Absolute Principle). Consequently, perception and the other *pramāṇas* are not wholly trusted as giving full knowledge of things. But they are regarded as reliable in the sense that their knowledge is not found to be contradicted in empirical experience and they help us to co-ordinate our empirical experience with our philosophical or metaphysical beliefs. But excepting the extreme idealists (Vijñānavādins and Kevalādvaitins) and the sceptics and the Mādhyamikas, the different schools do accept the *pramāṇas* as giving knowledge which is never completely sublated, even though it may be co-ordinated with or merged in the knowledge of the Highest Reality to present the whole of Reality as it is. The sceptics, the Vijñānavādins, the Kevalādvaitins, and

* The Lokāyata, and to a great extent the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may be regarded as exceptions.

the Mādhyamikas, on the other hand, regard knowledge derived from the different sources as valid only in empirical experience and deny any ultimate validity to it. Even among these, the sceptics and the Mādhyamikas and the (later) Kevalādvaitins (who believing in the reality of Brahman alone are interested in repudiating the reality of everything else-) are very insistent on the point that the different *pramāṇas* (sources of knowledge) can under no circumstances be relied upon as yielding truth, because the very concept of *pramāṇa* and its object is an indefinable one. One cannot be sure of any knowledge.

Dialectic would ordinarily proceed on the assumption that true knowledge can be acquired. But some schools of philosophical thought do not at all admit the possibility of the valid knowledge of things. Thus dialectic examining other cognisables turned upon itself and ransacked its very fundamentals.

In India about the end of the Upaniṣadic period (—though the sceptical tendency is evident even earlier—) with the upsurge of philosophical and critical thought there arose thinkers who were sceptical—though not necessarily so in actual life—about virtue and vice (—Pūraṇa Kassapa and others) and the attainment of knowledge or the possibility of the description of reality in words (—Sañjaya Belaṭṭhapuṭta). Their own works are not extant so we do not have a detailed idea of their line of argument or their sceptical views. Nevertheless we find some of their views recorded in the Buddhist and the Jaina canonical literature and we can say that they were thinkers whose parallels may be found in the sophists and the cynics and the sceptics of Greece. Buddha did not encourage this line of thinking as it was likely to prove morally futile. But the method of criticism and refutation continued to be adopted by the theorists of Buddhism especially by the Mādhyamikas; and later dialectical philosophers developed what is known as the *prāsaṅgika* method,—the method of examining all possible alternative interpretations of the opponent's proposition, showing the absurdity of the respective consequences and thus refuting it.

Some sceptical thinkers of India deny that they have any philosophical doctrine at all and hold that the function of philosophical reasoning is critical—solely to destroy false philosophies. It is strange that some others who believe in reaching truth by intuitive experience (*anubhava*) or realisation (*sāksātkāra*) are also critical of empirical knowledge and repudiate the validity of its sources. A thinker of the first type would say, in the words of Collingwood, “I do not know what the right answer to any philosophical question is; but I think there is work to be done in showing that the answers usually given are wrong. And I can prove that one answer is wrong without claiming to know that another is right, for my method is to examine the answers given by other people and to show that they are self-contradictory. What is self-contradictory is, properly speaking, meaningless; what is meaningless cannot mean the truth, and therefore by this method I can preserve a purely critical attitude towards the philosophy of others, without having any philosophy of my own. As to that, I neither assert nor deny its possibility: I merely for the present, suspend judgment and continue my work of criticism.”*

This is exactly the position of Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Tattvopaplavasīmha*.

The second form of scepticism—which may better be called Absolutism—agrees with the first in holding that philosophical reasoning cannot establish any positive or constructive position. But it holds that we are not on that account necessarily cheated of truth. It comes to us directly from intuitive experience or the Supreme Intelligence (*prajñā*). The Mādhyamikas and the Kevalādvaitins belong to this category. Nāgārjuna (second century A.D.) and all the other Mādhyamika thinkers accepting the doctrine of *śūnyatā* (void) repudiated the efficiency of all sources of knowledge and consequently the reality of the categories derived from them. Still this scepticism of theirs was not a thorough-going one. Unlike the *Tattvopaplavavādins*

* *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, p. 138—R. G. Collingwood (Clarendon Press, Oxford).

who were extreme sceptics, the Mādhyamikas looked to a supra-cognitive supreme reality—*Śūnya* or *Tathatā*. They admitted the operation of the *pramāṇas* in the empirical field, but contended that they were inefficacious in the attainment of the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality, which transcends them and can be realised not by discursive thought but by the Pure Intelligence (*Prajñā*) alone. Nāgārjuna is the first well-known exponent of this view, though not its founder. Inefficacy of *pramāṇa* (source of knowledge) in the establishment of the doctrine of *śūnyatā* is the main theme of his *Vigrahavijyāvartanī*. In his *Mādhyamika-kārikā*, he has shown the hollowness of the concepts of causality (*pratyaya*), going and coming (*gatāgata*), sense-organs, aggregates (*skandha*), elements (*dhātu*), passions and the persons under their influence (*rāga-rakta*), composite entities (*samskṛta*), action and its performer (*karma-kāraka*), ... pain (*duḥkha*), ... essential nature (*svabhavā*), bondage and emancipation, fruit of action (*karma-phala*), self (*ātman*), time (*kāla*), causal aggregate (*sāmagrī*), ... Tathāgata, error (*viparyāsa*), Noble Truths (*āryasatya*), ... *Nirvāṇa* and even *Śūnyatā*. Among the followers of Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita (6th cent.) seeks to prove that the knowledge of *Vijñānādvaita* (—idealistic monism—) cannot be attained by any logical argument as all logic is futile and inconsistent, whereas Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka (6th cent.) tries to establish his idealistic monism by arguments of his own. Candrakīrti (8th cent.) finally supports Buddhapālita's stand as against that of Bhāvaviveka, which he regards as equivalent to renouncing the Mādhyamika position that philosophical reasoning cannot positively prove anything, it can only destroy false views.

Among the Kevalādvaitins, Śrīharṣa (1150 A.D.) and Citsukha (1220 A.D.) resorted to a line of argument similar to that of Nāgārjuna.³ Like Nāgārjuna, Śrīharṣa also is not interested in giving any rational explanation of our world-experience; they are agreed in disregarding the validity of world experience. Though Candrakīrti explains that Nāgārjuna has faith in the efficacy of the super-intelligence to grasp the

ultimate nature of Reality—*Tathatā*, Nāgārjuna has not in his own works established any thesis of his own. On the other hand, Śrīharṣa has in his own work established the reality of Brahman (*Tad evaṃ bheda-prapañco'nirvacanīyah, brahmaiva tu paramā'rtha-sad advitīyam iti sthitam.*—KhKh., p. 82). He does not seem to have applied his own dialectic to his own thesis. His own description of Brahman also could not have stood the test of his rigorous dialectical examination. Nāgārjuna, on the other hand, has shown the hollowness of even the concepts of *Tathāgata*, *Nirvāṇa*, *Śūnyatā*. Again, while Nāgārjuna mainly attacks the accepted Buddhist categories and other relevant categories connected with them, Śrīharṣa attacks mainly the definitions of the Nyāya school³ and comes to the conclusion that as the Nyāya cannot define its categories, these are intrinsically indefinable and the world-appearance measured and scanned in terms of these categories is false.⁴ But though his chief polemic is against the Nyāya, since his criticisms are of a destructive nature, they can with modifications be used effectively against any other system. Definitions other than those refuted by Śrīharṣa can be refuted by a judicious manipulation of the arguments found in different places in Śrīharṣa's work or by urging similar or other arguments. Thus an intelligent man can repudiate the categories recognised and expounded by others.⁵ Those who criticise with the object of establishing positive definitions would object to certain definitions or theories of other schools; but the Mādhyamikas, the Tattvopaplavavādins and Kevalādvaitins like Śrīharṣa are interested in the refutation of all definitions as such and so their dialectic would be effective against all definitions and theories of other schools of philosophical thought. Nāgārjuna's methods differ from those of Jayarāśi and Śrīharṣa in that the concepts which he criticises are mostly just shown by him to be intrinsically based on concepts which have no essential nature of their own but are understood only in relation to others. No concept reveals any intrinsic nature of its own and one can understand a concept only through another and that again through the former or through another, and so on.⁶ Jayarāśi

and Śrīharṣa employ other arguments also to refute the concepts by bringing out the absurdities involved.

We shall now consider how these philosophers have repudiated the validity of the recognised sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Nāgārjuna's argument against those who maintain the reality of things on the ground that they can be known by the *pramāṇas* is that if you maintain that a *pramāṇa* can demonstrate the existence of things and those things are proved when there is a *pramāṇa*, then you must state where such a *pramāṇa* could be found as could demonstrate these *pramāṇas*. Were the *pramāṇas* demonstrated without having recourse to another *pramāṇa*, then the *pramāṇas* being themselves undemonstrated could not prove the existence of other objects (*Vigrahavyāvartanī*, 31). If, on the other hand, the *pramāṇas* be said to be demonstrated by another *pramāṇa* and this by still another, there would be the fault of *anavasthā* (vicious infinite series) (32). And if you say that the *pramāṇa* does not require to be demonstrated then you give up your stand that things are demonstrated by *pramāṇas*; and you must also account for this preferential treatment accorded to *pramāṇa* as to why it is not required to be demonstrated by a *pramāṇa* when other things are required to be thus demonstrated (33).⁷ It is mistaken to say that just as fire can illuminate itself and other objects so the *pramāṇa* can at the same time establish itself and other things. As a matter of fact, fire does not illumine itself for it would then have to be previously unperceived in darkness like a jar in darkness which is later illumined by fire. That is to say, if fire is luminous from the very beginning, it is not possible to say that fire can illumine itself. Moreover, if it is maintained that fire can illumine itself and other objects, then since fire can burn other objects, how is it that it does not burn itself? (34-36). And if fire can illumine itself as well as other objects darkness must similarly cover itself as well as other objects (37).

It may be urged that a *pramāṇa* is self-proved (*svataḥ-siddha*); a *pramāṇa* can be established without relation to

other things. If a *pramāṇa* has some relation with other things then it would not be self-proved; a *pramāṇa* can be self-proved only when it does not depend on other things. The answer to this is that if the *pramāṇa* could be established and could prove without any relation with the object to be proved, then nobody would use the *pramāṇas* in order to apprehend these objects. If the *pramāṇas* are said to be established inasmuch as they are related to the things to be known, then the *pramāṇas* are dependent on something which is already proved for if the things are not yet proved they cannot be reciprocally related. If on the other hand, things are already proved, there is no necessity of assuming a reciprocal relation between them. If the things which are to be apprehended are proved on account of their relation with the *pramāṇas*, then the things to be apprehended are subsequently proved in relation to the *pramāṇa* and could not be reciprocally related (41-44). If things are established without a *pramāṇa* then they have no relation with the *pramāṇa*. Why then does one employ a *pramāṇa* to establish them? What, as a matter of fact, could be proved by a *pramāṇa* ? (45) If it is maintained that the validity of the *pramāṇa* is proved as having relation to the object to be ascertained, then since the thing to be apprehended establishes the *pramāṇa* it would become the *pramāṇa* and the *pramāṇa* would become the thing to be apprehended as it is established by the thing to be apprehended (46).⁸ If they are said to establish each other then both remain unestablished. One may suppose that the father can give birth to the son or that the son can give birth to the father, but in that case who is it that gives birth and who is it that is born ? (47-51)

Thus a *pramāṇa* cannot establish itself; it is similarly not established by another *pramāṇa* of the same type, nor by a different *pramāṇa*, nor is it established by another thing. It is not established without a cause, or by its own objects and by the objects of another severally or collectively (52). Therefore it is wrong to say that the existence of things is established by *pramāṇas* or that there are *pramāṇas* establishing the things

to be apprehended (53) ⁹ Thus the *pramāṇas* cannot be regarded as sources of valid knowledge.

Nāgārjuna's main line of attack is that no concept, whether of knowledge or of the means of knowledge or of anything else can be defined intrinsically without depending on another and this latter again is not independent of the former or another. This dependence shows that there is no essential truth in the definitions and consequently in their content, and it is not possible to affirm the validity of empirical knowledge and the reality of the things cognised by it

Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa of the Lokāyata school is the only outright sceptic among the Indian philosophers known to us. In his *Tattvopaplavasīmha*, he sets out to repudiate the validity of the *pramāṇas* as they are expounded by the different schools. In the course of his dialectical refutation of these *pramāṇas* he refutes the concepts of *jāti* (class-character, universal), *samavāya* (inherence), soul and so forth; that is to say, he is not ready to accept the validity of any proposition. He strikes at the very root of all thought—the *pramāṇas*, and it is then easy to arrive at the consequent invalidity of every proposition. He shows the incorrectness of the definitions of the *pramāṇas* as formulated by the different schools and comes to the conclusion that all principles being thus upset all propositions are charming so long as they are not investigated into.¹⁰

The criteria of the truth of knowledge as recognised by the different schools of philosophy are *avyabhicāritva* (absence of discrepancy), *abādhitatva* (absence of contradiction), *avisamvāda* (absence of incoherence), *yāthārthya* (correspondence) and *vyavasāyātmakatva* (certainty or definiteness). Jayarāśi repudiates these concepts by anticipating all possible interpretations of these terms and showing them to be faulty and unacceptable. For example, What is meant by knowledge 'being-uncontradicted'? Does it mean that contradiction to this knowledge does not arise? And if so, does this contradiction not arise because the knowledge cognises the object correctly (i.e. there is correspondence between the knowledge and the object) or

because the aggregate of causal factors giving rise to the contradicting knowledge (*bādhaka-jñāna*) is incomplete ? It is observed that in the absence of the complete apparatus originating the contradicting knowledge, the previous knowledge is not contradicted; for instance, no contradiction arises when we cognise a mass of rays of the sun (*marici-nicaya*) at a distance as water, whereas this cognition is contradicted when the place is a familiar one, when the necessary causes for the production of the contradicting cognition are present. Again, this contradiction may not arise immediately but may rise after a year or so, or may not arise at all if the factors producing the contradicting knowledge are not present in a complete aggregate. Can it be said that the cognition is true, simply because no contradiction has arisen ? Moreover, does this absence of contradiction hold good with reference to all persons or with reference to the cogniser ? We can never know that contradiction to this cognition has never arisen in the case of each and every person for then we would be omniscient. And if it is said that a cognition is non-discrepant because the cogniser does not have a contradicting cognition, that is not proper; for even though a contradicting cognition may not arise in the case of the knower owing to his going to a different place or his death and the like reasons, yet the cognition of jewel (where there are only rays) and of mirage and the like are known to be false. Or the false cognition has, on account of the nature of its causal aggregate, arisen in such a fashion as to prevent the contradicting cognition from arising, and it is because of this that it is uncontradicted, like a cognition recognised to be right. Thus knowledge cannot be regarded as true (non-discrepant, *avyabhicāri*) simply because it is not contradicted.¹¹

Some reckon truth by the efficiency of knowledge (*pravṛtti-sāmarthyā*), that is to say, by its bringing us into relation with the successful achievement of its object. Is this efficiency of knowledge (*pravṛtti-sāmarthyā*) known or is it not known ?

If it be not known, how could it be known to exist, and if it be known how could you be certain of the truth of this knowledge? It is further contended that the truth of the previously produced cognition of water is ascertained by reaching and obtaining water. Is the water thus obtained identical with the water apprehended by the cognition, or of the same class or of the same family? It cannot be identical with the water revealed by cognition for it is quite possible that this water has ceased to exist owing to the changes produced in its parts by the circling of fishes and the splashing of buffaloes and the like causes. If it is said to be water of the same class, it happens at times that man may have false knowledge of water and yet accidentally reach (real) water and then this knowledge should according to this view be regarded as true—which is absurd. It may be urged that wrong knowledge never takes a person to water connected with the same place and time, whereas true knowledge does so and it is by reason of this that it is true or non-discrepant (*avyabhicāri*). If this be so, then knowledge of an object about to perish or knowledge of moon, sun, etc. (which we cannot reach) would not be true. Moreover, cognition cannot possibly enable us to reach water of the same place, for place too can, like water, cease to exist (owing to earth-quake, eruption, etc.).¹² The water reached also cannot have the same *jāti* (class-character) as the water that was revealed in cognition, for there is nothing like *jāti*.¹³ If the water reached is said to be of the same family or continuum, this is not acceptable as the last composite entity is devoid of the generative power; and the water-individuals cannot be many (—See the refutation of *jāti*, TPS, pp. 4–8).

Moreover, does the efficiency of knowledge acquaint us with its truth by being its mark (*liṅga*) or by being its means of perception? It cannot be its mark (*liṅga*) or probans as the relation between the two is not known, because if the relation were known, truth itself would be known and it would not then be necessary to utilise the mark

of inference, viz. efficiency.¹⁴ It cannot also be its means of perception, because there can be no contact with it which arose previously and then perished. Knowledge of it is not the result of perception, as it is objectless, like the cognition of *keṣaṇḍuka* (woolly mass seen by pressing the eye with the finger; this knowledge has as a matter of fact no object). Neither the negation of cognition nor its presence is revealed as itself is not there. How can a non-existent thing be said to be an object ? Due to its impressing its shape, or being endowed with the large (hence perceptible) size (*mahattva*) and the like characters; or mere presence, or being produced simultaneously (with cognition) ? When all these have been refuted, how could it be an object ? And if it be still regarded as an object, then the cause of illusion would have to be investigated in the case of the cognitions of the *keṣaṇḍuka*, etc. (for they also could be said to have an object and so could not be regarded as illusory by reason of their being objectless). If it were false by virtue of its mere existence, then everything would come to be false and there would be 'the upsetting of all principles' (*tattvopaplava*).¹⁵

If it is said that truth (*avyabhicāritva*, non-discrepancy) is cognised differently, that cognition produced by the contact of soul and mind is revealed as qualified by *avyabhicāritā*, —that is not proper. Is this *avyabhicāritva* its attribute or its very nature ? If it is its attribute, is it eternal or non-eternal ? If it be eternal it should be looked upon as repudiated on account of the same faults as are present in the case of *jāti* (—being eternal it would either give rise to cognition always or never—TPS, p 6). If it be non-eternal, is it produced before it or simultaneously with it or after it ? If it be produced prior to it (cognition), whose attribute could it be ? An attribute cannot exist without a substratum. If it is said to be produced simultaneously with it, then the relation between the two as signified by the genitive case in 'the *avyabhicāritā* of it' remains to be specified, as it cannot be identity (—because the two are different—), causality (—because the two are simultaneous—)

or *samavāya* (which has been repudiated—TPS, pp. 7–8). If it is said that it is produced subsequently, then it follows that the knowledge was previously *vyabhicāri* (discrepant, false). There is no personal attribute of the form of *avyabhicāritva* as distinct from pleasure etc. since on account of the impossibility of its apprehension it is not recognised as such even by the other party (—Naiyāyika in this case). If attributes like non-discrepancy (*avyabhicāra*), etc. are recognised as distinct entities, and cognition determined by them is stated to be the ascertaining factor of the causal apparatus, that is not prop.r, since each of them will not remain up to the time of the apprehension of the cognition as determined by a number of attributes, and in the absence of (the simultaneous existence of) that which is to be made known (viz. apparatus) and that which makes known (viz. *avyabhicāra*, etc.), cognition will be associated with the agent alone (TPS, pp. 9–10). That is to say, there will be the agent alone with certain stray pieces of knowledge, but not the relation of *jñāpya* (that which is known) and *jñāpaka* (that which makes known).

If *avyabhicāritva* is regarded as the very nature of knowledge, then is it so by virtue of its own existence or by virtue of the existence of another thing? If it be said to be *avyabhicāri* merely by virtue of its existence, then all cognitions including that of *keśaṇḍuka* should be *avyabhicāri* (non-discrepant). But knowledge is not said to be *vyabhicāri* or *avyabhicāri* by virtue of its mere existence. If cognition is said to be *avyabhicāri* by virtue of the existence of another thing, is this other thing helping (conducive to non-discrepant knowledge, *upakāraka*) or non-helping? If it be non-helping, then the cognitions of *keśaṇḍuka* and two moons should be *avyabhicari*. If the other thing is said to be a helping one, is it one that is known or unknown? If it be said to be one that is known, then past and future inferential cognitions, yogic perception, and cognition generated by injunctory statements (*codanāvācana*) could not be *avyabhicari* as there is absence in their case of the helping factor that is known, and if there,

be presence of it there would be the extinction of the process of sacrificing (because then it would not be guided by *Śruti* and it alone). If it be not known then the cognition of *keśonḍuka* and two moons should be correct. So this assumption is not acceptable (TPS, p. 10).

Moreover, is the cognition which acquaints us with the apparatus known to be *avyabhicāri* or not so known ? If it is known as such, is this cognition of the nature of self-apprehension or is it known by another cognition ? It cannot be of the form of self-apprehension because the Naiyāyika himself does not recognise self-apprehension of knowledge and if he were to admit this he would be contradicting his own doctrine (—the *nigrahasthāna* called *apasiddhānta*). If it be said to be known as *avyabhicāri* by another cognition, then the reason for the difference between the two cognitions must be inquired into. Cognition is distinguished from non-cognition by virtue of its nature of cognition, but how could it be distinguished from another cognition ? By its nature of cognition or by another character ? If it be distinguished by virtue of the nature of cognition, then the other would cease to be of the nature of cognition, like water, etc. If it be said to be distinguished by virtue of another character, then it would be devoid of the character of cognition, because the two characters could not be identical, and if they be identical, there should be one thing—cognition or non-cognition. If it be cognition, it could not be said to be distinguished due to another character but only due to its nature of cognition, and the other would come to be of the nature of non-cognition. If it be non-cognition then what the Tattvopaplavavādin desired is proved. If *jñānatva* (class-character of cognition) is said to be the distinguishing factor, by what does it distinguish, and so on as stated before; the line of argument stated above should be pursued. It cannot also possibly be cognised by another cognition. If it is said to be not known, how do you know that it exists ? Following this line of argument one has to accept the futility of the division of knowledge as true and false (TPS, p. 11).

Jayarāṣi now takes up the belief that true knowledge reveals that thing which is actually present and is in contact with the sense-organ, whereas false knowledge reveals a different thing.

'*Avyabhicāri*' may be taken to mean that the knowledge is of a thing with which the sense is actually in contact; in the case of *vyabhicāri* (wrong or discrepant) knowledge, on the other hand, the support or base (*ālambana*) (—the object before the sense) is different from the thing revealed in knowledge (*anyad ālambanam anyac ca pratibhāti*—TPS, p. 12). We ask, what is signified by *ālambana*? Does it signify that it is the producer of cognition, or that it impresses its shape, or that it is the substrate of cognition, or that it is revealed by cognition? If *ālambana* signifies being the producer of knowledge, then the eyes and light should be *ālambanas*. *Ālambana* cannot properly signify being the impressor of shape, since this is not acceptable to the Naiyāyikas. Cognition cannot reasonably have the shape of the object (—as is shown later by Jayarāṣi). *Ālambana* cannot signify that it is the substrate of cognition since cognition does not arise as associated with the circle of rays, but arises as inherent in the soul. Lastly, if *ālambana* signifies that it is revealed by cognition, this is not proper as it is water that is revealed in the cognition of water and not rays. If the rays themselves are known in the shape of water, is the shape of water different from the rays or non-different? If it is non-different, is it real or unreal? If real how could its cognition be false? If it be unreal, then the rays also would come to be unreal. There being identity with unreal water, the cognition of water is false. What is meant by this? It amounts to this that the cognition of rays is false. And when the one shape of water is known, who tells the fool of a Naiyāyika that the rays are revealed? If the shape of water is said to be different from the rays, then it should not be said that rays are cognised in the shape of water. We ask: What is revealed in the cognition of *keśaṇḍuka*, and what is its *ālambana*? The very same *keśaṇḍuka* serves as the *ālambana* and is also cognised; similarly water alone can

be the *ālambana* and also be known, and it is not necessary to postulate another *ālambana*. And cognition of water is false not because it has another *ālambana* than what is cognised, but because it (water) as a matter of fact, does not exist; otherwise the cognition of *keṣoṇḍuka* will not be false because it does not have a different *ālambana*.

It is contended that since the cognition takes the cogniser to the place of the rays, the rays are the *ālambana*. The answer to this is that in this way the place also would reasonably be an *ālambana*. And the cognition of water could not have been produced by contact with a thing different from the water that is revealed, as this is not seen in the case of the cognition of real water; otherwise even the inferential cognition of the water could be said to be produced by the contact of sense-organ and object, as it is produced by the contact of the soul and the mind. If it be urged that the mind has no relation with the fire that is cognised, then here also the eye has no relation with the water that is cognised.¹⁶

It is urged that false knowledge has a non-existent object whereas true knowledge has an existent object. Jayarāṣi now shows the futility of this distinction. If the false cognition of water is said to have non-existent water as its object, what is meant by its being an object ? What is said above holds good here also. If water is revealed in it, how does it not exist ? Yes, it may be argued, it is revealed but wrongly. What is meant by wrongness (*atathyatā*) —absence of what is apprehended, or the absence that is apprehended ? If it means absence of what is apprehended, is this true only then or at another time ? If only then, is it known or not known ? If known, by what is it known—by the cognition of water or by another cognition ? It (absence of water) cannot be known by the cognition of water, as this latter has water as its object. Or if it have that (absence) as its object the realisation that cognition of water is illusory would not be possible because the object, viz. 'absence' is an existent one. And the negation of water cannot be revealed in cognition apprehending water

for then anything could be revealed in any cognition, which is absurd; it involves *atiprasaṅga* (absurd over-extension). If it is said to be revealed by another cognition, that is not proper, because two cognitions cannot be simultaneous. And if absence or negation be established by the cognition of negation and existence by the cognition of existence, then the existence and the non-existence of water would be co-existent. It would be arbitrary to say that the cognition of existence does not establish existence, whereas the cognition of negation does establish negation. And if the cognition of existence were not to establish existence, people would be suspicious about all things, and in the event of that contingency there would be no limit to negation and consequently there would be *tattvopaplava* (upsetting of all principles). On the other hand, if it is not known how do you know that it exists? And if there is the absence of what is known at another time, then nothing is contradicted, for it is quite possible that even real water is absent at another time.

If wrongness (*atathyatā*), means the negation or absence that is apprehended, how could knowledge having that as its objects be possibly false, as only negation which is cognised is tenable? Moreover, positing absence when a positive character is cognised is not proper, as it involves *ati-prasaṅga* (absurd over-extension); otherwise, one could posit taste, etc. when colour, etc are apprehended. But this is not what is done. Similarly here also water is apprehended. It may be urged that it is apprehended but it is unreal. The answer to this is that in that case this is but a description of water just as 'long (patch of) water', 'sweet water' and the like are. It may be argued that in the case of the latter descriptions, water is apprehended, and so water is posited in them. The answer to this is that if this be so, then even here in both the cases water is cognised—real water and unreal water. In the cognition of real water it is real water that is revealed and not unreal water or non-water. Similarly, in the cognition of unreal water, it is unreal water that is revealed and not real

water or non-water, because apprehensions consist in the determination of their own objects (TPS, pp. 12-14).

A cognition is said to be wrong when it is contradicted by another cognition. Jāyarāsi asks what it is that is contradicted—the object (*artha*), cognition or both—, and by what it is contradicted.¹⁷ If it is said that the thing is contradicted, by what is it contradicted? Does it contradict itself or is it contradicted by another thing or by knowledge? If it contradicts itself, is the contradiction caused or originated by it or made known? If it is caused, is it different or non-different? If it is non-different then 'contradiction is caused' means 'its own self is originated by it'—which is not consistent, as a thing cannot operate on itself (—operation on itself involves contradiction—*vyāghāta*). If it is caused as distinct (from the thing) even then what is existent becomes the agent, but what is apprehended is not repudiated. If the contradiction is said to be made known (by the thing) is it non-different or different? If it is non-different, then 'contradiction is made known by it' is equivalent to 'water is made known'. If it is different, then what is existent is proved to be the *jñāpaka*, what makes known, and the existence of what is apprehended is proved.

If the thing is said to be contradicted by another, then it follows that both are real; only two existent things, like two kings, can stand in the relation of *bādhya* (contradicted, what is set aside) and *bādhaka* (contradicting, that which sets aside); one and the same thing cannot be both the *bādhya* and the *bādhaka*. Moreover, is the contradiction by it of what is apprehended, caused by it or made known? If it is caused, is it (contradiction) non-different or different (from the contradicted). If it be non-different, then 'non-different contradiction is caused' would mean 'water is caused'; and if it (water) be caused or originated, its cognition would not be false. If contradiction which is different (from the contradicted) be said to be originated, even then there must be water as it (contradiction) is cognised as related to water. If Devadatta

were not to exist, one could not speak of his eye; similarly a thing must exist in order that contradiction should be related to it. If contradiction is said to be made known, is it non-different or different (from water)? If it which is non-different is made known, then what is meant by 'contradiction is made known' is 'water is made known'. If being different it is made known, even then when we say, 'This is the contradiction of water', it is revealed as dependent on another (i.e. on water), and so there cannot be the absolute negation of it (i.e. water). Therefore, contradiction by another thing also is not possible.

If it is said to be contradicted by knowledge, is it contradicted by knowledge having that as its object or another thing as its object, or by knowledge that is objectless? If the contradicting knowledge has that (the thing contradicted) as its object, then it affirms its nature, does not falsify it, because it is of the form of the determination of that character. If the contradicting cognition has another thing as its object, that also is not proper; a cognition pertaining to an object can affirm the existence of only that, but it cannot affirm or deny anything else, since cognitions are restricted to their own object. If it is said to be contradicted by an objectless cognition, the answer is that this latter does not affirm or deny anything, even because it is objectless (TPS, pp. 14-16).¹⁸

If cognition is said to be contradicted, what is its contradiction? Does it have the form of the exclusion of *svarūpa* (nature), or denial of *svarūpa*, or of depriving it of its object? If it has the form of exclusion of its nature, then everything would be contradicted, because one cognition would be turned off (or destroyed) by another. If it is of the form of denial of its own nature, that is not proper, because even the cognition of false water is experienced. It is also not true to say that it is of the form of depriving it of its object. It has been shown above that a knowledge cannot be deprived of its object (—even cognition of unreal water has its object). Thus contradiction cannot be explained.

It may be asked that if the object is not contradicted, how it is that it has not got efficiency (does not bring about *artha-kriyā* or successful action) ? What is this *arthakriyā* which it does not bring about for people ? Is it of the form of consciousness, or of activity, or of attainment, or of the production and enjoyment of pleasure and pain ? If it is said that the object does not bring about *arthakriyā* of the form of consciousness, that is not true because water does bring about the *arthakriyā* of the form of consciousness (i.e. does give rise to the cognition of water). It is also not true to say that it does not bring about *artha-kriyā* of the form of activity, since activity is dependent on the will of man, and does not follow the being or non-being of the nature of a thing. A man may or may not act according to his desire, but this alone does not prove its absence. If it is said to be non-existent because it does not bring about *arthakriyā* of the form of attainment, that is not a proper criterion, because, moon, sun, planets, etc. can exist even though they cannot be reached. If it is said not to bring about *arthakriyā* of the form of pleasure or pain, we ask, 'Does this mean that it does not bring about pleasure originating from perception or from contact with body ?' It does bring about pleasure resulting from perception. If it is said that it does not give rise to pleasure arising out of physical contact, then this would not hold good in the case of moon, sun, etc., which do not give rise to pleasure arising out of physical contact and yet are (regarded as) real or existent. And things cannot be regarded as non-existent simply because they do not give rise to *artha-kriyā* (successful action) because the origination of all knowledge as such occurs only from its respective causal aggregate, and it may not bring about *arthakriyā* in the absence of accessory factors. Moreover, when it is stated that it does not bring about *arthakriyā*, is this stated with reference to one knower or to all knowers ? If it is said to be unreal because it does not give rise to *arthakriyā* in the case of one knower, then this would not hold good in the case of moon,

sun, planets, etc., and in the case of an object about to perish. If it is said to be unreal since it does not give rise to *arthakriyā* with reference to all knowers, in that case there would be the contingency of the non-existence of all things. All things do not bring about the desired ends of all men, and a man with a limited vision cannot know that a thing does not bring about *arthakriyā* in the case of all men. Thus *avyabhicāritva* cannot be defined and so it is not proper to regard *avyabhicāritva*, absence of discrepancy, as a criterion of the validity of knowledge (TPS, pp. 16-17).

Vyavasāyātmakatva (certainty or definiteness) is another accepted criterion of validity. But no knowledge can be excluded by this. It may be urged that doubtful cognition (*sandeha-jñāna*) arises when in the case of an object like a trunk or a pillar, owing to the contact of sense-organ and object there is the perception of merely the common, and not of the specific, features of the object, and this doubtful cognition is not regarded as valid because it is not definite. We ask : Is anything revealed in this doubtful cognition or not ? And if something is revealed, is it a substance or an attribute ? If a substance is said to be revealed is it real or not ? If it is real, cognition having that as its object must be regarded as valid. If it is unreal, then the condition of *avyabhicāritva* is sufficient to exclude its cognition and it is not necessary to regard definiteness as an additional condition. If an attribute is said to be revealed in doubtful cognition, is it 'pillarness' (class character of pillar) or 'manness' or both. If it be 'pillarness' or 'manness' that is revealed, is it real or unreal ? If it be real, its cognition could not be of the nature of doubt, because being the cognition of a real entity it is like the apprehension of real water. If it is unreal, then as said above, it is enough to say that valid knowledge is that knowledge which is *avyabhicārin* (non-discrepant); it is not necessary to say in addition that it is 'certain'. If both (pillarness and manness) are said to be revealed, are both real or both unreal or is one real and the other unreal ? If both be real, then their cognition should

be true only, and not of the nature of doubt; and if both be unreal, then their cognition should be of the nature of error and not doubt. If one be real and the other unreal, then one and the same knowledge should be both *avyabhicārin* (non-discrepant, true) and *vyabhicārin* (discrepant, false) inasmuch as it cognises a real and an unreal entity. This also explains the cognition of two moons; there the shape of substance is revealed and not that of attribute.

It may be urged that doubtful cognition is that which reveals the shape of a doubtful object. We ask : Does this doubtful object exist or not ? If it exists, its cognition cannot be of the nature of doubt, because like the apprehension of real water it would be of the form of an apprehension of an uncontradicted object. If it does not exist, then the criterion of *avyabhicāritva* is sufficient to exclude such cognitions and valid knowledge need not be further defined as 'certain'. If it be urged that nothing is revealed in doubtful cognition, then it could not be the result of contact of sense-organ and object, like the cognition of illusory water. Thus valid knowledge cannot be defined as certain or definite knowledge (TPS, pp. 19-20).

Similarly, valid knowledge cannot be defined as knowledge which is non-incoherent (i.e. coherent) (*avisamvādi jñānam—Pramāṇa Vārttika* 2.1). What is meant by non-incoherence (*avisamvāda*) ? Does it signify 'being the cognition of a thing as it is', or 'being free from contradiction', or 'being produced by the thing that is cognised', or 'being the stimulator in respect of the thing that is cognised', or 'being that which takes us to the thing' ? ²¹ If it signifies 'being the cognition of a thing as it is', this will not hold good in the case of inferential cognition (which as a matter of fact cognises only the generality of a thing, and not its particular features). Nor can 'being free from contradiction' apply to inferential cognition. If it is said to mean 'being produced by the thing that is cognised', this also cannot be proper in the case of inferential cognition, because the *sāmānya* (cognised by it) cannot

be regarded as producing (cognition) (as it is unreal) Similarly, the sensations of love, etc. could not be produced by the thing that is revealed, because they are devoid of the efficiency to produce themselves. And yogic perception also is not produced by the thing that is cognised, as past and future objects (cognised by it) could not possibly be producers, for otherwise they could not be past and future respectively. If non-incoherence be taken to mean 'being the stimulator in respect of the object that is known' this is found to be true of erroneous cognition also as it also stimulates activity in respect of its object. A man who has a wrong cognition of water is induced to act and yet his cognition is not non-incoherent. And it is quite possible that a person may for some reason not act even though he has knowledge of real water, but according to this definition this knowledge also should be incoherent—which is absurd.

If non-incoherence were to mean 'being that which takes us to the object', would this mean 'being that which takes us to just any object, or to the object that is revealed in knowledge, or to a thing e.g. water, of the same genus, or to the object that has produced it (coherent knowledge)?' Or does non-incoherence signify the unfailing or invariable existence of the causal factors that gave rise to it?²² If it means 'taking us to just anything', then the cognition of *keṣaṇḍuka* (woolly mass seen by pressing the eyes with the fingers) or of two moons also should have to be regarded as non-incoherent. If it be said to mean 'taking us to the object that is revealed', then inferential cognition could never be said to be non-incoherent, as it does not take us to the object that is revealed. What is revealed in inferential cognition is the shape of the *sāmānya* (universal) and it being unreal (in the Buddhist view) could never be reached. Similarly, yogic perception produced in respect of past or future objects cannot take us to the objects revealed (and so should be incoherent according to this definition). And even though there is the apprehension of love, etc. it does not take the apprehender

to love, etc. that are revealed. As a matter of fact, even in perceptual cognition, the object that is revealed is not reached or attained, for being momentary it perishes immediately. Non-incoherence cannot also mean 'being that which takes us to a thing, e.g. water, of the same genus (*jāti*) as the thing that is revealed in the cognition', because there is no such thing as the water-universal. Further, if non-incoherence signifies 'taking the knower to the thing that produced the cognition', that is not proper, because eyes, light, attention (active consciousness) which produce knowledge perish immediately and so cannot be reached. It may finally be urged that non-incoherence signifies the invariable existence of the causes that produced it (coherent knowledge) as in their absence there could be no non-incoherence. If this be so, even the cognition of *keśoṇḍuka* should be non-incoherent in view of the certain existence of its causes, because otherwise it would be accidental. This definition of *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) as non-incoherent or coherent (*avisamvādi*) knowledge not being established, the statement (of the Buddhists) that one who acts after cognising an object by means of these two sources of knowledge (viz. perception and inference) is never found to fail in respect of successful action—is childish and silly (TPS, pp. 28–29).²⁵

The Buddhists, the Mīmāṃsakas and others hold as a further condition or qualification of valid knowledge that it should be knowledge of a thing not cognised before (*anadhiḡatārthagatṛ*). Jayarāṣi's contention is that this is pointless in the case of the Buddhists who recognise unique particulars alone. No two cognitions of two different times—prior and posterior—have one and the same object, they cannot have one unique particular object or one and the same universal (*sāmānya*) as their common object. The unique particular which has one unitary (non-different) nature has not the potency to give rise to a number of cognitions one after another. (And *sāmānya* being non-existent cannot give rise to any cognition).²⁴

It may be urged that the qualification 'making known a thing not already known' is inserted in the definition of valid knowledge to exclude a number of cognitions produced simultaneously by one object. This is not proper, as in that case the cognitions a number of men have in respect of one (lit. produced by one) object would come to be invalid. It cannot also be meant to exclude a number of cognitions having one *sāmānya* (universal) as its object, because *sāmānya* itself being an unreality, there can be neither one cognition nor a number of cognitions in respect of it. Moreover, supposing there are two cognitions in respect of one object, is one lacking in validity or is it not-another-valid-cognition? If one of them is said to be invalid that is not proper, because inasmuch as they are alike of the form of the apprehension of one and the same object, both cognitions must be valid or both invalid as there is not the possibility of the alternative (that one is valid and the other invalid); if this last alternative be possible, then there would be the contingency of difference in the cognitions of a number of men pertaining to one object (—some men would have valid cognition and others invalid), especially when these cognitions are meant to sublate a previous cognition.²⁵ If it be said that it is not-another-valid-cognition, that also is not proper. Is numerical difference (*vyakti-nānātva*) of the many pieces of knowledge (perceptual and the like) produced by one object not possible, or is their qualitative difference (*ākāra-nanātva*) not possible? If it be said that their numerical difference is not possible that is not true, because numerical difference is found in the case of the many cognitions of blue produced by one blue. It is also not true to say that qualitative difference is not possible since cognitions of blue are found to be qualitatively different. And there is not a plethora of blues producing it, because the Buddhists themselves do not accept them as 'uni-natured' (—according to them, many things cannot have one nature). It may be urged that cognitions having one object cannot be termed perception (*pratyakṣa*) or inference (*anumāna*). But

this is not true, since a different nomenclature is quite possible on account of their being effects of different causes. For instance, the many cognitions that many—Devadatta and the like—have as produced by one blue object have a different nomenclature such as Devadatta's knowledge and the like (Yajñadatta's knowledge, etc.) because of their being the effects of different causes due to their being acquired by different agents. So here also (TPS, pp. 27-28).

The Mīmāṃsakas also cannot reasonably define valid knowledge as knowledge of a thing not known before. There is no criterion to determine that of cognitions of one object produced by different causal factors, the cognition produced first is valid and the succeeding ones are non-valid, even when they are all alike 'cognition of the object as it is'. And if it be still so accepted then in the same way, the first cognition should be non-valid as it has this in common with the others that it cognises an object that is cognised (by other cognitions). As the character of being the cognition of one blue object does not differ in the case of the many cognitions of the blue object produced simultaneously and manifesting one unique particular (*svalakṣaṇāvabhāsi*), so the cognitions produced earlier and later also cannot but be cognitions of a thing that is cognised.⁹⁶

It may be urged that the earlier and the later cognitions have their own specific objects inasmuch as the cognition produced first is accepted as receiving the shape of an object that is not cognised, whereas the succeeding one arises as having for its object the shape of a thing that is cognised. But this is self-contradictory. If the latter has for its object a thing that is cognised, how could it be said to have its own specific object, and if it has a specific object, how could it be the cognition of a thing that is cognised? Having its own specific object and being the cognition of a cognised object are opposed to each other. And if they have specific objects, both would be valid as both would cognise an uncognised thing. On the other hand if they have one object, both would be valid

or both non-valid as they have this in common that they cognise what is cognised. The Mīmāṃsakas thus cannot escape the 'gaḍupraveśā'ksitārakavinirgama-nyāya', casting off the whole eye when a mote has fallen in it instead of removing it. They would have to regard all knowledge as non-valid if they define valid knowledge as knowledge of a thing that is not cognised.

It may be urged that if a cognition is regarded as valid even when it has a cognised thing as its object, memory (*smṛti*) also would be a *pramāṇa* or the result of a *pramāṇa*. This contingency cannot be avoided. Does the memory arising here have for its object the shape of the thing made known by the initial apprehension, or has it another object or is it objectless? If it has for its object the shape of a thing made known by an apprehension previously arisen, then it cannot but be the fruit of a *pramāṇa* on account of its being, as said before, alike the cognition of a cognised thing. And the Mīmāṃsakas would then have to accept a seventh *pramāṇa* called Memory (*smṛti*). (It may be noted that violation of a specific postulation of number is regarded as a looseness in dialectical criticism as it shows that the system is not well defined). If it is said to have as its object a thing not cognised by a previous cognition, it cannot but be the result of *pramāṇa*. And like the initial cognition it could not be of the nature of memory, since memory has for its object a thing seen or heard of before, and not a thing not cognised. If it is regarded as objectless then memory should not be regarded as not-valid on account of its cognising a cognised thing, but on account of its being objectless, as the cognition of *keśonḍuka* is non-valid due to its being objectless. Moreover, if it be objectless, how could it be said to cognise a cognised thing? On the other hand if it is regarded as cognising a cognised thing, it cannot be said to be objectless. And memory is certainly not objectless. Such memories as 'I served my parents', 'I had five servants' comprehend the shape of the object made known by previous experience, as memory-cognition reveals the shape of an object

made known by previous experience. It may be argued that the thing which was cognised by the previous cognition has ceased to exist at the time of memory-cognition, so that cannot be its object. But in that case, memory would be not-valid on account of its being objectless and not, as said before, on account of cognising what is cognised.

And if a *pramāṇa* which has for its object a cognised thing be thus rendered *apramāṇa*, then inferential cognition also would come to be not-valid. To wit, does a person know by inference that very fire-universal which was known as invariably present where the *liṅga* (probans) existed at the time of cognising the relation of invariable concomitance by perception, or does he know the nature (*svarūpa*) of fire, or the relation of possession (i.e. possession by the substratum of smoke of fire,—‘Mountain has fire’) or the presence of fire simultaneous with the operation of the *liṅga*, or the subordination to the *liṅga* of fire-universal, or the dependence of fire-universal on fire-particular? If inference is regarded as having for its object the universal previously cognised then it can never attain validity (—the status of a *pramāṇa*), as like memory it cognises a cognised thing. And if it be not-valid, it would not be possible to determine the possession of fire, and in the event of this impossibility, the fire-individual could not be proved by *arthāpatti* (presumption or implication) (viz. there must be fire-individual, because fire-universal could not remain without fire-individual). And this would mean the end of all popular expressions like ‘There is fire there’, ‘Bring fire’. And if in order to avoid this, inference be accepted as valid in respect of a cognised thing, then the qualification ‘cognising a non-cognised thing’ would become meaningless for the Mīmāṃsakas (i.e. in the definition of *pramāṇa* as given by the Mīmāṃsakas). If you infer the *svarūpa* of fire, we ask: Was it formerly known as invariably existing where smoke is present, or was it not so known? If it was formerly known as such, inference comes to have a cognised thing as its object. If it was not so known, then

it comes to this that fire not invariably accompanying smoke is known from inference and if this be accepted then this inference could have as its object grass, water, etc. (which also are not invariably found with smoke). This is true of the cognition of possession (of fire) by inference, in which case also it can be asked whether this possession was formerly known or not, and the matter can be pursued as above

If the existence of the fire-universal simultaneous with the operation of the *liṅga* be said to be inferred, is this existence simultaneous with the operation of the *liṅga* different from fire-universal or is it non-different? If it be non-different then inference would have as its object only the existence formerly cognised and the epithet 'cognising a thing not cognised' would become meaningless. If it be different, was it formerly cognised or not? If it was formerly cognised, inference with that as its object could not be said to be 'cognising a thing not cognised'. And if it be not cognised, how could it, comparable (in this respect) to water, etc. be inferred from smoke? If the fact of the subordination to the *liṅga* of the fire-universal be said to be known from inference, is this subordination to the *liṅga* different from fire-universal or is it non-different? If it be non-different, how could inference having as its object just the very fire-universal that was cognised, be said to be valid? If it be different, was it known at the time of the cognition of the relation of universal concomitance as pervading the *liṅga* (probans) or was it not so known? If it was known, how could inference have as its object a thing not cognised? And if it was not known as pervading the *liṅga*, when you suppose inference to have that as its object, why do you not suppose that smoke leads to the knowledge of the three worlds, when in either case there is the absence of relation? Similarly, if the dependence of fire-universal on fire-individual be inferred from smoke, was this dependence of the fire-universal known as pervading the smoke or was it not so known? If it was known, again inference could not but be cognising a thing

already cognised. And if the dependence of the fire-universal (on fire-individual) be not known as pervading the smoke, how could it, as stated above, be inferred at all? (TPS, pp. 22-25).

Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa thus refutes in his *Tattvopaplavasīmha* all the characteristics that are believed to be found in valid knowledge according to the different systems of thought,—*avyabhicāritva* (non-discrepancy), *abādhitatva* (uncontradictedness), *avisāmvāditva* (non-incoherence), and *anadhigatārthagantṛtva* (cognising a thing not already known). He has shown that the concept of valid knowledge cannot be maintained. He similarly refutes the definitions of the different kinds of valid knowledge—perceptual, inferential, verbal testimony, analogical (*upamāna*), presumption or implication (*arthāpatti*) and negation (*anupalabधि*)—and comes to the conclusion that one can never be certain about the validity of any knowledge and so cannot know anything of reality. Critical investigation or dialectical examination leads to the upsetting of all principles (*tattvopaplava*) and so it is not possible to be sure of anything.

Śrīharṣa seems to be aware of the dialectical dilemmas of Jayarāṣi. At least his commentator Śaṅkarasvāmin has clearly referred to a work of the *Tattvopaplavavādin*.²⁷ In fact we do find quite a number of modes of thought similar to Jayarāṣi's, so here we shall take note of a few of those points which have not been given by Jayarāṣi and then briefly mention the distinction between these different philosophical positions. Śrīharṣa also starts his dialectical inquiry by stating the principle that definite knowledge and consequently the reality of all categories depend upon definitions and all definitions are improper and absurd inasmuch as they have the fault of self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*), or mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*), or argument in a circle (*cakraka*) or vicious infinite series (*anavasthā*) (*Lakṣaṇādhiṇā tāval lakṣyavyavasthitir lakṣaṇāni cānupapannāni, jñātādhikaraṇādilakṣaṇa-nirūpaṇadvāreṇa cakrakādyāpatteḥ*.—KhKh, pp. 141-142).

At the outset we may take up the definitions of valid knowledge that were examined by Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa and have been noted above. *Pramā* is defined as apprehension which is non-deviating or non-discrepant (*avyabhicāryanubhavaḥ pramā* -KhKh, p 248). But this is not true. What does 'non-discrepant' signify ? If it signifies invariable concomitance of knowledge with the object, does it mean that the knowledge exists only at the time when the object exists, or that the cognition co-exists in space with its object, or that valid cognition is similar to its object in all respects ?²⁸ 'Non-discrepant' cannot mean that the cognition exists only at the time when the object exists, for then the definition would be too narrow and would not apply to inferential cognition which often pertains to past and future things and which would consequently become invalid. It cannot also mean that knowledge co-exists in space with its object, because knowledge (—according to the Naiyāyika whose tenets and categories are repudiated here—) is inherent in the soul, whereas objects like jar, etc. do not reside in the soul. Hence the cognition of external objects would have to be regarded as not-valid; that is to say, the definition would be too narrow. Moreover, the erroneous cognition of soul in respect of the body would cease to be invalid according to this definition, since knowledge and object would be co-existent in space. 'Non-discrepant' cannot also mean that valid knowledge is similar to its object in all respects; in the view of those who regard knowledge and object as different entities, it is not possible that there should be similarity in all respects between knowledge and its object. On the other hand in the view of those who regard knowledge or consciousness and its object as non-different, the definition would apply to erroneous cognition also and the qualification 'non-discrepant' would become meaningless as it is not competent to distinguish right knowledge from an erroneous one (KhKh, 248-249).^x

^x It can be seen that Śrīharṣa's arguments are not very intelligent here. No one expects knowledge to be co-existent in time or space with its object or to be like it in all respects. But the *vaitandikas* repudiating everything have to resort to such reasoning so as to leave no alternative unrefuted.

It is not also proper to define valid knowledge as apprehension which is not contradicted (*abādhitānubhūtiḥ pramā*-KhKh, p. 254).[×] If the absence of contradiction refers only to the time of cognition, then even the erroneous cognition of silver in respect of nacre would be valid since it is not contradicted at least at the time when the illusion arises. If it is urged that a valid cognition is that cognition which is not contradicted at any time, then we are not in a position to assert the validity of any cognition, since it is not possible to say that any particular cognition will never be contradicted—cognitions of the waking state are contradicted in the dream state. Again, if by absence of contradiction is meant absence of contradiction in the case of the knower himself, then it is likely that a person who has had erroneous cognition would never come across contradiction of a former cognition and would never have an occasion to ascertain that the said cognition was wrong or not-valid. If absence of contradiction in the case of all persons in the world is meant, then this is something which can never be determined (KhKh, p. 254).

Another definition of valid knowledge is 'apprehension which corresponds to its object' (*yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā*-KhKh, p. 236). This also is not true. Correspondence (*yāthārthya*) can mean having the real nature of a thing as its object, or being similar to the object (*tattvaviśayatvaṁ vā arthasādṛśatā vā syāt*-KhKh, p. 236). But the real nature of a thing is indeterminable. * If we accept the second interpretation, then even erroneous cognition, e.g. 'This is silver' is similar to the object in point of cognisability and the definition would thus apply to it. It may be urged that in respect of the aspect of knowability or cognisability, the cognition is certainly valid, but it is not valid in respect of the 'silver' aspect. But this stand is not justified. In the cognition 'Jar possesses colour by the relation of inherence' though it is not accepted that the cognition is similar to the object in respect of the revealed character—viz.

[×] Here the dialectical arguments of Śrīharṣa and Jayarāṣi are similar.

*-This is shown while refuting '*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*'—KhKh, p. 143ff.

being the possessor of colour by inherence—, still cognition is regarded as valid, whereas the definition would not apply to it (*Vidyāsāgarī* gives another illustration—There may be cognition of two white jars but the cognition is neither two, nor white, and yet the cognition is regarded as valid in respect of these two jars—p 398). It may be urged that correspondence (*yāthārthya*) consists in this that colour, etc. belong to the object as qualities or attributes residing in it by inherence, whereas they belong to knowledge as attributes which it reveals. But this is not true, as in that case the definition would apply to a cognition like 'The silver before me' (*purovartī rajatam*) inasmuch as 'before me' which is an attribute of nacre (by inherence or by *svarūpa-sambandha*) is present in knowledge also in so far as it is its object, and knowledge grasping the nacre lying before as 'the silver before me' should be regarded as valid.²⁹ If this be regarded as valid cognition then it is meaningless to define valid cognition as apprehension which has correspondence with the object; it might as well be defined as only 'apprehension' (*anubhūtiḥ pramā*). Every cognition has some object to which it refers and so far as that only is concerned every cognition would be valid. According to the Naiyāyika, even error is ultimately valid in as far as reference to an object is concerned, so all apprehension is valid. If however full correspondence of cognition and object be urged then partial correspondence like the above could hardly be considered satisfactory. If full or entire correspondence is regarded as indispensable then the validity of the partial correspondence has to be ignored whereas the Naiyāyika admits all cognitions as valid so far as reference to an object is concerned. And if ignoring the non-deviating or non-discrepant (*avyabhicāri*) aspect or part, the Naiyāyika dares to classify such a cognition as erroneous, why does he not ignore the deviating or discrepant (*vyabhicāri*) part and keeping in view the non-discrepant one classify it as a valid cognition? And in that case valid cognition could be defined as 'apprehension', 'knowledge' or the like. If cognitions, one of whose aspects

is contradicted, be regarded as invalid even in respect of the uncontradicted aspect, then the ordinary perceptions cognising things at a distance as smaller than they really are and yet popularly accepted as valid should be regarded as invalid. Further, cognition reveals water as connected with space, time, light and the like, but does cognition ever have the efficiency to take us to water connected with this entire aggregate of associates ? How then could this cognition be regarded as valid ? One would thus not have faith in any cognition. And if you regard knowledge contradicted in one aspect (e.g. silverness) as invalid even in respect of the uncontradicted aspect ('before me'), then someone might very well argue that if knowledge of silver is contradicted in respect of nacre-silver, it should be regarded as contradicted (and so invalid) even in respect of the real silver, because they are both silver and you would have no answer to give except that the instance of valid cognition popularly accepted as such would have to be given up.

It may be urged that if the qualifier of knowledge in the form of its object is also a qualifier of the thing, then on account of this similarity or correspondence with the object the knowledge should be regarded as valid; and this validity should be verified in respect of all specific objects or qualifiers; for instance, 'silverness' an object of knowledge is not present in nacre as its qualifier so the cognition, 'This is silver' is invalid in that aspect, even though it may be valid in respect of the 'this' aspect. The term '*yathārtha*' has been inserted in the definition to refer to this point to point correspondence. The answer to this is that according to this interpretation, the thing which is the object of the cognition is not a qualifier of the object (that is to say, it is not its own qualifier) and so the cognition would become invalid in respect of the thing itself. It can be argued that a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) is that which distinguishes, and the thing also distinguishes the qualifier residing in it and so is a qualifier (—as 'cowness' is a qualifier of cow, so the individual cow

is a qualifier of 'cowness') (Further, if the thing be not regarded as a qualifier, the cognition in its part cognising the qualities of a thing would become *nirvikalpa* or indeterminate as there would not be the relation of qualifier-qualified in it). The answer to this is that the thing is not in any way the qualifier and so the cognition of the thing (-qualified entity) would be invalid according to this definition. Again, in this way, even 'silverness', etc. qualify nacre—'Here is the nacre which appeared as silver'—, so the knowledge 'This is silver' should be regarded as valid in respect of the silver aspect also and therefore as wholly valid. It may be urged here that what is meant is that the object of knowledge should be a direct qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the thing, whereas here 'silverness' is a qualifier of nacre via knowledge and thus the definition is not too wide. But this is not true, because then in the case of the cognition 'man with a long staff', wherein the qualified 'man' is apprehended as distinguished from 'man with a small staff', the apprehension should not be valid, because length etc. are qualifiers of man via staff and not directly. The definition cannot be modified to state that 'when the object of knowledge is the qualifier of the thing without depending on the medium of knowledge, the knowledge is valid', because in that case the cognition 'The jar has been cognised direct' (*saksātkṛtaḥ ghataḥ*), wherein directness is an attribute of jar via cognition would not be valid. It might be urged that what is meant is that it should be a qualifier of the thing exactly as revealed in knowledge and then there would be no difficulty; the object 'silverness' of the cognition 'This is silver' is not a qualifier of nacre by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) as revealed in knowledge and so the cognition is invalid. But then the definition will not apply to the cognition 'jar having colour' as colour is not a qualifier of cognition by the relation of inherence. It can be argued that this rule of its being a qualifier of the thing exactly as revealed in knowledge (i.e. by inherence and the like) is with reference to the qualifier of the thing and not with reference to the cognition

whose qualifier it can be only in virtue of its being the object of cognition (*arthaviśeṣaṇatve'yaṁ niyamaḥ yat tajjñānaprakāśītena rūpeṇeti, na tu jñāne'pi*—KhKh, p. 242). The definition would then be : "That cognition whose qualifier (in virtue of the latter's being an object of cognition) is a qualifier of a thing exactly as revealed in cognition, is valid in respect of the thing." * But this definition would become too narrow and would be restricted to only a particular cognition on account of the use of 'yat-tat' (that-which). × And if 'that' be taken to refer to all cognitions, then since in the cognition 'I know nacre as silver', silverness is a qualifier, the cognition 'This is silver' also would be valid, and the expression 'that-which' would become superfluous as it was introduced only to preclude the cognition 'this is silver' from the scope of the definition of valid knowledge,—which purpose is nevertheless not served (KhKh, pp. 236-242).

Like Jayarāśi Śrīharṣa refutes Dharmakīrti's definition of valid knowledge as non-incoherent apprehension' (*avisamvādy anubhavaḥ pramā*—KhKh, p. 249). Does non incoherence (*avisamvāditva*) signify that the object of this cognition is cognised in the same manner (i.e. with the same details) by another cognition, or that its object is not cognised in a reverse way (i.e. differently) by another cognition, or that a thing pervaded by, and so concomitant with, the object of the cognition in question is known, or does it signify anything else (—leading to successful action and the like)? ³⁰ It cannot signify the first, otherwise, an illusory cognition repeated successively through a number of moments would have to be admitted as valid because the previous cognition is certified as true by the cognition of the succeeding moments. That is to say, coherence of knowledge is no test of the validity of

* Some Naiyāyikas do not admit definitions expressed in terms of 'that-which' as they believe that such definitions refer to particular cases only and are thus devoid of the very requisite of a definition that it should apply to all things of the same class or to all similar cases.

× (*Yajjñānollikhita-prakāreṇa yadarthe yadviśeṣaṇaṁ taj jñānaṁ tatrārthe pramā*—Śaṅkara Miśra's Commentary, pp. 242-243).

knowledge. If it is urged that the other cognition must be a valid one, we have only to say that we have yet to define valid cognition. The second interpretation also is not proper, because according to it erroneous cognition would have to be regarded as valid if it is not contradicted. Moreover, the perception of the conch-shell as white may be contradicted by the later perception by the jaundiced eye as yellow, and according to this definition, the former cognition would have to be regarded as invalid. It cannot be insisted that the other cognition must be a valid one, because we have yet to define valid cognition and there would be the faults of *ātmāśraya* (self-dependence, because *pramā* is determined by *pramā*) and *anyonyāśraya* (mutual dependence—because '*avisamvāditā*' is employed to determine '*pramā*' and '*pramā*' to determine '*avisamvāditā*').

It may be urged that what is meant by 'non-incoherence' is that the cognition is not contradicted by a later cognition produced by faultless instruments (or non-defective sense-organs) and then there would be no such difficulty. But instead of going in for this circuitous method, why could not one define *pramā* or valid cognition itself as apprehension produced by faultless instruments (or non-defective sense-organs)? Moreover, unless the concept of faultiness or defectiveness is explained it would not be possible to explain the concept of 'non-defectiveness'. Why, it may be said, there is nothing difficult in this; defectiveness or faultiness is a particularity (or specific feature) of the cause of knowledge and gives rise to wrong cognition (*viparita-jñāna*). But when one is not aware of anything which could be excluded by the term 'wrong' it is useless to incorporate it in this explanation; that is to say, unless true cognition is properly defined, there is no sense in speaking of wrong cognition. And if it is not inserted in the explanation then faultiness would be equivalent to being the cause of all knowledge whatsoever, and this would mean that there is no knowledge which is produced by non-defective causes (or normal senses). The nature of *pramā* as distinct

from that of other cognitions has not yet been ascertained, so how could we think of distinguishing it ? Again without being aware of *pramā* as distinct from others it is not possible to know *pramā* as distinct from others, thus *ātmāśraya* (self-dependence) is involved. Further, *pramā* (valid cognition) will be known when distinguished from *apramā* (cognition that is not valid), and *apramā* when distinguished from *pramā*, so there will be *anyonyāśraya*. Or, cognition produced by faultless causes will be explained as cognition distinct from *apramā* and *pramā* will be explained as cognition produced by faultless causes, and this *pramā* will be utilised to explain *apramā* and this will involve *cakraka* (argument in a circle). And, if *pramā* precluded by the term 'wrong' (*viparīta*) is differently interpreted, it may be possible to avoid these faults, but there will be dependence on a second *pramā* and still on a third and so no infinitely—the fault of *anavasthā* (vicious infinite series).

The third interpretation—'that knowledge is non-incoherent the thing pervaded by whose object is cognised'—is also not proper. Does '*vyāpya*' (pervaded) refer to all pervaded things or any specific *vyāpya* ? If it is said to refer to all *vyāpyas*, then the dream-cognition of fire associated with smoke or this cognition produced by a sentence uttered by an unreliable person (*anāpta*) could not be regarded as invalid. If it be said to refer to a specific *vyāpya*, viz. *arthakriyā* (efficiency or provocation to action) or *sāmagrī* (apparatus) even then the above mentioned fault would be there—the definition of *pramā* would apply to dream-cognition and cognition produced by the statement of an unreliable person, both of which are associated with *arthakriyā* and *sāmagrī*. Moreover, several cognitions do not arise simultaneously, that is to say, the knowledge of *arthakriyā* or *sāmagrī* will not be simultaneous with the cognition of an object, so the *vyāpya* will not be known simultaneously with knowledge of the *vyāpaka* (viz. object) but after it. Therefore there will be awareness of the validity of the previous cognition on the strength of the awareness of the *arthakriyā*

or *sāmagrī* arising in the second moment, and the validity of this again will be determined by another cognition of the *arthakriyā* or *sāmagrī* arising in the third moment; and so on. Thus a man's entire life would be exhausted in knowing just one thing. And if this series is stopped somewhere, the last cognition will have to be regarded as *apramā*, so the preceding one will be *apramā* and so on backwards till the first with the result that all cognitions of the series will have to be regarded as invalid. If what is meant by *arthakriyā* is real efficiency which is not present in dreams, etc. then reality cannot be explained independently of valid cognition and valid cognition has not yet been explained, so it is no use talking of real efficiency, otherwise the definition of *pramā* will apply even to what is regarded as *apramā*.

There can be a fourth interpretation of *avisamvāda* (non-incoherence) viz, 'having for its object that which is efficient'. Dharmakīrti has said, 'Valid cognition is cognition which is non-incoherent, and non-incoherence means efficiency or successful action' *pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiś cā'visamvādah.*—KhKh, p. 253). * If this is intended to be general then efficiency is possible in the case of illusion also; even the wrong cognition or illusion of snake can cause fear and even death. It may be urged that the efficiency must be exercised by the object in the same form in which it is apprehended, whereas silverness wrongly cognised does not exercise such efficiency. But this is not true, as it is well-nigh impossible to ascertain this. It is difficult to say whether the efficiency to give rise to a ring though perceived in silver is due to silver or to some other character, so even the cognition 'This is silver' in respect of silver will have to be regarded as *apramā*. *Arthakriyā* (efficiency) cannot be determined by its perception, because as there can be cognition of silver even without there being silver, so there may be cognition of *arthakriyā* even in its absence. And we have not yet ascertained what valid cogni-

* *Pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ, avisamvādanam.....*

—*Pramāṇa Vārttika*, 1.3,

tion is; we are still trying to define it, so it cannot be said that the cognition of *arthakriyā* must be a valid one. It may be urged that validity may be determined on the strength of the non-frustration of our intention or desire as limited or determined by the shape revealed in knowledge. But such non-frustration of desires is found to be possible even in the case of dream-cognitions and the like. If it is argued that what is meant is non-incoherence even at other times (i.e. at times other than the time of cognition), this can never be determined, for we cannot say that a cognition will always be found to be non-incoherent. On the contrary, it is just likely that all cognitions of the waking state would be found to be incoherent (*visamvādin*) in a dream, and then there would be nothing which the definition could define (—the fault of *asambhava*). This disposes of the view that *avisāmṃvāda* (non-incoherence) means 'capability of attainment' (*prāpti-yogyatā*). If capability of attainment (*prāpti-yogyatā*) at the time of cognition is meant that is found even in the case of wrong cognition. If capability of attainment at all times is meant, that cannot be determined even in the case of what is regarded as *pramā*.³¹

Some again define valid knowledge as the direct apprehension of the real nature of things (*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā* —KhKh, p. 143). But this definition is not proper, since it is not possible to define what *tattva*, 'the real nature or thatness of things' means. '*Tattva*' cannot mean 'the state of being of a thing that is relevant', as there is nothing that is relevant to, or referred to in, the context. [This is the first definition of the *Lakṣaṇamālā* of Śivāditya, so nothing is mentioned before to which '*tat*' (that) could refer.] It may be argued that direct apprehension always has an object, and it is this that is referred to by '*tat*' —the object present in the mind of the speaker and the hearer— and *tattva* means the thatness or the state of being that. But this is not proper; even the erroneous cognition, 'This is silver' in respect of nacre has an object—that—and so the definition can apply to such an erroneous cognition also, and it is too

wide. Similarly 'that' cannot refer to the '*bhavitṛ*', the substrate of being, jarness, etc. (i.e. to the basic thing itself), so its knowledge and the knowledge of it as qualified by jarness etc. could not be valid; that is to say, knowledge of jarness would be *pramā* but not knowledge of jar according to this definition. It may be urged that '*tattva*' denotes the nature (*svarūpa*) of a thing, so it is not just to find faults keeping in view the meaning by parts; thus the attribute, the substance and their relation would all be comprehended by 'nature', and there would be no likelihood of the definition being narrow. This too is not true. *Svarūpa* (nature) is the substrate of *svarūpatva* ('natureness'). Does *svarūpatva*, whether a *jāti* or an *upādhi*^{3a} reside in itself or not? If it does, then this involves the fault of *ātmiśraya* (self-dependence). And if it does not, then being devoid of '*svarūpatva*' it will not be '*svarūpa*', for that alone is called '*svarūpa*' which is possessed of '*svarūpatva*'. Again *svarūpa* is peculiar to each thing and so the definition will be too narrow in scope. Moreover, '*tattva*' cannot preclude erroneous cognition. The cognition of silver in nacre is also cognition of *svarūpa*. The substrate—nacre—and silverness are both '*svarūpa*' and it is but proper that the relation appearing between them (—*samavāya* or inherence) is also *svarūpa*. It may be urged that it is right that *samavāya* is *svarūpa*, but it does not belong to silverness in respect of nacre because silverness is not inherent in nacre. But this is not proper. It may not be there, yet this does not prevent *samavāya* from being *svarūpa*. Devadatta may not be in the house, but this does not mean that he is not '*svarūpa*'. It may be argued that *svarūpa* alone is not *tattva*, but *svarūpa* as associated with time and space in which it is apprehended is *tattva*. This involves a difficulty. How could time and space be apprehended without being related to time and space? Time and space are not related to time-space, so time-space could not be comprehended by '*tattva*' and so the definition of *pramā* will not apply to the valid cognition in the aspect of relation to time-space, which will consequently become invalid in respect of this

aspect. It may be said that in these particular cases their *svarūpa* alone is *tattva*, but this will not help. *Tattva* has many meanings—time—nature (*kāla-svarūpa*), space—nature (*deśa-svarūpa*) and nature as connected with space and time (*deśakāla-sambaddha-svarūpa*). If any one of these is meant, the definition will be too narrow; if the aggregate is regarded as intended, the definition will not apply to each, and if each is intended, the definition will not comprehend the case of the aggregate.

It may be urged that that is *tattva* which is found to be exactly as it is apprehended in cognition; that is to say, if a thing is found to possess such attributes as it was known to have in cognition, then it is *tattva*, reality. But this is not true. For in that case if an object be found to have the same form or character as was perceived in cognition at some other time different from the time of cognition even then it would be *tattva*. And so if a pitcher which is to become red in the future as a result of baking, be cognised even when it is black as red by a man suffering from *rakta-pitta* (red bile) that cognition of his would have to be regarded as valid. It may be argued that if the statement is modified to say that that is *tattva* which is found at the same moment when it is cognised to be exactly as it is apprehended in cognition, then there would be no such difficulty. But this does not solve the difficulty. Time is not related to time, so the part of the cognition which pertains to time and its relation to pitcher could not be regarded as valid according to this definition. It may again be urged that Time by itself is one, still it appears to be many on account of its being limited by different adjuncts (*upādhi*), so Time as limited by one adjunct (e.g. *sūryakriyā*) can be related to Time as limited by a different adjunct (e.g. *candrakriyā*); as for example, Time as limited by fortnight or day. But arguing in this way, Devadatta as possessed of staff should be able to stand on himself as possessed of ear-rings—which is an absurdity. Even a skilful acrobat cannot stand on his own shoulders. Devadatta is one, though the adjuncts may differ, so also Time; and hence though

limited by different adjuncts it could not be related to itself. This also dismisses the definition that 'Tattva is cause (-cause in respect of successful action or cause of knowledge of itself)'. Cause is that which is present in the immediately preceding moment. A thing cannot reside in itself, so time will not have the characteristic of being present in the immediately preceding moment, and so cognition of time could not be regarded as valid. Moreover, *pārimāṇḍalya* (smallest size), *mahat* (big size), final destruction, etc. are not causes of anything according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, so their cognition could not be regarded as valid. Further, that is said to be a cause which is possessed of 'causeness' (*kāraṇatva*), and if *kāraṇatva* be said to reside in *kāraṇatva*, there would be *ātmāśraya*. If another *kāraṇatva* be recognised, then what would reside in this second *kāraṇatva*? If the first *kāraṇatva* be regarded as existing in it there would be mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*), and if a third be recognised a third and a fourth and so on *ad infinitum* would have to be recognised. And if we stop somewhere and believe that further *kāraṇatva* does not reside in a particular *kāraṇatva*, that would not be a cause and apprehension of that *kāraṇatva* could not be regarded as valid according to this definition. It may be urged that all things are momentarily changing, so a thing of one moment is the cause of the thing of the next moment, and thus all things are causes and knowledge of all things could be regarded as valid. But this is equivalent to accepting the Buddhist view in which Reality is defined as causally efficient (*arthakriyākāri sat*) and the Naiyāyika would be giving up his own position—which is the *nigrahasthāna* called *apasiddhānta*.³³ Thus there would be four faults—*ātmāśraya*, *anyonyāśraya*, *anavasthā* (vicious infinite series) and *apasiddhānta* (KhKh, pp. 143–148).

Śrīharṣa similarly repudiates the concept of *anubhūti* (apprehension) by posing four alternative interpretations of it and refuting them—Is *anubhūtitva* a sub-division or species of the genus *jñānatva* (knowledgeness) or is it knowledge distinct from memory or knowledge devoid of the characteristics of

memory or knowledge whose special cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) is produced in the moment preceding it ?³⁴ The definition '*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*' stands refuted even if we take the two words together, because any apprehension even though accidentally correct could be regarded as valid according to this definition. If one guesses rightly the number of things that are concealed in the fist (i.e. not perceived), this can be regarded as valid cognition according to this definition, because the object as qualified by number is *tattva*, and the cognition is *anubhūti* as it pertains to a thing not known before.

It may be urged, "This is a case of doubt inasmuch as the cogniser or guesser has no ascertaining factor at his disposal. As for his speaking as if he is certain about one alternative, it is like a peasant undertaking an agricultural operation, behaving as if he is certain that the accessory factors being present there will be a rich harvest, though he has a doubt, 'Will there be a rich harvest or not ?' " But this is not true; the analogy is faulty, as in the case of the peasant there is deliberate or volitional certain knowledge about one alternative (*āhārarupaika-koṭi-niścayāsthārāt*), viz. 'There will be harvest; there being rain and the like accessory factors in their full aggregate the result is sure to follow' (*sahakāri-sampattau kṛṣer avaśyaṃ phalam iti jñānam āhārah—Śāṅkarī*, p. 230), and not doubt wherein there is uncertainty on either side. If doubt also is belived to work like this knowledge with certainty on one side then doubt will have to be treated as an aggregate of certain knowledge of both alternatives. Or if the peasant's volitional knowledge of one alternative is treated as a case of certain knowledge of one alternative, all cases of doubt will have to be treated as cases of certain knowledge of both alternatives (—which is absurd). Nor can the correct guess about concealed things be regarded as valid cognition, because it cannot be included under any of the heads of perception, etc.

It may be urged that the definition can be modified to say, "The apprehension of the real nature of things if it is produced by non-discrepant special causes is *pramā* " (—*avyabhicāri-*

karaṇajanyatve satīti viśesaṇīyam.—KhKh, p. 231). But in that case, the term '*tattva*' becomes superfluous. Moreover, you cannot accept that cognition accidentally coherent is produced by wrong or discrepant (*vyabhicāri*) special causes, because then it will have to be accepted that even wrong special causes can lead to right cognition. It cannot be said that there is no cause whatsoever for the correctness or truth of cognition (including the correct guess), because then there will be no ascertaining factor and error can be right cognition or right cognition erroneous. If the guess pertaining to hidden things be right, the special factors giving rise to it must be non-discrepant or the right ones. And the responsibility of showing what the special cause of the truth or correctness of a cognition is devolves on the opponent, so that knowledge could be classified under perception, and the like or it could be precluded on the strength of this definition.³⁵

Similarly at times there is correct inferential cognition produced by a fallacious mark of inference (*liṅga*) and the like. For instance, we have on the strength of the erroneous cognition of a cloud of dust as smoke, the inferential cognition of fire with regard to a place which has by chance both the mark or probans (smoke) and the probandum (fire), or only the probandum (fire). Though this cognition is not valid in respect of the fallacious probans or in respect of the probandum as qualified by the fallacious probans, still people would regard the cognition having as its object the probandum qualified by the probans as valid in respect of the probandum as qualified by another probans or in respect of the probandum (i.e. fire). So the definition is too wide.

It may be urged that the object (viz. fire) of the cognition produced by fallacious causes is different from the real fire, so this cognition pertains to '*atattva*', and thus the definition is not too wide. This is not convincing. Though it may have a different object from the point of view of the particular fire still it has '*tattva*' as its object from the point of view of *jāti* or generality and so the definition is certainly too wide.

It may be further argued that if the particular (viz. fire) as it is revealed in this inferential cognition is different from the real fire, then the generality also must be different from the real fireness, otherwise the generality will drag along with it the real particular which resides as related to one of its aspects or portions. This is not true. Though a thing may not be known in its particularity, yet it may be known in respect of its generality. For instance we may not know that a garland has been made by Devadatta or by Yajñadatta, yet we know for certain that it was made by a human being. If there were not knowledge of generality and if the probans and probandum were known only in their particular aspects there would not be the knowledge of their concomitance. Moreover, a person mistakes a rag tied round the neck of a bull for a dewlap and infers therefrom from a distance ' bullness ' (*gotva*), that it is a bull, (—which cognition is coherent), or the generality being one, it cannot be said that a different ' bullness ' is cognised. To wit, it cannot be said that a different ' bullness ' (*gotva jāti*) and a different inherence (*samavāya*) from the real ones are inferred here, because ' bullness ' and inherence are one, and if they be believed to be different, they would no longer be *jāti* and *samavāya*, they would be non-existent, and so giving up the *anyathākhyāti* theory or error (according to which it is the existent that is perceived, the Naiyāyika would be turning to the *asatkhyāti* of the Buddhists (according to which the non-existent is perceived in erroneous cognition)—which is *apasiddhānta* for the Naiyāyika.

It may be argued that in such an inference, the attributes colour, etc. are regarded as identical with the *jāti gotva*, and so this *gotva* is different from the real *gotva*. But even here the inference will be invalid in respect of only the identification, but in respect of the thing 'bull' and the generality 'bullness' it is valid. Moreover since here there is an occasion for *samsargāropa* (mistaken association) there can be no *tādātmyāropa* (superimposition of identity or mistaken identification). This *tādātmyāropa* might, though

rarely, be possible in *svārthānumāna* (inference for one's self), but in a fallacious inference for others (*parārthānumānābhāsa*) it is impossible. In the latter there is the specific statement of the thesis 'This is a bull' and we have all the factors leading to *sāmsargāropa*, viz. the presence of the attributes and generality in the thing, and if in spite of this we admit *tādātmyāropa*, then the distinction between *sāmsargāropa* and *tādātmyāropa* would become baseless. And what will you say of the case of a person who has the definite knowledge of coherence in respect of the cognition of *sāmsargāropa* as a result of *anuvyavasāya* (introspection), viz. "I am inferring the relation of 'gotva' in respect of 'go' (bull) " ? It will not be possible to say here that there is *tādātmyāropa*.

Moreover, in the case of *siddhasādhana* (proving what is already proved), the cognition is correct (i.e. it corresponds to the object) so the definition will apply to it and be thus too wide. It can be argued that in such a case quite a different probandum is proved and so the cognition is incorrect and the definition will not apply to it. The answer to this is that in that case the probandum becomes one which is not already proved and so the fallacy of *siddha-sādhana* itself will not be present and the definition of inferential cognition can very well apply to it. And then all fallacious reasons can be said to lead to valid cognition and it is not necessary to assume quite a different fire as the probandum in the case of the inferential cognition of fire on the strength of the illusory perception of cloud of dust as smoke. If another fire be assumed, then, as explained before, there would be valid cognition even in the case of *siddhasādhana* and the definition would be too wide (*ativyāpta*). (KhKh, pp. 229-235)

Śrīharṣa then criticises the definition of valid cognition as given by Udayana. Udayana defines valid cognition as proper or right determination (*samyak-paricchittiḥ pramā*—See KhKh, p 242). Discussing the meaning of *samyaktva* (rightness), Śrīharṣa says that *samyaktva* cannot mean 'having the true nature of a thing as its object' (*tattva-visayatā*) or correspondence

(*yāthārthya*) as explained above. It may be urged that *samyaktva* conveys the meaning of 'entirety' (*sāmastya*); people say, "I did not see it properly, I saw it in just its general form" (*na mayā samyag dṛṣṭam, sāmānyākāreṇa tūpalabdham*). So here '*samyak-pariccheda*' means the entire determination of a thing or the determination of a thing in its entirety. This is not true. Does 'entirety of a thing' signify its being possessed of all its parts or being possessed of all its attributes? It cannot signify its being possessed of all its parts, because in that case the cognition of partless things (*ākāśa*, etc.), as also the cognition of a 'thing having parts' which does not reveal the invisible interior of the object would not be valid according to this definition. It is impossible to perceive all the visible and invisible constituents of a thing. The other meaning also is not acceptable as none but an omniscient being could perceive a thing along with all its attributes, and so all cognitions of a non-omniscient being would be invalid according to this definition.

It may be argued that '*samyak*' means 'along with its particular features'; when a person says, "I did not see it properly," what he means is that he did not see it in respect of its particular distinguishing features; therefore, valid cognition or right or proper determination means the determination of an object with its specific distinguishing features. Error, doubt, etc. arise in the case of a person who does not see the specific distinguishing features of the object, and so the term '*samyak*' is included in the definition to exclude such cognition. All distinguishing features (*viśeṣas*) are not recognised as having other distinguishing features (*viśeṣa*) as this would go on *ad infinitum*; the nature of some *viśeṣas* (viz. the final particulars as found in the atoms of earth, etc.) is such that they serve to distinguish themselves and so the definition can very well apply to right cognition of *viśeṣa* (particular) and there is no *avyāpti* (—the definition is not narrow). This is not proper. If *viśeṣa* means distinguishing feature in general, then even in the erroneous cognition of shell as silver the perceiver seems to perceive the distinguishing feature of silver

in the shell and so it should be valid. The whole point, in the words of Dasgupta, lies in the difficulty of judging whether the distinguishing marks observed are real or not and there is no way of determining this. If the definition be taken as stating that *pramā* is the determination of the objects along with the specific features peculiar to each, then the definition would be restricted to the particular case and would not apply to other cognitions. If the definition be taken to refer to all *viśeṣas*, it would apply to erroneous cognitions also as said above,—the fault of *atiprasaṅga* (absurd extension). Thus there is inconsistency in either way of interpreting the definition.³⁶ Moreover, the very nature of *viśeṣa* may be a distinguishing feature (*viśeṣa*), yet there would be only one entity and the object '*viśeṣa*' would not be 'possessed of (any distinct) specific features', as required by the definition, which would not therefore apply to the cognition of *viśeṣa*.

Some describe the *viśeṣas* as those features without the perception of which there can be no definite or certain knowledge and the perception of which ascertains the question of contradiction (*bādhā*) or non-contradiction (*abādhā*) and so of the absence or presence of a thing. As a matter of fact, without admitting these *viśeṣas* it will not be possible to distinguish between *tattva* and *atattva*. But this is absolutely necessary as otherwise there would be contradiction or stultification (*vyāghāta*). If everything is said to be invalid, the validity of the cognition of this also will be questioned as it is included in 'everything', and similarly its invalidity will be questioned as it has no proof to support it. If everything were invalid, there would be contradiction between validity and invalidity in the statement denying validity. If invalidity alone were left behind, all cognitions would be invalid and one could never act confidently; and there would be *vyāghāta* (contradiction or stultification) in action in respect of its success or failure (efficiency or otherwise), because even these are dependent on validity and invalidity respectively (—see *Śāṅkarī*, p. 245–246). But this argument is not proper. It is impossible to discover

any *viśeṣa* (specific feature) of which it could be said that error, doubt, etc. are not possible with regard to it, that is to say, of which one could be positively certain. A dreamer perceives all *viśeṣas* and yet his cognition is not valid. It is not proper to recognise or admit *viśeṣa* which we cannot account for only in order to avert the fear of *vyāghāta*. In stead of admitting the unaccountable *viśeṣa*, why may not one recognise an indescribable way of getting rid of this *vyāghāta* ? One is not aware of any knowledge of visible objects which are not possible to cognise in a dream or in a fallacious statement; that is to say, *viśeṣas* are the objects of what are believed to be erroneous cognitions as well as of what are believed to be true cognitions. Thus, since all these *viśeṣas* are capable of being known in dreams, etc., the assumption of their not being apprehended (*apratīyamānatā*) and consequently leading to erroneous cognition, doubt, etc., is contradicted as it is not found to be so. Much better than this is the assumption of the removal of contradiction (*vyāghāta-parihāra*) by unknown causes.

It may be urged that by '*viśeṣasahitopalambha*' is not meant 'cognition along with *viśeṣa* (distinguishing feature)', but 'cognition of an object along with its *viśeṣa*'. The *viśeṣa* of silver is not present in nacre, so the definition will not apply to the erroneous cognition of silver in respect of nacre; whereas in the case of the true perception of silver, silver is found to possess the *viśeṣa* revealed in the cognition. But this stands refuted as stated above. It is difficult to define *viśeṣa*; if just any *viśeṣa* is meant, then in the case of the wrong perception of silver in nacre, the *viśeṣa* of 'being before the eye' is also present in the nacre and so the contingency of *ativyāpti* (-the definition being too wide) is not averted. If particular *viśeṣas* are meant, then there being endless *viśeṣas* it will not be possible to formulate any definition which includes them all and the definition would be too narrow. If the opponent is still not prepared to give up his stand that *viśeṣa* determines contradiction or non-contradiction (*bādhābādha-vyavasthā-hetu*)

(and so the absence or presence of a thing), he should be asked what *viśeṣa* he sees in things as referred to by a reliable person which he does not find in them as referred to by an unreliable person both of whom say, 'There are five fruits on the bank of the river'. He will not be able to discover any. If there be any person so silly as would not be convinced even then, he should be instructed as follows : " You recognise *viśeṣas* as capable of distinguishing themselves from others, because otherwise you would be landed in a vicious infinite series of *viśeṣas*. The nature of these *viśeṣas* is mutually exclusive and they have nothing in common, so it is impossible to frame a definition which could apply to all *viśeṣas*; the definition would be very narrow, pertaining to one *viśeṣa* only.³⁷ It may be argued that the *viśeṣas* have this in common that they can determine contradiction or absence of a thing and so the definition can apply to all cases and there will be no *avyāpti*. But it is not possible for anything to determine the absence of a thing in all cases. If it is said to determine the absence of a thing in some cases only, that is possible in the case of erroneous cognition also. Silverness makes known the absence of other things in the case of the cognition 'This is silver' in respect of real silver. As a result, even the erroneous cognition 'This is silver' in respect of nacre will have to be regarded as valid. If it is argued that it is *viśeṣa* only in respect of that thing in whose case it determines the absence of other things (*tatra tasyeti cet--KhKh*, p 247), the answer is that because of the use of 'that-which', the definition will become too narrow and will apply to that *viśeṣa* alone which is referred to by 'that-which' and not to other *viśeṣas*.

Bādha (contradiction or contradictory knowledge) cannot be defined as *viparīta pramā* (opposite knowledge). All opposite knowledge is not *bādha* (contradictory, denying), because in that case cognition of lake as devoid of fire will be contradictory to the cognition of mountain as possessed of fire; hence contradictory knowledge would have to be defined as knowledge which cognises the absence of the contradicted or denied

thing in that in which it is cognised as existing (*bādho na viparīta-pramāmātram api tu bādhyam yatra yat tadviparītapramā-śāṅkari*, p. 248). If this definition employing 'that-which' refers to silver, it will not extend to the contradiction of the erroneous cognition of serpent in respect of a piece of rope. Moreover, *pramā* is defined as cognition of a thing with all its *viśeṣas*; *viśeṣa* is defined as the cause of the ascertainment of the absence of other things (*bādhavyavasthāhetu*) and *bādha* is defined as *viparīta-pramā* (opposite valid cognition or valid cognition of the opposite). Thus the definition of *bādha* is based on *pramā* and that of *pramā* on *bādha*, via *viśeṣa* so there is the fault of *cakraka* (argument in a circle).³⁸

Moreover, *tarka* (hypothetical reasoning) and volitional or deliberate error and doubt (*āhāryau samśaya-viparyayau*) arise only when the *viśeṣa* has been cognised (i.e. only when knowledge in respect of particular features has been attained). One must have the knowledge 'Hill has fire' before one could indulge in *tarka* of the form : 'If there were not fire, there would not be smoke.' This is also true of volitional doubt and error. Hence the definition of *pramā* would apply to these also. It is not proper to say that volitional doubt and error are never indulged in. Volitional error forms the very basis of the statement of a person who wants to deceive. And even the scriptures approve of the teacher, who is fully in the know of the truth, raising doubts and putting forth objections for the sake of instructing his pupils.³⁹ Further, '*pariccheda*' (determination) is a synonym of '*anubhūti*' and so suffers from all the faults pointed out in the case of the latter (KhKh, pp. 242-248).

The Naiyāyikas who admit *jāti-saṅkara* (cross-connection of *jāti*s or *genera*) as impeding *jāti* cannot define *pramā* as possessed of the *jāti* (class-character, genus) *pramātvā* (*jāti-saṅkaram icchatas ca pramātvā-lakṣaṇajātyabhisambandhāt pramety api durlakṣaṇam* (-KhKh, p. 255). *Sāksāttva* (directness) is present in *bhrama* (erroneous perception) wherein *pramā-tva* ('valid-cognitionness') is absent, whereas *pramātvā* is present

in *anumiti* (inferential cognition) wherein *sāksāttva* is absent, and both *sāksāttva* and *pramāṭva* are present in valid perceptual cognition; that is to say, there is their *sāṅkarya* in it. Thus owing to the fault of *saṅkara*,* there can be no such *jāti* as *pramāṭva*. It may be urged that *pramāṭva* associated with the absence of defects is responsible for the nomenclature '*pramā*' and *pramāṭva* not produced by sense-organs is responsible for indirectness (*parokṣatva*). Their causes being different, there will be no *saṅkara*. But is *pramāṭva* responsible for the expression 'This is *prāma*' when it is known or when it is not known? If it gives rise to it even when not known, there will never be any awareness of error or suspicion of invalidity in respect of any knowledge. That is to say, if we regard the known *pramāṭva* as giving rise to the expression 'This is *pramā*', then we can say that it will be impossible without the knowledge of *pramāṭva*, and there can only be the notion of erroneous or doubtful cognition in respect of it. But when the known *pramāṭva* is responsible for the expression, we will use only one expression 'This is *pramā*' with regard to all cognitions. It may be urged that *pramāṭva*, which is existent but not known, when accompanied by the absence of defects is responsible for the expression 'This is *pramā*', so we do not use this expression where defect is present and we have only the notion of erroneous or doubtful cognition in respect of it. But in that case, every cognition in respect of which no notion of erroneous or doubtful cognition has arisen and which is not also known as *pramā* or as having *pramāṭva*, must be referred to as 'This is *pramā*', because *pramāṭva* along with absence of defects is present. Moreover, if the known *pramāṭva* is regarded as responsible for the expression 'This is *pramā*', how can the knowledge of this *pramāṭva* be accounted for? Mental perception (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) cannot be said to be its proof because at times

* *Parasprātīyāntābhāva* — *samānādhikarāṇadharmayoṛ ekaṭra samāveśaḥ saṅkaraḥ*. — An entity cannot have the characters of different genera unless the one genus includes the other.

even when a cognition is valid we have a doubt as to its being valid or not or we even wrongly regard it as invalid—which would not be possible if like cognition *pramāṭva* were mentally perceived. It may be said that the mental perception with the help of the other marks (such as *yathārthānubhavatva*, *tattvānubhūtitva*) will enable us to know *pramāṭva*, or these becoming the *liṅga* will enable us to infer the presence of *pramāṭva*, so there can be the erroneous cognition or doubt of invalidity when we do not have the knowledge of these factors. The answer to this is that if this is so, these marks can themselves be responsible for the judgement 'This is *pramā*'; there is no need to assume *pramāṭva* for which there is no proof. Moreover, these marks have already been repudiated, so it is inconsistent to say that there can be the mental perception of *pramāṭva* with the help of these marks.

Thus, in whatever way you may define *pramā* and regard it as responsible for the expression 'This is *pramā*' whether as unknown or as simply known (i.e. not as an object of valid cognition) even erroneous cognition would have to be regarded as having *pramāṭva* for if the factor responsible for this expression is unknown, in this state both truth and falsity would be like one and there would be no difference between the two, and the expression could be used in regard to false knowledge also. Or, there could be suspicion of validity with regard to invalid cognition or one could wrongly regard invalid cognition as valid. If *pramāṭva* is urged to be validly known (*pramita*—known by valid cognition), this is inconsistent unless *pramā* is defined, which it is not. It can be argued that *pramāṭva* is certainly validly known, though 'the fact of its being validly known' may not be known, so there is no difficulty, (*pramitam eva pramālakṣaṇam na tu pramitatvena jñātam api yena duravadhāraṇam syād ity arthaḥ*. —*Śāṅkarī*, p. 258). But in that case if some one says that *pramāṭva* has not been, as a matter of fact, validly known, what answer could be given? *Pramāṭva* has not been explained yet, so it could not be proved to be validly known by the cognition, 'It is validly known'. And if

without being validly known *pramāṭva* could be responsible for the expression 'This is *pramā*', then even *pranā* without being known could be responsible for judgements pertaining to jar, etc. and it would not be necessary to attempt an exposition of *pramāṭva* as determining the judgment pertaining to *pramā*. It is not necessary to go into further details (*iti āstām vistaraḥ*.—KhKh, p. 257). (See KhKh, pp. 255–257).

Having repudiated the concept of *pramā* (valid knowledge), Jayarāśi and Śrīharṣa have similarly repudiated the six main sources of valid knowledge, which have been variously recognised by the different schools of Indian thought—*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* (analogy), *śabda* or *āgama* (verbal or scriptural testimony), *arthāpatti* (implication) and *anupalabdhī* (non apprehension). We shall here consider briefly inference which is not only closely connected with dialectic but which can also be said to comprehend most of the forms of indirect knowledge.

In the *Nyāyasūtra*, inference is defined as preceded by or based on perception (*tat-pūrvakam anumānam*—NS. I.1.5). The relation between fire and smoke is determined by the operation of the eyes and the like in the kitchen; as a result of this an impression is formed; later there is a second perception of the said *liṅga* (mark of inference, probans, viz. smoke), then there is the recollection of the *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance between smoke and fire), and after the recollection of the *vyāpti* there is the knowledge of the probans which is invariably concomitant with the probandum as residing in the *pakṣa* (minor term), this last which is called *parāmarśajñāna* (synthetic judgment or consideration of the probans) along with the probans is the special means of inferential cognition (*anumāna*).

Examining this, Jayarāśi argues : The effect cannot come into existence in the absence of the cause, and perception is said to be the cause of inference in the definition. Perception has been repudiated earlier, so in the absence of perception, inference also is impossible; or if it were to arise it would be

accidental. Keeping in view the absence of perception it has been urged that the relation of invariable concomitance cannot be cognised. But supposing it is cognised we ask : Does the cognition of the relation of invariable concomitance signify the determination of the relation between two universals, or of that between two unique particulars, or of that between a universal and a unique particular ?⁴⁰ It cannot mean the first and the last, for there is no objective reality like the universal (*sāmānya*). It cannot also mean the determination of the relation between two unique particulars, because there are an infinite number of fire and smoke individuals and there is no persistence of any one factor in all these. Moreover, perception is not capable of determining the relation of individuals on account of the incompatibility of place, time and nature, (that is to say, things distant in place and time and things that are supersensuous cannot be perceived, and if the things cannot be perceived their relation cannot be determined). At the time of the cognition of the relation of invariable concomitance all the things so related are not visible, and it is absurd to regard even those that are not cognised as cognised, otherwise when taste is known colour also can be imagined to have been known. If it is urged that a few individuals which are present at the time of the grasping of the relation of invariable concomitance help to determine the relation and not all, then only these could help us to know the relation of another. By Devadatta's eye being in contact with a jar, cognition of water does not arise. (TPS pp. 64-66) *

Jayarāśi further shows that the cause cannot be inferred from the effect, because it is untenable that smoke be regarded as an effect. This untenability, in its turn, is there because we never cognise the cessation of existence (of smoke). If it is said to be cognised by perception, we ask : Does this perception as it arises affirm something or deny something ? If it is said to affirm something, is this something smoke, or another,

* Jayarāśi gives further arguments here but the text is broken and so does not give an exact idea of what is meant to be conveyed.

or nothing ? If it affirms smoke, then grasping its nature it would affirm rather than deny smoke. If it affirms another object, then it can neither affirm nor deny smoke, for a cognition can affirm the existence of only its own object. If it affirms nothing, it can neither affirm nor deny smoke, like a man who is dumb, blind and deaf. If the preception is said to arise as denying something, is this something smoke or another or nothing ? If it is the denial of smoke, then smoke must have existence by its side, and then the denial will affirm rather than deny smoke. If it denies another object then it can neither deny nor affirm smoke. If it denies nothing, then being produced ignorant, it will neither deny nor affirm smoke.

If *sattāviccheda* (cessation of existence) is said to be equivalent to *pradhvaṃsa* (destruction, posterior negation), and that to be cognised by perception, we say that this is not proper. *Pradhvaṃsa* is another object altogether and the cognition that arises in respect of it can only affirm its *svarūpa*, but cannot deny anything else. And when it is experienced, nothing is found to be contradicted, for all cognitions as grasping their own objects, affirm their nature, but do not deny anything. It may be urged that the *svarūpa* (nature) of smoke is not revealed in the cognition of *pradhvaṃsa*, so it is its repudiation. If this is so, it will be the repudiation of the three worlds which are not revealed in the cognition of *dhvaṃsa*, or *dhvaṃsa* is not of the form of the three worlds. (TPS, pp. 66-67). It cannot also be said that *dhvaṃsa* is opposed (*virodhi*) to smoke and so is its repudiation. Jayarāśi shows the hollowness of the concept of *virodha* (opposition) by putting forth different alternative interpretations and refuting them. Does *virodha* signify not having the same shape or being present in different times, or the non-apprehension of one when the other is present, or being produced by it, or being its producer, or being the doer of a different activity, or being produced by different causes or not being based on what is based on another ?⁴¹ Jayarāśi has shown by further dialectical reasoning that the determination of the relation between cause

(*hetu*) and result (*phala*) is not possible (TPS, pp. 70-73): Jaya^rāśi has also confuted the inference of the existence and nature of the soul in the different systems of philosophy (TPS, pp. 74-83).

Even in the case of the Buddhists, inference is not possible as the relation of invariable concomitance cannot be known. The relation cannot be one between two universals (*sāmānyā*) or between universal and unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), as the universal has no reality. If the relation is said to be determined between two unique particulars, is it between two things or two cognitions or between a cognition and a thing? If the relation determined is between two things, we ask: Is the cognition of the relation of cause and result (or effect) between fire and smoke on account of their existence alone, or by virtue of association with their shape or on account of being produced by them or due to all these jointly? If the apprehension of fire and smoke be said to be on account of their existence alone, then it would not be the apprehension of fire and smoke alone; it should be the apprehension of all the three worlds as even what does not aid the rise of cognition has all the same existence in common with others (p. 83). Jayarāśi repudiates the second alternative by showing that knowledge cannot assume the shape of the object and that therefore knowledge of fire is an impossibility (pp. 83-86): The apprehension of fire cannot also arise on account of its being produced by it. How can it be said to be produced by fire?—by virtue of its nature which is non-productive of that or by virtue of its nature which is productive of that? If fire be non-productive of cognition, how could it give rise to cognition? If it be by nature productive of cognition, how could it give rise to smoke? If it is said to give rise to smoke by the very same *svabhāva* (nature), the cognition should have the character of smoke or smoke the character of cognition and there would be nothing which could differentiate smoke and the cognition of fire. Fire cannot produce these by different

natures as one thing cannot have two natures. When fire gives rise to smoke it cannot give rise to its own knowledge and the relation of cause-effect between fire and smoke cannot be determined without knowledge. And if fire gives rise to knowledge of fire, it cannot give rise to smoke, and in its absence, the relation of cause-effect between two external objects cannot be determined by the cognition of fire, etc. (pp. 86-87) Jayarāśi gives many more arguments to show that fire and smoke cannot be related as cause and effect (pp 87 ff).

Two cognitions also cannot be determined to be related as cause and effect; the effect cognition as determined by its self-apprehension does not apprehend another cognition, and if it does not do this how can it know by what its nature was brought about, because cognition different from it is comparable to a *piśāca* (evil spirit which is uncognised and therefore not known to be existent)? So cognition is not different from another cognition; and if they are non-different how can they be related as cause and effect, because to say that a thing operates upon itself is self-contradictory ? (p. 93)

Further, what is the object of inferential cognition—the unique particular fire and the like, or real universa¹ or unreal universal or a conceptual construction or its own portion ? Or is it objectless ? If it be said to have unique particular as its object then there would be no difference between perception and inference; having the unique particular as its object even inferential cognition would be lucid, and the Buddhists themselves regard it as not-lucid, and not others.

Others say that the unique particular alone is of a distinct shape. If the unique particular cognised by perception is very distinct and that cognised by inference is not distinct, this is the difference of the *svalakṣaṇa* itself (and not of the cognitions). One fire is capable of producing perception, whereas another fire is capable of producing inference. If in respect of fire capable of producing perceptual cognition there be inferential cognition, there might possibly be a difference between perception and inference. But the fire capable of producing inferential cognition

is a different one. It may be argued that on account of similarity in respect of object viz. unique particular, perception and inference are imagined to be non-different. But in that case the cognitions of odour, taste, etc., on account of their similarity in point of having a unique particular as the object, should all come to be non-different and all these cognitions should be called cognitions of odour or cognitions of taste. It may be urged that even though they have alike the unique particular as the object, they are termed 'cognition of odour' and the like with a view to convey the sub-divisions. The answer to this is that in that case even though perceptual and inferential cognitions have fire as the object they are called 'perceptual' or 'inferential' in order to convey the sub-divisions. If it is argued that cognitions of odour, etc. are different on account of the difference of the respective sense-organs operating, then the difference between perception and inference should be explained on the basis of the difference between their *karaṇas* (special instruments) and on the basis of the difference between their objects. Hence the statement that inference has unique particular as its object is silly.

Inference cannot have the real universal as its object, because there being its negation it cannot bring about its own cognition and so cannot be the object. It may be urged that unreal *sāmānya* is the object of inferential cognition as it is said that 'universal is conceptual, its form being presented by the intellect' (*vaikalpikam sāmānyam buddhyupadarśitarūpam*). But this also is not proper. How could an unreal *sāmānya* be the object of the intellect?—By virtue of its mere existence, or co-production or by being the producer and impressing its shape? When all these are impossible because *sāmānya* is unreal, it remains to be shown how it could be said to be an 'object'. If the *sāmānya* were to be revealed in consciousness, even without being the producer and the like, then colour etc. also should not be imagined as giving rise to cognition, and colour etc. without bringing about cognition should be directly known.

Examining the contention of the Buddhists that inference proceeds to their determination or judgment after having identified the perceived and the conceived objects (*'drśya-vikalp-yāṁ arthāṁ ekikṛtya tad-adhyavasāyena pravartate'*), Jayarāṣi says : The perceived is an external unique particular e.g. colour, etc.; the conceived is a shape superimposed by the intellect. What does their identification mean? Does it mean their ascertainment as non-different or that they are connected? If it is said to mean their being produced as non-different the answer is that only an irresponsible person could talk of what is existent and what is non-existent being generated as non-different. And if they be generated as non-different, the existent would come to be non-existent, or the *sāmānya* would be real; and if it be real, inference would have *svalakṣaṇa* (unique particular) as its object and it would not be possible to distinguish between perception and inference. If identification means that the perceived and the conceived are cognised as one, that is not proper. Is only one shape revealed or a duality of shapes? If one shape is revealed or cognised is it the perceived one or the conceived one? If it is the perceived shape that is cognised, then inference would have the unique particular as its object, and so could not be distinguished from perception. If it is the conceived shape that is said to be cognised, the answer is that because it is devoid of all discernible character (*upākhyā*) and so is not an object of reflection, it should be explained whether... * If it be non-different (from unique particular) inference would have unique particular as the object, and it should not be said that the superimposed universal is cognised; the universal would come to be real.....or there would be the contingency of the unreality of the perceived. If the conceived shape is different then it should not be said that it is cognised through superimposition as there is a gap between unique particular and the conceived shape. If it is contended that identification means that the universal is connected with the unique parti-

* The text is lost here.

cular, that is not tenable, because the existent and the non-existent cannot be connected; connection is observed between two existent things, e.g. between eye and jar.

If a duality of shapes—that of universal and that of unique particular—is cognised, then the shapes of the universal and the unique particular which are different from each other are cognised. And therefore it should not be said that inference proceeds to their judgment after having identified the perceived and the conceived objects. If two distinct shapes are revealed then inference would have unique particular as its object, and it would not be possible to account for the distinction between the two sources of cognition. It is not possible for the universal devoid of all discernible character (*upākhyā*) to be cognised. Moreover, it is said that in the cognition of fire produced by smoke, *sāmānya* of the form of exclusion of non-fire is revealed or cognised. Why is it not accepted as being revealed in the form of exclusion of non-water? As a matter of fact, inferential cognition is not generated so as to exclude non-water or to exclude non-fire and if it is not (so) generated, the rule of every cognition having its own specific object will not apply.

Inferential cognition cannot be said to be objectless, because it has its own portion or aspect as its object. In the Buddhist view, there is no cognition which is objectless, because it arises as cognising itself. And if knowledge were objectless, in respect of what would the cogniser make an effort or what would he try to avoid? There would be no activity. If it is argued that thinking that the cognition is generated by fire he starts walking in the direction of fire, then he would similarly start moving even when the cognition of smoke is generated. Similarly, inference cannot be said to have its own portion as the object as in that case there would not be difference between perception and inference as the cognised knowledge or consciousness is of the character of unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) (TPS, pp. 9C-93).

Jayarāṣi repudiates also inference based on identity as recognised by the Buddhists. It is not possible to ascertain the relation in its case, as there is no relation. A relation is seen between two different things which are connected; but there cannot possibly be a relation of one thing. *Anityatva* (non-eternality) is inferred from *kṛtakatva* (artificiality, a thing's being created). Is *kṛtakatva* known or not known? If it is not known, then how can a thing which is itself not known serve as a probans? And if it is known, then is *anityatva* revealed in the cognition of *kṛtakatva* or not? If it is not revealed, how could there be identity between what is revealed and what is not revealed? If it is revealed, what is the use of inference? When an act has been achieved, the instruments are useless, otherwise, inference would be employed even for the cognition of *kṛtakatva*. If it is urged that *kṛtakatva* is already known, so inference is not employed, then is *anityatva*, which is connected with its nature and known, known by means of inference? The probans which is employed in respect of the known *anityatva*, is it sometimes employed for the knowledge of *anityatva*, sometimes for the exclusion of the superimposition of eternality (*nityatva*) and sometimes for the sake of the verbal expression of *anityatva*? If it is said to be for the knowledge of *anityatva*, *anityatva* is already known, so the attempt is meaningless. If it is said to be for the exclusion of superimposition, we ask: Is this exclusion of superimposition (*samāropa-vyavaccheda*) non-distinct from *anityatva* or distinct from it? If it be non-distinct, it would be known even by the cognition of *anityatva* and another proof would not be required for it. If it is distinct, is it a real entity or not? If it be a real entity, the *kṛtakatva* present in *śabda* (word) could not possibly be identical with it; and if it be indetical, it (*samāropa-vyavaccheda*) would be known even on account of the cognition of *kṛtakatva*, and would not require inference for its cognition. If it is a non-entity, is it brought about or made known? It is not proper to say that it is brought about, for it which is devoid of discernible character (*upākhyā*) cannot

possibly be brought about, and if it could be brought about there would be the contingency of its being real. It is not also proper to say that it is made known, because *kṛtakatva* could not have any relation with it; and if it had relation with it, it would be real or *kṛtakatva* would be non-existent.

It may be urged that the verbal expression (*vyavahāra*) about *anityatā* is brought about; one, who though conscious of *kṛtakatva* does not use the expression '*anityatā*' (i.e. does not say that the thing is *anitya*), is made to use this expression (*vyavahāra*). In answer to this we ask : Is this *vyavahāra* non-different from *anityatā* or different from it ? If it (*anityatā-vyavahāra*) is non-different, it also turns out to be a case of inferential cognition. If it is different, is it caused by *kṛtakatva* or made known by it ? If it is caused, then the producer of *śabda* (word, expression) will not be a special cause of inference. If it is said to be made known, the relation with *kṛtakatva* must be stated. It cannot be identity, because it (*kṛtakatva*) is different from what is made known. It cannot also be of the nature of causality. Is the jar caused by the verbal expression or usage (*vyavahāra*) or is *vyavahāra* caused by the jar ? The jar could not be caused by the *vyavahāra*, because the jar existed prior to its being called a jar (i.e. prior to *ghaṭa-vyavahāra*). If *vyavahāra* is caused by jar, then this would be a case of *kāraṇānumāna* (inference based on causality) and not *svabhāvānumāna* (inference based on causality). And even the Buddhists do not accept this. (TPS, pp. 108-109)

Jayarāśi has repudiated the concept of *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) while discussing the problem of *avayavin* (whole) (TPS, pp. 94-95). Thus Jayarāśi has shown that inference accepted by the Buddhist as being based on causality and identity or non-apprehension is not tenable. He has repudiated the validity or even the very possibility of inference by showing that it cannot justifiably have any object, or be objectless.

Let us see how Śrīharṣa tackles the problem of inference. He refutes the definition or signification of *anumāna* (special instrument of inferential cognition—*anumīyate anena iti*), viz.

liṅga-parāmarśa (consideration of the presence in the *pakṣa* or minor term of the *hetu* or middle term which is invariably concomitant with the *sādhya* or major term). What is *liṅga*? If you say it signifies 'being an attribute of the *pakṣa*', *pakṣa* is that in respect of which there is a doubt about the presence of the *sādhya* (probandum) (*sandigdha-sādhya dharmā dharmī pakṣaḥ*). Is doubt (*saṁśaya*) an *upalakṣaṇa* (indicator) or *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier) of the *pakṣa*.⁴² If it be an *upalakṣaṇa*, *liṅga-parāmarśa* (consideration or synthetic judgment) would be the *anumāna* even when the *sādhya* (probandum) or the determinant concomitant (*vyāpaka*) has been actually perceived in the thing. Since doubt must be present in respect of the *pakṣa*, it must be its *viśeṣaṇa*. *Pakṣa* is a thing qualified by doubt, so when on the rise of inferential cognition doubt perishes, the *pakṣa* qualified by it should also perish, so in what would the *sādhya* reside? If the *sādhya* cannot reside in it there should not be any activity in respect of the *sādhya* whose substratum has perished. It may be urged that there is no such difficulty. From the smoke existing in the mountain as qualified by doubt, fire is inferred in the mountain, and the mountain exists even when doubt has been dispelled by the demonstration of the probandum; so there will not be absence of activity along with the destruction of the *pakṣa* qualified by doubt. This *vaiyadhi-karaṇya* (difference of substrata) between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, that the *hetu* resides in the entire *pakṣa* (*pakṣa* qualified by doubt) and the *sādhya* in the thing alone (devoid of qualifier), is certainly acceptable. The answer to this is that in that case the definition of *vyāpti* as signifying the presence in one substratum of the *liṅga* and the *liṅgin* (*sādhya*) would be violated. It may be argued: If the *liṅga* is found in the qualified thing (e.g. mountain qualified by doubt) it is certainly present in the thing (e.g. mountain) in which the *sādhya* also resides, so there is not *vaiyadhi-karaṇya* and concomitance is not affected. The answer to this is that then *pakṣa-dharmatā* would not be a means of inferential cognition. By the knowledge of the presence in the thing of

the *liṅga* which is known to be invariably concomitant, there is knowledge of the *sādhya* in its generality in respect of it; but the *sāmānya* cannot be established without the particular, so there will be knowledge of the *sādhya* in its particularity also. Hence the condition of *paksadharmatā* (presence in the *paksa*) is not essential for proving the *sādhya* either in its general or in its particular form. It can be said to be useful in so far as it averts the fault of *siddha-sādhana* (proving what is already proved). But *siddha-sādhana* is not a fault in *svārthānumāna* (inference for oneself) as one employs inference in respect of the soul which is established by *śabda* or verbal testimony, and those desirous of emancipation employ *śabda*, *anumāna* and *dhyāna* (meditation or extra-ordinary perception) in respect of the knowledge of the soul. So *paksadharmatā* is not an essential condition in the case of all inferential cognition. This also repudiates the condition regarding doubt.

The definition of *anumāna* (means of inferential cognition) may be modified to say that the *liṅga* is that which is the determinate concomitant (*vyāpya*, pervaded), and its consideration is *anumāna*. We ask : Is the consideration of the *vyāpya* in its essential nature the *anumāna* or the consideration of it as determinate concomitant ? It could not be the former because otherwise the consideration of smoke, etc. (e.g. 'Mountain has smoke') even by a man who has not grasped the relation of invariable concomitance would be an *anumāna*. Nor could it be the latter because the cognition pertaining to *vyāpti* (pervasion, e.g. 'smoke is pervaded by fire') would be *anumāna*, as it necessarily cognises *vyāpyatva* (that is to say it cognises that smoke is pervaded by or invariably concomitant with fire). This also repudiates the epithets 'second' and 'third', in the statement that the second *liṅga-parāmarśa* (viz. 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire') or the third *liṅga-parāmarśa* (viz. This is possessed of smoke) is the *anumāna*, for if these be accepted, the second or the third cognition in the continuous cognition 'Mountain has smoke' would come to

be *anumāna*. And the synthetic judgment referring to both, viz. 'Smoke and fire are determinate and determinant concomitants' which arises after the concomitance (of smoke and fire) has been perceived should also then be regarded as *anumāna*. It cannot be accepted as an *anumāna*, because there being no doubt about the *sādhya*, there is no *pakṣa*, and the probans abiding in it could not be a *pakṣa-dharma* (attribute of the *pakṣa*). It may be urged that not being a *pakṣa-dharma* is not a fault in *svārthānumāna*, so the *liṅga-parāmarśa* (e.g. 'Smoke and fire are the determinate and the determinant concomitants') which arises after the perception of *vyāpti* is certainly *anumāna*. The answer to this is that if the said *parāmarśa* be accepted as *anumāna*, the cognition arising after it (e.g. 'Mountain has fire') would have to be regarded as inferential or indirect cognition inasmuch as it is produced by *anumāna* and as direct cognition because it is associated with the sense-organ. Thus one and the same cognition will have to be regarded as direct and indirect—which is self-contradictory.

The definition may be attempted to be modified thus : The consideration (*parāmarśa*) of the *vyāpya* (i.e. *liṅga*, probans) which does not have the *vyāpaka* (*sādhya*, probandum) as its object is *anumāna*. But there cannot be any cognition of the *vyāpya* (pervaded) which does not refer to the *vyāpaka* (pervader) also, for we have the cognition of the *vyāpya* in the form 'This is the *vyāpya* of that'; the *vyāpya* (pervaded) is always cognised along with its *pratiyogi* (that whose *vyāpya* it is), it cannot be known without the knowledge of the *vyāpaka* (pervader, determinant concomitant); the *vyāpaka* is always revealed as a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) in the cognition of the *vyāpya*, otherwise the cognition of the qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) would not be possible in the absence of the cognition of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). It cannot also be said that the *parāmarśā* of the *vyāpya* (*liṅga*) which does not have the *vyāpaka* (*sādhya*) in its particularity as the object is *anumāna*; otherwise in the case of a person who knows the association or concomitance of smoke and fire

on account of the instruction imparted by a reliable person or due to its repeated apprehension, the *vyāpya-parāmarśā*, which arises from cogitation (*vimarśa*) occurring at a time when fire and smoke are not apprehended, will be *anumāna*, because the *vyāpaka* is not cognised in its particular form in this cognition. It may be argued that not all cognitions, but recognitory cognition (*pratyabhijñā*) alone can be *parāmarśa*. But this is not true, because in that case, the recognitory cognition 'This is the very same *vyāpti* which was cognised by means of the instruction of a reliable person or by means of cogitation' after having got the knowledge of *vyāpti* by means of the instruction of a reliable person or by means of cogitation, would be *anumāna*. It may be contended that only that *parāmarśa* which cognises the *vyāpya* (i.e. *liṅga*) in its particularity is *anumāna*. Does this mean that it has as its object the particular smoke, subsistent in mountain, or that it has any individual smoke as its object? In the former case, the definition will not apply to the consideration of the smoke in the forest etc. as it pertains to only the consideration of the smoke on the mountain. If the latter is accepted then any individual smoke is also an object of recognition, and so the definition will apply to all such cases of recognition as are mentioned above.

Moreover, by reason of possession of smoke, is the presence of fire on the mountain at any time whatsoever inferred or the presence of fire only at that time? In the case of the first alternative, people will start operating with respect to fire at other times also as well as at that time. Nor is the second alternative proper because smoke is not known to be concomitant with the fire of that time but with fire in its generality. It may be urged that fire existing at the time of the smoke can certainly be inferred as time is undoubtedly apprehended in the cognition of concomitance viz. 'Whenever there is smoke there is fire'. This is not true. At some place the smoke may be found at another time also, so that other time also is 'the time of the smoke' and then the person interested in fire

should act at that time also. It may be argued that what is meant is the time of that smoke which is the object of *parāmarśa* and so the person interested in fire would not make an effort at another time. The answer to this is : If the definition be made so narrow as to refer to the different individual smokes which are the object of *parāmarśa* in each case, the difficulty is that the cognition of *vyāpti* is not with respect to the particular smoke-individuals, so how could their respective times be cognised in inference ? If it is said to refer to just any individual in respect of which there has been the cognition of concomitance then it is quite likely that there may have been cognition of *vyāpti* in respect of smoke existing at another time, and so there will be activity even at other times, and not necessarily at the time of the smoke on the mountain.

It may be urged that the fire on the mountain can be established on the strength of *paksadharmatā* also and not on the strength of occurrence at a specific time alone which as a matter of fact is incompetent in this respect. The answer to this is that by reason of the *pakṣa-dharmatā* of the *hetu*, the fire of a place other than mountain and of a time other than that may not be established; only the probandum of that place and time may be established. But fire can certainly be proved at another time. It may be urged that the thing which is qualified by the time of the inferential cognition or of the *liṅga* and in respect of which there is a doubt as to the existence of the *sādhya* is the *pakṣa*; so the *sādhya* of that time is apprehended by the inferential cognition, and the *sādhya* as present at another time can never be proved. In that case with the passing away of that time the thing qualified by it will also cease to exist, so how can one act confidently with respect to that *pakṣa* ? (There will not be any activity). It may be argued here that the time of the *liṅga* in its particular form is not apprehended, but only the time of the *liṅga* in its generality is apprehended in the *pakṣa*, and since the time of the smoke continues to exist there will certainly

be activity. The answer to this is that if the time of the smoke be regarded as a qualifier of the *pakṣa* then other times also could be times of smoke and there could be activity at other times also. If the time of that smoke which is the object of *parāmarśa* be said to be a qualifier of the *pakṣa*, then the *pakṣadharmatā* should be cognised thus : 'The mountain which is qualified by the time of 'that' smoke, has smoke'; this means that smoke partly resides in itself, as the 'thing qualified by the time of the smoke which is the object of *parāmarśa*' is the *pakṣa*, and 'the smoke which is the object of *parāmarśa*' is its *dharma* (attribute); there is partial *ātmaśraya* (self-dependence). Thus the concept of *liṅga-parāmarśa* is shown to be self-condemned (KhKh, pp. pp. 347-353).

Then Śrīharṣa repudiates *vyāpti* which is the very basis of inference (KhKh, pp. 353 ff). What is *vyāpti*? It cannot be defined as *avinābhāva*, for does this mean that when one is non-absent, the other is present, or that when one is absent the other also is absent? If it has the former meaning, the presence of one when the other is present would be signified and then there should be *vyāpti* (concomitance) between 'earth' and 'possibility of being cut by iron' because the latter is present in a log of wood in which 'earthiness' also is present (—but the two are not really concomitant because a diamond cannot be cut though it is earthy, constituted of earth).⁴³ It may be contended that occasional relation (*kvācitra-sambandha*) is not *vyāpti*; *vyāpti* signifies universal (*sārvatrika*) relation. But what is this universality of relation? If it means 'presence in all the individuals of that class' this cannot be established unless all the individuals of that class are known, and all individuals cannot be particularly known because the contact of sense-organ and object required for the purpose would not be there in all cases. To this it may be said that at the time of the cognition of *vyāpti*, all the individuals of that class are cognised by a sort of mental contact, called *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti*; if without recognising *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti* one admits the cognition of *vyāpti*, it would be equivalent, as

Vācaspati points out, to the desire to have a son on the part of a young lady after having married an impotent person. The answer to this is : "In that case the person cognising *vyāpti* by *sāmānyalakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti* would be omniscient because in cognising the *vyāpti* between *prameyatva* (cognisability) and *abhidheyatva* (nameability) he would be knowing every knowable thing i. e. everything. A rejoinder (*pratikṛtyā*)* may be given that in putting forth this contingency of omniscience, the knowledge of everything was pre-supposed, because unless a person has the awareness of everything he cannot have an idea of omniscience. This is not proper; the idea behind urging the contingency was that nothing should be unknown, whereas you are ignorant of what is going on in my mind. It may be argued that when by *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti* all things are known as knowable (*prameya*) they are known only as knowable not as having any other character, and so the contingency of omniscience urged is not justifiable. But even those other characters are all knowable, so the contingency of omniscience stands, and if you admit this then you who know all things as knowable should be able to tell what is in my mind and then I shall have faith in you."⁴⁴ It may be urged that knowability is one single character and that things may otherwise be quite different and may yet be one so far as knowability is concerned, and hence the things may remain unknown in their diversity of characters and yet be known inasmuch as they are knowable. To this Śrīharṣa answers that the class concept 'knowable' would include all knowables and so even the diversity of characters would be included in 'knowable'.

Again, assuming for the sake of argument, that all things of a class are cognised by *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti*, what proof is there for the existence of a relation of invariable concomitance obtaining between them. If our senses themselves could observe such relations of concomitance, then there would

* *Kṛtyā* is a spirit working havoc, and a *pratikṛtyā* is a spirit undoing or preventing this havoc. Here *pratikṛtyā* figuratively stands for *pratibandī* (rejoinder, retort).

be no error in the perception of these relations as the sense-organs would cognise them rightly. But such errors are there and they are rectified later after contradiction. There is no way in which one can account for these. The causal apparatus (sense-organ, *sāmānyālakṣaṇa pratyūṣatti*, etc.) being the same one cannot say that some cognitions of *vyāpti* (e.g. of smoke and fire) are true, whereas others (e.g. earthiness and capability of being cut by iron) are false. It is well-nigh impossible to differentiate on the strength of the presence of defects and non-defects. The difference in the results also cannot help us to detect a difference in the causal apparatus. You cannot say that in the case of smoke-fire the relation is a universal one whereas in the case of earthiness and possibility of being cut by iron it is an occasional one, because at the time of the cognition of *vyāpti*, the future relation is absent and so cannot produce this cognition. If it is said that in its general character the relation of the individuals of the two classes (e.g. smoke and fire) is certainly present before the cognition of the relation, this holds good in the case of both true and erroneous cognitions of the relation. Even the relation of *pārthivatva* (earthiness) and *loha-lekhyatva* (possibility of being cut by iron) is certainly present in its general form in wood etc. otherwise if this relation were not present anywhere even erroneous cognition would not be possible.

It may be urged that on the strength of the difference in the result, a different cause can be inferred for the erroneous cognition of relation—a cause different from the cause of the cognition of universal relation. Will this different cause that is imagined be an accessory of the sense-organs or quite a different instrument? It cannot be the former because there is no proof that the sense-organs are instruments of knowledge in respect of the portion of the relation which pertains to past and future things. On the contrary even when the sense-organs have ceased to operate, a person who cogitates, 'If smoke and fire were not concomitant they would not be repeatedly perceived together', is found to have determinate knowledge of the concomitance

of two things which were previously known to be related to each other. The mind may be functioning as a sense-organ even when the other sense-organs have stopped functioning, but that makes no difference, as we know that like the other sense-organs eye, etc. the mind is instrumental in bringing about the cognition of concomitance. But if it is intended to remove all faults by assuming certain accessory causes, there is no proof relying on which one could hold that the mind is the *karaṇa*, special instrument; in the bringing about of the cognition of the relation it is just one of the causes like the eye, and the like. If, as in perceptual cognition, eye or the like sense-organ is a *karaṇa*, so in the cognition of the relation of universal concomitance, a *karaṇa* different from the mind is assumed, then if the cognition of relation is direct, a seventh sense-organ will have to be recognised, and if it be indirect (i.e. non-sensuous) a seventh *pramāṇa* (means of proof) will have to be recognised, because being entirely independent of *vyāpti*, etc. (the *karaṇas* in the five cognitions, inferential, etc. other than perceptual), it will be different from *liṅga* (reason), etc. and this will go against the tenets of the Nyāya system—the ‘check’ *apasiddhānta* can therefore be applied. If the mind is regarded as the *karaṇa* then even in the case of cognition by the eyes, etc. the eye, etc. will not be the *karaṇas* because even there as in the apprehension of pleasure, etc. the mind can be the *karaṇa* and the eyes etc. only accessories. The second alternative that the special cause is different from the above sense-organs, cannot similarly be upheld, because there would be the contingency of recognising a seventh sense-organ or a seventh means of proof (*pramāṇa*), KhKh, pp 353-358).

Then, it may be said, let *vyāpti* mean *avinābhāva*, the absence of one when the other is absent. When one thing being absent, the other is present, the relation between them is that of *vinābhāva* (separate existence); the negation of this is *avinābhāva*, which means that when one is absent, the other also is absent. But such a definition is faulty, for it can apply

to those cases where there is no real invariable concomitance. For instance, there is not *vyāpti* between *pārthivatva* and *loha-lekhyatva*, yet in *ākāśa* (ether), there is the absence of both, so according to the above definition they could be regarded as concomitant. It may be urged that concomitance cannot be determined by a single instance of co-absence, it must be approved that in all instances of the absence of the one (e.g. fire), there is also the absence of the other (e.g. smoke). But it is as difficult to ascertain universal co-absence as it is to ascertain universal co-presence. And if it is possible, then let there be the ascertainment of universal co-presence, rather than the unnecessarily crooked or round-about ascertainment of universal co absence .⁴⁵

Some define *vyāpti* as the co-presence of two things in respect of which there is evidence against the presence of one (probans) in a substrate (*vipakṣa*) where the other (probandum) is absent (*yatra vipakṣe vṛttau hetau bādhakam asti tayoṃ anvayo vyāptir iti kecit.*—KhKh, p. 359). But it is not possible to determine the impossibility of the presence of the probans where the probandum is absent—by sense-perception (which cannot cognise past, future and distant things), inference (which itself involves concomitance) or by any other source of knowledge (KhKh, pp. 359–363). *Tarka* (hypothetical reasoning) also is not capable of determining the impossibility of the presence of the probans where the probandum is absent. *Tarka* itself is based on *vyāpti*, so this would involve the contingency of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) Moreover, this second *vyāpti* would require for its determination another *tarka* which again would be based on *vyāpti* and so on *ad infinitum*—the fault of *anavasthā* (vicious infinite series). If *tarka* is not accepted as rooted in *vyāpti*, it will have a rather slender root (*mūla-śaithilya*) as *vyāpti* alone can serve as its firm root, and it will be a case of *tarkābhāsa*.

It may be urged that there will not be this difficulty, because the *tarka* required to confirm the *vyāpti* requires nothing to

confirm it. The *tarka* is: "If smoke is not regarded as concomitant with fire, then smoke being causeless would either be eternal or not exist at all." A further *tarka* is not required to determine or corroborate the *vyāpti* underlying this *tarka*, because if you doubt it, you will contradict your own practical experience. The practical rule is that doubts can be entertained only so long as such entertainment of doubts is compatible with practical behaviour, and does not contradict one's own practical activities or experience. Thus *tarka* which is the final evidence wherever there is doubt must be regarded as determining the impossibility of the presence of the probans where the probandum is absent.⁴⁶

The answer to this is that we would never raise a doubt like 'If smoke and fire were not invariably concomitant, there would not be the relation of effect and cause between them or smoke would be causeless', so that this could be incompatible with our experience. On the contrary, we would raise this doubt, "Smoke might very well arise from a cause different from fire also and in that case smoke would not be invariably concomitant with fire." It might be argued here that in that case all smokes would not be of the same class, as they are actually found to be. But are not cognitions of the same class whether they be generated by the sense-organs or by the means of inferential cognition and the like? This is true of smoke also. It may be urged that in the case of cognition (*jñāna*) the sense-organs etc. are responsible for the sub-classes or species (*avāntara-sāmānya*), directness (*sākṣātkāritva*), etc., and not for the class-character knowledge (*jñānatva*). But in that case, some factor present in all cases as responsible for *jñānatva* will have to be mentioned in order to avert the contingency of the accidental character of *jñānatva*. And we can similarly say that fire is responsible for some particularity (*viśeṣa*) of smoke and not for the generality 'smokeness' (*dhūmatva*). It cannot be rejoined that no particularity is noticed in smoke which could be said to have been brought about by fire, because this non-awareness can be explained on the strength of the non-perception of the species

(*avāntara-jāti*) in the case of smoke due to certain other circumstances. That is to say, we have not had the occasion to perceive a particularity of smoke brought about by a cause other than fire, and so the particularity of smoke brought about by fire is not noticed. But when the particularity brought about by another cause is observed, the question as to what is responsible for the generality *dhūmatva* will certainly be raised. Nothing can come in the way of this possibility.

It may be suggested that the contact of soul and mind is a common cause in the generation of all cognitions which accounts for their *jñānatva*, whereas no such cause other than fire is found which could generate all smokes and account for 'smokeness' (*dhūmatva*). But if what is generated by the contact of soul and mind be cognition, then desire and the like also would have to be regarded as cognition. If a particular unseen (*adr̥ṣṭa-viśeṣa*) or a particular potency (*śaktiviśeṣa*) or the generality *jñānatva* or the prior negation (*prāgabhāva*) of cognition be regarded as the common cause of all cognition, then even in the case of smoke when smoke and fire are not concomitant, these can account for the generality smokeness (*dhūmatva*) of smokes, and fire, etc. can be responsible for their particularity. There may be cases where smoke and fire are not co-present though we may not at present be aware of these. The *pramāṇa-vādin* (one who recognises the validity of *pramāṇas*) may be tempted to say : " If you go on doubting in this way, you will never be able to employ any inference Unless you infer the existence of a soul in your opponent in a debate you will not be able to discuss with him. And if you infer the existence of his soul, you will have a doubt about your inference, and this will contradict your own activity or behaviour (*svakriyāvyāghāta*). Thus you will yourself be subject to the fault of *vyāghāta* (contradiction) urged above." The rejoinder to this is : " Do you want to suggest that even when there is a doubt as to the concomitance, the inferential cognition is true ? But you yourself admit the fallacy of *śaṅkitopādhi* (the doubt of an adventitious factor) intervening between the probans and

the probandum and bringing about their concomitance. Or do you want to suggest that even a defective *anumāna* (instrument of inference) is a special instrument of valid inferential cognition? In that case as the inferential cognition of fire from smoke is valid so the inferential cognition from fire of its causes, grass, fuel, stone (*maṇi*) etc. would have to be regarded as valid. When the causal apparatus—the presence of the probans in the minor term (*pakṣa*), doubt as to the concomitance of the probans and the probandum and the like—is the same, we cannot say that the inferential cognition of fire from smoke is valid, and that of grass, etc. from fire (e.g. ‘This place has grass, because it has fire’) is invalid. If simply out of fear of *vyāghāta* (contradiction of practical experience) you do not allow doubt to arise even though the causal factors giving rise to it, viz. perception of common attributes, non-perception of particular feature, etc. are present, then you also are faced with the difficulty of *vyāghāta* as you make efforts to produce or bring together the causal aggregate in the form of words, etc. to give rise to knowledge or conviction in others and in spite of that the result is not achieved.” *

Udayana argues that if you entertain a doubt that it is possible that there may be instances at other places and times in which the concomitance recognised between two things may not be found to be true, then for the confirmation of this *vyāpti*, an *anumāna* will be necessary, since knowledge of other places and times must be acquired by inference as perception is always concerned with perceptible things here and now. So doubt itself proves the necessity of inference. If such an exaggerated doubt be considered illegitimate there is no obstruction in the way of inference. Doubts can be entertained only so long as such entertainment of doubts is compatible with our practical experience and *tarka* brings an end to doubts :

“*Śaṅkā ced anumāsty eva na cec chankā tatastarām.*

vyāghātādvadhīr āśaṅkā tarkaḥ śaṅkādvadhīr mataḥ.

(*Nyāya-kusumāñjali* 3.7)

* Śrīharsa has refuted the concept of *vyāghāta* in the fourth *pariccheda* in the context of the refutation of *tarka*.

Śrīharṣa gives a rejoinder by a slight change in the words of Udayana to the effect : If there is *vyāghāta* (contradiction) there must be doubt (because there cannot be *vyāghāta* without doubt). If there is no *vyāghāta* then in the absence of an obstructive factor, doubt prevails all the more. How could doubt be said to end finally with *vyāghāta* or how could *tarka* be said to bring an end to doubt (when doubt prevails even in respect of *vyāpti*, the very basis of *tarka*) ? (“*vyāghāto yadi śaṅkā'st na cec chankā tatastarām. vyāghātāvadhir āśaṅkā tarkaḥ śaṅkāvadhiḥ kutah.*—KbKh. p. 310). Thus *tarka* cannot remove doubts and ascertain *vyāpti*

Others define *vyāpti* as a natural relationship (*svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ*). But we may ask whose natural relationship it is Is it of the things related or of other things ? If it is of other things then the position will be reversed; that is to say, there will be *vyāpti* of unrelated things alone. If it is said to be the natural relationship of related things, what is meant by ‘natural’ ? Does it mean (i) that the relation subsists in the very *svabhāva* (nature) of the related things, (e.g. ‘hotness’ subsisting in the *svabhāva* of fire), or (ii) that it is produced by the *svabhāva* of the related things (e.g. the fructification of trees being brought about by spring is natural to it), or (iii) that it is not different from the *svabhāva* constituting the relatedness—(that is to say, *vyāpti* is identical with relation which is their very nature) or (iv) it is pervaded by (or is the determinate concomitant of) the *svabhāva* of the related things; or (v) that it is not brought about by anything other than the *svabhāva* of the related things; or (vi) is it meant to be something else ?⁴⁷

If it has the first meaning, then *pārthivatva* and *loholekhyatva* also will become invariably concomitant, because *loholekhyatva* is found with *pārthivatva*. If it is understood as produced by the *svabhāva* of the related things, then the definition will be either too wide or too narrow. For instance, *vyāpti* between smoke and ass will have to be accepted because the relation between the two is produced by them (—the fault of *ativyāpti*, the definition will be too wide); and the relation of *samavāya* (inherence) in the same substrate

in the case of colour and taste cannot then be considered as *vyāpti* because it is not produced by them (—the fault of *avyāpti*, the definition will be too narrow). Hence also the third interpretation is not tenable; as the definition will then apply to the relation of the surface of the ground and negation of jar (*ghaṭābhāva*) and will not apply to the relation of smoke and fire. The fourth interpretation too is not proper because unless *vyāpti* is defined *vyāpyatva* cannot be explained; there would be *ātmāśraya*. Moreover, if the relation is regarded as less extensive or pervaded, then the more extensive (pervading) related things will be found in more places than the relation and there will be nothing to guarantee the inference of one thing from the perception of the other. That is to say, there will be *vyāpti* between relation and the related things, but not between the related things themselves, so one will not be able to infer one thing from the other. 'Svābhāvika' cannot also have the fifth meaning, 'not brought about by anything other than the *svabhāva* of the related things'. If 'not brought about' means that it is 'not produced', then this amounts to the relation being unproduced i.e. eternal and then the qualification 'by a thing other than' will become superfluous, because what is unproduced is not produced even by the *svabhāva* of the related things. Even if it is regarded as a produced relation its nature will not be established, as it is nowhere to be found that a relation is generated only by the two related things. All generated things are generated by the causal apparatus and so ultimately it will have to be admitted that the relation is produced by time, space, *adr̥ṣṭa*, etc also. Moreover if '*prayukta*' means '*janya*' (produced), the definition will not apply to unproduced relation, e.g. inherence of colour and taste in one substrate, and the definition will be too narrow (*avyāptidosā*). The sixth interpretation also is not proper as it is not possible to explain it. Still it is necessary to put forth an alternative like this last one to avoid the possible doubt of the fault of *nyūnatva*, that is to say, to avert the charge of the opponent that all possible alternative interpretations have not been discussed and refuted,

and that his own view falls outside the alternatives mentioned and so stands unrefuted (KhKh, pp. 370-371).

Still another definition of *vyāpti* is : '*Vyāpti* is a relation which is not adventitious' (*anaupādhikaḥ sambandho vyāptih*) What is *upādhi*, freedom from which amounts to 'non adventitiousness' ? "*Upādhi* (conditional circumstance or adventitious factor) is that which being more extensive than the probandum is less extensive than the probans" (*sādhya-vyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakah*.—KhKh, p. 372). This is the substance derived negatively from Udayana's definition, that "Of the probans and the third factor (which is recognised as the *upādhi*), the two being unrelated, that is the *upādhi* whose negation is pervaded by the negation of the probandum when the relation of one (i.e. the probans) with the probandum is to be cognised.⁴⁸ Connection with moist fuel, for instance, is the *upādhi* in the inference of smoke from fire, just as *japā* flower responsible for the appearance of redness in crystal is called an *upādhi*. It is said that a probans associated with an *upādhi* can never prove the probandum. Even if there is the slightest suspicion of this *upādhi*, the probandum cannot be determined by the *probans* Śrīharṣa's rejoinder is that according to this definition, even *paksetaratva* 'being other than the minor term' would become an *upādhi* and this being present in all inferences, no inference would ever be possible. Moreover, unless *vyāpti* has been defined one cannot say that the *upādhi* is *sādhana-vyāpaka* (less extensive than or pervaded by the probans) and *sādhya-vyāpaka* (more extensive than or the pervader of the probandum) Thus conditionality (*aupādhikatva*) of relations cannot be determined without the knowledge of the nature of *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) and this latter cannot be determined without a previous determination of the conditionality or otherwise of relations (KhKh, pp. 371 ff).

Thus it is not possible to explain *vyāpti*, and so to accept its truth.

Some logicians believe that *vyāpti* and *paksadharmatā* (presence of the probans in the minor term) jointly give rise

to inferential cognition. We ask : what is this *pakṣa*, being the attribute of which is said to be *pakṣa-dharmatā* ? *Pakṣa* is defined as the thing in respect of which the attribute which is the probandum is desired to be proved (*sisādhayisita-sādhya-dharmā dharmī*—KhKh, p. 382). Is desire to prove (*sisādhayisā*) the desire to communicate (*pratipipādayisā*) or the desire to know (*pratipitsā*) ? In either case the definition will be too narrow as it will not apply to inference for oneself, in which in some cases there is not even the desire to know (as for instance in 'Rotten meat must have a bad taste as it gives out smell' *saṣṭitamāṃsam kuṣitarasavat asurabhigandhavativāt*).

Pakṣa cannot also be defined as that in respect of which the attribute is not known or determined (*anavadhārīta-dharmā dharmī pakṣaḥ*—KhKh, p. 383). Like the probandum the probans also is an attribute of the *pakṣa* and if it also be not known, there could not be *liṅgaparāmarśa* (consideration of the probans, which is concomitant with the probandum, as present in the *pakṣa*) and consequently inferential cognition would be impossible as *liṅga-parāmarśa* is the cause of inferential cognition. And if the probans be known as an attribute of the *pakṣa*, the above definition of the *pakṣa* would no longer be true. The definition may be attempted to be modified as follows : *Pakṣa* is that in respect of which the object of the probans i.e. the probandum) is not known as an attribute (*anavadhārītahetu-viṣayadharmā dharmī pakṣaḥ*.—KhKh, p. 383). But to whom is it not known ? It surely could not be unknown to the man who sets forth the inference for he would not then be able to demonstrate it to the other party by means of a syllogism; that is to say, inference for others (*parārthānumāna*) would be impossible. It cannot also be said to be necessarily unknown to the other party, because even in respect of a thing that is known to both parties, there is seen to be the use of inference in debates in order to show off the respective excellence of knowledge. Moreover, is this the absence of knowledge of an attribute which is the object of just any probans or of the probans adduced by the debater ? The former alternative is

not true, because even when there is definite knowledge of fire, the mountain would, according to this, be a *pakṣa* because there is absence of knowledge of a number of attributes, the objects of different *hetu* (reasons). The second alternative also is not true, because even when fire is known as an attribute of the mountain, the latter can be a *pakṣa* in respect of the darkness, location, etc. which can be inferred from the *hetu* (probans) smoke and so are its objects. And even other *hetus* are employed by the debater at some time or the other. If it is specifically pointed out that that is the *pakṣa* in respect of which a particular attribute is not known, then the definition will become too narrow and a different definition will be required for each different set of probans and probandum. A definition will have to be provided for the *pakṣa* of each and every inference. There will also be the fault of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) as the *hetu* is defined as that which is concomitant with the probandum and which subsists in the *pakṣa*, and *pakṣa* is defined as having an attribute which is the object of the probans.⁴⁹

The probans is not stated in inference for oneself, so there being no *pakṣa* there will not be inferential cognition; and in the case of a contrary reason (*viruddha-hetu*) there will be negation of *pakṣa-dharmatā*, because there the probandum is not the object of the probans. It may be urged that since the probans is concomitant with what is opposed to the probandum, it is regarded as fallacious and the inference is rendered invalid even on account of this. The answer to this is that *virodha* is directly a fault of the *hetu* and not through the *pakṣa*.

This also repudiates the definitions that *pakṣa* is that in respect of which there is a doubt about the probandum being its attribute and the probandum is that which is the object of the cognition produced by inference for oneself or for others⁵⁰

“Or *pakṣa* may be what you like, but what is *pakṣadharmatā* ?”

It is said to signify presence in the *paksa* (*pakṣāśrītatā*). But in that case *prameyatva* (cognisability) will not remain a probans for the Naiyāyikas. They do not regard *prameyatva*, which is of the nature of the relation of object and subject (*viśaya-viśayin*) as distinct from the nature of the knowable (*jñeya*), and knowledge (*jñāna*), and these *jñeya* and *jñāna* cannot reside in the *jñeya* (the *paksa* here, every *paksa* being a *jñeya*). For instance, in the inference, 'Jar is nameable, because it is knowable' (*vācyo ghaṭaḥ prameyatvāt*), knowability of the nature of jar and its cognition cannot reside in jar as a thing cannot be its own substrate and cognition cannot subsist in anything but the soul, so there will not be *paksadharmatā*.⁵¹ The definition will thus be too narrow. It may be urged that *pakṣadharmatā* signifies the competence of the pervaded i.e. probans (*vyāpya*) to restrict to the particular (mountain and the like) the knowledge which is envisaged in grasping the pervader or probandum (*vyāpaka*) in its universality on the strength of *vyāpti*.⁵² But this is not true, because cognition of the universal is not impossible without the cognition of the particular, just as knowledge of *vyāpti* (e.g. whatever has smoke has fire) is not impossible without the cognition of the particulars. If the knowledge of universal is really impossible without that of particulars the acquisition of this latter knowledge will be a case of knowledge derived through *vyāpti* (i.e. a case of inferential knowledge—the cases of *arthāpatti* being according to the Naiyāyika cases of inference). As a matter of fact, if the knowledge of universal does really stand in need of that of particulars, we will have the undesirable contingency either of the type of 'interrupted operation' (*viramya vyāpārāpatti*) or of the type of necessity of 'positing an additional instrument of valid cognition' (*mānāntaratvāpatti*). (The first type of undesirable contingency will arise if it is held that the knowledge of universal first comes into existence and is then followed by that of particulars; the second type will arise if it is held that the knowledge of universal not being tenable gives rise to that of particulars.—Śaṅkara Miśra).

If the particularity of the probandum is established by *pakṣadharmatā*, then on perceiving fire by the eye after its inference, or on perceiving two men after having inferred the existence of a man from his voice, there should not be the doubt, 'Is this the same particular fire as was inferred or is it another?' or 'Is this the man who was inferred or is it the other one?' It may be urged that there is such a doubt because previously there was not the perception of the particular or specific character. Then it can as well be said that afterwards (i.e. at the time of doubt) the perception of the specific character is already there and so there should not be doubt. But the doubt is there (KhKh, pp 382-385). That is to say, knowledge of particular is not possible with the help of inference.

Thus *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* which are regarded as the special causes of inferential cognition cannot be explained and so inference cannot be explained. Thus the source of knowledge called inference (*anumāna*) is repudiated ⁵³

Śrīharṣa has, besides repudiating the *pramāṇas*, however strange it may seem, similarly refuted even *hetvābhāsas* (fallacies of reason) (KhKh, pp. 415 ff) and *nigrahassthānas* as also other faults of reasoning and debating. This shows that the Tattvopaplavavādins on the one hand, and the Anirvacanīyatāvādins (those who say that the absolute is beyond expression, and everything else is indefinable and so unreal—the Mādhyamikas and the Kevalādvaitins) on the other challenge the concepts of truth and error, validity and invalidity which are usually admitted by the other philosophers. They hold that nothing can be known by means of the empirical sources of knowledge. The sceptics do not recognise any reality, while the absolutists admit a non-dual ultimate principle which can be realised by the highest spiritual experience alone, but which the empirical sources of knowledge cannot grasp and which cannot be described in terms of empirical concepts and conventional symbols—products of the discursive intellect.

But then a very honest and pertinent question can be asked: How can the thinkers of other schools of thought discuss with such sceptics and how can the latter refute the views of other schools of thought if they do not recognise any of the sources of knowledge or the standards of truth and error or subscribe to any philosophical doctrine?

Śrīharṣa has in his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* raised this very question before starting to confute the categories of the Nyāya system, especially those pertaining to, and connected with, knowledge. How is a debate or a discussion possible without both the parties recognising the well-known sources of knowledge (*pramāṇas*)? Some are of the view what *pramāṇas* and the like being established as the accepted principles or tenets of all the schools of thought they should be recognised by both parties in a debate, otherwise discourse would be impossible. Others (—the absolutists and the sceptics) do not agree with this. On what ground could it be said that both parties in a debate should recognise the reality of the *pramāṇas* etc.? (1) Is it so because the two parties not recognising these could possibly carry on their controversy or debate which is invariably connected with the simultaneity of acceptance, so that whoever is a debater must always be one who recognises the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc.? (2) Or because *pramāṇas*, etc. are the causes in respect of the controversy to be carried on by the two parties? (3) Or because they are popularly accepted? (4) Or if they are not recognised even those ordinary persons who know nothing of these could be said to be able to determine the truth and to attain victory—which is absurd (that is to say, because the results of a controversy cannot be attained without the recognition of *pramāṇas*, etc.)? ⁵⁴.

The first cannot be a sound reason, as there are known to have been debates and discussions with and between Lokāyatikas and Mādhyamikas who do not recognise these; and if such conversation and discussions on their part were

impossible, 'Why did you take pains to refute them?' Wonderful is this *mantra* (charm) in the form of non-acceptance of the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc. meant for silencing speech, under whose influence the *Lokāyatika-sūtras* were not composed by revered Bṛhaspati, the tenets of the Mādhyamikas were not taught by Buddha, or a commentary was not written by Śāṅkara on the *sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa : (that is to say, these were undoubtedly accomplished so it does not follow that one who does not recognise the *pramāṇas* cannot speak or discuss). It may be urged that even those who do not recognise the *pramāṇas* and the like may give expression to their stand-point, but simply on account of this their utterances will not be competent to establish or confute anything. But this is not true. Non-acceptance of the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc. is not a factor deciding ineffectuality in respect of proving or confuting; the deciding factor, on the other hand, is that these utterances should be possessed of the characteristics of a valid statement in order to be able to prove or confute anything, or possessed of the characteristics of a fallacious or invalid statement (i.e. *nigrahasthāna*, *jāti*) in order to be ineffectual in this respect. It is this that is acceptable to all. It is a known fact that even if both the parties in a debate admit the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc. the view or thesis of one party is refuted by the members of the other party who are the adherents of a different school of thought. This shows that merely acceptance of *pramāṇas*, etc. cannot make utterances effectual or sound; and even one who does not recognise the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc. cannot be said to be defeated unless the opponent detects some flaw in his argument. Merely saying, though it be a hundred times, that the opponent is carrying on the debate without recognising *pramāṇas*, etc. will carry no weight in respect of the result of the controversy. If this is an arbitrary criterion, the sceptic can as well say that the statements of a person who recognises the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc. will invariably be invalid simply because he recognises the reality of these.

It may be urged that in the absence of *pramāṇas* there would be no debate and there would be no question of

refutation and the like as all assertions and negations are dependent on the *pramāṇas*. The sceptic answers this by saying : "We do not insist that one must start the controversy or debate only after admitting that there are no *pramāṇas*. We only say that just as you enter into a debate believing in their reality, there may be some debaters who are indifferent as to the reality or unreality of *pramāṇas* etc. and yet they can carry on the discussion. Otherwise it would not be even possible to find fault with our position by fathering on us the view that *pramāṇas*, etc. have no reality. What rule or limit (*maryādā*) is this debate subject to on the basis of which you are refuting us? Is it that (i) both parties must admit the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc. or that (ii) both parties must admit their unreality, or that (iii) one party must admit their reality and the other their unreality? The first is not acceptable for the charge of a debate not being possible has no scope in respect of one who admits the reality of the *pramāṇas* and the like. In the second case, you will yourself be in a difficult position for it will mean that you also do not recognise them. The third also is not true for in the same way other debates also can be carried on. The rules of a debate should, as a matter of fact, be such as are acceptable to all—these rules are those pertaining to the time-limit, the selection of judges and the like. In the absence of such rules applicable and acceptable to both the parties in a debate, the opponent also would according to his own whim point out some flaw in your expression, and it would be difficult to decide to whom the victory should go. For instance, if there were no conventional prohibitions of utterances like *Hum*, *Fat*, etc. or if there were not rules regarding expression etc. to be observed by both parties any kind of expression could be objected to and made a ground of censure or defeat. And one who admits the reality of the *pramāṇas*, etc. has this extra burden on him over and above the acceptance of the common rules. It follows therefore, that you have urged this objection against me in a debate which is subject to the rules

pertaining to time etc., irrespective of whether the reality or unreality of *pramāṇas* etc., is recognised. Thus arguing in a debate which is carried on irrespective of the reality or otherwise of *pramāṇas*, etc., you tell me that there cannot be a debate without the recognition of the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., which means that you cannot decide what your own stand is and so you cannot even distantly hope to understand the stand-point of others.' The sum and substance of this is that the sceptic says that he is indifferent as to the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., the '*pramāṇavādin*', on the other hand, ascribes to him the view that there are no *pramāṇas*.

The *pramāṇavādin* may retort; "It is not our intention to debar a sceptic from debates by saying that he who does not recognise *pramāṇas*, etc. cannot enter into a debate, after having entered into a debate with him. We are only trying to impress upon our pupils and followers that one who does not recognise *pramāṇas*, etc. has no right to enter into a discussion. It is because of this that Vātsyāyana has said, 'If on being questioned about the purpose, *he* accepts it'; he has not used the expression, '*you* accept it'." But this is not convincing. The *pramāṇavādin* will to have explain to his pupil: 'This is the drawback of the Lokāyatikas and the like'. This drawback could be pointed out in a debate which would have to be initiated without admitting the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc. Thus if the Lokāyatikas and the like have access to a debate, then it is contradictory to say that they no right to enter into a debate; and if they have no right this check could be applied only in a debate which must be initiated irrespective of the stand that they have no right to discuss (KhKh, pp. 6-13).

The second reason that *pramāṇas*, etc. are the causes of debate is also not acceptable. If there were no debates with or among thinkers denying the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., then alone could it be said that *pramāṇas*, etc. are the causes of the debate carried on by debaters. As we have seen, it is not possible to deny the debates carried on by the Mādhyamikas and other sceptical thinkers. It may be urged:

"*Pramāṇas*, etc. are real because they are the causes of debate between two debating parties and a cause is always an immediately preceding existent thing (*niyata-pūrvabhāvi sat*), and because they are real they are recognised, as the established practice is that what is real is recognised". This is not true. What rules and limits is the debate subject to in which it is established that the *pramāṇas* etc. are the causes of the debate of the debaters, and that because they are real they are recognised? If this debate could be carried on even before determining the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., other debates could be similarly carried on; there would be the fault of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) if it is said that the recognition of *pramāṇas*, etc., depends on a debate which in its turn can proceed only if *pramāṇas*, etc. are recognised.

Those wishing to determine the truth or to defeat the rival party in a debate should admit before the debate starts only as much as is simply necessary for achieving their end; and this is possible in the case of either party if they only fix the rules of debate as to time, etc., and this is what is actually done. These rules are : 'The proponent should employ *pramāṇas* and *tarka*; the opponent similarly should point out to the proponent one of the *nigrahasthānas* such as *pratijñāhāni* and the like, which are indicative of the negation of truth. If the *nigrahasthāna* is properly urged by the opponent, the proponent should be declared defeated, and if the opponent is not able to do so and the proponent can avert it, the opponent should be declared defeated. Accordingly, the other party is declared victorious. The thesis supported by *pramāṇas* should be declared as the true one'. That is to say, our mundane activities, e.g. debates, can be carried on without the recognition of the reality of things, e.g. *pramāṇas*; only there must be consistency in our behaviour.

It may be argued that that these rules of a debate are its cause must similarly be proved in a debate which would have to be carried on without these rules and they are thus not proved

to be essential constituents of a debate. But such a rejoinder is out of place, because both the debating parties of their own sweet will accept these rules of debate as the very basis of the determination of truth or of victory, which is desired to be attained by their procedure of investigation. That is to say, there has never been any difference of opinion regarding these rules as no debate could proceed without these, and they are therefore the real causes of a debate. It need not be feared that in such a debate which is not preceded by the knowledge of *pramāṇas* etc., but is based only on what is accepted by the will of both parties, there would be the contingency of the upsetting of the relative positions in respect of the mode of reasoning (*sādhana*, establishing and *dūṣaṇa*, refutation), the objects of investigation (*pakṣa-vipakṣa*, thesis-counter-thesis, or *vādin-prativādin*, proponent-opponent) and result (victory and defeat or determination of truth), or the investigation would not give rise to true knowledge, there would not be objects under investigation, and there would be absence of victory and the like on account of the possibility of the very root being vitiated. This set of rules is empirically real, has been traditionally handed down and has always been found to be consistent by the elders (that is to say, they have accepted that debates are not possible without these rules which are invariably found to make the procedure of the debate possible), and what is found to be consistent is recognised as empirically true. Thus, this set of rules is unvitiated inasmuch as these rules are self-established since one could not even think of the possibility of debates being conducted without them. But it is not similarly incumbent on both the parties to accept the necessity of *pramāṇas*, etc.; because a debate is possible only if the rules are recognised, even without recognising the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc.; and even if the reality of the *pramāṇas* is admitted, determination of truth or victory which is the desired end of the two rival parties will not be accomplished in the absence of the above mentioned set of rules. (KhKh, pp. 13-16)

The third alternative that *pramāṇas*, etc. are the causes of a debate because they are popularly believed to be so, is also not tenable. Is this popular belief based on *pramāṇas* or is it the belief common to the vulgar and the like? It cannot be the former as without an attempt at investigation or discussion it cannot be proved to be based on *pramāṇas*, and it is for this investigation that rules are initially sought to be fixed. Nor can it be the latter as in that case even the opinion of those who believe that the soul is not different from the body and the like will have to be accepted. If it is argued that such opinions are not accepted because they are repudiated by reasoning, then even *pramāṇas* if they can be repudiated by reasoning should not be admitted, otherwise (i.e. if they be not refuted) they could be admitted. Thus, not popular opinion but absence of repudiation by reasoning is the criterion of acceptance or recognition (KhKh, p. 17).

The fourth alternative including the contingency urged is also not plausible, for as the *pramāṇavādins* resort to the set of rules for a debate after recognising the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., even so the sceptics resort to the set of rules while being indifferent as to the reality or unreality of *pramāṇas*, etc. Hence the contingency urged would hold true in the case of either. That is to say, the determination of the set of rules alone can decide which party is victorious, and not the acceptance of the reality of *pramāṇas*, which is therefore superfluous.

It may be argued that even a person who engages in a debate after having fixed the rules for a debate will have to recognise the reality—may be empirical—of *pramāṇas*, etc., as it is not possible to speak of practical activity without accepting the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc. Activity (*kriyā*) means the making existent of what is non-existent. The rule that one must proceed with the help of the *pramāṇas* will not be determined unless the fact of the *pramāṇas* being the cause is included in the set of rules, and a cause is that which is necessarily existent immediately before the effect, so the reality

of the *pramāṇas* must be accepted. And if a rule is fixed that a person should be declared defeated if there are defects in his reasoning, and that there being the rule of invariable concomitance and the other members of a syllogism, the conclusion is necessarily true,—then it is futile to say that it is possible to engage in a debate even without recognising the reality of *pramāṇas* etc.

The answer to this is that this is not tenable. Even these arguments can be advanced in order to prove the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., only after a debate has started, so as this debate can proceed without the recognition of the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., other debates may similarly be possible only if the set of rules is fixed. It may be argued that the set of rules which are voluntarily accepted results ultimately in the acceptance of the existence or reality of *pramāṇas*, etc. But this is not true as the knowledge of existence may then be an *aṅga* (accessory factor) of a debate, but not existence itself. Is it meant to be suggested that existence must be accepted simply on the strength of mere knowledge of existence or on the strength of uncontradicted knowledge? The former is not true since in that case the existence of water in a mirage will have to be accepted. The latter also is not tenable. Is this absence of contradiction meant to refer to only the proponent (*vādin*), the opponent (*prativādin*) and the judge (*madhyastha*) and that too only at the time of the debate, or to just any person at all times. It cannot be the former as it is on the face of it absurd. A thing may be known at one particular time in the same way by all the three persons, yet this knowledge is mostly found to be contradicted by the knowledge of a fourth person or by their own cognition at another time. And a thing though unreal will not be regarded as real in the same form as it was cognised in, even after a contradicting knowledge has arisen, only on the strength of the earlier cognition of the three persons. Hence only that which is never contradicted by any person whatsoever can be regarded as real. Thus, even though the knowledge of the existence of

dūsaṇa (refutation) etc. (i.e. *pramāṇas* and the like) is regarded as an *aṅga* of the debate inasmuch as it is not contradicted by the debaters, etc. at the time of the debate, how does this affect the sceptic's non-acceptance (as an *aṅga* of the debate) of the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., which can be regarded as real only if they are never in any way contradicted? All empirical behaviour is found to be based only on the cognition of a thing as having a particular form by a few persons at a particular time, and the knowledge of the reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., which is regarded as an *aṅga* of the debate is of this type. It is, therefore, said that the debate is preceded by the recognition of the empirical reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., but the *pramāṇas* are not ultimately real as the Non-dual Brahman is the only Ultimate Principle. Hence, if the judges give the decision that a particular debater has not violated in the course of his argument the rules of debate as they were fixed at the outset, he is victorious, and defeat goes to him in respect of whom no such decision is possible. The party in respect of whom there is the recognition of a flaw or *nigrahaśthāna* urged by the other party is defeated, not the other. These and such other rules should be accepted as indispensable for starting a debate. (KhKh, pp. 17-22)

Śrīharṣa has made it clear that even these rules are only empirically real or valid, inasmuch as they help to carry on the debate since they are fixed by mutual consent by both the parties.⁵⁵ The gist of Śrīharṣa's argument is that though the sceptics and the Absolutists do not admit the ultimate reality of *pramāṇas*, etc., they are not keen on proving them unreal in the case of each and every debate; they are just indifferent as to their reality or otherwise and make use of them only in order to facilitate the procedure of the debate and also to defeat the opponent on his own ground by pointing out contradictions in the set-up of his own reasoning and the system consequently evolved. They subscribe whole-heartedly to the rules of procedure fixed by mutual consent by the two parties in a debate. But by their inner conviction they do

not recognise the ultimate reality of these as none can stand a critical examination; the conflict in reason cannot be eradicated. Hence the sceptics do not claim to possess any theory or doctrine of their own; they are satisfied with the popular beliefs and prevalent views so long as they work. We may also note that Nāgārjuna did not see any need to introduce any change in the prevalent logic of his times. What is the sense in creating factions and dogmas unnecessarily when they cannot explain the ultimate truth? One dogma is as good or as bad as any other. Candrakīrti also vindicates, from the stand-point of empirical truth, the soundness of commonsense notions with regard to the objects of sense-perception as against the Sautrāntika-Vijñānavāda doctrines of the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and perception as devoid of conceptualisation (*kalpanāpoḍha*); these refinements or niceties have not much use either as a statement of the empirical or of the ultimate reality.

Nāgārjuna has, in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, similarly anticipated an objection that if everything is without essence (*niḥsvabhāva*), words are included in this 'everything' and so must be *niḥsvabhāva* and so it is not possible to refute the essence of things. Nāgārjuna answers this by saying that his position is quite sound and consistent. Words are essenceless and whatever is expressed by them is also essenceless. What he affirms is not contrary to the empirical or conventional truth, nor does he disregard it. He can affirm that the essence of all *dharma*s is void because he bases his reasoning upon the conventional truth. If he claimed that his thesis was real then his position could be challenged. But he does not regard his thesis as real. There is neither the refutation of objects nor the thing to be refuted. That is to say, a sceptic or an absolutist has no thesis of his own to uphold; he refutes the stand-point of others to show the weakness of their theories and doctrines.⁵⁰

Some critics of sceptical thought and the *vitaṇḍā* type of debate are, as we have seen, impatient about this. They say that when the sceptic criticises the view of others, it is implied

that he has a constructive philosophy of his own. Collingwood, among the moderns, brands scepticism as 'a covert dogmatism'. When a sceptic condemns the philosophies of other people and points out faults in them, does it not imply a conception of what a constructive philosophy should be, as also a conception of what philosophical criticism should be? And should he not state and defend these against criticism? Hence a sceptic is dishonest inasmuch as he disclaims the possession of any theory of the nature, method and limitations of philosophical thought, and conceals it from criticism; and he applies a form of criticism which in his own case he will not admit.⁵⁷

The stand of the Indian thinkers with a sceptical tendency is that unless one can define a thing properly it is not possible to affirm its reality, and because all definitions and expositions are found to involve contradiction or other faults like *ātmāśraya*, *anyonyāśraya*, *cakraka*, *anavasthā*, etc., we cannot say anything to affirm the reality of things. All we can do is to suspend judgment, be indifferent as to their reality or unreality and carry on our mundane activities complacently. The conflict of Reason impedes us at every step. To explain one entity we have to depend on another, says Nāgārjuna, and what is dependent on another cannot have an essence of its own. Thus Reason cannot tell us anything of the reality of the things which are empirically accepted to carry on our worldly activities and satisfy our ego (e.g. conception of heaven, hell and the like), and the ordinary man cannot go beyond the normal range of the sense-organs and the intellect. Jayarāṣi stops at this. The Mādhyamikas and the Kevalādvaitins on the other hand have the conviction of the reality of the ultimate principle (*Śūnya*, *Nirguṇa Brahman*) which no flight of the intellect can know, but which can be realised by the transcendent vision or the highest spiritual experience. But from the point of view of Reason, everything is indescribable and so unreal. Thus, it can be seen that these sceptical or *vaiṭaṇḍika* thinkers have tried to subject themselves to the same criticism

as they apply to others. Nāgārjuna warns us against clinging to the view of *śūnyatā* also after it has served its purpose. Śaṅkara and all the Absolutist Vedāntins go to the extent of saying that the Upaniṣads, etc. also are *avidyā*, but have to be recognised empirically till the Ultimate Reality is realised. Śrīharṣa says that he has no soft corner for his own view of *anirvacanīyatā* (indescribability) also, as it also is included in 'everything', and should share the same fate; that is to say, it also is indescribable. He only wants to refute the view of others that things are *nirvacanīya* (describable); he does not want to establish the theory of *anirvacanīyatā* and so is not worried about its fate. According to the view of others when *nirvacanīyatā* is refuted, *anirvacanīyatā* would become established, but the thinkers of a sceptical tendency do not accept this and so do not hold themselves subject to the charge that they must also admit their acceptance of a philosophical conception when they criticise the philosophies of others.⁵⁸ They would not even say that everything is *anirvacanīya*, but they have to discourse with others and hence are compelled to use expressions which are invariably faulty, faults being themselves indescribable.⁵⁹ Conflict of Reason prevails everywhere. Nothing can be established if it is not self-established (—pure consciousness), the Absolutists would say.

'Is criticism possible without holding a position' ? This problem has been discussed in passing by Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.1, but his treatment is not satisfactory. He, it seems, fails to understand how a thesis could be criticised without accepting a counter-thesis. We have discussed this in connection with *vitaṇḍā*. If the *vaitaṇḍika*, says Vātsyāyana, has something to say, he has a thesis to establish and cannot be called a *vaitaṇḍika*; on the other hand, if he has nothing to say, his statements would be meaningless prattle. But the holding of a position cannot by itself decide the issue in favour of either party in a debate or discussion. The opponent can be defeated and his position refuted only if it is pointed out that his position involves contradiction, its

implications contradict it or are absurd. These need not be believed in by the party arguing and raising objections: what is necessary is that the consequences should be shown to be implied by the position of the opponent concerned to his satisfaction. The latter or the judges must be convinced of the absurdity of his position on the strength of principles acceptable to him. The Mādhyamikas or the Absolutists in general claim to do nothing else. They do not have any view or theory of their own and do not care to frame any argument to prove their own position as they have none. As both Candrakīrti and Śrīharṣa have pointed out, a *vādin*, in putting forward a thesis, is expected as he is a *pramāṇavādin* (believer in the reality of *pramāṇas*) to prove it. He must prove to his opponent the validity of the arguments by which he arrives at what he believes to be the right conclusion. But the sceptic or Absolutist has not to prove any thesis to convince his opponent. There are no reasons and examples which he believes to be true. He has only to reduce his opponent's position to absurdity by means of the logical apparatus acceptable to the opponent. To point out the conflict of Reason is his only task. To criticise a thesis it is not necessary to advance a counter-thesis. It is even irrelevant and defeating the purpose for which it is done.⁶⁰

But does not the sceptical attitude towards knowledge betray a 'defect of temper', * as Collingwood would put it? Its general temper instead of being sympathetic, as good criticism should be, can hardly escape being superficial and to some extent frivolous. Does it not display a disposition which sees no good in others? Yes, it does if the sceptic assumes the role of a sophist and is out just to criticise. We are apt to lose our temper when we find such a philosopher at times setting one position against another, when as a sceptic he should have criticised either position independently, or when he is just out to refute the opponent's position by any means

* *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, p. 139—R. G. Collingwood.

including the foul. Śrīharṣa says at the end of his *Khaṇḍ-nā-khaṇḍākhāḍya* : " All definitions should be similarly confuted; if necessary by inserting with slight changes an argument used elsewhere into these arguments, or by urging similar or other arguments. Thus an intelligent man should confute the categories propounded by others. If after you have refuted a definition, the opponent formulates another definition or explains away the objections raised, and if you are at a loss as to how to answer, you must initiate another refutation for the purpose of repudiating the meaning of a word used by the opponent in his reply. If even here the opponent can silence you, you should jump to another branch (i.e. pass on to another topic of refutation) and be thus very cautious in respect of the circle of refutation. There will not be the fault of *Arthāntara* (irrelevancy—a *nigrahassthāna*) on account of passing on to another subject, because the latter also is not irrelevant. Similarly, there will not be *Anaucitya* (impropriety) by virtue of shifting to another topic when you have started to settle one, because *anaucitya* occurs only when one passes on to an irrelevant topic. Otherwise, one will not dare to doubt or to desire to understand the probans '*kṛtakatva*' (artificiality) adduced to prove that *śabda* (word) is non-eternal, and there will be nothing like *anyatarāśiddhi* (—the probans not being recognised by one of the parties) and the like, because if the probans is attempted to be proved or established it would land one in *Arthāntara* or *Anaucitya*, with the result that no one would attempt to establish the probans in the context of the establishing of the probandum. But as a matter of fact, the probans is relevant because if the probans which is meant to prove the probandum cannot be explained (—is *anirvacanīya*), the *sādhya* also will turn out to be indescribable (*anirvacanīya*)". (KhFh, pp. 730-731). Śrīharṣa concludes : 'My method of confutation has a triple course—urging arguments similar to the ones advanced by me, use of arguments employed by me in one place in another context, and when one finds these insufficient, a chain of other refutations.'⁶¹

As a rule, the sceptical philosopher is very conscientious and cautious lest his method drift into mere sophistry. "He uses only one weapon—By drawing out the unacceptable implications of any view he shows its self-contradictory and absurd character. The dialectic is a series of *reductio ad absurdum* arguments (*prasaṅgāpādana*);⁶³ every thesis is turned against itself." * The sceptic disproves the opponent's view but does not uphold any position of his own, because the disproving of the opponent's position does not necessarily mean the establishing of one's own indirectly, for the opponent's view and its opposite may both be false. For instance, the rejection of *satkāryavāda* (—the theory that the effect is latent in the cause) does not entail the proving of *ārambhavāda* or *asatkāryavāda* (—the theory that a novel effect is produced by the causes). As a matter of fact, even the latter and all other theories of causality as also the concept of causality can be confuted.

The dialectic of such philosophers is not merely bent on refuting; it is pre-eminently a critique of Reason—a criticism of Reason undertaken by Reason itself, a case of Reason sitting in judgement upon itself. There is no ill will against any one school of philosophy or all schools of philosophical thought; there is only self-criticism. Mere refutation of all the prevalent views cannot help anyone unless it is helpful in saving him from the mistakes committed by others. The Mādhyamika, for instance, wants to free the human mind of dogmatism (—including that of *Śūnyatā*) and the net of conceptualisation (*vikalpa-jāla*) and verbal elaboration. Conflict is visible everywhere in reason which therefore has no access to the Ultimate Reality which cannot be described in terms of linguistic symbols which can express merely empirical concepts that are found to be anomalous and self-contradictory. Silence is, as a matter of fact, the only explanation reaching nearest the Absolute. Śrīharṣa similarly refutes all categories recognised by the systems of philosophy (mostly the Nyāya ones) on

* *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 131—T. R. V. Murti.

the basis of their own tenets and grounds and observes that Reason cannot give us any knowledge of the Highest which is Pure Consciousness and can only be spiritually experienced or realised (—this also is an inappropriate expression for we cannot be conscious of realising it when we are that and there is no duality).

We may again note here in passing that there was a sub-school of the Mādhyamikas, viz. the Svatantra Mādhyamika school, the chief exponent of which was Bhāvaviveka, which believed in advancing a counter-thesis. But this school was severely criticised by Candrakīrti in his *Vṛtti* on the *Mādhyamika Kārikā* as behaving in a manner opposed to the stand-point of a true Mādhyamika. When Bhāvaviveka adduces syllogisms of his own, he, Candrakīrti says, is merely trying to show off his skill at reasoning and he betrays the school to which he belongs. Candrakīrti reaffirmed the *prāsaṅgika* standpoint of Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka with the result that the sub-school to which the latter belonged never became popular. Candrakīrti's contention is that if the opponent is so dogmatic as not to be convinced even when the absurdity of his own stand is brought home to him on the basis of principles accepted by him, it will not in any way help to set forth a syllogism independently. And a Mādhyamika cannot set forth a syllogistic argument because he does not accept any counter-thesis and it is because of this that the Mādhyamika's position is irreproachable.⁶³

In conclusion we may say that the sceptical approach as revealed in some Indian philosophers is only an attempt at a Critique of Reason. It is, as said before, Reason sitting in judgement upon itself. 'Keep an open mind free from all dogmas and suspend judgement' is the message left by the sceptical philosophers. Of the two types of sceptical thinkers—the sceptics and the *anirvacanīyatānvādins* or Absolutists—the latter depended for the knowledge of truth upon spiritual or intuitive experience. The sceptical thought had this effect on Indian logic that it set all logicians thinking seriously and

consequently all the schools of philosophy tried to evolve their own theories of truth and validity. and of error in a very precise manner

NOTES

1. See *Madhyamika-vṛtti—Prasannapadā* Commentary of Candrakīrti, pp. 14 ff, 36 ff, etc. (Bibliotheca Buddhica).
2. Śrīharsa himself admits the similarity of his criticisms to those of Nāgārjuna—*Tathā hi yadi darśaneṣu śūnyāvadānirvacanīya-pakṣayor āśrayaṇam tadā tāvad amūṣām nirbādhaiva sārva-pathinatā*—KhKh, p. 138.
3. The historical reason may possibly be that in his own time the Nyāya was the most prominent school for the theory and the dialectical use of the *pramāṇas*.
4. *Api ca, yadi pramāṇādhīnaḥ prameyādhigamas tēpi pramāṇāni kena paricchidyanta ityādinaḥ Vīgrahavyāvartanyām vīhito doṣaḥ, tad-aparīhārāt samyag-laksana-dyotakatvam api nāsti*—MKV, p. 59.

Lakṣaṇādhīnā tāval laksyavyavasthītiḥ lakṣaṇāni cā'nupapannāni, jñātādhikaranādi-laksana-nirūpanadvāreṇa cakrakādyāpatteḥ.—KhKh, pp. 141-142.

Compare—*Sallakṣaṇanibandhanam mānavyavasthānam māna-nibandhanā ca meya-sthitiḥ, tad-abhāve tayoh sadvyavahāraḥ* *visayatvaṁ katham (svayam eva) ...tām.*—TPS, p. 1.

5. *Evamprakāraṇi tattallakṣaṇesu khaṇḍanāny ūhanīyāni tad etāsu khaṇḍana-yuktiṣu kām api sthānāntarasthām keṇā'pi prakāraṇārenā'-niya tat-sadṛśīm anyām vā svayam ūhitvā parair vivicyamānāni padārthāntarāny api buddhimatā bādhanīyāni.*—KhKh, p. 730.
6. *Pratītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat.*—MK, 18.10
Pratītya yad yad bhavati tat tac chāntam svabhāvataḥ.—MK, 7.16
apratītya samutpanno dharmah kaścīn na vidyate;
yasmat tasmād aśūnyo hi dharmah kaścīn na vidyate.—MK, 24.19
apara-pratyayaṁ śāntam prapañcair aprapañcitam,
nirvikalpam anānārtam etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam.—MK, 18.19
parasparāpekṣā siddhīr na svabhāviki—MKV, p. 200
7. *Yadi ca pramāṇatas teṣāṁ teṣāṁ prasiddhīr arthānām;*
teṣāṁ punah prasiddhīm bīḥi katham t-sām pramāṇānām.
anyair yadi pramāṇaiḥ pramāṇasiddhīr bhavaty anavasthā;
nādeḥ siddhīs tatrāsti naiva madhyasya nāntasya.

tesām atha pramānair vinā prasiddhiḥ vibhijyate vādaḥ,
vaisamikatvaṁ tasmīn viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavyaḥ.—ViV, 31-33

8. Atha tu pramānasiddhir bhavaty apeksyaiva te prameyāni;
vyatyaya evaṁ sati te dhruvaṁ pramāṇa-prameyānām.
—athā' pī manyase' peksyaiva prameyān arthān pramāṇāni bhavanti,
evaṁ hi sati mā bhūti pūrvokta-dosa iti kṛtvā, evaṁ te sati vyatyayaḥ
pramāṇa-prameyānām bhavati; pramāṇāni te prameyāni bhavanti
prameyaḥ sādhitatvāt pramāṇāni ca prameyāni bhavanti pramāṇānām
sādhakatvāt —ViV, 46 with Nāgārjuna's auto-commentary.
9. *Vigrahavyāvartanī* of Nāgārjuna with his own *ṛtti*—K. P. Javasswal and
Rāhu'a Sāṅkrīyāyana (Appendix to JBORS, Vol. 23) and Tucci's
Translation of the same in '*Pre-Diñnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic*' (GOS).
10. Tad evaṁ upaplutesu eva tattvesu avicārita-ramanīyāḥ sarve vyavahārā
ghatante iti.— TPS, p. 125.
11. TPS, pp. 2-3. Atha bādhanutpattya'vyabhicāritvaṁ jñāyate: bādhanut-
pattir vijñānasya kim yathārtha-grhītatvena, āhosvid bādhakajñārot-
pādaka-kāraṇakavalkalyād iti sandehmaḥ. —TPS, p. 2.
12. TPS, pp. 3-4. Atha pravṛtti-sāmarthyena avyabhicāritāṁ vetsy; pravṛtti-
sāmarthyam phalenā'bhīsambandhaḥ, phalaṁ ca srak-candana-vanito-
dakādi. tesu satyaphalanisatteti teṣu phalopacārah taddehasambandhaḥ
pravṛtti-sāmarthyam pravṛttau kāyasthā kriyā tat-sāmarthyam avyabhi-
cāritāṁ gamayati tat kim avagatam, anavagataṁ vā ? yadi nā'vagatam,
tad 'asti' iti katham vetsy, athā'vagatam, tadavagater avyabhicāritā
katham avagamyaṭa iti pūrvoktam anusartavyam.
udaka-prāptya pūrvotpannodakavijñānasya avyabhicāritā vyavasthā-
pyate. kim tatpratibhārodakaprāptya, āhosvit tajjatiyodakaprāptya, tad-
vaṁśajajalaprāptya vā ? — TPS, p. 3.
13. For refutation of *jāti*, vide TPS, pp. 4-8.
14. This would be a problem with all inferences. The probans and the
probandum are known in their generality, then from a particular probans
in a particular substratum, the probandum is connected with the
substratum.
15. TPS, p. 9. Avidyamānasya visayārtho vaktavyaḥ—kim ākāṛpakatvena
vā, mahattvādidbarmopetatvena vā, sattā mātrena vā, sahlotpādena vā ?
sarvasya pratyastamitatvāt katham asau visayaḥ ? tad-viśayatve
keṣondukādi-vijñānasyeva mithyātve bijam anvesanīyam ātmasattāmātrena
mithyātve sarvasya mithyātvam āpadyate tatraḥ tattvopaplavaḥ syāt.—
TPS, p. 9.

16. TPS, pp. 11-13. Ko'yam ālambanārtho nāma yenedam udghuṣyate—anyad ālambanam cānyat pratibhāṭīti?—kim vijñānajanakatvam, ākāra'-rpakatvam, vijñānādhikarāṇatvam, vijñānāvabhāsitaīā vā?—TPS, p. 12.
17. Atha bādhyamānatvena mithyātvam iti cet, kim bādhyate—arthah, jñānam, ubhayam vā? yady arthasya bādha, sa kena bādhyate? kim svayam evātmānam bādhathe, āho arthāntareṇa, jñānena vā.—TPS, p. 14.
18. Atha jñānena bādhyate, kim tad-visayeṇa, anya-viṣayeṇa, nirviṣayeṇa vā? yadi tad-visayeṇa, tadā tat svarūpam vidhatte na tu viparyāsayati tadākāra-paryavasita-rūpatvāt. atha anyaviṣayam bādhakam, tad api na yujyate, yad yadvisayam tat tasyaiva sattām vidhatte na tv anyasya vidhāyakam pratiśedhakam vā svaṣiṣaya-paryavasāyinyo hi buddhayaḥ. atha nirviṣayena bādhyate, na kimcid vidadhāti pratiśedhati vā nirvisayatvād eva.—TPS, pp. 15-16.
19. Na hi sarve bhāvāḥ sarvapuruṣārtha-hetavaḥ. na ca sarvapuruṣārthakriyā-viḥnam etad ity avagantum pāryate arvāgvidā. tasmāt sthitam etad avyabhiçāri-padam anarthakam.—TPS, p. 17.
20. Tasmin sandeḥa jñāne jāte kimcit pratibhāti āho na pratibhāti? tad yadi pratibhāti, sa kim dharmī dharmo vā? tad yadi dharmī pratibhāti sa tāttvikāḥ, atāttviko vā.—TPS, p. 19.
21. Anye tu 'avisamvādi jñānam' (*Pramāna-vārttikam*, 2.1) pramāṇam abhidadhati. ko'yam avisamvādārthah—kim yathāvyavasthitārtha-grhīitvam, bādha-rahitatvam vā pratiyamānārthajanyatā vā, pratiyamānārtham prati pravartakatvam vā, artha-prāpakatvam vā.—TPS, p. 28.
22. Atha artha-prāpakatvam avisamvādaḥ, tatra kim arthamātra-prāpakatvam, āho avabhātārtha-prāpakatvam, tajjātiyodaka-prāpakatvam vā, svotpādakārtha-prāpakatvam vā, atha svotpādaka-kāraḥ dhruva-bhāvitvam avisamvādaḥ.—TPS, p. 29.
23. Evaṁ cā'vyavasthite yad uktam—"na hy ābhyām artham paricchidya pravartamāno'rthakriyāṃ visamvādyate" iti tad bālavilasitam. —TPS, p. 29.
24. Tathā, Tathāgatānām api anadhiḡatārthagantṛ-viṣeṣaṇam apārthakam apohyajñāna'sambhavāt. na hi pūrvā'parakālabhāviṇi vijñāne eka-viṣaye staḥ, na svalakṣaṇaikaviṣaye, na sāmānyaikaviṣaye, svalakṣaṇasya abhinnaika-svabhāvasya kramavṛttyaneka-vijñāna-jananaśakti vyatirekāt. —TPS, p. 27.
25. The reading in the text is 'Vikalpe bādha-ṣiṣayotpannā'nekapuruṣa-vijñānabhedā-prasaṅgaḥ.—TPS, p. 27. This does not convey any meaning. Could it be 'vikalpe vā ekaviṣayotpannā'....'?

26. Anye tu anadhigatārtha-gantṛtvena praṇāna-lakṣaṇam abhidadhati. te tv ayuktavādino draṣṭavyāḥ. katham ayuktavādītā tesām iti cet; ucyate — vibhinnakāra kotpāditaiḥ kārthavijñānānām yathāvyavasthitaikārtha-grhītirūpatvā'viśeṣe'pi pūrvotpannavijñānasya prāmāṇyam nottarasya ity atra niyāmakam vaktavyam. atha yathāvyavasthitaikārthagrhītirūpatvā'viśeṣe'pi pūrvotpanna-vijñānasya prāmāṇyam upapadyate na prathamottara-vijñānasya, tadā'nenaiḥ nyāyena prathamasya'py aprāmāṇyam prasaktam grhītartha-grāhitvā'viśeṣāt. yathā ekaṇiḥ-svalakṣaṇāvabhāsita- * yugapadutpannānekaṇiḥ-vijñānānām nīlaikārthagrhītirūpatā na bhidyate, tathā pūrvāparotpanna-vijñānānam api grhītarthagrhīti-rūpatā na nivartsyati.—TPS, pp. 22-23.
27. Tad anabhyupagacchato'pi Cārvāka-Mādhyaṃikāder vāgvistarāṇam pratiyamānatvāt. tasyaiva vā'niṣpattau bhavatas tannirāsa-prayāsa' nupa-patteḥ. So' yam apūrvāḥ pramāṇādisatīnabhyupagamātmā vākstambhānamantro bhavata'bhyūhito nūnam, yasya prabhāvād Bhagavatā Suraguruṇā Lokāyatikāni sūtrāṇi na praṇītāni, Tathāgatena vā Madhyamāgamā nopadiṣṭāḥ, Bhagavatpādena vā Bādarāyaṇiyeṣu sūtreṣu bhāṣyam nā'bhāṣi. —KhKh, pp. 6-7. See Śaṅkara Miśra's commentary.
28. Avyabhicāritvam arthāvinābhūtatvam, tadā praṣṭavyam ko'syārthaḥ? kim yadārthas tadaiva jñānam, uta yatrārthas tatraiva deṣe jñānam, atha yadṛg arthas tādṛg eva jñānam yat tat pramītiḥ iti.—KhKh, pp. 248-249.
29. Arthasya ca yathā samavāyād rūpam viśeṣaṇibhavati tathā viśaya-bhāvāt jñānasya'pi tad viśeṣaṇam bhavaty eva iti cen, na, evam hi puro-vartitvādina rūpeṇa tathābhāva-sambhavāt purovartinim śuktim rajatatayā'vagāhamānam jñānam pramā syāt.—KhKh, p. 237.
30. Avisamvāditvam hi jñānāntareṇa tathāivollikhyamānārthatvam vā, jñānāntareṇa viparītatayā' pratiyamānārthatvam vā, p atiyamāna-vyāpya-viśayatvam vā, anyad eva vā kiñcit.—KhKh, p. 250.
31. KhKh, pp. 249-255. The arguments put forth by Śrīharṣa are similar to those of Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa. The arguments have been given at length to enable the reader to compare for himself. Śrīharṣa enters into greater details—he had the advantage of greater acquaintance with works of dialectical criticism, though Jayarāṣi's criticism is many a time subtler.
32. *Ghaṭatva* (jarness) is *jāti*, but *nīla-ghaṭatva* (blue-jarness) is *upādhi*; *svarūpatva* is *upādhi*; *svarūpa* is own unique essence or character, so no *jāti* can be possible. *Upādhih* (2) *Dharmamātram*, *sa ca dharmāḥ kvaci*

* The correct reading should be 'svalakṣaṇāvabhāsi' and not 'avabhāsita'.

jāti ādih, *kvaṇit tadbhinnō'pi bhavati yathā padārtha-vibhājakopādhimattvam ityādau. pādārtha-vibhājakopādhyas tīvad dravyātva guṇātva-karmatva-sāmānyatva viśeṣatva-samavāyatva-abhāvavairūpāh ścitti. tattu dīvaṇādvādaḥ jātirūpāh sāmānyatvādaḥ as tu tad-bhinnāh jātibhinnō dharmo' pi dīvidhāh sakhandopādhih akhaṇḍopādhiś cēti. tatrādyah akāśavādhīh (Siddhānta-candrodaya, p. 3, Benares) dvitīyah prameyatva-kūṇḍulīva-pratīyogitvādhīh (Tarka-kaumūdī p. 20, Bombay 1886).—Njāyakośa of Bhīmācārya Jhaṇakikara (BORI, Poona 1928). See also 'Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic', Introduction, pp. 40–42—Daniel Ingalls (Harvard Oriental Series, 1951) "The difference between generic character (*jāti*) and imposed property (*upādhi*) is based partly on the extent to which they distinguish the qualificand from other entities." (Ibid., p. 4)). For instance, in the cognition 'It is a man', the qualifier (*viśeṣana*) of man is the *jāti* 'manhood'; this character is present in many individuals and is said to inhere in all its loci. On the other hand, in the cognition 'It is Devadatta', the qualifier of Devadatta is the *upādhi* 'Devadattahood' which belongs to nothing other than the man Devadatta. It is said to reside in Devadatta not by the relation of inherence but by a particular Qualification Relation (*viśeṣanātā-viśeṣa-sambandha*); this relation is also called Peculiar Relation (*svarūpa-sambandha*) i.e. a relation peculiar to the pair it connects. A qualifier is also termed *upādhi* if it is the qualifier of a generic character, e.g. *ghoṣātva* (jarredness). A qualifier is an *upādhi* if its loci are loci of loci of a generic character; e.g. *daṇḍitva* (staff-holderness). The loci of staff-holderness are all persons who hold staffs; these persons are loci of staffs; staffs are the loci of the generic character staffness. And so on.*

33. Etena kārānam tattvam iti nirastam sarvasya tathāhv: param tyabhāvenā'tmāśrayeṇa ca pratiksana-viśiṣṭa-viśvāvaśyakāraṇatvopagam: durapavārttha-kriyākāritva-sattvalakṣaṇāṅgīkāri-jainacarana-śaranapraveśa-vidambanāpādidosagrāṣeṇa ceti —KhKh, pp. 147–148.
34. Kim cedam anubhūtitvam nāma? Jñānatvā'vāntara-jātibhedo vā, smrtivyatirikta-jñānatvam vā, smrtilakṣana-rahita-jñānatvam vā, tadavidhāra-prākālotpatinīyātā'sādhāranakāranakabuddhitvam vā. —KhKh, pp. 149–150.

It may be noted with regard to the last alternative that the *asādhāraṇa kārāṇa*s of perception, etc. are sense-object contact, knowledge of concomitant probans (as residing in the minor term), knowledge of similarity; and knowledge of *śabda* or word; these are produced immediately before them, whereas *samskāra* (impression) the *asādhāraṇa kārāṇa* of memory is not produced in the immediately preceding moment. See KhKh, pp. 149–228.

35. Avaśyam asyā'vyabhīcāritve avyabhīcārinīyatam eva karanam vaktavyam. kim tad iti cet, svātmanaivā'tra praśne dīyatām uttaram bhavatā, yena niyatesu pramā-rāśisv evedam jñānam antarbhāvyam pramā-sāmānyalaksanena vā vyavacchettavyam.—KhKh, p. 231.
36. Pratyartham vyāvrttākārānam ca viśeṣānām upādāne'nanugama-prasaṅgāt, sāmānyataś cā'tiprasaṅgād iti ubhayathā'py asaṅgatatāpattēḥ.—KhKh, p. 244.

See *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 135—S. N Dasgupta.

37. 'Bādhābādha-vyavasthāhetur asti viśeṣaḥ' iti pakṣam yas tu jaḍataro na jahāti sa 'āptānāptavākyaābhyām nadītre phalāni santī'tyevam-rūpābhyām pratipādyamāne'rthe sthitam kam viśeṣam ekatra paśyasi yam aparatra na paśyasi?'—iti prstvā pratibodhanīyaḥ; tatthā'py ajātabodhas tu jaḍatamaḥ kaścid yadi syāt sa evam prabodhyaḥ—ye te viśeṣāntarapravāhasvīkāre'nantaviśeṣāpattibhayāt tvayā svata eva viśeṣarūpā iti svīkṛtāḥ teṣām svarūpam tāvat paraspāra-vyāvṛttam ato'nugataikarūpābhāvad avyāpakatvam syād iti.—KhKh, pp. 246-247.
38. Other likely objections and attempts at defence have been repudiated in the refutation of *yāthārthya* (correspondence) and so are not refuted here in order to avoid repetition,—“Śaṅkāntarāni cā'taḥ parāṇi yāthārthya-viśeṣanadūśanadūṣitāny evopanīpatantītibha dvir abhidhānabhayān noktāni".—KhKh, pp. 247-248; yadvīśeṣasahito dharmī tena rūpenā'nubhavaḥ pramā, sāksād viśeṣa-sābhityam samyak-paricchedo vivakṣitaḥ, bhāsamāna-yāvadviśeṣa-viśeṣaṇa-viśayaka-jñānam vā prameityādy api pramā-lakṣaṇam dūṣitam evety āha.—Śāṅkarī, pp. 248-249.
39. Na cā'hāryau tau nābhyupagantavyāv iti yuktaṁ, vipralambhakasya vākyaprayogamūlatayā āhāryabhramasya jñāta-tattvasya ca guroḥ śiṣya-prabodhārthaṁ vicāram pravartayata āhārya-samśayanāṁ bhavata eva śāstre'numatatvāt. —KhKh, p. 248.
40. Ito'pi avinābhava-sambandha-grahanā'nupapattiḥ—kim sāmānyayoḥ sambandhāvadhāranam, āho svalakṣanayoḥ, sāmānya-svalakṣaṇyor vā. —TPS, p. 65.
41. Atha dhūmavirodhātvena asau dhūmasya khaṇḍanā iti cet; kaḥ punar asau virodhārthaḥ ? Kim-atadākārataḥ; āho asamānakālīnatā, tatsadbhāve tasyā'nupalambho vā, tajjanyatā vā, taj-janakatvam vā, bhinna-kriyā-kartṛtvam vā, bhinnahetūtpādyatvam vā, āśritānāśṛitatvam vā ? —TPS, pp. 67-68.

42. *Upalakṣaṇa* and *viśeṣaṇa* are different kinds of qualifiers. *Upalakṣaṇa* qualifies and helps one to recognise the qualificand even when not present; for instance, even when the crow is not sitting on the house-top, Devadatta's house can be introduced or pointed out as the one on which the crow was known to sit. *Viśeṣaṇa* is an internal quality or qualifier; for instance in the proposition 'The blue lotus is dancing on the waters', blue is qualifier, internal to the lotus and so associated with the action predicated of it. The external qualifier which is not integral to what it qualifies is regarded by Indian logicians as two-fold—(a) *upādhi* (adjunct) which is in actual association with the qualificand, e.g. ear-drum of *ākāśa* (ether). (According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the auditive organ is nothing but ether enclosed in the ear-drum); (b) *upalakṣaṇa* (pointer) which qualifies even when not in association with the qualificand.
43. Kaś ca vyāpti-śabdārtha iti vaktavyam, avinābhāva iti cen, na. kim ekasya'vyatireke'parasya bhāvo'vinābhāva-padārthaḥ, uta ekasya vyatireke'parasya vyatirekaḥ? yady ādyaḥ tadā'vyatireko'nvyarthā ity ekasyānvaye parasyānvaya ity uktam syāt, evam ca sati pāṛthivatvalohalekhyatvayor apy anvayo vyāptiḥ syāt.—KhKh, p. 353.
44. Prameyatayā sarvaṁ tadā jñāyate eva na tu rūpāntareṇa iti cen, na, yadi rūpāntareṇa tat prameyaṁ tadā rūpāntarvato'pi prameyatvādhāratayā katham agrahaṇam. atha na prameyaṁ nāsty eva rūpāntareṇa tat, yena tu rūpāntareṇāsti tena sarveṇa prameyaṁ iti yāvad-vidyamānā-kāreṇa jñātātva-prasaṅgaḥ. tathātva-svikāre ca jñāyatām prameyatva-darśinā bhavata māmakī citta-vṛttiḥ, tataḥ śraddhāsyē.—KhKh, p. 355.
45. Sārvatrikaṁ vyatireka-yaugapadyaṁ vivakṣitaṁ na tu kvācitkam ata evocyate avinābhāva-niyama iti cen, na. Sārvatrika-vyatirekāvadhāraṇasya'py aśakyatvāt, śakyatve cānvayāvadhāraṇam evāstu sārvatrikaṁ, kṛtaṁ vyatirekāvadhāraṇa-kuṭīlikayā.—KhKh, p. 359.
46. Agnidhūma-vyabhicāraśaṅkāyām bādhakas tarko'yam abhidhīyate—'yadi dhūmo'gnim vyabhicared akāraṇakaḥ san nityaḥ syāt, na syād eva vā'. sa cā'yam anuttaras tarkaḥ; tatra śaṅkāyām vyāghātāpatteḥ, tad eva hy aśaṅkyate, yasminnāśaṅkyamāne svakriyā-vyāghātādayo doṣā nāvatarantī'ti loka-maryādā. evam sarvatrānuttaras tarko bādhako'-bhidheya iti.—KhKh, pp. 363-364.
47. Ādye kaḥ svābhāvika-śabdārtha iti praśtavyam; kim sambandhi-svabhāva-śrītaḥ (1), atha sambandhi-svabhāva-janyaḥ (2), atha sambandhitva-vivikta-svabhāvanatiriktaḥ (3), atha vā sambandhi-svabhāva-vyāpyaḥ (4), atha sambandhi-svabhāvād anyena na prayuktaḥ (5), utānya eva kaścid (6), vivakṣitaḥ.—KhKh, p. 370.

48. "Ekasādhyāvinābhāve mithaḥ sambandha-śūnyayoḥ;
Sādhyābhāvaḥ vinābhāvaḥ sa upādhir yadatyayaḥ. —KhKh, p. 372;
yadatyayo yadabhāyaḥ sādhyābhāvaḥ vinābhāvaḥ sādhyābhāva-vyāpyaḥ
sa upādhis tathā ca sādhyābhāva-vyāpyāḥ bhāva-pratiyogi, sādhyā-vyāpaka
iti yavat—mithaḥ sambandha-śūnyayoḥ sādhanopādhyor madhye ekasya
sādhanaśya sādhyāvinābhāve grāhye yadatyayaḥ sādhyābhāvaḥ vinābhāvaḥ
sa upādhir iti Bhaṭṭācārya-vārttika-yojanā. —Śāṅkarī, p. 373.
49. Vyāpta-pakṣadharmaṭvam hetuṭvam hetu-viśaya-dharmaṭvam ca pakṣa-
tvam ity anyonyāśraya ity arthaḥ. —Śāṅkarī, p. 384.
50. Etena sandigdha-sādhyadharma-viśiṣṭo dharmī pakṣaḥ sādhyatvam ca
sva-parārthānumāna-sādhāraṇam utpādyā-jñānatvam iti nirastam.
—KhKh, p. 384.
51. KhKh, p. 382; also—prameyatvam nāma pramā-viśayatvam, viśaya-
viśayibhāvaḥ ca svabhāvanatirikta ity pramāto viśayataḥ ca prameyatvam
nātiriktaṁ tathā ca'drṣṭādi kasyacit pratyakṣam prameyatvād ity asya
hetor apakṣadharmaṭmā syāt. ātma-vyatiriktasya'rthajātasya pramā-
śrayatvānupapatter arthasya' pi svā'śrayatvānupapatteḥ. ataḥ pakṣā-
śritatvam pakṣa-dharmaṭvam ity avyāpakam ity āha—prameyatveti-
Nayanaprasādini on *Tattva-pradipikā*, p. 393 (Udāsīna Saṁskṛta
Vidyālaya, Kāśī, 1956).
52. Pratītiṁ vyāptibalena sāmānyato vyāpakāvagāhanapravṛttīm—viśeṣam
ādāya paryavasāyayitum vyāpyasya sāmānyatvam sā iti cet. —KhKh, p. 384.
53. Citsukhācārya also has refuted the *pramāṇas* in his *Tattvapradipikā* or
Citsukhi. His refutation of *anumāna* is almost a summary of the arguments
advanced by Śrīharṣa. See *Tattva-pradipikā*, pp. 378-397.
54. Atha kathāyām vādino niyamaṁ etādṛśam manyante—'pramāṇādayaḥ
sarvatantra-siddhāntatayā siddhāḥ padārthāḥ santīti kathakābhyām
abhyupeyam', tad apare na kṣamante; tathā hi—pramāṇādinām sattvam
yad abhyupeyam kathakena, tat kasya hetoḥ ? Kim tad anabhyupagacchad-
bhyām vādi-prativādiḥ bhyām tad-abhyupagama-sāhitya-niyatasya vāg-
vyavahārasya pravartayitum aśakyatvāt ? (1), uta kathakābhyām
pravartaniya-vāgvyavahāraṁ prati hetuvāt ? (2), uta lokasiddhvatvāt ? (3),
atha vā tad-anabhyupagamasya tattvanirṇaya-vijayaphalātiprasaṅja-
katvāt ? (4). —KhKh, pp. 5-6.
55. Astu evam hi, tathā hi tatra tri-catura-jñāna-kakṣā-gaveṣaṇamātra-
viśrāntena vicāreṇa tataḥ param ananuseraṇa-ramaṇiyenaiva ca samayaṁ
baddhvā kathāyām mithaḥ sampratipattyā pravartanāt. —KhKh, p. 23.
Compare.—Tad evam upapluteṣv eva tattveṣu, avicārīta-ramaṇiyāḥ sarve
vyavahāra ghaṭanta iti. —TPS, p. 125.

56. Sarvesām bhāvānām sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaś cet.
 tvadvacanam asvabhāvam na nivartayitum svabhāvam alam. 1.
 Na svābhāvikam ctad vākyam tasmān na vādahānir me.
 nāsti ca vaisamikatvaṁ viśesahetuś ca na nigādyah. 24.
 Samvyavahāram ca vyaṁ nānabhyupagamyā kathayāmaḥ 28 cd.
 (Apī ca. na vyaṁ vyavahāra-satyam pratyākhyāya vyavahāra-satyam
 anabhyupagamyā kathayāmaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā itī. na hi vyavahāra-
 satyam anāgamyā śakyā dharmadeśanā kartum. yathoktam-
 Vyavahāram anāṣṛitya paramārtho na deśyate,
 paramārtham anāgamyā nirvāṇam nādbigamyate.
 itī. tasmād madvacanavat śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ sarva-bhāvānām 3 a
 niḥsvabhāvatvam ubhayathopapadyamānam itī.—Nāgārjuna's *Vṛtti*).
 Yadi kācana pratijñā tatra syād esa me bhaved dosah,
 nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me dosah. 29
 pratiśedhayāmi nāham kiñcit pratiśedhyam asti na ca kiñcit,
 tasmāt pratiśedhayāṁty adhīlaya eva tvayā kriyate. 64.
 —ViV, 1, 24, 28, 29. 64.
57. See 'An Essay on Philosophical Method', pp. 140-141—R. G. Colling-
 wood (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962).
58. Vijnāna-vyatiriktam punar idam viśvam sadasadbhyām vilaksanam
 brahmavādinah saṅgirante. tathā hi nedam sad bhavitum arhati,
 vaksyamānadūsanagrastatvāt. nā'py asad eva tathā sati laukika-
 vicārakāṇām sarva-vyavahāra-vyābhyāpateḥ....—KhKh, p. 76.
 Na ca te dosāḥ svakam apī ghnanto jātayah katham na syur itī vācyam,
 yato nirvacaniyatvaṁ bādhyate tair dosaiḥ svayam apy anirvacaniyair
 eva. anirvacaniyair eva ca tair vyavahriyate eveti kuto'smān prati
 vyāghātaḥ syāt: tājñātivasya ca nirucya yojayitum aśakyatvāt.—KhKh,
 p. 77.
 Yo hi sarvam anirvacaniya-sadasattvaṁ brūte sa katham anirvacaniyatā-
 sattva-vyavasthitau paryanuyujyate. sāv pi hi kṛtsna-prapañcapara-sarva-
 śabdābhidheya-madhyā-nivṛtāiva. parasyaiva vyavasthayaivam pary-
 avasyati—nirvacana-pratikṣepād anirvacaniyatvaṁ, vidhiniśedhayor ekatara-
 nirāsasyetara-paryavasāyitāyās tenābhupagamāt. tataḥ parakīya-ṛityedam
 ucyate—'anirvacaniyatvaṁ viśvasya paryavasatyati' itī. vastutas tu vyaṁ
 sarva-prapañca-sattvasattva-vyavasthāpana-vimvṛtīḥ svataḥ-siddhe cid-
 ātmani brahma-tattve kevale bharam avalambya caritārthāḥ sukham
 āsmahe.—KhKh, pp. 78-79.

The conflict of Reason is finely presented in the works of the
 Mādhyamika school. See MK—Ch. 2 on motion, 5. 1-8; 18.10; 24.19
 etc. The ultimate reality is attempted to be explained in MK 18.9, 25.3,
 etc. See also MK 2.21, 19.6, 6.10, 10.16, 10.1, 10.15, 8.12-13, 4.1; 14.8;
 24.18, *Catuhśataka* 14.14; 9.2; 8.16; *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, p. 352.

59. "The unhappy terminology used even in philosophical treatises is a predicament of language. Language is pre-eminently an instrument to express the empirical. This is not only natural, but pragmatically the more important. Very often philosophy, especially absolutism, has to convey through the usual symbols what admittedly cannot be symbolised. This it does by superimposing an induced or artificial signification on conventional words. Many of the ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies in the Mādhyamika or other absolutist systems are traceable to this necessary predicament. They are ever trying to convey through language and concepts things for which language was not intended as an instrument of expression."—*The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* p. 153-T. R. V. Murti (George Allen and Unwin, second edition, 1960).
60. Na vyaṃ svatantram anumānaṃ prayujyāhe para-pratijñā-nisedha-phalatvād asmad-anumānānām.—MKV, p 34. Kiṃ punar anyatāprasiddhenā'py anumānenā' sty anumānabādhā. asti s' ca svāprasiddhenaiva hetunā, na parāprasiddhena. lokata eva dīṣṭatvāt. kadācid dhi loke'rthi-pratyarthibhyāṃ pramāṇikṛtasya sāksīno vacanena jayo bhavati parājayo vā. kadācit svavacanena. paravacanena tu na jayo nā'pi parājayaḥ. yathā ca loke tathā nyāye'pi. laukikasyaiva vyavahārasya nyāyaśāstre prastutavāt.—MKV, pp. 34-35. See also MKV, p. 57, pp. 18-19; KhKh, p. 11.
61. Tattulyoḥas tadīyaṃ ca yojanaṃ v sayāntare,
śrīṅkalā tasya śeṣe ca tridhā bhramatī matkriyā.—KhKh, p. 731.
62. Ācārya bhūyasā prasaṅgāpattimukhenaiva parapaksaṃ nīrākaroti sma.
—MKV, p. 24. Prasaṅgāpādanaṃ ca na svapaksaśihāpanāyopādīyate kiṃ tu parasyā' niṣṭāpādanā' rtham, parān'staṃ ca tadabhyupagamasiddhair eva dharmādibhiḥ śakyam āpādayitum.—*Njāyakandali*, p. 197 (as quoted by Murti).
63. See MKV, pp. 14-16· also pp. 36-38, etc.

CHAPTER 14

PROBLEM OF TRUTH

Indian logicians from very early times recognised certain sources of knowledge, the most important of them being perception, inference and verbal or scriptural testimony.¹ The philosophical systems have accepted the important rule that knowables (*prameya*) can be established on the strength of *pramāṇas* (sources of valid knowledge).² Accordingly, each system of philosophy has laid down the number of *pramāṇas* acceptable to it and it is within the framework of these that the different doctrines of a particular school are established and developed. The logical and the metaphysical principles, as said above, present a striking consistency in the systems of Indian philosophy.

The Mādhyamikas, the most outstanding among them being Nāgārjuna (second century A. D.), and the sceptics, as we have seen, did not admit that the *pramāṇas* could yield valid knowledge. The knowledge derived from them may be empirically efficient or useful, but its ultimate validity cannot be proved. The system of *pramāṇas* is dependent on their being properly defined, and the system of knowables is dependent on the *pramāṇas*, but the *pramāṇas* cannot be defined as the different definitions put forth suffer from anomalies and contradictions, and consequently nothing can be proved. The Śāṅkara Vedāntins also repudiated the validity of the *pramāṇas*.³ Besides, the Buddhists did not admit *savikalpa pratyakṣa* (determinate perception) as valid as it is determined by conceptual construction (*kalpanā*) and is not derived from the object alone. In the face of such devastating criticism, the *pramāṇavādins* had to put their conception of valid knowledge on a sound basis, and they formulated their theories of truth and validity and attempted to establish them, especially keeping in view the criticism directed against them.

The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* distinguishes between *vidyā* (true cognition) and *avidyā* (untrue cognition) by saying that *avidyā* is defiled knowledge (*duṣṭa jñāna*), knowledge which is conditioned by vitiations (such as defects of the sense-organs, vitiated predispositions and the like). *Vidyā* is knowledge not so defiled.⁴ The *Nyāya-sūtra* inserted two epithets in the definition of *pratyakṣa* (perception) which can be applied to all cases of valid cognition—*avyabhicārin* (non-deviating or non-discrepant) and *vyavasāyātmaka* (certain, i.e. not doubtful). As Vātsyāyana says, that cognition is *avyabhicārin* (non-deviating, non discrepant) which presents its object as it is in reality; what is otherwise is *vyabhicārin* (deviating or discrepant).⁵ It is to be noted that here true and untrue cognitions are defined in terms of their characteristic features and not the conditions leading to them as in the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra*. Here the emphasis is on conformity or correspondence with the object—undoubtedly a progressive step. True knowledge (*yathārtha jñāna*) in order to be *pramā* (valid knowledge) must be presentative (*anubhavātmaka*) in character and not reproductive of previous experience. *Smṛti*, though a cognition, which agrees with its object or is true, is not regarded as valid in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.⁶ Here the psychological distinction of *anubhava* (direct knowledge) and *smṛti* (memory, remembered knowledge) enters into the demarcation of the definition of *pramā* (valid knowledge). The reason may be that memory, however correct it may be, suffers from haziness, while the understanding of truth requires lucidity and resoluteness in it. Thus, according to the Nyāya school, the truth of cognition consists in its correspondence (*avyabhicāritva* or *yāthārthya*) and certainty or definiteness (*vyavasāyātmakatva*); and to be *pramā* (valid), knowledge must be, as said above, presentative (*anubhava*). *Anubhava* is the knowledge of real objects as distinguished from those that are imagined; that is to say, knowledge which is grounded in the object itself (*arthajanya*).⁷ Knowledge not of this nature is *apramā*.

The nature of truth according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is correspondence (*yāthārthya*) between the objective fact and its apprehension. According to the Correspondence Theory, a proposition is true if there is a fact to which it corresponds; correspondence consists in the agreement of the constituents of the objective fact and of the proposition. But it may be noted here that when we apply the terminology of western philosophy to Indian theories, it is not fair to load the understanding of Indian theories with all the implications of the terms of western philosophy. As a matter of fact, any Indian theory pertaining to the nature of truth is not exclusively a theory of Correspondence or of Coherence or of Pragmatism. Thus, according to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, the truth of knowledge consists in correspondence with objective facts. Where a test of truth is required, it is expected to satisfy the test of confirmation and utility. If we accept the proposition, 'There is water at a distance', we can test its truth by approaching it and making sure. This is what *pravṛtti-sāmarthya* (efficiency) also means. Or we may compare a similar true knowledge of water on several occasions in the same circumstances (*tajjāṇyatva*). Yet the Nyāya school does not accept the pragmatic theory of truth. Knowledge, according to it, is useful because it is true; it is not true because it works.⁸

We have seen that the concepts of *avyabhicāritva*, *vyavasāyātmakatva*, *yāthārthya* were severely criticised and repudiated by sceptics like Jayarāśi and absolutists like Śrīharṣa and others. Gaṅgeśa (thirteenth century)—the founder of the Navya-Nyāya school who kept in view these criticisms of Śrīharṣa, discussed the different definitions of *prāmāṇya* and recognised the definition—'*yatra yad asti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramā, tadvatī tatprakārahānubhavo vā.*' (*Pramā* is presentative knowledge of a thing in respect of that in which it subsists, or presentative knowledge having that as the special qualifier in respect of a thing which possesses that).⁹

The author of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* while saying that *śabda* is the only infallible guide in respect of *dharma*

gives us an idea of what the Mīmāṃsakas understand by *pramā* or valid cognition. According to Kumārila, the *Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsā sūtra* 1.1.5 says : “ The (metaphysical) relation between word and its meaning is eternal and the means of knowing it is the *Upadeśa* (injunction) which is incapable of contradiction; it is authoritative with regard to an object not apprehended before, because it is independent, so says Bādarāyaṇa” (*autpattikas tu śabdasyā'rthena sambandhaḥ tasya jñānam upadeśo'vyatirekaś cā'rihe'nupalabdhe tat pramāṇam Bādarāyaṇasyā'napeksatvāt*).¹⁰

Thus according to the Pūrvā-Mīmāṃsakas, knowledge in order to be valid must be uncontradicted and must have novelty, that is to say, must cognise a thing not apprehended before; it must be presentative in character. *Smṛti* is not regarded as valid, though it may be true, by the Mīmāṃsakas as it does not yield, any fresh knowledge and is dependent on previous impressions. Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) is not excluded as it does not consist only of remembrance; there being the element of direct cognition in it, it is valid. Continuous cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) similarly cannot be classified under memory as there is throughout contact between the sense-organs and the object and the various stages are independent of one another.¹¹ Prabhākara in a way differs from this view. According to him, it is not a necessary characteristic of *pramā* or valid cognition that its object should be one that is not already cognised (*agr̥hita*). He defines valid cognition as apprehension (*pramāṇam anubhūtiḥ*) and regards memory as non-valid not because it is not *agr̥hita-grāhin* (cognising a thing not already known), but because it is not independent, being dependent upon previous cognitions. Presentation (*anubhava*) is an essential requisite of *pramā*. This definition of *pramā* presupposes the intrinsic validity of knowledge; *pramā* can be defined as *anubhūti* only if each and every knowledge is inherently valid. Kumārila, on the

other hand, regards *agr̥hita-grāhitva* as an indispensable characteristic of valid cognition, which must of course be definite.¹² Determinate perception (*savikalpa pratyaksa*), continuous cognition (*dhārāvāhika-jñāna*) and inference (*anumiti*) are valid as they add to the knowledge already acquired.¹³

The Mīmāṃsakas accept the *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* (intrinsic truth or validity) of knowledge, because if each piece of knowledge is required to be ascertained by another, it would lead to the contingency of *anavasthā* (infinite series) and never lead to confident action. It is only the invalidity or falsity (*aprāmāṇya*) of knowledge that is determined by extraneous means—defects, etc. A cognition is known to be false only if it is contradicted by another cognition. The peculiarity of the Mīmāṃsakas lies in this that they test *aprāmāṇya* rather than *prāmāṇya*. They have a theory of Error, rather than a theory of Truth. Truth is an inherent characteristic of knowledge though we may test the truth of our knowledge by finding out whether it coheres with other experiences or not. But this test is an external one and does not affect the nature of truth. The statement of the Mīmāṃsakas that a judgment may be ascertained to be true by seeing if it is confirmed by other judgments, suggests the theory of coherence. The various judgments must fit together.

It may be noted here that according to Prabhākara and his followers all presentative cognitions are valid (*pramāṇa*); they may be *bhrānta* (erroneous) or not according as they come into conflict with our empirical experience and behaviour or not. We may take the instance of a person suffering from jaundice who sees a yellow conch-shell. This cognition is valid (*pramāṇa*) inasmuch as it really consists of two true cognitions between which he has failed to distinguish; but it is *bhrānta* (erroneous) as it is contradicted later when the man realises that the conch-shell appeared yellow because of the yellow bile in the eye. In the case of the cognition of 'hot water' on the other hand, the heat really belongs to the particles of fire, but the cognition is never found to be contradicted or

to be inconsistent (*viśamvādin*), so it is not erroneous (*bhrānta*). Those who call it invalid and erroneous are contradicting experience common to all (*sarvalokavirodha*)¹⁴ Pārthasārathi Miśra refutes this argument regarding the cognition of 'hot water'. There would be *sarvalokavirodha* if people admitted its validity though knowing that it was not true. But they regard it as true (*yathārtha*) and hence also valid and not-erroneous. But those who know it as *ayathārtha* (not-corresponding to the objective facts) never regard it as valid and not-erroneous, Hence *yāthārthya* is an essential characteristic of valid cognition.¹⁵ Kumārila and his followers contend that so far as the judgment 'This is silver' (in respect of shell) involves a cognition it is quite valid for the cogniser at the time he has the cognition; the subsequent experience or detection of some defect in the sense-organs, etc. sets aside the validity that belonged to the cognition.¹⁶

Valid knowledge according to the Buddhists is that which points to a point-instant of reality and is free from error. According to them the *svalakṣaṇa* (unique particular) alone is real, there is no *sāmānya*, universal, which is general and characteristic of the class. Direct perception cognises the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and inference the universal (*sāmānya*). In that case, inference would be indirect and non-valid as it involves conceptual construction (*kalpanā*). From that high standard from which pure sensation perceiving the *svalakṣaṇa* is regarded as valid knowledge, perceptual judgment is subjective and conceptual and hence not valid. Much less valid is inference which is more steeped in thought-construction. Dharmottara says that inference is erroneous since it deals with non-entities. The course it takes consists in having to deal with mental contents of a general, unreal character and in ascertaining through them some real fact and so is regarded as *pramāṇa*. Inference has an imagined thing as its object, as inference is cognition of a thing which cannot be perceived but can only be imagined. But its procedure consists in referring this imagined object to a real point. Its ultimate result is the same as in *pratyakṣa*,

the cognition of a point of reality through a constructed symbol. What is finally cognised is a point-instant of reality as possessing a definite symbol, e.g. the mountain as possessing the unperceived fire. *Pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* point to definite objects and therefore are valid; what is other than these is not valid.¹⁷

A further characteristic of valid cognition, according to the Buddhists, is that it should be fresh or new, that is to say, cognition of a thing not already cognised. A person acts as stimulated by the knowledge which first cognised an object. If knowledge is characterised as 'stimulative to action' (*pravartaka*), no other knowledge than that of the first moment is required as it would be superfluous. Hence knowledge of things already cognised is not valid.¹⁸ Novelty is regarded by the Buddhists as an essential characteristic of valid knowledge. The Mīmāṃsakas also accept this, but they make concessions and regard *savikalpa pratyakṣa* (determinate perception) and *dhārāvāhika jñāna* (continuous cognition) as valid, as explained above. The Buddhists, on the other hand, insist that it is only the knowledge in the first moment of pure sensation that is valid; afterwards it is intellectually determined. The object in the later moments is not *grāhya* (object of sensuous apprehension), but *adhyavaseya* (intellectually determined). Though the Buddhists accept *anumāna* as a *pramāṇa*, source of valid knowledge, they are really hesitant about it, as in it ideation is at work from the very outset. They expel with a single stroke, *savikalpa pratyakṣa*, *saṁśaya* (doubt), *viparyaya* (error), *pratyabhijñā* (recognition) and *smṛti* (memory) from the category of *pramāṇa* or valid knowledge. Dharmottara evidently excluded even *dhārāvāhika jñāna* from the category of valid knowledge (*Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, pp. 3-4). Arcāṭa opines in his *Ṭīkā* on the *Hetubindu*, that the *dhārāvāhika jñāna* of *yogins* is valid as it is conscious of the different point-instants, not so of ordinary persons.¹⁹

The test of truth in Buddhism is a pragmatic one.²⁰ Yet the Buddhist logicians point out that what constitutes validity is

not pragmatic fitness (*arthakriyāyogyatā*) and verification alone but that along with the correspondence of the presentation with the true nature of reality. Such presentations as those of jewel itself for the light of the jewel, or of yellow conch-shell for a white one, or of moving trees for trees which are really stationary are not valid though there is verification. The pragmatic test must satisfy the conditions of shape, quality, place, time etc. Every variation in the characteristics makes the characterised object a different one. Thus, cognition revealing one shape of the object is not to be considered valid when the real object has a different shape. For instance, 'the yellow conch-shell' is not a valid cognition of the shell which is really white. Nor is the cognition valid when it falsely reveals the place of the object; e.g. the cognition apprehending a jewel in the radiance in the chink in a door, when the latter is mistaken for the jewel which is in the room behind the door. The cognition is not right also when it reveals an object as existing at a time which does not belong to it; for instance, dream of an object being seen at noon is not a true cognition of a real object existing at midnight²¹. The Buddhists can be said to insist on a pragmatic test which agrees in all respects with the circumstances of the original cognition.

But here a difficulty presents itself. In the view of the Buddhist, objects are momentary, so to reach the object in its own time—the unique moment to which its real existence is confined—is impossible. The Buddhist agrees and says that he does not maintain that it should be reached by a distinct cognition at that very moment to which its existence is confined. There is a moment of sensation and a different moment of actual reaching or even distinct perception. The unity which appears to exist between different moments is a unity produced by the synthesis of distinct apprehensions and represents in reality a chain of momentary existences.²² The pragmatic test can be said to be satisfied if an entity of the same continuum is reached.

There were perhaps thinkers among the Buddhists themselves who regarded the pragmatic test as ultimate. The knowledge of the moving trees, for instance, is valid as acting upon it the trees can be reached, and some say that it was because of this that Diñnāga did not regard '*abhrāntatva*' (non-illusoriness) as an essential characteristic of direct perception. (He defined *pratyaksa* as only *kalpanāpodha*, devoid of conceptualisation). But it is the contention of Śāntarakṣita and Dharmottara among others that what constitutes validity is not just verification but verification in the true sense of the term, which satisfies all considerations of colour, time, place, etc.²³ The purpose of knowledge is served when it presents an objective reality in its true character. Buddhism does not accept knowledge as true only because it is useful, but it should be useful in the sense that the content of cognition is verified. It may be noted that the actual attainment of the object which takes place by reason of a chain of psychical phenomena or efforts is a secondary product. The intermediate link between knowledge and attainment has only a psychological bearing on the problem, its logical value is mediate and derivative. Dharmottara distinguishes clearly between knowledge and its result, viz. attainment of an object. The volitional urge and the attainment follow as necessary consequences. This means that an instrument of knowledge fulfils itself by making known an object which is not cognised before, this object being one towards which effort or activity can be successfully directed.

The Jainas define *pramāṇa* as knowledge which is self-luminous and which illumines other things, which is definite and uncontradicted. Definiteness (*vyavasāyātmakatva*) is an essential characteristic of *pramā*, so that *saṁśaya* (doubt), *viparyaya* (error) and *anadhyavasāya* (indefinite cognition) are not regarded as valid. For the Jainas, all true and definite uncontradicted knowledge is *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge)—even *smṛti*, *tarka*, *pratyabhijñā*, etc. The Jaina view does not regard *agrhitagrāhitva* or novelty as essential for *pramāṇya*. *Avyabhicāritva*

(non-discrepancy) is enough to make a cognition valid.²⁵ The validity of knowledge is ascertained from *avisamvāda* or lack of inconsistency with facts. According to the Jainas though the knowledge of a moving tree when the ship is moving is *avisamvādin* because if a person puts it to the test, the tree is undoubtedly found, yet this knowledge is not *pramāṇa* as the knowledge does not conform to facts as they are found. A moving tree is apprehended while what is found is a stationary one. In those cases where by previous knowledge of correspondence a conviction is produced that a particular knowledge is true there may be a psychological ascertainment of its validity without reference to extraneous facts. *Vyavasāya* (decisiveness, definiteness) is also regarded as a criterion of validity. It enables a person to employ propositions about the existence or non-existence of things. As Vidyānanda says *avisamvāda* and *vyavasāya* do not differ essentially. Correspondence is essential, besides conative fulfilment for the validity of knowledge.²⁶

The Kevalādvaitins initially did not propound any logical views of their own; it was only at a later stage that they laid down their logical principles. According to them all uncontradicted knowledge is *pramā*. The Śāṅkara Vedāntins have no special objection to accepting *smṛti* as valid knowledge, nor do they insist on the inclusion of *smṛti* in *pramā*. Valid knowledge is knowledge which cognises a thing as possessed of the attributes it actually has, and which is conducive to successful effort.²⁷ But, it may be urged, all empirical phenomena are unreal and are sublated on the realisation of Brahman; their knowledge is contradicted or becomes *bādhita*, and hence the knowledge of jar, etc. cannot be regarded as valid. The answer to this is that '*abādhita*' means not contradicted during the empirical or worldly state and so the definition is quite acceptable with regard to empirical knowledge. Of course, the definitions of logic are such as to be consistent with metaphysical principles from a higher point of view. All our uncontradicted knowledge of the object of the world of

appearance should be regarded as valid until the absolute is realised. Śāṅkarācārya distinguishes the empirical world, which is taken for granted in logic, from dreams and illusions. They do not satisfy the logical test of the fulfilment of conditions of place, time, cause and non-contradiction²⁸ According to Śāṅkara and his followers that alone is true or real which is not contradicted in all the three times (*trikālābādhita*). Thus, the non-dual Brahman which is pure consciousness and which is not an object of knowledge is the only reality.

The Vedāntins can, on the whole, be said to admit the Coherence theory of truth. Truth is a systematic coherence. This is more than just logical consistency. A proposition is true in so far as it is a necessary constituent of a systematically coherent whole. In the Vedāntic view, truth in its fulness is only one systematic coherent whole, which is the absolute. It attaches to propositions as we know them and to wholes as we know them only to a degree. A proposition has a degree of truth proportionate to the completeness of the systematic coherence of the system of entities to which it belongs. Thus, according to Rāmānuja, when of the three elements—fire, water, earth—a particular element predominates in an object, the latter is designated by its character, though the other elements are also present. The element of fire or light (*tejas*) being present, a shell possesses the qualities of *tejas* i.e. silver and thus resembles silver in some sense. In the case of illusion, owing to defect in the sense-organs and the like, perception grasps only the qualities of silver (*tejas*) existing in the shell and not qualities of the other elements in it (e.g. the *pṛthvī* or earth element) and the shell is perceived as silver. The knowledge of silver is thus true as it refers to a real object, the element of silver in the shell. In this view all knowledge is regarded as having a real object. Viewing it differently, it can be said that every cognition is strictly speaking imperfect as it cognises only the predominant element in a thing but not the others.²⁹ According to the Vāllabhaites, the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) generates *pramā* when it is equipped

with *sattva-guṇa*, otherwise there is *apramā*. The knowledge which is primarily predominant in *sattva* is the knowledge that one universal essence is present everywhere; this knowledge alone is absolutely valid. Our empirical knowledge is associated with *rajas* and is not absolutely valid. This *rājasa jñāna* is ordinarily regarded as valid, though it is not absolutely so, and it is with *rājasa jñāna* that logic is mainly concerned. Knowledge associated with *tamas* is completely false.³⁰ Thus a knowledge can be judged as valid or not in relation to the system of which it is an essential part. Jar, cup, saucer, etc. are unreal when considered by themselves; they are real inasmuch as they are modifications of clay or earth. Similarly, earth, etc. are unreal by themselves and are real only when viewed in relation to the Ultimate Principle. This is true of their cognitions also. All knowledge is to be viewed within the framework of the knowledge of the Absolute. According to the Kevalādvaitins also, the ephemeral or illusory (*prātibhāsika*), the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) and the highest (*pāramārthika*) are real or true in view of the Absolute Brahman which is the substratum of all appearance. Whatever reality there is derives from the Absolute Principle. It may be noted that for the Vedāntins truth and validity are identical; only the Vallabhaïtes do not regard memory, though it be true, as valid. Definite uncontradicted knowledge whose causes are not vitiated is regarded as valid.

Yāthārthya (correspondence or agreement with the object), *avisamvāda* (coherence or lack of inconsistency) and *arthakriyā-kāritva* (efficiency or being capable of leading to successful action) are regarded as the criteria of true and valid knowledge. Novelty is regarded as another requisite of valid knowledge especially by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists. The Naiyāyikas and the Prābhākaras regard *anubhūtitva* (presentativeness) as an essential characteristic of valid knowledge; knowledge in order to be valid must be presentative and not reproductive in character. *Smṛti* though true cognition is not *pramā* (valid knowledge). For almost all the other schools, truth and

validity are one, and all true knowledge is regarded as valid knowledge.

The Indian logicians have lent much thought to the theory of knowledge. They have distinguished between knowledge, true and untrue, valid and invalid, as also defined valid knowledge and formulated theories of truth. The moot problem with them is whether *prāmāṇya* (validity) or *aprāmāṇya* (invalidity) of knowledge is intrinsic (*svataḥ*) or extrinsic (*parataḥ*), generated by the same factors as produce knowledge or by other causes, whether it can be known directly along with knowledge and whether it can proceed independently in its task of rightly or wrongly ascertaining the object. That is to say, "Is *prāmāṇya* independent of other factors in respect of its origination (*utpatti*), apprehension (*jñapti*) and its effect or the function of ascertaining things as they actually are (*yathāvyavasthitārthapariccheda-lakṣaṇe kārye*)?" The two main exponents of the theory of the validity of knowledge are the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that *prāmāṇya* or validity is not dependent on other factors in all these respects, whereas *aprāmāṇya* is dependent on other conditions; the Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, are of the view that both validity and invalidity are dependent on conditions other than those required for the origination, etc. of knowledge. The Vedāntins have generally accepted the theory of the Mīmāṃsakas. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga, in agreement with their theory of everything being always existent whether latently or patently, are believed to hold that validity and invalidity are both intrinsic and self-sufficient. The Jaina logicians hold that validity and invalidity are dependent on other factors for their genesis and function but in respect of their apprehension they may be dependent or not, according as the object cognised is a familiar one or not a familiar one. The Buddhist logicians hold the same view as the Jaina logicians though they are generally believed to be of the view that validity is extrinsic and invalidity intrinsic. In familiar cases both *prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya* can be known intrinsically. A person with some

eye-disease (that he is aware of) knows as soon as he sees anything that his cognition is not true. Similarly, in normal cases *prāmāṇya* is ascertained along with the cognition.³¹ *Prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya* seem, according to the Buddhists, in their *utpatti* to be *parataḥ*, as being due to excellence or defect in the causal apparatus. The controversy on this problem is mainly and primarily between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas. Following in their wake, other schools formulated their own theories regarding *prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya* as seen above

We shall discuss at some length the views of the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas with regard to validity being intrinsic (*svataḥ*) or extrinsic (*parataḥ*). The former were concerned most with proving the validity or authoritativeness of *Śruti* or the Vedic word. They accepted it on the strength of their tradition, but they had to prove this in their controversies and discussions with others. It is obvious that they could not confine their discussions to the intrinsic validity of the *Veda* alone which they regarded as *apauruṣeya* (authorless, not owing its existence to any person, not even God). Consequently, they formulated a theory of validity in general.³² We may now consider the arguments in favour of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* (intrinsic validity) as given by Kumārila in his *Śloka-vārttika* (1.1 2, 33 ff) and supplement this discussion where necessary by additional arguments advanced by others.

With regard to all cognitions you must consider the following questions : Is the validity or authoritativeness (*pramāṇatva*) and invalidity or unauthoritativeness (*apramāṇatva*) of a cognition due to itself or to something else ?³³ Since those that are themselves non-existent cannot by any means be established, some people attribute both validity (*prāmāṇya*) and invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*) to the cognition itself whereas others attribute them to the proved excellences or defects of its cause. But both cannot be due to the cognition itself, since the two are mutually contradictory and cannot subsist in one entity. Nor can both be due to something else, because there would be no definiteness

in the cognition and it would have no character of its own. That is to say, if both are held to be due to proved excellences or defects in the cause, then a cognition having arisen, so long as such excellences or defects have not been proved, the cognition cannot be accepted as valid or invalid, and so would be without any character—which is an absurdity. How could it again be possible that any one thing, independently of all extraneous agency should have contradictory characters? And when devoid of both these characters, what nature could the cognition have? It may be urged that though one and the same cognition cannot be both valid and invalid, yet the duality of character can be explained as referring to different cognitions and thus there would be no contradiction. This is not tenable, because even then if no extraneous determining factor is accepted, how can it be ascertained which cognition is valid and which not, and also where it is one or the other. Therefore, for those who hold *aprāmāṇya* of cognitions to be intrinsic or natural (*svābhāvika*), *prāmāṇya* must depend upon something else. In this connection the following rule is laid down: '*Aprāmāṇya* being a negative factor can never be due to the defects of the cause, whereas *prāmāṇya* being a positive entity is brought about by the excellences of the cause'

Kumārila thus puts forth all possible alternatives regarding *prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya* being intrinsic or extrinsic. Showing the impossibility of both being intrinsic or extrinsic, he anticipates the arguments in favour of the view that *aprāmāṇya* is intrinsic and *prāmāṇya* extrinsic. If cognitions as a rule have *prāmāṇya* and the negation of *prāmāṇya* be not determined by anything else, then no one could prevent dream cognitions from having *prāmāṇya*. Their *aprāmāṇya* cannot be said to be due to defects, because as said above, being a negative entity it cannot but be causeless. In the view that *aprāmāṇya* is intrinsic and *prāmāṇya* extrinsic, however, there can be no *prāmāṇya* in the absence of a particular cause, and consequently there is not the contingency of a negative factor (viz. *aprāmāṇya*) having a cause (in the form of defects of the

cause). The excellences of the sense-organs, etc. alone can be said to be the cause of *prāmāṇya*, but the authority of these is denied for two reasons—(i) the occasional disorders of the organs of perception, and (ii) the occasional absence (e.g. during dreams) either of the organs themselves or of their capabilities. It is on account of this fact that you have the mistaken notion that the illusory cognition is due to defects in the cause. As a matter of fact, the invariable concomitance of defects leads to the knowledge of the absence of excellences and this absence establishes the *aprāmāṇya* of the cognition; that is to say, *aprāmāṇya* is not brought about by defects in the cause, but is due to the absence of the excellences which would have brought about *prāmāṇya* in the cognition. *Aprāmāṇya* is the rule and *prāmāṇya* an exception in respect of cognitions. Therefore the purity of the cause (*kāraṇa-śuddhatva*) must be admitted to be the cause of the *prāmāṇya* of a cognition; while *aprāmāṇya* being natural is due only to the absence of such purity (in the cause). There is no invariable concomitance, either positive or negative, between *aprāmāṇya* and defects, so *aprāmāṇya* cannot be said to result from a defect in the cause. No defect, for instance, is found to exist in the case of *ajñāna* (non-cognition) that is due to the absence of the cause of cognition. [It may be noted here that *aprāmāṇya* is of three kinds—doubt (*saṁśaya*), erroneous knowledge (*viparyaya*) and non-knowledge (*ajñāna*)] Therefore inasmuch as there is no human agency—or even if there be any, because of the impossibility of any purity belonging to it—, there is no cause for the *prāmāṇya* of the Vedic injunction (*codanā*) and so *prāmāṇya* cannot rightly be said to belong to it.³⁵

Kumārila then answers these arguments and establishes the view of the Mīmāṃsakas that *prāmāṇya* belongs intrinsically to cognition, and it is *aprāmāṇya* that is extrinsic or due to external factors: We must understand that *prāmāṇya* (validity) is inherent in all *pramāṇas* for a potency by itself non-existent cannot possibly be brought into existence by any other agency; since it is only for the sake of its origination

that a positive entity requires a cause, and when it has once acquired existence, gives rise to its effect or proceeds to do its work naturally.³⁶ If even on the rise of a cognition, the object is not comprehended until the purity of its cause has been ascertained by means of another valid cognition then in all cases we should have to wait for the rise of another cognition from another cause, for until the purity of the cause of a cognition has been ascertained, it is as good as a non-entity. And this second cognition could be regarded as valid only on the ascertainment of the purity of its cause and so on *ad infinitum*. On the other hand, if *prāmāṇya* is accepted as due to the cognition itself, nothing else is required, because in the absence of the cognition of defects, falsity (i.e. *aprāmāṇya*) becomes precluded automatically. Therefore, the authoritative character which cognition comes to have through the mere fact of its having the character of 'cognition' can be set aside only by the awareness of the contrary nature of its object or by the recognition of defects in its cause. (For instance, in the typical case of mistaking the rope for a serpent, when it is found on examination that it is a rope, the validity of the previous cognition of the serpent is set aside. Similarly, one suffering from jaundice, perceives the white conch-shell as yellow, but as soon as he recognises the disorder in his eye, he attributes the cognition of yellowness to the disorder and accepts the conch-shell as white, thus setting aside the validity of his previous cognition).

Aprāmāṇya is three-fold according as it is due to falsity (*mithyātva*), non-cognition (*ajñāna*) and doubt (*saṁśaya*). From among these, two, viz falsity and doubt, being positive entities are brought about by discrepancies in the cause. In the case of non-cognition, however, we do not admit the operation of such defects, because all non-cognition is due to the absence of the cause of cognition. The fact of *aprāmāṇya* being due to defects does not involve the *svataḥ prāmāṇyavādin*s (those who hold that *prāmāṇya* is intrinsic) in any vicious infinite series (*anavasthā*) as is found to be the case with the theory of excellences (as

being the cause of *prāmāṇya*). [They explain *aprāmāṇya* as due to defects in the cause and the contrary character of the objects of cognition which are known by *pramāṇas* which are authoritative; thus the latter cognition comes to be intrinsically valid and here the matter rests and they are saved the necessity of assuming one cognition after another *ad infinitum*. It is only when one thing (authoritative or otherwise) is made to depend upon another of the same kind that the contingency arises].³⁷ *Aprāmāṇya* (falsity) is got at directly through the cognition of the same object as having a contrary character, for so long as the former cognition is not set aside, the subsequent cognition (of its contrary) cannot arise. As to the other method, though the cognition of the defect of the cause is known to refer to a different object (than the object of the original cognition), yet we have co-objectivity (of the two cognitions) as being implied thereby and hence there is the preclusion of the former as in the case of the milking pot. (There is a general rule for performing a certain rite by means of a certain vessel: but in a particular case there is a special rule, whereby the rite is performed by means of another vessel, and here both the rules are accepted as being co-extensive in their scope as having the common purpose of laying down a vessel for the same rite. Similarly in the case of the cognition of yellowness with reference to conch-shell, though the preceding cognition of such yellowness has for its object the yellowness of the conch-shell and the subsequent cognition, the yellowness of the bile in the eye, the cause of perception being the defect of being jaundiced; yet in this latter case also we must admit a co-extensiveness of the scope of the two cognitions as implied by their meaning. The cognition of yellowness leads to the cognition of the bile, and the bile being the cause of the perception of yellowness in white, is found to exist in the eye and thereby leads to the conclusion that its effect—the perception of yellowness—is wrong and this conclusion of the cognition of yellowness being a mistaken one contradicts the former

cognition of yellowness in the conch-shell, and hence this latter is set aside. The implied meaning of the subsequent cognition is that there is bile in the eyes and the presence of the bile has given rise to the mistaken cognition of yellowness in respect of the conch-shell.)

But this rule (regarding the *prāmāṇya* of the previous cognition being set aside by a succeeding cognition) applies only to those cases in which with regard to the latter there is neither cognition of any defect in the cause nor any contradictory cognition. In those cases, however, in which we have either of these two, the succeeding cognition becoming false, the preceding one comes to be authoritative.³⁸ But in that case too, the *prāmāṇya* is intrinsic (in the absence of any cognition of defects). It may be urged that just as the first cognition is set aside by the second, so the second may be set aside by the third and so on and on we may have to proceed and find every cognition set aside by the one following it. The answer to this is that where there is no such cognition of defects, there is no reasonable ground for doubt. It is only the recognition of defects in the cause that sets aside the cognition. Hence when we do not come across any such defect, we cannot reasonably doubt the validity of the cognition (*dosajñāne tv anutpanne nā' śaṅkā nispramāṇikā*.—Ślv, 1.1.2, 60 cd.) In this way the *svataḥprāmāṇyavādin* does not stand in need of postulating more than three or four cognitions and it is for this reason that he adheres to the doctrine of *svataḥprāmāṇya*.³⁹

Speaking of *śabda* (word, verbal testimony) in particular, Kumārila says: As a rule the possibility or rise of defects in an assertion or statement depends on the speaker; and in certain places the absence of defects is due to its having a faultless speaker because the defects removed by his good qualities cannot attach to his word, or in the absence of any speaker (as is the case with the *Veda*), there would be no defects as these would have no substratum to inhere in. In the case of (truthful) human speech, we find two factors—absence

of defects and presence of excellences, and it has already been explained that *prāmāṇya* cannot be due to excellences. Therefore excellences must be held to help only in the removal of defects, and from the absence of these latter proceeds the absence of the two kinds of *aprāmāṇya* (viz erroneous knowledge and doubtful cognition, non-cognition being out of the question in a case of cognition). And thus the fact of *prāmāṇya* being inherent in cognition—here verbal knowledge (*śabda*)—remains unaffected. It may be urged that if the absence of defects is held to result from excellences, there is the same *anavasthā* (vicious infinite series) as was urged against the rival thinkers. The answer to this is that it is not so, because at the time of the cognition of the absence of defects, we do not admit of any active functioning of excellences, though they continue to be recognised because in the cognition of the absence of defects, they help by their presence. If the cognition of excellence be the cause of the ascertainment of *prāmāṇya*, then even this cognition would stand in need of another for its confirmation and so on *ad infinitum*; but as a matter of fact, excellences help the ascertainment of the absence of defects only by means of their presence, which serves to suppress the defects and these are not able to weaken the confirmed *prāmāṇya* of the cognition. Then too in the case of the *Veda*, the assertion of freedom from reproach is very easy to put forward, because there is no speaker in this case, and for this reason, the *aprāmāṇya* of the *Veda* cannot even be imagined. Thus, then, the *prāmāṇya* of the *Veda* being independent of a speaker or author, taking resort in its Author is entirely out of place, for this could be possible only if the *Veda* be assumed to be devoid of *prāmāṇya*. (Only if the Naiyāyika holds the theory of the unauthoritativeness of the *Veda* itself would he require a shelter in its infallible Author whom he assumes. But then, this infallible author would depend on the *Veda* for the proof of His existence, and the infallibility of the *Veda* resting upon the infallibility of such an Author, the reasoning would become a case of mutual dependence). Hence the mere fact of the *Veda*

not having been composed by a respectable or reliable (*āpta*) author ceases to be a defect. It is only human speech that depends for its authority upon another means of valid knowledge, and hence in the absence of the latter, the former becomes faulty, but the other (i.e. Vedic statement) can never be so on that ground. [The commentators clarify even here that the other *prāmāṇya* serves merely to set aside (suspicion of) a fault and not to establish *prāmāṇya*].⁴⁰

Kumārila goes on to give a detailed exposition of the validity of the vedic word, into the details of which it is not necessary to enter here. Kumārila has not explicitly referred to the three problems involved in the discussion of *prāmāṇya*—though these are implied in the exposition. Is *prāmāṇya* intrinsic in respect of its origination (*utpatti*), its own effect or function (*kārya*) and its own cognition (*jñapti*) or is it dependent on factors other than those on which knowledge depends? Most of the logicians discuss the problem of *prāmāṇya* from the point of *utpatti* (origination) and *jñapti* (cognition, awareness).⁴¹ But some like Jayanta, the author of the *Nyāya-mañjari* and Abhayadeva (tenth century),⁴² the author of the well-known commentary of Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmati Tarka* have discussed it from a third point of view also, viz. its *kārya* (effect, or function of making things known as they are) (see *Nyāyamañjarī*, I, pp. 146 ff; *Sanmati-ṭīkā*, pp. 2 ff).

It may be noted that with regard to the cognition of validity (*prāmāṇya*) there are three views among the Mīmāṃsakas. According to the Prābhākaras it is known from the knowledge itself which is self-luminous. According to Murāri Miśra it is known from the *anuvyavasāya* which arises after the knowledge of a thing (e.g. I know the jar), and according to Kumārila and his followers it is known by inference from the *hetu*, viz. *jñātātā* (cognisedness) produced in a thing by the *anuvyavasāya*. Nevertheless all hold that *prāmāṇya* is ascertained intrinsically, that is to say, by the very factors that are necessary for the apprehension of knowledge (see *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*,

Pratyakṣa-Khaṇḍa, *Prāmāṇyavāda*, pp. 54ff; also Vardhamāna's commentary on the *Nyāya Kusumāñjali*, 2, p. 9).⁴³

The Naiyāyikas on the other hand hold that *prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya* are extrinsic (*parataḥ*). This problem was initially discussed from the point of view of the determination of the *prāmāṇya* or *aprāmāṇya* of knowledge. The validity of a cognition must be established ultimately by an appeal to facts. The process is that on the perceptual judgment 'This is water', there arises the further mental judgment 'I see water' and its validity is proved by actually drinking the water. The validity of cognition is determined by its *pravṛtti-sāmarthya* (efficiency) though we may not verify each case of cognition of, for example, water.⁴⁴ The difficulty is anticipated in the *Nyāya-vārtika* and later works that there would be thus *itaretarāśraya* (mutual dependence). A person will not act till he knows that his knowledge is true and the truth or validity of his knowledge cannot be determined till he acts (see NV, pp. 3-4; NVTT, pp. 11 ff). The Naiyāyika's solution is that the validity of knowledge can be determined only by its *pravṛtti-sāmarthya*. A person proceeds to act on there being the cognition of a thing, but not on there being the certain true cognition of a thing, because intelligent persons (scientists, discoverers, etc.) are seen to act even when there is doubtful cognition about a thing. And even when people act with the confidence that the knowledge of a thing is certain, they might be doubtful about the future result, whether they would be able to reach and handle the object or not. These, functioning even when doubtful of the result, determine the truth of the cognition from the success the activity meets with, and later determining the validity of similar cognitions pertaining to familiar things and circumstances on the ground that they are similar and so efficient, they act on such cognitions. The validity of each cognition would be already determined by inference on the strength of similarity with a previous successful cognition and so on. If the cognition of the result attained by acting on a particular cognition is doubted by

reason of comparison with enjoyment in a dream and the like, then we can say that such a cognition is not a familiar one, so its validity would have to be determined by *pravṛtti-sāmarthya*, as explained above (NVTT, p. 12). Thus determining the validity of *mantras* and Medicine whose results have been actually seen by reason of their *pravṛtti-sāmarthya*, the validity of the *Veda* which has no visible fruit but which is similar to the former can be determined even without resorting to *pravṛtti-sāmarthya*, by reason of its being the utterance of an *āpta* (viz. God). The allegation of mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*) can be answered by the consideration that one's mundane life (*samsārā*) is beginningless, so even when a baby starts sucking the breast it does so on the strength of its conviction of the validity of the cognition of the breast by comparison with similar experiences in past lives, so the fault of mutual dependence is not there as also in the case of seed and sprout (NVTT, pp. 13-14). It may be observed here that even the Naiyāyikas admit that the *prāmāṇya* of *anumāna* (inferential cognition), *upamāna* (analogy) as also of *anuvyavasāya* (introspection) is *svataḥ*. This is so because the inferential cognition arises out of a *liṅga* which is invariably concomitant with the *sādhya* and so is resolute in its genesis. *Anuvyavasāya* is always true; even in the case of the cognition of the shell in front as silver, the *anuvyavasāya* is 'I know the thing before me as silver' (*purovartinam rajatatvena jñāmi*). This does not require further verification. But sensuous cognition and verbal testimony necessarily require further verification as though pertaining to an existent object and caused by it, they are not known to be invariably connected with the object; nor are the other causes, sense-organs, etc. invariably connected with the object in question. Word is not necessarily connected with the thing, but makes us understand the meaning of the proposition only on the strength of the knowledge of the convention regarding the meaning of words (NVTT, pp. 12-13).

Udayana has discussed the problem of the validity of cognition more systematically in the second *śābaka* of his

Nyāya-kusumāñjali and this is ably supplemented by Vardhamāna in his commentary *Nyāya-kusumāñjali-prakāśa*. Vardhamāna has incorporated in his commentary arguments advanced by his father Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattva-cintāmaṇi (Pratyaksa-khaṇḍa—Prāmāṇyavāda)*. We shall consider here Udayana's arguments, supplemented by those of Gaṅgeśa or Vardhamāna only where necessary.

The argument establishing the *paratastva* of validity in respect of *utpatti* (genesis) is : "*Pramā* (valid cognition) is dependent on causes over and above those that are the causes of cognition, because being an effect it is a particular type of it, like *apramā* (invalid cognition)" (*pramā jñānahetvatirikta-hetvadhīnā kāryatve sati tad-viśeṣatvāt, apramāvat*). Vardhamāna examines a number of likely objections against the wording of this definition, but the simple argument is quite understandable as it is. What is meant is : whatever causes, including the special ones (sense-organs, etc. in the case of perceptual cognitions, etc.) are required for producing the respective cognitions, cannot bring about the validity also of the cognition for which additional causes such as excellence of the sense-organs and the like are necessary. If *pramā* (valid cognition) were dependent on only as many causes as are required for the origination of cognition, then even *apramā* would be *pramā*; the cause of cognition is also a cause of *apramā* since otherwise *apramā* would not be cognition. And, as Gaṅgeśa and Vardhamāna add, even *apramā* (invalid cognition) should thus be intrinsic (*svataḥ*), not extrinsic (*parataḥ*), because if it, like *pramā* (valid cognition), were produced by the peculiar causes giving rise to cognition, *dosa* could not possibly be its cause. If the causal apparatus being there, *dosa* is regarded as the cause of *apramā*, on account of positive and negative concomitance of *dosa* (e.g. non-perception of particular features) and *apramā*, then on account of positive and negative concomitance of such *guṇa* (excellence) as perception of particular features and the like and *pramā*, *guṇa* should similarly be regarded as a cause of *pramā* (T C, *Prāmāṇya vāda*, pp. 167; *Nyāyakusumāñjali-prakāśa* 2, p. 3).

Udayana continues : It may be urged that even while being cognition, it is *apramā* owing to the presence of defects in addition in the causal apparatus. The answer to this is that similarly owing to the presence of the absence of defects in addition to the causes of cognition, cognition arises as *pramā* (valid cognition) as it necessarily depends on that. It may be further urged that absence of *dosa* (defect) may be an additional factor, all the same it is not a positive one and so *pramā* can be said to depend only on those factors that are the causes of cognition. The answer to this is that this would be tenable if *dosas* were necessarily positive in character. But it is not so. Even absence, e.g. absence of cognition of the particular features of a thing, can be a defect; otherwise how could doubtful and erroneous cognitions arise due to it ? And then absence of *dosā* would be positive in character. Why should one not take it like this ? (*Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, pp 1-2).

Vardhamāna explains this as follows : – It may be urged : “In the case of the cognition ‘yellow conch-shell’, erroneous cognition arises though there is the perception of particular features ; hence non-perception of particular features cannot be the cause of erroneous cognition; or where perception of particular features also is erroneous there the knowledge produced by it would also be erroneous, so perception of particular features cannot be said to bring about *pramā*.” This is not tenable. The absence of that perception of particular features which is opposed to erroneous cognition is the cause of *apramā*. In the case of perceptual error, direct perception of particular features is opposed to it because this is found to be true with respect to erroneous perception of directions and the error ‘I am fair’ (–body and soul are identified); and that is not there due to a defect. Perception of particular features which is of the nature of valid cognition is an excellence (*guṇa*) and so its negation or absence is a defect (*doṣa*).

It may be argued here : “Non-perception of particular features is not a defect, but bile, etc. which obstruct the perception

of particular features are defects, because they are indispensable in the generation of invalid cognition. It may be urged on the ground of parsimony or simplicity (*lāghava*) that since these are many, it would be better to regard non-perception of particular features as the cause of *apramā* in view of its persistence (—i.e. its being common to all cases—) as an obstructive factor of perception of particular features. But there is persistence in the sense that there is some defect or the other in all cases, otherwise *apramā* would not arise even from bile, etc. as these do not persist in all cases of invalid cognition; and because there is a greater degree or intensity of illusion corresponding to the greater degree or intensity of bile, etc. If bile etc. are not defects how is it that there is not the valid cognition of particular features? If it is said that this is because the particular features of these particular features are not perceived, then this would lead to a vicious infinite series. Moreover, perception of particular features is not the cause of all valid cognitions whatsoever, nor of valid perceptual cognition, because this is not always found to be the case, and because if it were the cause of the valid cognition of particular features there would be a vicious infinite series."

This reasoning is not tenable. Though it may not be a cause of all valid cognition, yet it is a cause of the valid cognition which arises after doubtful and erroneous cognitions. Non-perception of particular features being a defect here, it is a defect in other cases also. The greater intensity of bile, etc. is not directly connected as a cause of a greater intensity of *apramā* inasmuch as it mostly obstructs the perception of particular features. Thus excellence (*guṇa*) is a cause of *pramā* and *dosa* (positive or negative in character) that of *apramā* (NKuP, pp. 4-5; also TC, *Prāmāṇyavāda*, pp. 174-184)

The Mīmāṃsaka may perhaps concede that validity is brought about in perceptual cognition and the like by excellence but yet contend that in the case of the *Veda*, the four-fold negation of error, etc. is the cause of *pramā*; in

practice only when there is absence or error, etc., is there the rise of *pramā*, and being possessed of the true knowledge of the meaning of the utterance of a speaker or the like is not an excellence. Thus, as Udayana puts it, the Mīmāṃsaka may argue that in the case of *śabda* (verbal or scriptural testimony) the defects are comprised by positive factors like the intention to deceive so in their absence the validity of verbal cognition is intrinsic. But this is not tenable. The Naiyāyika's contention is that in the case of inference, etc. though the fallacies (lit. perversities) of *liṅga* and the like which are positive are present as defects, *pramā* does not arise simply due to their absence.

It may be urged : "Whatever may be the position elsewhere, in the case of *śabda* there being the absence of the intention to deceive and the like, the excellences of the speaker are not required for the rise of valid cognition." This is not true. It can as well be said then contrarily that there being the absence of excellence its invalidity does not depend for its origination on the defects of the speaker. If it is argued that *prāmāṇya* is concomitant both positively and negatively with *dosas* (defects) and so they are its causes, this is not tenable; *prāmāṇya* is likewise concomitant both positively and negatively with *guṇas* (excellences) and so they are its causes.

It may be argued further : "This may be the position with regard to a person's (*pauruseya*—owing its rise to a person) word or speech, but in the case of the Vedic word which owes its rise to no person (i.e. is *apauruseya*, authorless), there is *prāmāṇya* only due to the absence of *dosa*." This is not tenable, because even *aprāmāṇya* is possible due to absence of *guṇa*. If it is contended that absence of *guṇa* is never found to be efficient with regard to *aprāmāṇya*, we ask : "Where has absence of *dosa* been found to be efficient with regard to *prāmāṇya* ?" If it is said that this is found to be the case with the utterances of worldly people, we say that absence of *guṇa* is similarly found to give rise to *aprāmāṇya*. It may be said : *Doṣas* alone are the cause of *aprāmāṇya*,

the absence of *guṇas* being there because it cannot be avoided. The answer is : This is true of *guṇas* with regard to *prāmāṇya*. If it is held that the presence of *guṇas* is there due to the removal of *doṣas*, then we can similarly urge that the presence of *doṣas* is due to the removal of *guṇas*. It may be argued that in that case the *apauruṣeya Veda* would become *niḥsvabhāva* (characterless) inasmuch as it would be associated with neither *guṇa* (the cause of *prāmāṇya*) nor *dosa* (the cause of *aprāmāṇya*) and so would be neither valid nor invalid. The rejoinder to this is : "You have to blame yourself for this." Therefore, as even though there is invariable connection with the absence of *dveṣa* (hatred, dislike) and absence of *rāga* (love, liking), still as it necessarily follows in the wake of *rāga* and *dveṣa*, effort of the nature of proceeding towards (*pravṛtti*) or desisting from (*nivṛtti*) a thing, is said to have *rāga* or *dveṣa* as the cause, and it is not proper to differentiate between them by saying that *nivṛtti* is due to *dveṣa*, whereas *pravṛtti* is due to absence of *dveṣa* though it follows in the wake of *rāga* – so here also *pramā* and *apramā* are both due to *guṇa* and *dosa* respectively, and *pramā* cannot be said to be due to *doṣābhāva* (absence of *doṣa*).

The Mīmāṃsaka may rejoin : "Still the *Veda* being established to be *apauruṣeya*, it will come to have validity even because it is free from the *doṣas* of the speaker, and *prāmāṇya* being thus established it follows that it is there even in the absence of *guṇas*; so *doṣābhāva* is the cause of *prāmāṇya* and not *guṇas* (excellences)." This can be counter-balanced by the argument that the *Veda* being devoid of the *guṇas* of the speaker is not-valid and *aprāmāṇya* being thus proved, absence of *guṇa* is the cause of *aprāmāṇya* and *doṣas* are not the cause of it. It may be urged : "*Prāmāṇya* is determined intrinsically, and the attempt at determination only removes doubt about it; being based on *doṣas*, the doubt is absent. Hence it is not possible to put forth a counter-balancing rejoinder here." This is not true; there can easily be doubt or suspicion

based on the absence of *guṇas*. If it is urged that absence of *guṇa* alone cannot be a cause of *aprāmāṇya* (—it can be a cause only when accompanied by *doṣa*—) so there cannot be a doubt due to it, the rejoinder is that absence of *doṣa* alone cannot be a cause of *prāmāṇya*) (—It can be a cause only when accompanied by *guṇa*). So the doubt cannot cease due to absence of *doṣa* (NKu. pp 5-6).

Then Udayana takes up the question of the apprehension (*jñapti*) or determination of *prāmāṇya* by extraneous means and not intrinsically. The argument is: “Similarly, *prāmāṇya* is known from another source, because in unfamiliar cases it is doubtful, like *aprāmāṇya* (*prāmāṇyam parato jñāyate, anabhyāsa-dāśāyām sāmśayikatvāt, aprāmāṇyavat*—NKu, 2, p 7).

Udayana observes that if knowledge carried with it the conviction of its validity, there would never be any doubt about its validity (*yadi tu svato jñāyeta, kadācid api prāmāṇya-samśayo na syāt*—NKu, p. 7), as there is never any doubt about its ‘knowledgeness’, and there is no scope for doubt in respect of determined things. Doubt does not arise from the perception of common attributes and the like alone, leaving aside the absence of *sādhaka* (corroboratory proof) and *bādhaka* (negatory) proof, for if it were so there would be the contingency of its complete extinction (—there would never be any doubt). If it is said that what is meant is that as in the case of *pramāṇa* so even in respect of *apramāṇa* there arises doubt owing to the apprehension of the cognition and the non-apprehension of particular features, then we ask: Even when there is the apprehension of valid knowledge, is its *prāmāṇya* (validity) not apprehended or is the valid knowledge itself not apprehended? In the former case, how can there be the determination of *prāmāṇya* intrinsically, because it (*prāmāṇya*) is not apprehended even when the knowledge is apprehended? In the latter case, how could there be doubt when the thing itself is not apprehended? The argument that the validity of knowledge must be intrinsically known as otherwise immediate successful activity on a vast scale would not be possible — is

not tenable. This can be otherwise explained Immediate effort not being possible without the immediate aggregate of causal factors implies its existence; profuse or intense effort implies profuseness or intensity (*prācurya*) of its causes; and desire is the cause of effort, and its cause again is the knowledge of the means of achieving what is desired and that arises from the apprehension of the probans '*tajjāṭṭiyatva*' (being of the same class), and that also arises from contact with sense-organs and the like. But cognition of *prāmāṇya* is nowhere found useful, and even if it were useful how could it be said to be intrinsic? Then profuseness of successful activity also results from profuseness of *prāmāṇya* or profuseness of its cognition, but where is its *svataṣṭva* (intrinsicness) useful? And because those who want water, immediately, forcefully and successfully act with reference to water, therefore it does not follow that its potency to allay thirst is perceptible (NKu, pp. 7-8). That is to say, on there being cognition of water people proceed in its direction if they are thirsty not after ascertaining the validity of this cognition or the potency of water to allay thirst, but only on the basis of past experience or similarity to previous cognitions of water and the behaviour based on it.

It may be urged : ' All this (immediate activity etc.) is justifiable on there being the cognition of *prāmāṇya*; but if it were not intrinsic it would not be there at all, because the view that it is extrinsic suffers from the fault of *anavasthā* (vicious infinite series).'' As Vardhamāna explains, if cognition whose validity is not grasped is accepted as determining the validity of another cognition, then let even definite knowledge whose validity is not cognised determine the object. What is the need to cognise its validity? And if on account of there being suspicion of its invalidity there is not the determination of the object from that alone, then due to doubt or suspicion as to the invalidity of the inference pertaining to validity there is not the determination of validity from it. If the validity of this also requires to be ascertained there would be

anavasthā. Similarly owing to the validity of the cognitions of the *liṅga* (probans), *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) etc. not being determined, the *hetu* (reason), etc would be *asiddha* (unproven), and if they were to be ascertained there would be *anavasthā*. It is not true that there is not doubt as to the validity of the cognition of *liṅga*, as this would contradict practical experience. Therefore it has to be accepted that *prāmāṇya* is cognised intrinsically.

Udayana's rejoinder is : Even if it (*prāmāṇya*) is not cognised, everything (immediate action, etc) is possible even from the doubtful cognition of the thing. And there is not involved *anavasthā* (vicious infinite series) because it is not accepted that *prāmāṇya* must be necessarily known, otherwise the fault would be there in the case of the theory of the intrinsic cognition of *prāmāṇya* also. Vardhamāna argues that there is not the determination of the object only due to the determination of the validity of the knowledge, but where in respect of knowledge of palm of the hand and the like (i.e. familiar objects) there is not the suspicion of invalidity, there is the determination of the object only on there being definite knowledge; so confident activity is possible only due to it and there is not the pursuit of the validity of the cognitions of the *liṅga* and the like of the inferential cognition of validity, and so there is no *anavasthā* (NKu. 2, pp. 12-13 and *Prakāśa*, p. 14).

Udayana continues : It may be urged that the *liṅga* can help to determine only if it is itself determined, so another *liṅga* would be required for its cognition and so on *ad infinitum*. The *Naiyāyika* rejoins : Does the thing, which is not accounted for, imply the existence of what can account for it without itself being determined, so that there should not be *anavasthā* ? It may be urged here that it is definitely known by means of perception and it by its very presence is a determining factor, so this difficulty is not there. This is not tenable. In my case also, the *liṅga* is definitely known by means of perception and it serves as a determining factor

by its very presence; so the difficulty is similarly not present here. It may be asked : When validity of the knowledge of probans is not determined, how could there be its definite knowledge? We can rejoin : When there is not the definite knowledge of the validity of the knowledge of the thing which is not accounted for, how could there be its definite knowledge? The argument is similar. If it is contended that as said above, perception does not help to determine its object by definite knowledge or by definite knowledge of its *prāmāṇya*, but by its very presence, a similar argument can be advanced against it. It may be objected : “ What would happen if the probans accepted to establish *prāmāṇya* turns out to be a fallacious one ? ” We can similarly ask : “ What would happen if the thing that is one not accounted for also proves to be a simulation ? ’ It may be argued : “ It also implies *prāmāṇya*, so the general rule is maintained. It is only set aside at times by a contradicting factor.” The rejoinder is that this would be true in the case of the probans also. It may be further urged that thus doubt will remain all the same with regard to the inference of validity, so the attempt to prove validity is meaningless. The answer to this is : “ It will be the same in your case also. If it is urged that the thing, which is not accounted for, is such that it could not be a simulation even in a dream, and so there would be no suspicion, we answer that the same can be said of the *liṅga* also. What again is this thing which is not a simulation even a dream, on the non-apprehension of which there would be scope for erroneous cognition and on the apprehension of which there is the demonstration of its contradiction or absence (*bādhavyavasthā* ? Otherwise, if the contradicting factor is itself subject to deviation (*vyabhicāra*), *bādhavyavasthā* also would not be there”. If the opponent urges, ‘ What harm if it is not there ? ’ The rejoinder is that this is not tenable as the classification of reality (or truth) and unreality (or falsity) has to be there, otherwise there would be contradiction of worldly behaviour. How can there be the superimposition of the opposite even when there is the apprehension of all

particular features which are the decisive factors? Or if this were to happen how could there be a contradicting factor, when there is the non-apprehension of the particular features other than these? And in its absence how could that which is not contradicted be illusory? (NKu. 2, pp. 13-14). Vardhamāna explaining this says: If there be superimposition of the opposite even when there is the apprehension of all particular features that are deciding factors, then its character of being a superimposition could not be determined without a contradicting or sublating factor (*bādhaka*) because otherwise there would be the contingency of everything being a superimposition. If it is determined by the *bādhaka*, then on that which is regarded as the *bādhaka* being contradicted, there would be the contingency of its being a non-*bādhaka*; and in the event of its being uncontradicted there could not be the possibility of superimposition, when there is the apprehension of the particular features. And if *prāmāṇya* is thus inferrable, knowledge whose *prāmāṇya* is cognised would not be the stimulator in respect of a thing which can be achieved after great effort, because the inferential cognition of its validity would have already perished; but the stimulation can come only from another cognition having the same object as that knowledge and in respect of which there is no suspicion of *aprāmāṇya* (invalidity). And thus inferential cognition of *prāmāṇya* is not fruitless as without is there would be suspicion of invalidity in respect of knowledge having the same object.

That is to say, the *prāmāṇya* of knowledge in unfamiliar circumstances has to be ascertained by inference. The similar cognition that arises after this serves as the stimulator of activity. In familiar cases, it is not necessary to ascertain the validity of cognitions, but this is so only because we have an inner conviction of their validity on the ground of similarity with previous cognitions in the same circumstances which had been ascertained to be valid. This is the substance of Udayana's contention.

Summing up, one may say that the sceptic's and the absolutist's challenging the absolute truth of knowledge put the thinkers and logicians of the other schools on the alert and they carefully formulated their own theories of truth and error, validity and invalidity. Even here they held different views and discussed their own theories and confuted rival ones at length in actual debates and controversies and in works on logic and philosophy. An enormous mass of dialectical thought grew around this subject. The attack on the authority of the the *Veda* and the sceptical attitude with regard to all knowledge in general gave the fillip to establish theories pertaining to validity and invalidity of knowledge in general. The Mīmāṃsakas, mainly concerned with the defence of the intrinsic authority of the *Veda*, contributed much that is really important to the problem of knowledge. According to the Mīmāṃsaka, truth is inherent in knowledge as the very aim and purpose of knowledge is truth and the very drive of it is towards it. According to the Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, cognition is neutral to truth and falsity which are due to and apprehended by extraneous conditions. Even the Naiyāyikas had almost to recognise the intrinsic validity of *anuvyavasāya*, *upamāna*, etc.; their contention that validity is extrinsic mostly pertained to perceptual cognition and verbal testimony. The Mīmāṃsakas of all the different sub-schools gave convincing rejoinders to the arguments advanced by the Naiyāyikas. Thus an important epistemological problem came to light and received due attention from the different schools of philosophy as a result of dialectics.

The Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins who assert that validity is intrinsic to knowledge and invalidity extrinsic seem to have hit upon a very important truth. Knowledge does carry with it the conviction of its own truth in the case of every normal person. Even the ever-doubting sceptic's drive in the cognitive process is towards truth though he never feels sure of it and so goes on doubting and questioning. The agnostic, though he does not believe in the possibility of the discovering of the ultimate truth about fundamentals,

yet has faith in, and works with, empirical truths. But there cannot be an unbridgeable gulf between the ultimate truth and the empirical one, though one may not be able to bridge it. In our human condition with its limitations one has to proceed with the conviction that the quality of truth is inherent in every knowledge as it arises and that further contradictory experience removes the element of error from it and thus progressively leads to a clearer and a still clearer vision of Reality. This was the stand of the Mīmāṃsakas, which became more comprehensive in the case of the Uttara-Mīmāṃsakas or the Vedāntins who attempted to grasp Reality as a whole.

NOTES

- 1 See *'The Great Epic of India'* pp. 90 ff.—Hopkins.
- 2 Prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi—*Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, 4.
- 3 Sal-lakṣaṇanibandhanam mānavyavasthānam, mānanibandhanā ca meya-sthitiḥ, tad-abhāve tayoh sadvyavahāra-visayatvaṁ katham (svayam eva) .—TPS, p. 1; Lakṣaṇādhinā tāval lakṣyavyavasthitiḥ, lakṣaṇāni ca anupapannāni, jñātādhikaranādi-lakṣaṇanirūpaṇadvāreṇa cakrakā-dyāpatteḥ.—KhKh, pp. 141-142; see also VI V, 31.
- 4 Indriyadoṣāt saṁskāradosāc ca avidyā; tad dustajñānam, aduṣṭam vidyā.—VS 9.2.10-12.
- 5 Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavāsāyātmakam pratyakṣam.—NS. 1.1.4; yad atasmiṁs tad iti tad vyabhicāri yat tu tasmiṁs tad iti tad avyabhicāri pratyakṣam iti.—NB. 1.1.4.
- 6 See *Saptapadārthi*, 59-61; 211 ff; *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, 4.1ff; *Tarkasaṅgraha*, 34-36; 64-65; *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, 51, 126-130.
- 7 Tattvam anāropitam rūpam, tasya jñānam anubhavaḥ.—*Saptapadārthi*, 110-111.
- 8 Pramānato'rthapratipattau pravṛtti-sāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam. pramāṇam antarena nārthapratipattiḥ nārthapratipattim antareṇa pravṛttisāmarthyam. pramāṇena khalu ayam jñātā'rtham upalabhya tam artham abhipṣati jihāsati vā tasyepsājihāṣā-prayuktasya samihā pravṛttir ity ucyate. sāmarthyam punar asyāḥ phalenā'bhāsambandhaḥ. samihāmānas tam artham abhipṣan jihāsan vā tam artham āpnoti jahāti vā.—NB Introductory, 1.1.1. See also NM. 1, pp. 158-159.

9. TC, *Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa-siddhānta*, *Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa*, p. 217 (Darbhanga, 1957). Gaṇgeśa does not regard the following definitions as tenable—*yathārthāgr̥hīta-grāhitvaṃ lokasiddha-pramātvam*, *yathārthānubhavatvaṃ pramātvam*, *guṇajanyānubhavatvaṃ doṣābhāva-janyānubhavatvaṃ vā pramātvam*, *abādhitānubhavatvaṃ pramātvam*, *samvādyanubhavatvaṃ pramātvam*, *samarthopapravṛtti-janakānubhavatvaṃ pramātvam*, *tattvānubhavatvaṃ pramātvam*. The refutation is almost the same as in KhKh, though not so elaborate. Other definitions refuted have the ring of Navya Nyāya about them; for instance, ‘*Viśeṣyanis̥ṭhātvyantābhāvapratiyogidharma-prakāra-kānubhavatvaṃ*’ [*pramā* is *anubhava* of which the chief qualifier (*prakāra*) is that (e.g. *ghaṭatva*) which is not the counter-positive of the absolute negation (e.g. *paṭābhāva*) which subsists in the qualificand (e.g. *ghaṭa*)]; this definition is not acceptable as it is so narrow that it cannot apply to the valid knowledge of e.g. *saṃyoga* (conjunction) which is co-subsistent with its negation in the substrate. See *pramālakṣaṇapūrvapakṣa* in the *Pratyakṣa Khaṇḍa* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.
10. See also ‘*Etac ca viśeṣaṇatrayam upādadanena Sūtrakāreṇa kāraṇadoṣa-bādhakajñāna-rahitam agr̥hitagrāhi jñānam pramānam iti pramāṇa-lakṣaṇam sūtritam*.—ŚD. 1.1, p. 45
11. PP, Ch. 6, 2-4, p. 127; also PP, p. 42.
12. The following stanza is ascribed to Kumārila :
Tatrā’pūrvārtha-vijñānam niścitaṃ bādhavarjitam,
aduṣṭakāraṇārabdham pramāṇam loka-sammatam.
13. Tad-ādhikeyāc ca siddham uttareṣāṃ prāmāṇyam.—ŚD. 1.1, p. 46.
14. PP, pp. 43-44.
15. ŚD, p. 46
16. Tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā,
arthānyathātvaheṭuttha-dosa-jñānād apodyate.
—Ślv. 1. 12., v. 53; tasmāt svataḥ-prāmāṇyam prāptam anyathātva-kāraṇadoṣajñānābhyām apodyate ity avaśyam aṅgikartavyam.—ŚD, p. 22.
17. Bhrāntaṃ hy anumānam. svapratibhāse’narthe’dhyavasāyena pravṛttatvāt—NyBT, p. 9, yathā ca pratyakṣam pratibhāsamānam niyatam artham darśayati, anumānam ca līṅgasambaddham niyatam artham darśayati; ata ete niyatasyā’ rthasya pradarśake; tena te pramāṇe nā’nyad vijñānam.—NyBT, p. 4.

18. Yenaiva jñānena prathamam adhigato' rthas tenaiva pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ prāpitaḥ cā'rthaḥ. tatraiva rthe kim anyena jñānenādhikam kāryam. tato'dhigataviśayam apramāṇam.—NyBT, p. 4.
19. Tad yadi pratikṣaṇam kṣaṇavivekadarśino'dhikṛtyocyate tadā bhinnopayogitayā prthak prāmāṇyād nānekāntaḥ. atha sarvapadārtheṣu ekatvādhyavasāyinaḥ sāmivyavahārikān puruṣān abhipretyocyate tadā sakalam eva nīla-santānam ekam artham sthira rūpam tat-sādhyam cā'rthakriyām ekātmikām adhyavasyantīti prāmāṇyam apy uttareṣām anikṣam eveti kuto'nekāntaḥ.—*Hetubinduṭīkā*, pp. 37-38 (GOS).
20. Vide *Pramāṇavārttika*, 1.3 ff
21. NyBT, pp. 4-5.
22. Nocyate yasminneva kāle paricchidyate tasminneva kāle prāpayitavyam iti. anyo hi darśanakālo'nyaś ca prāptikālaḥ. kim tu yatkālam paricchinnam tad eva prāpaṇyam. abhedādhyavasāyāc ca santānagatam ekatvam draṣṭavyam iti.—NyBT, p. 5.
23. Tan nādhyavasitākārapratirūpā na vidyate, tatra'py arthakriyāvyaṅgī anyathā'tiprasajyate.—TvS, 1325.
24. Tac ca pūrvamātram, na tu sākṣātkāraṇam. samyagjñāne hi sati pūrvadṛṣṭasmarāṇam, smaraṇād abhilāṣaḥ. abhilāṣāt pravṛttiḥ. pravṛtteḥ ca prāptiḥ. tato na sākṣāddhetuḥ.—NyBT, p. 5; tathā hi na jñānam jana-yad artham prāpayati, api tu arthe puruṣam pravartayat prāpayaty artham. pravartakatvam api pravṛttiviśaya-pradarśakatvam eva, na hi puruṣam haḥhāt pravartayitum śaknoti vijñānam. ata eva cā'rthādhigatir eva pramāṇaphalam. adhigate cā'rthe pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ prāpitaś cārthaḥ. tathā ca saty arthādhigamāt samāptaḥ pramāṇa-vyāpāraḥ. ata evā'nadhigataviśayam pramāṇam.—NyBT, pp. 3-4.
25. Pramāṇam sva-parābhāsi jñānam bādhavivarjitam.—NyA, 1. See also 4-6. Tattvārthavyavasāyātma jñānam mānam itīyatā, lakṣaṇena gatārthatvād vyartham anyad viśeṣaṇam.—TŚlv. 1.10.77; Svaparavyavasāyi jñānam pramāṇam.—PNTL 1.1.2; Samyag arthanirṇayaḥ pramāṇam.—PM 1.1.2. gṛhitam aṅghritam vā svārtham yadi vyavasyati, tan na loke na śāstreṣu vijahāti pramāṇatām.—TŚlv. 1.10.78 jñānasya prameyā'vyabhicāritvam prāmāṇyam, tad itarat tv aprāmāṇyam. —PNTL 1. 18-19.

26. See *Nyavāvatārasūtra-vārttika-vṛtti*, p. 17;

Tatsāmarthyādhīnatvāt pramānatvasthiteḥ. avisamvādasyāpi svārthavyavasāyātmakatvāt.—*Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 279; see *Ibid*, pp. 276-280.

27. Tatra smṛtivyāvṛttam pramātvam anadhiḡatā' bādhitārtha-visayakajñānatvaṁ, smṛtisādhāraṇaṁ tu abādhitārtha-ṡṡayakajñānatvaṁ.—*Vedāntoparibhāṡā*, Ch. 1, p. 5; tathā hi smṛtyanubhava-sādhāraṇaṁ samvādi-pravṛtṡyanukūlaṁ tadvati tatprakārajñānatvaṁ prāmānyaṁ.—*Ibid*, Ch. 6. pp. 148-149.

28. Kim punas tatra kārtsnyam abhipretaṁ, deṡa-kālanimitta-sampattir abādhaṡ ca —*Br. Sū. Śāṅkarabhāṡya*, 3.2.3.

29. See *Śribhāṡya*, 1.1.1, pp. 96-97 (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series); also NP. p. 39; *Yatindramataḡipikā*, pp 4-5.

30. *Prasthānaratnākara*, pp. 5ff (of Puruṡottama) (CSS).

31. Āhosvid aprāmānyaṁ svato' vagamyate prāmānyaṁ tu kāranaguṇajñānāt samvāḡajñānād arthakṛiyājñānād vā avadhāiyate.—ŚD 1.1.2, p. 20; tasmād aprāmānyaṁ svataḡ prāmānyaṁ tu samvāḡajñānādibhir ity etad eva yuktam.—ŚD 1.1.2, p. 21. The author of the *Yuktisneha prapūraṇi-siddhānta-candrikā* refers to this as the Buddhist view;

Ābhyāśikaṁ yatha jñānaṁ pramānaṁ gamyate svataḡ,
mithyā jñānaṁ tathā kiṇcid apramānaṁ svataḡ sthitam.

—TvS, 3100; also *Pañjikā*, p. 811.

For the Nyāya-Vaiṡṡika view see *Bhāṡā-pariccheda*, 131, 136;

Nyāya-kusumāñjali, 2.1. p. 1 ff; *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 157-160.

Pūrvamīmāṁsā view—S lv. 1.1.2. 33ff; ŚD 1.1, p. 20ff; PP, pp. 33ff;

Jaina view—PMS 1.1.3; PNTL 1.20; PM 1.1.8, etc.

Vedāntic view—*Vedānta paribhāṡā*, Ch. 6, 149 ff; Bhāskara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, 1.4.21; NP, pp 31-34; TT. Vol. 4, pp. 4ff. Puruṡottama thinks that in some cases where knowledge is due to the accessory influence of memory, its validity is not spontaneous or intrinsic, but is derived through corroborative sources; whereas there may be other cases where knowledge is intrinsically valid (PR, p. 155).

I have dealt with Indian epistemology at length, with special reference to the problem of error, in my book *Avidyā-A Problem of Truth and Reality* (Published by the Gujarat University).

32. Vide Ślv. 1.1.2. 27-32. I am highly indebted to Gaṅgānātha Jhā's translation.

33. Sarvavijñāna-viśayam idam tāvat parikṣyatām,
pramāṇatvā' pramāṇatve svataḥ kiṃ parato'tha vā.—Ślv. 1.1.2. 33.
34. Tasmāt svābhāvikaṃ teṣāṃ apramāṇatvam iśyatām,
prāmāṇyaṃ ca parāpekṣam atra nyāyo'bhidhiyate.
aprāmāṇyam avastutvān na syāt kāraṇadoṣataḥ,
vastutvāt tu guṇais teṣāṃ prāmāṇyam upajanyate.
—Ślv. 1.1.2. 38-39.
35. Anvaya-vyatirekābhyām aprāmāṇyaṃ na doṣataḥ,
nā'jñāne dṛśyate hy etat kāraṇābhāvahetuke.
tataś ca puruṣābhāvāt sati vā śuddhyasambhavar,
nirmūlatvāt pramāṇatvaṃ codanānām na yujyate.
—Ślv. 1.1.2. 45-46.
36. Svataḥ sarva-pramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyam iti gṛhyatām,
na hi svato'satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena śakyate.
ātmalābhe hi bhāvānāṃ kāraṇāpekṣitā bhavet,
labdhātmanāṃ svakāryesu pravṛttiḥ svayam eva tu.
—Ślv. 1.1.2. 47-48.
37. Doṣataś cā'pramāṇatve svataḥ-prāmāṇyavādinām,
guṇajñānā'navasthāvan na doṣeṣu prasajyate.—Ślv. 1.1.2. 56
38. Tatra doṣāntarajñānaṃ bādhadhīr vā parā na cet,
tadudbhūtau dvitīyasya mithyātvād ādyamānataḥ.
—Ślv. 1.1.2. 59.
39. Evaṃ tri-caturajñānanmano nā'dhikā matiḥ,
prārthyate tāvad evaikam svataḥ prāmāṇyam aśnute.
—Ślv. 1.1.2. 61.
40. Tatpāpavādanirmuktir vaktrabhāvāl laghīyasī.
vede tenā'pramāṇatvaṃ nā''śaṅkāṃ api gacchati.
ato vaktranadhīnatvāt prāmāṇye tadupāsanaṃ,
na yuktam apramāṇatve kalpye tat-prārthanā bhavet.
tataś cā''ptā'prāṇitvatvaṃ na doṣāyātra jāyate,
prayogānāṃ tu saiveṣāṃ vakṣyaṃaḥ pratisādhanaṃ.
pauruṣe ye tu vacane pramāṇāntaramūlatā,
tadabhāve hi tad duṣyed itaran na kadācana.
—Ślv. 1.1.2. 68-71

Parthasārathi Miśra has given a summary of Kumārila's arguments in his *Śāstradīpikā*, pp. 20-23.

41. See *Nyāya-Kusumāñjali*, 2. p. 1ff; *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, *Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa*, *Prāmāṇyavāda*.
42. See Appendix 2.
43. Tenaiva prāmāṇyagraha iti Prābhākaraḥ. jñānasya'indriyatayā tadanu-
mityā tadgraha iti Bhāṭṭāḥ. manasaiva jñānasvarūpavat tat-prāmāṇya-
graha iti Murāriśiṣṛāḥ. tritaya-sādhāraṇaṁ ca svatasvaṁ niruktam eva.
—Vardhamāna's commentary on the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, 2, p. 9.
44. See NB, NV-1.1.1(Introductory).

Part III

CHAPTER 15

GROWTH OF DIALECTICAL CRITICISM AS NOTICED IN PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

Vedic Literature :

We shall, in this chapter, study the evolution of dialectical criticism in philosophical writings. Certain hymns of the *Vedas* pertain to philosophical subjects; there is an attempt in them to explain the creation of the world and describe the ultimate principle, and different thinkers have tried to express their views in a language which is gradually becoming clearer and clearer with the passage of time and the growing maturity of thought. The monotheistic tendency is evident in them though its expression is not always consistent. The *Puruṣa Sūkta* is an illustration in point. The *Nāsadīya Sūkta* is a bold philosophical sally. The thinker with a monistic bent of mind is thinking of the origin of the world. The sage finds it difficult to give expression to a principle which is beyond *sat* (being) and *asat* (non-being), which breathes without breath. He tries to show the process of origination. Then a thought comes to him—who could have information about the origination of the world? Perhaps the gods might know or even they could not for they were produced later. Was the world ever produced or was it not? The hymn ends with a query which smacks of Agnosticism. We can be sure that in the age of the later Vedic hymns, philosophical speculations of all sorts were rampant, some of which have found a place in the Vedic *Samhitās*. The form in which these speculations are given does not admit of much reasoning or argument and therefore we do not get any clear idea of the processes of thought by which the thinkers arrived at their own conclusions which are stated in the hymns, or of the discussions and controversies

that were there among the thinkers of that age in respect of philosophical problems.

The *Brāhmaṇas*, on the other hand, are exegetic works, a kind of commentary on the Vedic hymns and sacrificial rites. There is an attempt in them to explain everything—even the number of syllables in a particular metre, and the etymology of terms.¹ There is a myth to explain every sacrifice and there are tales in exhortation of the performance of particular sacrifices, and also tales to recommend particular rites or in condemnation of the transgression of moral rules and the proper mode of performing different sacrificial rites. For instance, we are told that Kalyāṇa Āṅgiras told a lie and he lost his former state, he became a leper. As Sāyaṇa points out in his commentary there is implied here a relationship between telling a lie and losing the former state and becoming a leper.² Similarly, in the story of Śīśu Āṅgirasa, who addressed his elders as ‘*putrakāḥ*’ (‘Dear Boys’), the gods pronounce the judgment that he who is a *mantrakṛt* (maker of *mantras*) is a *pitr* (father)—*yaḥ mantrakṛt sa pitā*.³ There is a certain logic behind this however childish it may seem to us—which succeeded in convincing the people of those days and some of which can convince even today (e.g. dignity and seniority rest more on inner worth than on age). The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 5.2.1.10 tells us—A wife is half the husband, so the husband is only half (i.e. imperfect and insufficient) so long as he is without a wife. He does not become whole till he marries and begets a son (lit. till he is born in her).⁴ This explains why the presence of the wife is required by the side of the husband in religious ceremonies.

What is more interesting for our purpose is that we find recorded in the *Brāhmaṇas*, differences of opinion among the different schools as regards the interpretation of sacrificial rites and their performance. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 4.2.9, there is noted a difference of opinion as to the number of metres to be used for reciting verses for Sūrya and the order in which the verses addressed to Sūrya are to be recited. An

objection is similarly referred to and attempted to be answered in the same *Brāhmaṇa* (3.4.43 ff). In the Agniṣṭoma, the beginning and the end are so alike that it is not possible to distinguish between them as in the case of the Śākala serpent one cannot say which is the fore-part and which the hind part. But some object to this saying, "They make the beginning of the *stotras* of the Soma day with the *trivṛt* (three-fold) *stoma* and conclude with the *ekavimśa* (twentyone-fold) *stoma* (at the evening libation), so how could they be alike?" To this one should answer, "They are like in so far as the *ekavimśa stoma* is also a *trivṛt stoma* for both contain triplets of verses." Similarly a question is raised that on the hand we are told that the Agniṣṭoma is like the sun because both are connected with the day, and on the other hand it is said that the rites must not be performed hurriedly so that mistakes could be avoided. Now if the rites of the evening libation (*trītyasavana*) are performed slowly, there being very little time at the disposal of the sacrificer, the sun might set even before the ceremony has been performed. The answer to this is that the sun neither rises nor sets. When people think that the sun is setting it itself produces two opposite effects, making night to what is on this side and day to what is on the other side. When they believe that it rises, having reached the end of the night it makes itself produce two opposite effects, making day to what is on this side and night to what is on the other side. In fact, the sun never rises or sets. Rising and setting are both relative, the sun retains his high position in the sky.⁵ Perhaps what the thinker means to say is that sunrise and sunset do not signify the origination and the destruction of the sun, and so from this point of view, the sun neither rises nor sets for neither is it born nor does it perish. Sāyaṇa seems to suggest this interpretation (*astamayaḥ svarūpanāśaḥ, udayaḥ sūryotpattiḥ*). That rise should be equated with origination and disappearance with destruction might appear childish to advanced science, but we find here the seeds of philosophy wherein appearance does signify origination

and disappearance destruction At least, the inquiry of a searching mind is quite evident here.

The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 7.2.10 refers to a question asked by some, "In what does an *Agnihotrin* who has no wife bring his oblations with speech (i.e. by repeating the *mantras* required with his voice) ? In what way does he offer his daily burnt offering when his wife dies after he has already entered on the state of an *Agnihotrin*, his wife having by her death destroyed the qualification for the performance of the daily burnt offering. The *Agnihotrin* who has no wife says to his children, etc. "I have ascended the heaven by means of what was no heaven (i.e. by the sacrifice performed in this world)." He who does not wish to have a second wife keeps up, by speaking thus, his connection with the other world. His children, grand-children and relation establish new fires for him who has lost his wife. How does he who has no wife bring his oblations with his mind ? Faith is his wife and Truth the sacrificer. The marriage of Faith and Truth is a most happy one, for by faith and Truth joined they conquer the celestial world. Another controversial point discussed in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 7.4.26 is whether the *kṣatriya* should or should not eat the sacrificial food which is to be eaten by the sacrificer. They say if he eats then he commits a great sin by eating sacrificial food although he is an *ahutād* (one not permitted to eat). If he does not eat, then he cuts himself off from the sacrifice, for the portion to be eaten by the sacrificer is the sacrifice. Thus he is on the horns of a dilemma (This is a case of *ubhayataḥ spāśā rajju*, which is then shown to be an *ābhāsa*, simulation)

One view is that it to be made over to the *brāhmaṇa* priest, for the *brāhmaṇa* priest of the *kṣatriya* is in the place of his *purohita*. The *purohita* is one-half of the *kṣatriya*; only through the intervention of another (—the *brāhmaṇa* priest) the portion appears to be eaten by him though he does not eat it with his own mouth, for the sacrifice is there where the *brāhmaṇa* priest is. The entire sacrifice is placed in the *brāhmaṇa* and the sacrificer is the sacrifice. They

throw the sacrifice in the shape of the portion which is to be eaten by the sacrificer, into the sacrifice which has the form of the brāhmaṇa priest, just as they throw water into water, fire into fire without making it over-flow; this does not cause any injury to the sacrifice. Therefore, the portion to be eaten by a sacrificer is, if he be a kṣatriya, to be given to the brāhmaṇa priest. Some sacrificial priests, however, sacrifice this portion to the fire saying, "I place thee in Prajāpati's world which is called Vibhān (shining everywhere); be joined to the sacrificer, *svāhā*!" But the sacrificial priest should not proceed thus for the portion to be eaten by the sacrificer is the sacrificer himself, and therefore the priest who acts thus burns the sacrificer in the fire. In this last passage we find different views held in respect of the same point and also that there is some justification given for a particular view and also condemnation of a different one. This is thus a very good instance of dialectical criticism. Further the dilemma is posed that if the kṣatriya partakes of the sacrificial food he becomes a sinner and if he does not eat the sacrificial food, he cuts himself off from the sacrifice, and a solution is found so that either difficulty is averted.⁶

The examples of dialectical criticism given above are by no means exhaustive, and we do not here concern ourselves with the contents of the discussions in the *Brāhmaṇas*, yet we discern the logical skeleton underlying them. It is quite likely that during the long sacrificial sessions, the people participating got plenty of time to indulge in all sorts of discussions and riddles and the like. As a consequence of this, modes of dialectical criticism and elements of logic emerged. Some scholars are of the opinion that the early Mīmāṃsakas were the original pioneers in the field of logic and that *pūrvavat*, *śesavat*, and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* types of inference were originally formulated by the early Mīmāṃsakas who perhaps formulated also the syllogism of ten members (*avayava*) referred to by Vātsyāyana.⁷ In the *Āraṇyakas* the sacrificial rites are given a symbolic interpretation and this is

attempted to be explained, though there are not many reasoned out statements

In the *Upanisads* we find recorded a number of philosophical debates and discussions as to the nature and identity of the soul and the Ultimate Reality, each thinker having a more and more subtle interpretation of his own to offer thereof.⁸ But very few arguments are found advanced by way of refutation.

Still we do find at times a rival view referred to and refuted briefly. Uddālaka Āruṇi explains to his son that in the beginning this was Being (*sat*) alone, one without a second. Some people say that in the beginning this was Non-being (*asat*) alone, one only without a second; from that Non-being, Being was produced. But how, objects Āruṇi, could it be thus? How could Being be produced from Non-being? Hence it follows that in the beginning there was Being alone, one only without a second (*Chāndogya Up.* 6.2.1-2). Similarly we find philosophical problems posed in the *Śvetāśvatara Up.* 1.1—Those who discourse on Brahman say: "What is the cause? Is it Brahman? Whence are we born? By what do we live? And in what are we established? O ye who know Brahman, tell us presided over by whom do we live our different conditions in pleasure and pain?" A number of views are mentioned as they were suggested in the history of the philosophical thought of that period—"Time, inherent nature, necessity, chance, the elements, the womb or the person—should they be considered as the cause? It cannot be a combination of these because of the existence of the soul. Even the soul is powerless in respect of the cause of pleasure and pain. Those who were devoted to meditation and contemplation saw the power of the Divine hidden in its own qualities. He is the one who rules over all these causes from Time to the soul." (*Śvet. Up.* 1.2.3; see also 6.1). In the *Kaṭha Up.* (1.1.20), Naciketas asks Yama regarding the state of man after the destruction of the body as some hold that he is and some that he is not. Thus different views on the same point

are at times mentioned in the *Upaniṣads* though we hardly ever find any reasoned out statement in support or in refutation of any view.

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.8,9-11, Yājñavalkya adduces inferential evidence from the orderliness of the world. The maintenance of the respective positions of heaven and earth and the like is not possible without the existence and guidance of an intelligent transcendent ruler. Yājñavalkya explains that this Ultimate Reality is inexplicable, indescribable, beyond speech and mind and undifferentiated. We have a number of such negative explanations of the Ultimate Reality wherein all opposites are negated of it, these being confessions of the fact that logical reasoning or other empirical proof or verbal expression confined to empirical concepts cannot give us an idea of the Absolute Reality. This shows the limitations of Dialectics with regard to metaphysical ultimates. The *avyākṛta* (indeterminable) problems of Buddha may be compared in this respect. Any answer to such questions is invariably relative and therefore invalid from the absolute point of view.⁹

From the fore-going account it is clear that philosophical discussions and controversies were very common and popular in the *Upaniṣadic* period among the enlightened people especially learned Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas. The philosophers must have reasoned and discussed at length before they arrived at or proved their conclusions, though these arguments are not preserved, as the *Upaniṣads* seem to be brief accounts of the philosophical speculations of the period, perhaps by way of brief notes and points helpful to the memory. The philosophers gradually developed the niceties of philosophical thought and expression. As the *Nāṣadiya sūkta* says that there was neither being nor non-being in the beginning, so in the *Subāla Up.* 1., Brahmā says to Subāla, 'It was not existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent (*na san nā san na sadasad iti*). For a very long time, Vedānta confined its description of the Absolute Principle to the negation

of existence, non-existence and both Sañjaya Belatthaputta, the Mādhyamikas and the sceptics add one more alternative and deny that also—‘not neither’ (*na asadasat*), and come to their conclusion that the Ultimate Reality cannot be described in terms of empirical concepts or that it is not possible to have definite knowledge of anything or that all definitions of Reality are self-contradictory. The seeds of such fine speculations can be traced to the Upaniṣadic period, if not earlier.

Buddhist Canonical Literature—The early Buddhist Pali literature (collected roughly in and after the fourth century B.C.) is packed with accounts of discussions and controversies between Buddha and his disciples and between Buddha and rival thinkers. We have also references to disputes and controversies in the Sangha itself and with thinkers of rival schools. These discussions also contributed to the growth and method of dialectical criticism. Buddha puts himself as far as possible in the mental position of the questioner. He accepts as the starting point of his exposition the position of the opponent (e.g. desirability of the union with God as in the *Tevijja Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, of sacrifice as in the *Kūṣadanta Sutta*, of social rank as in the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* of seeing heavenly sights as in the *Mahāli Sutta*, or of the soul theory as in the *Potṭhapāda Sutta*) and even adopts the very phraseology of the questioner. And then partly by putting a new and (from his own point of view) a higher meaning into the words and partly by an appeal to such conceptions as are common ground between them, he gradually leads his opponent to his conclusion. In later philosophical works we find a similar mode adopted; to satisfy the opponent his position is accepted and the anomalies and contradictions are pointed out; the opponent's position is also refuted even independently and the contrary position established. Buddha also asks questions in answering which the opponent is gradually led to accept his view.¹⁰ In the *Assalāyaṇa Sutta* (*Majjhima Nikāya*), Buddha's questions while repudiating *varṇā-vyavasthā* (—classification of *varṇas* i.e. classes hardened into castes—) are very convincing, e.g.

"Is fire lit by a Brāhmaṇa brighter and more useful than that lit by others?" This is another way of embarrassing the opponent on the basis of experience which cannot be contradicted. Similarly, in the *Vāseṭṭha Sutta*, Buddha explains to Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja that there is a *liṅga* (characteristic mark) peculiar to different classes of living beings but there is no such mark distinguishing the *jātis* or castes of human beings from one another. There is no difference in their bodies. They are only conventionally addressed differently. Here there is an attempt to show that no conclusion can be accepted if there is no mark to prove it. We have seen that inference, especially of the *śesavat* or the *sāmānyato-drṣṭa* type is very frequently found in the Buddhist Canonical literature. Buddha very often discusses as to who is a true Brāhmaṇa, and how one is a Brāhmaṇa whether by his birth or by his character.¹¹

It may be noted here that Buddha avoided answering certain metaphysical questions which he regarded as *avyākata* (*avyākṛta*, indeterminable). They are—(1) The *loka* is eternal, (2) the *loka* is non-eternal, (3) the *loka* has an end, (4) the *loka* is endless, (5) soul and body are one, (6) soul and body are different, (7) the Tathāgata exists after death, (8) the Tathāgata does not exist after death, (9) the Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death, (10) the Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death (see *Māluṅkya Sutta*, *Majjhima Nikāya*). One view with regard to this is that Buddha was a practical philosopher and so did not discuss such topics, as these in no way help to ease the pain man's life is full of. Buddha himself says that such questioning is of no avail. Another view is that Buddha was an agnostic; he was of the opinion that one could not have certain knowledge of these metaphysical entities and problems; we must restrict our activities in such a manner as to concentrate all our energy on the leading of a life guided by right conduct and on the removal of pain. The last four of the questions mentioned above betray Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta's influence that

one cannot affirm existence, non-existence, both or neither in respect of anything. We shall come to this point later. Any such proposition betrays a conflict of Reason and so could not be valid. Thus no knowledge is valid. This line of thought leads to utter scepticism in respect of everything. Buddha might not have gone to this length but he probably detected the conflict of reason in all empirical statements. It is here that we have the beginning of dialectics having to confront the conflict of Reason at every step of one's argument. The Mādhyamikas admitted this and came to the conclusion that everything is *śūnya* (void) as it is relative and dependent on another and only what is independent can be real. All the same they recognised the claims of Pure Knowledge or Highest Intuition. Prof. Murti seems to be of the view that this was the position of Buddha himself also and that is why he refused to answer questions of a purely metaphysical interest.¹²

Jaina Canonical Literature—Mahāvīra, we are told was not the founder of a new school of thought but was a reformer of the older one of Pārśva so he must have had to vigorously combat the opinions of his opponents and defend those he had accepted or refined. During this process, dialectical criticism must have experienced a notable growth though we may not notice this in all its significance in the accounts of controversies in the Jaina Āgamas. Before coming to the extant canonical works we may note that besides the *aṅgas* there existed other and probably older works called *Pūrvas* of which there were originally fourteen. The knowledge of these *Pūrvas* was gradually lost, but according to the Śvetāmbara tradition, the *Pūrvas* were incorporated in the twelfth *Aṅga*, the *Dṛṣṭivāda* which also was lost (before 1000 A.V. i.e. 474 A.D.). But a detailed table of contents of the *Dṛṣṭivāda* and consequently of the *Pūrvas* has survived in the *Samavāyāṅga* and in the *Nandī Sūtra*. From this we know that they dealt chiefly with the *dṛṣṭis* or philosophical opinions of the Jainas and other schools. It may be inferred that the *Pūrvas* contained much dialectical criticism, though it might

have been of a preliminary character. The title *pravāda* which is added to the name of each *pūrva* confirms this.

At times criticism proceeds on the basis of one's own interpretation of the teachings or writings of other philosophers. The *Sthānāṅga Sūtra*, 587 mentions seven *pravacana-nihnavas*, that is to say, those who conceal the true teaching of Mahāvīra and put a new interpretation on it. Some recognise the Digambaras as the eighth *Nihnava*. These creators of schism even while remaining within the Jaina fold rejected the traditional interpretations of certain Āgamic texts and gave them a meaning contradictory to the traditional one but favourable to their own position on account of some bias or obsession of theirs. Some interesting episode of personal experience is connected with most of these *nihnavas* which conditions their thinking. It may be noted in passing here that if two parties enter into a discussion as regards the interpretation of a particular text without bias or obsession, neither is considered to be *Nihnava*. For instance, there was difference of opinion between Jinabhadra and Siddhasena whether *kevala-jñāna* (perfect determinate or particular knowledge), and *kevala-darśana* (perfect indeterminate or general knowledge) occur at different times or are simultaneous and whether they are different or one. They are not called *Nihnavas* because the sincere desire to know the truth was behind this difference of opinion of theirs. On the other hand *Jamālī*, *Tiṣyagupta* and such others are regarded as *Nihnavas* because they deliberately tried to misrepresent or transgress some of the teachings of Mahāvīra and created schisms even while remaining generally in the same school of thought. In later philosophical works we find attempts to misconstrue or misinterpret the views or arguments of the opponent before refuting them.

In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1.1.4., a number of views including those of the Cārvākas, Buddhists, Sāṃkhyas, Vedāntins, Ajñānikas (agnostics) are referred to and refuted briefly by pointing out some striking drawback. For example, in the refutation of the Vedāntins recognising one sentient principle

appearing under various forms as the universe, it is argued that in that case one could not be sure that the man engaged in undertakings who committed a sin would himself suffer severe pain (1.1.1.9-10). The views that are refuted pertain to all kinds of philosophical problems such as number and nature of the souls, perfection, *karma*, good and evil, creation of the world and the like. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2.6. gives an account of the discussions which Ārya Adda (Ārdraka) had with a number of thinkers—Gośāla, a Buddhist, a Vedic priest, a Vedāntin, a Hastitāpasa (belonging to a sect members of which kill one big elephant and live upon it in order to spare the lives of other animals). Gośāla finds inconsistencies in Mahāvīra's earlier solitary life and his present life when he sits in the midst of a crowd, surrounded by monks teaching his doctrines for the benefit of many people.¹³ Adda explains that this is no sin. Gośāla rejoins that in that case an ascetic who lives alone and single commits no sin if he uses cold water, eats seeds, accepts things prepared for him and has intercourse with women. This is an instance of *pratibandh*. Thus the discussion proceeds. Similarly, in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2.7, there is a discussion between Gautama and Udaka, a follower of Pārśva. Udaka raises a question whether at some future time all movable things in the world might not die out being born as immovable things and none but immovable things exist and vice versa. In the latter case, a layman who abstains from killing animals practically causes no injury whatsoever; in the former case, he cannot be said to transgress the Law even if he would do injury (2.7.12). Gautama combats this at length with the result that Udaka is converted from the creed which enjoins four vows to that which enjoins five great vows and the *pratikramaṇa* (expiation of sin).

Saṅjaya Belaṭṭhaputta and Ajñānavādins—This is sufficient to show that dialectical criticism gradually developed as a result of discussions between rival schools of which quite a number are mentioned in the Buddhist and Jaina *Āgamas*.¹⁴ Of the *Annāṇiya* (*Ajñānikāḥ*), it is said in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*

112.2 that though they pretend to be clever, they reason incoherently and do not get beyond the confusion of their ideas. In the *Brahmajāla-sutta*, *lokāyata* (sophistry) is enumerated among the low arts. Lokāyatikas are said to enter into controversies on fabulous or absurd points. The *Brahmajālasutta-aṭṭhakathā* states that the term *lokakkhāyikā* is applied to such conversation as : 'Who made the world ? The world was made by so and so. Crows are white because their bones are white; cranes are red because their blood is red.' *Lokāyata* or *vitandā* comprises such controversies.¹⁵ In relation to dialectics we are interested in *Ajñānavāda* (Agnosticism referred to in Jaina works) or in the theory of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta as stated in Buddhist works. The latter is reviled as *amarāvikkhepa* (*amarāviksepa*, eelwriggling), behaviour like that of the *amarā* fish which is slippery and wriggles through the hand. The applicability of this term to the teachings of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta can be seen from the following passage from his reply to Ajātaśatru : "If you ask me whether there is another world—well, if I thought there were, I would say so. But I do not say so. And I do not think it is thus or thus. And I do not think it is otherwise and I do not deny it. And I do not say there neither is nor is not another world." And if you ask him about the being produced by chance, or whether there is any fruit, any result of good or bad actions, or whether one who has known the truth continues or not after death—to each or any of these questions he gives the same reply.¹⁶ Thus the Eel-wriggler equivocates about each of such propositions as the following :

- (a) (i) There is another world,
- (ii) There is not another world,
- (iii) There both is and is not another world,
- (iv) There neither is nor is not another world;
- (b) (i) There are chance beings (sprung into existence without the intervention of parents,
- (ii) There are no such beings,

- (iii) There both are and are not such beings,
 - (iv) There neither are nor not such beings;
- (c) (i) There is fruit, result of good and bad actions,
 (ii) There is not,
 (iii) There both is and is not,
 (iv) There neither is nor is not;
- (d) (i) The Tathāgata continues to exist after death,
 (ii) He does not,
 (iii) He both does and does not,
 (iv) He neither does nor does not.¹⁷

It is evident that the Eel-wrigglers, as they were called, did not commit themselves to the assertion or denial or both or neither of anything. The Buddhists and the Jainas condemned them as ignorant, stupid. But perhaps they were too critical to accept the validity or truth of any proposition. Their theory can be called proto-agnosticism or even proto-scepticism. They found that there could be no absolutely true knowledge for the conflict of reason faces us at every step, though there may be pragmatic truth which conducts and guides our worldly affairs. Sañjaya Belatṭhaputta examined all modes of expression of the existence or non existence of a thing, and rejected them.

The Buddhists and the Jainas as also the thinkers of the Vedic school could not but be influenced by this agnostical or sceptical trend of thought, especially with respect to transcendental matters. We find in the Vedic works descriptions of the ultimate Reality in negative terms—not *sat* (being), nor *asat* (non-being), nor both, (nor neither), this last being introduced very gradually and in a very few cases. We also find a clear-cut distinction between the empirical reality or truth and the ultimate reality or truth in Vedāntic thought, though nowhere so marked as in the philosophy of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara, who were definitely inheritors of a past tradition going centuries back. The influence of Sañjaya Bellatṭhaputta

on Buddhist and Jaina thought is obvious. In the *Māluṅkya Sutta* (*Majjhima Nikāya*) Buddha sets aside questions such as whether the Tathāgata exists after death, does not exist, both exists and does not, and neither exists nor does not exist—as *avyākṛta*, indefinable, indeterminable.¹⁸ As Jacobi says, if the public of Buddha's time had not been accustomed to be told that some things, and those of the greatest interest, were beyond the ken of the human mind, and had not acquiesced in such answers, it certainly would not have lent a willing ear to a religious reformer who declined to speak out on what in Brāhmaṇical philosophy is considered the end and goal of all speculations.¹⁹ Agnosticism or scepticism seems to have prepared the way for the Buddhist doctrine of *Nirvāṇa*. Buddha could afford to maintain his reticence on the nature of *Nirvāṇa* in the intellectual or philosophical atmosphere of his days. But as the different schools of thought kept on criticising and refuting one another, each school of thought even while refuting the position of others and demonstrating one's own was bound to develop and be transformed internally. The followers of Buddha also having to hold their own against such hair-splitting dialecticians as the Brāhmaṇical philosophers, were almost driven to enunciate more explicit ideas about the important problem of *Nirvāṇa* which Buddha had left unsolved. This is true to some extent of the concept of soul or the intelligent principle also, and this and such factors led to the division of the community into a number of sub-schools after the life-time of Buddha.

This brief digression is meant to show the important part played by dialectical criticism in the development of philosophical views. In support of the assumption that Buddha was influenced by contemporary agnosticism or scepticism, we may note that as stated in the *Mahāvagga* 1.23.24, Sāriputta and Moggallāna two of his most distinguished disciples had previously to their conversion been adherents of Sañjaya and had brought over to Buddha two hundred and fifty disciples of their former teacher. This happened not long after Gautama's

reaching Bodhi (enlightenment), that is at the very beginning of the new school when its founder must have been willing—on account of his enthusiasm to have an open mind and a rational attitude, or in order to win pupils (—perhaps on account of the former reason)—to treat prevalent opinions with due consideration. It is quite likely that Mahāvīra established his *Syādvāda* under the influence of Agnosticism or scepticism or in opposition to it as Hermann Jacobi suggests.²⁰ As the *Ajñānavāda* (Agnosticism) declares that of a thing beyond our experience and thinking existence or non-existence or both or neither can neither be affirmed nor denied, so in a similar way but leading to contrary results, the *Syādvāda* states that we can affirm the existence of a thing from one point of view (*syād asti*) deny it from another (*syād nāsti*) and affirm both existence and non-existence with reference to it at different times or from different points of view (*syād asti nāsti*). If we should think of affirming existence and non-existence at the same time from the same point of view, we must say that the thing cannot be spoken of (*syād avaktavyah*). Similarly, under certain circumstances the affirmation of existence is not possible (*syād asti avaktavyah*), of non-existence (*syād nāsti avaktavyah*) and also of both (*syād asti nāsti avaktavyah*).²¹ There are similarly the famous *ṇayas* of the Jainas which justify different points of view and suggest that a proposition may be correct from some point of view, though it does not give the whole truth. Perhaps the Jainas were motivated to enunciate such *ṇayas* to silence the opponents and to lessen difference of opinion. The *Ajñānavādins* must have puzzled and even misled many of the contemporaries, and the *Syādvāda* must have seemed to them a happy way out of the maze of *Ajñānavāda*.²²

Thus Sañjaya Belatthaputta and other sceptics and agnostics, though brushed aside cursorily as stupid and ignorant, and as having confused ideas, influenced considerably contemporary speculation and the development of dialectical criticism and of philosophical views in general

The Epics — In the period of the epics (2nd cent. B.C.-2nd cent. A.D.) systems of philosophy were fully ripe for formulation even if they were not actually formulated. This accounts for the number of expositions connected with different schools of thought, especially the Sāṃkhya with a theistic tinge and without it, in the epics, particularly the *Mahābhārata*. There are references to the views of the Vedāntin, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Śaiva, Pāñcarātra, Bauddha, Jaina, Lokāyata.²³ We may only say here that there occurred discussions and disputes between adherents of different schools which we find reflected in the *Mahābhārata*. People of the Vedic faith were confronted with materialists and other heretics.²⁴ Rationalisation (*hetuvāda*) was prevalent and was a favourite practice among the Paṇḍitas and that is why too much of it is condemned. There are numerous references to people indulging in too much of reasoning and devoid of any faith in the scriptures. Thus in *Śāntiparva* 19. 23-24 are mentioned rationalists (*hetumantaḥ*), hard to convince, who are by nature confused and stubborn and deny the existence of the soul. These fools are despisers of immortality and talkers in assemblies of people; they wander over the whole earth, being fond of speaking and learned.²⁵ The *Bhagavad Gītā* 4. 40 refers to the unbelieving man who keeps on doubting, according to whom neither this world nor the other exists. (See MBH, 12. 131-13). He negates or repudiates all scriptures, duties and even the soul. Thus we find the Lokāyatas referred to as extreme rationalists who question everything. It can be said that it was the dialectical criticism of the Lokāyatas that gave the chief incentive to other philosophers to formulate their theories of the *pramāṇas* and their metaphysical views precisely and in a well reasoned out manner. Rationalisation carried to an extreme was looked upon as dangerous and unhealthy as far as practical life was concerned. Nevertheless, the study of logic (Nyāya) was wide spread and the *Mahābhārata* is, as seen before, full of references to Nyāya. Vyāsa admits that he was able to arrange and classify the *Upanisads* with the help of *Ānvikṣikī*; that is to say, the *Upanisads* ought to be interpreted rationally.²⁶

Philosophical discussions are necessarily only a few in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa* (-especially rare in the latter-), but these works abound in very interesting and appealing dialogues and controversies full of arguments by means of which the parties decide the future course of action. An interesting feature of these is that the parties make out a point very clearly and have something to say in defence of their own position even after the other party has pointed out drawbacks in it. These discussions—personal or political—are not of the formal type, yet the element of supporting or defending one's own position is evident in them. On the other hand we hardly ever find this in the philosophical and religious discussions and disputes recorded in the *Upaniṣads* and the Buddhist and Jaina canonical works, in which a disputing party is shown to be immediately convinced, once the inconsistency in its position is pointed out and the other party has presented its position convincingly. In the *Sūtras*, as we shall see, we find finer points being raised in favour of one's own position and looseness or fallacy detected in the opponent's argument even after the opponent has had his say. The dialogues of the epics and the dialectical parts of the *Sūtras* can be said to be the predecessors of all later dialectical literature.

The *Sūtras*—The composition and the chronology of the *Sūtras* are such as not to permit a clear chronological order amongst the different *dārśanika Sūtras*. However, it may be said that the *Sūtras* with which we are dealing are not later than the second or third century A.D. Leaving aside the question of chronological order we may here arrange them from the point of view of the dialectical matter contained in them. Looking to the form of the *sūtras* we cannot expect much dialectic or argumentation expressed in them. Nevertheless, if one studies the *sūtras* consecutively, one does not fail to perceive that there is a certain mode of argumentation running through them and that they imply the *pūrvapakṣa* (prima-facie view) and the *uttarapakṣa* (final view) and their intermediary forms.

Yoga-Sūtra—The *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali gives a very systematic account in four chapters of the philosophy and the technique of Yoga. But there is not much of dialectical criticism in it. An objection is anticipated, as the commentator Vyāsa explains, in Ch. 4, sūtra 12 that if there is no existence for that which exists not, and no destruction for what exists, how could residuary impressions (*vāsanā*) which exist as entities be destroyed. Patañjali answers this by saying that the past and the future exist in reality, there being difference of the attributes in respect of the paths of being (4.12). He proves the reality of the object by means of the unity of modification; a single modification of more than one is observed. Wick, oil and fire change into a lamp, as illustrated by Vācaspati. Similarly, though the attributes are more than one; a single modification does take place. Thus things have a real unity (4-14). There is then the refutation of the *Vijñānavāda* in this chapter in connection with this. 4.16—‘*Na caika-cittatantram ced vastu tatpramāṇakam tadā kim syāt*’—states that if an object is dependent on the one mind, then if the mind is restrained or attending to some other object, the object will not be cognised by it, nor will it come into objective relationship with any other mind; it will not be cognised by it. Will it then cease to exist at the time? (Vyāsa gives further arguments condemning *Vijñānavāda*). Patañjali goes on to say that the mind is not self-illuminating, since it is a knowable and since both (one’s own nature and the nature of the object) cannot be ascertained at the same time (4. 19-20). If this is said to be cognised by another mind, by what will the cognition of cognition be apprehended? If by another this will mean *ati-prasaṅga* (extreme absurdity) in view of the vicious infinite series, and there will be confusion of memories. As many will be the cognitions of various *buddhis* so many will be the memories. Thus the opponent can be said to have confused everything by denying the existence of the sentient principle or *puruṣa* who is a witness of the *buddhi*.²⁷

In short, there is hardly any dialectical criticism in the

Yoga-sūtra. Only in the last chapter, there is refutation of the Buddhists who regard the *citta* as self-illuminating and who deny the existence of a soul, as also of external objects. This is intended to prove the reality of things which, according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, are never destroyed though they may undergo modifications. This became relevant especially when the problem of destruction of *vāsanā* (residual impressions) came up for discussion. The distinction between the knowable mind and the knower *purusa* is also shown here. Argument based on *anavasthā* (vicious infinite series) and *saṅkara* (confusion) is found employed here.

Vaiśeṣika Sūtra—*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 2.1.8ff shows how the existence of *vāyu* (air) can be inferred from *sparsā* (touch) since it is the substrate of this quality. *Vāyu* is also proved to be a substance (*dravya*), eternal (as atoms) and many. An objection is anticipated that no one has perceived *vāyu*, so the inference from *sparsā* can only be of the type of *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* and so only based on verbal testimony (*tasmād āgamikam*—2.1.17). The answer to this is that people having supernormal powers must have perceived this substance for names are given only to things one knows directly. Thus that it has a name is itself a mark of inference (*liṅga*) to prove the existence of *vāyu* (2.1.18–19). Then it is shown that *śabda* (sound) can be the distinguishing feature of *ākāśa* alone and so can serve as a mark or *liṅga* of *ākāśa* which is supersensuous. Kaṇāda refutes the view that the existence of *ākāśa* can be inferred from the fact that a man enters or goes out through the door and not through the wall. Exit through the wall is obstructed because of the conjunction of body, the substrate of action, with a substance, viz wall having touch (and not because *ākāśa* is absent there, since *ākāśa* is present everywhere) (2.1.20–28) 4.1. gives an argument proving certain things to be eternal and explains how the existence of such non-sensuous eternal things can be inferred. An existent thing devoid of a cause is eternal (*sad akāraṇavat tan nityam*—4.1.1.), e.g. atom. Supersensuous things can be inferred from their

effects. Non-eternality of supersensuous things cannot be perceived, so it cannot be affirmed of such things; they are real (4.1.2-5). The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, it can be seen, attempts throughout to justify the existence and nature of its *padārthas* (categories).

An interesting topic discussed at some length is: "Is *śabda* (word) connected with *artha* (the thing denoted, meaning)?" *Śabda* is an attribute (*guṇa*) of *ākāśa*, so it could not be connected with *artha* (thing); moreover, a *guṇa* is motionless, so *śabda* being a *guṇa* cannot reach the *artha*. If *śabda* were to come into contact with the *artha*, the expression '*nāsti*' (is not) could not be employed with reference to what is non-existent for there can be no conjunction with the non-existent. Therefore *śabda* and *artha* are not connected. It may be urged that we can have knowledge of the *samyogin* (substance, viz. man with a staff) from the staff, and of the *samavāyin* (substance, horned animal) from the horns. Now the staff and the man and the horns and the animal are connected; similarly, since we have the knowledge of *artha* from *śabda*, the two must be connected. The answer to this is that the two cases are not parallel. Man with a staff and horned animal are perceptible, whereas here the relation of *śabda* and *artha* is imperceptible, so the knowledge of *artha* from *śabda* cannot be a reason (*hetu*) proving their connection. The *Siddhāntin* treats the *Pūrvāpaksin's* argument as a *jāti* (sophistical rejoinder). Moreover, if *śabda* were connected with *artha*, a person could know the *artha* simply on hearing the *śabda* (word) even when he is not aware of the convention in respect of its meaning. If it is argued that *ākāśa* is connected with *śabda* and *artha* is connected with *ākāśa*, so *śabda* and *artha* are connected, the answer to this is that this would cause confusion. All things are connected with *ākāśa*, which is all pervading, so which particular thing would the word denote? Hence *śabda* and *artha* are not connected. The knowledge of *artha* can be obtained from *śabda* due to convention (*samaya*) and not due to any relation between

them (7.2.15-24). * The relation of *śabda* and *artha* must have been a controversial and important topic of the times. Jaimini takes great pain in his *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā sūtras* to prove that the relation of *śabda* and *artha* is eternal, and Kaṇāda has almost gone out of his way to devote a number of *sūtras* to this topic to show that *śabda* and *artha* are not related. The arguments employed here are quite nice and subtle. The *sūtras* 9.2.3-5 explain that verbal testimony is inference.

It can be seen that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* examines in its own way the categories of the Vaiśeṣika system by showing their similarities and dissimilarities. It also tries to account for the number and size, perceptibility or otherwise and the like of things. At times an argument is anticipated and refuted. It has given a fairly good exposition of the problem whether *śabda* and *artha* are connected or not and comes to the conclusion that they are not. It puts forth reasons to prove that *śabda* or verbal testimony can be included in inference, that it is in fact inferential in character. Kaṇāda shows acquaintance with the *jāti* type of arguments though he has not branded them with the name '*jāti*'.

Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra—We shall here examine very briefly the method adopted by the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* in presenting in a systematic manner the contents of the *Brāhmaṇas* and the procedure of sacrificial rites. We shall also note the dialectical modes implicit or explicit in the composition of the *sūtras*. 1.1. is called the *Tarka-pāda* (Argumentative Quarter). 1.1.1. shows that *Dharma* can be known by means of verbal (i.e. scriptural) injunctions; the relation of word and its meaning is an intrinsic one and is therefore eternal; Instruction (*upadeśa*) is the means of knowing *Dharma*; it is infallible regarding all that is imperceptible; it is a valid source of knowledge since it is independent, according to Bādarāyaṇa (1.1.5). Then the *Pūrvapakṣa* that *śabda* is a product and is non-eternal is

* According to the G.O.S. Edition of *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* with the commentary of Candrānanda, there are a few additional *sūtras* here.

refuted and it is proved that *śabda* is eternal (1.1.6–23). This topic is very interesting and is very carefully discussed as it is the very pivot of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system. Jaimini stresses that both accept that *śabda* is freshly perceived; now, a thing can be perceived if it is brought about by the causal apparatus, and even when it being unmanifest is manifested by certain factors; so it cannot necessarily be said that *śabda* is produced and so is non-eternal. The Naiyāyika's argument that *śabda* is non-eternal because it is a product—is a wrong one (—See The Chapter on *jāti*s). *Sūtras* 24–26 establish the expressiveness of the Vedic sentences; 27–32 prove that the Veda is *apauruṣeya*—not the work of any person, as against the view that it has an author. This is again a very important topic of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system and the arguments on both the sides are very apt and interesting. 1.2.1–18 establish the authority of *arthavāda* (valedictory) passages in general. The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that the purpose of the Veda lying in the enjoining of actions, those parts of the Veda which do not serve that purpose are useless, and in respect of these therefore the Veda is declared to be non-eternal; moreover, herein we find the scriptures and the directly perceived facts contradicted, and so on and so forth. The *Siddhāntin's* contention is that being construed along with injunctions they would serve the purpose of commending those injunctions. He refutes at length the other arguments of the *Pūrvapakṣin*. 1.2.19–25 prove that such *arthavāda* passages as resemble injunctions inasmuch as they say something not already known, are nevertheless not injunctions as the *Pūrvapakṣin* would have us believe; if they be taken as injunctions, there would be a syntactical split (*vākyaabheda*). 1.2.31–53 refute the prima-facie view that *mantras* have no meaning, and prove that they certainly have a meaning. This topic is again very interesting and an important one for the Mīmāṃsaka.*

1.3.1–7 discuss the authority of the *Smṛti* texts in general, that *Śruti* is more authoritative than the *Smṛti* and that no

* Compare the Kautsa commentary in Yāska's *Nirukta*, 1.

authority attaches to *Smṛtis* prompted by worldly motives. 1.3.8–9 show that a word in Vedic and *Smṛti* texts should always be understood in the sense assigned to it in the scriptures. Sū. 1.3.10 says that the usage of words current among Mlecchas is also authoritative, and 1.3.11–14 show that the authority of the *Kalpa-sūtras* is not a self-sufficient one. In all these cases, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is either implicit or is explicitly stated. 1.3.24–29 discuss the authoritativeness of grammatical *Smṛtis* 'Gauḥ' is grammatically correct, whereas 'gāvi', 'goṇi', etc. are incorrect or vernacular forms of it. Are the latter forms rightly expressive of 'cow' or not? The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that they are expressive as there is actual cognition even with the help of them. The *Siddhāntin's* view is that the utterance and use of incorrect words is only due to the slips on the part of the speaker, hence they cannot be believed to have an unbroken tradition behind them. Yet they can express the meaning only by reminding us of the correct word due to a part of the word being the same as that of the correct word. 1.3.30–35 establish that words denote class (*ākṛti*, lit. configuration) and through it the individual. Here the *Pūrvapakṣa* that words cannot denote class is stated at length and then refuted. 1.4. discusses whether the names *udbhid*, *citra*, *śyena*, etc. signify accessories of a sacrifice or are names of particular sacrifices, the latter being the *Siddhānta* (conclusion), and that doubts regarding the meaning of words and sentences are set aside by subsequent passages and consideration of the capacity of things.

The second *Adhyāya* deals with the differentiation among actions, and matters subsidiary to it e.g. *apūrva*, *mantra* etc. At the outset, verbs and nouns are defined and differentiated in order to give a rejoinder to the opponent's objection that all words denote activity. 2.1.30–31 show that *mantras* are not injunctive as against the *Pūrvapakṣa* that they also are injunctive. 2.1.46 gives the principle of 'syntactical unit'-one sentence. So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words which on being separated are found to be incapable of effecting that purpose, they form one sentence (*vākya*). But when the

sentences are equally independent of one another they should be treated as syntactically distinct or as distinct sentences (*vākyabheda*) (2.1.47). Incomplete sentences should be completed by elliptical extension (*anuṣaṅga*) as the passage that is supplied belongs equally to all. But there can be no such elliptical extension where there is intervention of words which are not consistent with the passage to be supplied, and so cannot also be connected with it (2.1.48-49).³⁸ After this the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* gives in II. 2 the grounds of differentiation among acts, the difference in the *apūrva* of subsidiary acts, and other details pertaining to sacrificial ceremonies and their performance. We need not pursue this further as this is sufficient to illustrate the method of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*. They have not explicitly referred to or refuted any school of philosophical thought as their main concern is the sacrifice. But whenever a controversial problem or a topic in which an alternative is possible is to be discussed, the author gives a full statement of the other view or views and then establishes his own after refuting them. Each topic thus becomes the subject of a controversy or debate. Jaimini has, moreover, set forth the method of interpreting Vedic texts. For instance, in 5.1. he states the factors that determine the order of sequence (of rites) and in 2.1.46-49 the principles of syntactical unit (*vākya*), syntactical split (*vākyabheda*) and elliptical extension (*anuṣaṅga*). The examples for illustrating the laws of interpretation (*nyāya*) are all from texts pertaining to sacrificial rituals. As the sacrificial ritual has almost disappeared from the life of the people, these rules are not properly appreciated or sufficiently used. Even so, it continues to be recognised that the rules that Jaimini or his predecessors evolved are still found useful in the interpretation of law-texts and they have been so widely used that there is no important legal digest which does not draw upon the *nyāyas* of Jaimini. The enunciation of these laws must have been the result of many discussions and controversies about the interpretation of Vedic texts, or proposi-

tions in general and texts quoted in their support. After they were made clear, they must have been used in interpreting texts, particularly so in courts of justice.

Brahma Sūtra—After indicating the subject of study and showing that Brahman is the Ultimate Reality from which the origination, etc. of the world proceed, the *Brahma-sūtra* shows the harmony of Vedic texts. All scriptural passages have Brahman as their purport, and their differences are only apparent. *Sūtras* 1.1.5–11 establish by various arguments that the cause of the world is a sentient ultimate principle which cannot be identified with the insentient *Prakṛti* or Matter as the *Sāṃkhya* holds. They refute the *Sāṃkhya* interpretation put on certain Vedic passages cited in support of their own theory by the upholders of the *Sāṃkhya* system of philosophy. For instance, the *Vedāntin* argues that if the meaning of the word 'seeing' ('thinking') is accepted as secondary or figurative, this is not true on account of the word '*ātman*' (self) (*gauṇasā cen nātmaśabdāt*—1.1.6). It may be urged that the word 'seeing' is used in a secondary or figurative sense in some passages,— 'That fire thought, that water thought' (*tat teja aikṣata, tā āpa aiksanta—Chāndogya Up.* 6.2.3–4), and it may be so treated here. But this is not tenable, as the word 'self' is actually employed. It is the self that sees or thinks and it is not necessary to look upon 'seeing' as figurative. In the passages, 'fire thought' or 'water thought', what thinks is the Self acting through them. From this section onwards (i.e. from 1.1.12ff) we find a discussion whether certain terms used in the *Upaniṣads* refer to the Supreme Self, the individual soul or unintelligent matter—such terms being *ānanda*, *ākāśa*, *prāṇa*, *jyotiḥ*, etc. All possible interpretations of these words are stated, which make the passage a controversial one. The *Pūrvaślokin* is supposed to plead for one or more of these, and then the *Siddhāntin* refutes this and gives his own interpretation. Thus each *adhikaraṇa* assumes the form of a controversy. 1.4.1–3 give a *Vedāntic* interpretation of such terms as *mahat*, *avyakta*, etc. which apparently seem to be technical terms of

the Sāṃkhya, the Sāṃkhya view being refuted at each step. 1.4.14ff show that there is no conflict in passages pertaining to Brahman's causality and that it is Brahman that is the material and efficient cause of the world. Incidentally the nature of the Highest Self, as also the relation of the individual soul and the Highest Self, is discussed and views of Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi and others are quoted. The last *sūtra* of *Adhyāya* 1 states, "Hereby all the doctrines (opposed to the Vedānta view) are explained". The Sāṃkhya is the *pradhānamalla* (principal wrestler in the game of intellectual wrestling), and by refuting his doctrines, all doctrines can be looked upon as refuted.

Argument from *anupapatti*, not being able to account for something or inappropriateness, is a favourite one with the author of the *Brahma-sūtra*. All other alternative explanations are rejected and one is accepted because there is some *anupapatti* involved in the former (See 1.1.16; 1.2.13). *Asambhava* (impossibility) or *sambhava* (possibility) is a similar basis of argument (1.2.17; 1.3.18; 1.3.26). Absence of conflict with the *pratijñā* (thesis or position) and *dṛṣṭānta* (example) or non-contradiction is regarded as an essential characteristic of a conclusion (—See *prakṛtiś ca pratijñā-dṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt*—1.4.23).

2.1.1–3 repudiate the *Smṛti* opposed to *Śruti*, especially when the *Smṛti* supports the Sāṃkhya–Yoga view. The opponent should not argue that thus certain *Smṛti* texts though authoritative will have no scope at all, because the *Smṛti* texts being of a conflicting character, if these be accepted others would have no scope. This is an example of a *pratibandhī*, the urging of a fault same as that urged by the opponent. 2.1.4–11 refute the view that the sentient Brahman cannot be the cause of the insentient world on account of disparity in the natures of the cause and the effect. A number of problems whether insentient things can arise out of, and be merged in, a sentient cause and the like are discussed. The author of the *Brahmasūtra* argues here that the faults and objections urged by the Sāṃkhya against the Vedānta view are present in his view also (*svapakṣadoṣāc*

ca- 2.1.10). And it is a rule that common faults should not be urged against each other. Of course to ascertain and prove one's position, each party should try to answer these objections. Urging of *prasaṅga* (contingency) is a favourite device of dialecticians. For instance, Bādarāyaṇa argues here that if it is urged that quite a different conclusion from that of the Vedāntin can be arrived at by means of reasoning, the answer to this is that if reasoning be solely relied on there would be the contingency of non-release (2.1.11) (—see also 2.1.21, 26). Here again the Sāṃkhya is the principal opponent and by refuting the Sāṃkhya theory, the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* claims to have refuted other theories which are less reasonable (2.1.12). He also tries to account for the distinction between Brahman, the enjoying soul and the objects of enjoyment (13), and establishes the non-difference of the effect from the cause (14–20). He further answers the objection that if the individual soul be non-different from Brahman, imperfections and faults like not doing what is beneficial to oneself would attach to Brahman (21–23). He discusses other questions such as Brahman's independence of material and instruments of action (24–25), Brahman's integrity being unaffected by the world (26–29), the manifold powers of Brahman, the world being His *līlā* (sport), the problem of suffering and evil and inequality in respect of the souls and their experiences (30–36), and shows that Brahman has all the qualities necessary for being the creator of the world.³⁷

Brahma-sūtra 2.2. is called the *Tarka-pāda*. Here the author refutes the important philosophical views with regard to the cause of the world, which are opposed to the Vedāntic position—Sāṃkhya (1–10), Vaiśeṣika (11–17), Sarvāstivāda (18–27), Vijñānavāda (28–32), Śūnyavāda (32, according to Rāmānuja), Jainism (33–36), Śaivism (37–41), Bhāgavata view or Vaiṣṇavism (42–45). The statement here is mainly based on argumentation—perhaps chiefly for the conviction of those who would not recognise the authority of the Vedas, or even the validity of verbal testimony and would demand a rational stand. The

Sūtrakāra has not stated here the view of the opponent; but presupposing acquaintance with it on the part of the reader, he straightaway starts refuting it by advancing arguments showing inconsistencies in the opponent's position. For instance, he says that since the orderliness of the world is not possible on the Sāṃkhya hypothesis, *Pradhāna* inferred by the Sāṃkhya cannot be the cause of the world (*racanānupapattēś ca nānumānam*—2.2.1).

Argument from *anupapatti*, as said above, is very common with the dialecticians (—see also 2.2.8); further a conclusion is discarded if it involves contradiction (*vipratishedhāc cā'samañjasam*—2.2.10). Rejection of an argument or theory because it involves vicious infinite series is found illustrated in the refutation of the Vaiśeṣikas. If the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) be admitted between two things, then the *samavāya* which is different from them must be inherent in them by means of another *samavāya* and so on *ad infinitum* (*samavāyābhyupagamāc ca sāmīyād anavasthiteh*—2.2.13). In the refutation of the Jaina view, it can be seen that the doctrine of Syādvāda is brushed aside cursorily by saying that it cannot be accepted on account of the impossibility of contradictory attributes in one thing (*naikasmīnnasambhavāt*—2.2.33). The Jainas also would not accept this in this form; when they affirm such contradictory attributes of one thing they always qualify their expression by *svarūpeṇa* (from the point of view of one's character) or *pararūpeṇa* (from the point of view of another's character), which the Sūtrakāra has conveniently ignored. This is an instance showing that sometimes in the enthusiasm for refutation the dialecticians misrepresented or imperfectly represented the opponent's view. This would be an example of *jalpa* in practical life, the sole aim being victory.

It may be noted here that Bādarāyaṇa starts here with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya and then refutes the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika, the Buddhist, the Jaina, the Śaiva and the Bhāgavata schools. The Sāṃkhya stands nearest the Vedānta doctrine; it admits the non-difference of cause and effect;

and is acceptable in one form or other to *Smṛti* texts. So Bādarāyaṇa repudiates it first. This was one way of refuting rival philosophies. The *pradhāna-malla* is defeated first and then it is easy to repudiate the others. In later philosophical literature we find a different method adopted. The most alien or distant philosophical theory or doctrine is stated and another school is made to refute it, the corresponding doctrine of this school being refuted by another, and so on till one comes to a theory which is very near one's own, which being refuted, one's own theory is established. This method we find adopted in Abhayadeva's commentary on the *Sanmati-tarka*, and in the *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* and such other works.

The author of the *Brahma-sūtra* has considered other attempts at the interpretation of the *Upanisads* and summarised their results. The ancient teachers cited seem to have entertained different views on important points of doctrine such as the relation of the individual soul and Brahman and the like. Some of these are stated and Bādarāyaṇa's view is defended.²⁹ Thus the *Brahma-sūtra* indulges in the refutation of rival systems of philosophy and the criticism of other traditions of Vedāntic thought. Each *adhikaraṇa* is in the form of a controversy; or the *Pūṇapakṣin's* argument is anticipated (*-iti cet*) and refuted.

Nyāya Sūtra : The first chapter of the *Nyāya-sūtra* is concerned, as Vātsyāyana says, with the enumeration and definition of the Nyāya categories. The fifth chapter also gives the varieties of *jāti* (futile rejoinder) and *nigrahasthānas* (grounds of censure). In 1.2.15-17, an objection is anticipated that *upacāra chala* (figurative quibble) is not different from *vāk chala* (verbal quibble) and answered by saying that they are different: if some similarity be sufficient reason to regard them as one, then on account of some similarity, however slight, all the *chalas* could be brought under one variety only. This is a criticism of a view which accepted only two varieties of *chala* (—see *chala* in *Caraka Saṃhitā* and *Upāyahrdaya*).

From the second chapter onwards the author of the *Nyāya-sūtra* examines these categories by putting forth the likely arguments that could be advanced by the *pūrvapakṣin* and refuting them. He starts with the examination of the concept of *saṁśaya* (doubt) (2.1.1-7). As against the definition of doubt given earlier (1.1.23), the *Pūrvapakṣin* urges that no doubt can arise either from the definite cognition of properties common to several objects or from the definite cognition of characters belonging to only one of the objects, or from the cognition of diversity of opinions or from that of uncertainty. On the contrary, where there is diversity of opinions there is certainty of conviction. Further, since uncertainty itself is quite certain in its uncertain character, no doubt can arise from it. (Vātsyāyana adds that if uncertainty is not quite certain in its own character, it would mean that it is not a real uncertainty at all, and in this case also no doubt should arise.) Lastly, says the *Pūrvapakṣin*, doubt would never cease, as the property whose cognition gives rise to doubt continues to exist. The *Sūtrakāra*'s rejoinder to these arguments is that when doubt is held to arise only from such a cognition as has been described (in 1.1.23) as not apprehending the specific character of any one object, there is no possibility of either there being no doubt at all, or of there arising a doubt that would be unceasing. The arguments in the *pūrvapakṣa* here seem to be those of some sceptical philosopher and speak highly of the development of dialectical thought of the time. We find a few such rare glimpses of advanced dialectical criticism as early as the *Sūtras*, and especially in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali (2nd cent. B.C.). In 2.1.8-20 there is a dialectical examination of the *pramāṇas* in general. The *Pūrvapakṣa* (prima-facie view) is that perception and the rest cannot be regarded as sources of cognition (*pramāṇa*) on account of the impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time. If the *pramāṇa* exists already before the object, then perception cannot be produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the object. If the *pramāṇa* comes

into existence after the object then by whose instrumentality could the thing be cognised and thereby become the *prameya* (object of knowledge)? If the two come into existence simultaneously, then inasmuch as each cognition is restricted to its own object, there can be no sequence among cognitions (2.1.8-11). The answer to this is that the denial itself is the cause or instrument of the cognition of the impossibility of *pramāṇas* and so there can be no denial as it is impossible to connect it with any of the three points of time; since all the *pramāṇas* have been denied, the denial itself cannot be established. If the character of *pramāṇa* is admitted in the case of reasoning, the denial becomes restricted to only a few from among the *pramāṇas*,—which is not proper. There should be no denial of *prameyas* with regard to all the three points of time as their existence as cause and effect is proved in the same manner as that of the musical instrument is proved by its sound. *Pramāṇa* itself can be a *prameya* as the names are applied according to circumstances. The weighing balance, for instance, which is a *pramāṇa* (the means of ascertaining the weight of things) is a *prameya* also as regards its own accuracy (2.1.12-16). Here the *pūrvapakṣin* raises a point: If the *pramāṇas* are cognised by means of *pramāṇas*, then this involves the possibility of other *pramāṇas* and so on infinitely (that is to say, there is the fault of *anavasthā*, vicious infinite series). If another *pramāṇa* is not operative in respect of a *pramāṇa*, then just as the cognition of the *pramāṇa* would be accomplished without the operation of a *pramāṇa*, so could the cognition of the *prameya* (object of cognition) also (2.1.17-18). The answer to this is that it is not so, as the apprehension of the *pramāṇas* is similar to that of lamp-light.³⁰ There is no absolute rule, as in the case of certain things we find that other instruments are inoperative, while in others it is found that they are not inoperative (2.1.19).³¹ *Sūtras* 20-29 examine and defend the definition of perception especially in view of the charge of the *Pūrvapakṣin* that all the causes of perceptual cognition are not mentioned, 30-32 state and refute the view of the

Pūrvapakṣin that perception is only inference because only a part of a thing is perceived and the cognition of the composite whole (*avayavin*) proceeds from it. 33-36 examine the nature of the *avayavin* and refute the *Pūrvapakṣa* that there is no real thing corresponding to the conception of the whole. The *Pūrvapakṣin* says that we have the conception of 'one' in respect of a number of constituents of a forest or army because owing to distance, their distinctness cannot be perceived; similar is the case with other things because the distinctness of the atoms is not cognised. The *Siddhāntin*'s answer is that the two cases are not parallel. The trees and the constituents of the army can be individually perceived, whereas the atoms are super-sensuous. Therefore the *avayavin* is perceived as also the parts. In 37-38, the *Pūrvapakṣin* gives examples of inferences which are not true, thereby showing that inference has no validity or does not yield true knowledge; and the *Siddhāntin* refutes the *Pūrvapakṣin*'s arguments saying that if a particular inference is fallacious, it is due to the fault of the person putting it forth and not because inference has no validity. 39-43 examine the nature of Time especially in view of the contention of the *Pūrvapakṣin* that there is no present time, for when an object falls, the only possible points of time are—that which has been fallen through, and that which has to be fallen through. In 2.1.41-48 the *Pūrvapakṣa* is that *upamāna* (analogy) can be included in inference; there can be no analogy on the basis of either perfect or partial resemblance. In 2.1.49-56 the *Pūrvapakṣa* that *śabda* (word, verbal testimony) is *anumāna* (inference) is examined at length and it is proved that there can be no relation between word and its meaning (as the Mīmāṃsaka believes) as the meaning of a word is based on convention. 57-68 deal with *śabda* in its particularity i.e. the Vedic word. The *Pūrvapakṣin*'s contention is that *śabda* cannot be regarded as a *pramāṇa* because of such defects as falsity, contradiction and tautology. The *Siddhāntin*'s rejoinder is that it is not so, as the failure is due to deficiencies in the

action, the agent and the means, the contradiction is only apparent and repetitions have a purpose; and so on.

2.2.1-12 examine and refute the claim of *Aitihya* (tradition), *Arthāpatti* (implication), *Sambhava* (inclusion) and *Abhāva* (negation or non-apprehension) to be *pramāṇas*. *Sūtras* 2.2 13-19 give an exposition and proof of the non-eternity of *śabda*. In the course of the discussion, arguments and objections of the *Pūrvapakṣin* who holds that *śabda* is eternal are anticipated and refuted. The *Pūrvapakṣin* employs *chala* (quibble) at one place : "When a thing is 'different', it is 'different' from something that is 'different' from it, and what is 'different' from the 'different' must be 'non-different', so that there is nothing that can be regarded as 'different' (*anyad anyasmād ananyatvād ananyad ity anyatābhāvaḥ*—2.2.31). The *Siddhāntin's* rejoinder to this is that if there is no conception of the 'difference', 'there can be none of 'non-difference' as the two conceptions are mutually relative" (*tadābhāve nāstyanyatā tayor itaretarāpekṣasiddheḥ*.—2.2.32). In continuation of this discussion, *sūtras* 40-56 examine and refute what is meant by the modification of letter-sounds (*varṇa*); It is established that there is no modification in letter-sounds as would justify the continuity of their existence. Here too the *Pūrvapakṣin* employs *chala*— "As there is constancy in non-constancy, it is not right to say that there is no constancy" (*aniyame niyamān nā'niyamaḥ*—2.2 54). 57-68 give the definition of word and discuss what a word means. There are differences of opinion that a word means the individual (*vyakti*), configuration (*ākṛti*) or the universal (*sāmānya*). The *Nyāya* view is that all three constitute the denotation of a word; it is established by refuting the other views. It can be seen that the whole of the second chapter is devoted to the examination of *pramāṇas*, their definition, validity, number and the like problems pertaining to them, which all the schools of philosophy discussed.

Sūtras 3.1.1-3 show that the soul is distinct from the sense-organs, and 4-6 refute the view that it is identical with the body (—refutation of the *Lokāyata* view or the *Tajjiva-*

tacchariravāda). 7-15 refute the view that the visual organ is one only (*caksuradvaita*); being two it could not be the soul which is one. 16-18 refute the view that the mind is the soul. 19-27 show that the soul is eternal and it does not originate. 28-32 examine the exact nature of the body—that it is composed of earth—and refute other views. *Sūtras* 33-53 are highly dialectical in character. They refute the view that the senses are not made up of elemental substances, and while proving that they have a material character, objections are repeatedly anticipated (*-iti cet*, if it be urged—) and answered. 54-63 refute the view that there is only one sense-organs and the objection that their objects being many, the sense-organ, also should be many and not only five; and prove that there are five sense-organs of the same nature as the five elemental substances. 64-75 examine the objects of the respective sense-organs and the qualities that the elemental substances have; here also the *Pūrvapaksa* that each one of the substances has only one quality is stated and refuted.

3.2.1-9 discuss whether *buddhi* (cognition) is eternal or non-eternal. At many places the *Nyāya-sūtra* states what the ground of such a controversy is. For instance, here it is said that the doubt whether *buddhi* is eternal or non-eternal arises due to its similarity to action and *ākāśa* (3.2.1. See also 3.1.54, 4.2.44). In problems pertaining to the sense-organs, *buddhi*, eternality or non-eternality etc. the *Pūrvapaksin* is mostly the *Sāṃkhya*. In connection with the question of the eternality or non-eternality of *buddhi*, 10-17 state and refute the theory that things of the world are in perpetual flux and perish in a moment (*ksaṇabhaṅga*-refutation of the Buddhist view of perpetual flux). 18-41 prove that *buddhi* (cognition) is not a quality of the sense-organs, or the object or the mind, but is a quality of *ātman* (soul). Arguments based on the probans being itself one that requires to be proved, or the position of the opponent being liable to the same objection and the like are found advanced here. Objections on the part of the *Pūrvapaksin* and on the part of other schools of thought are

anticipated and answered with the result that the problem is treated in a highly dialectical fashion. 42–45 discuss the point : ‘Granting that *buddhi* (cognition) is non-eternal, does it perish as soon as it is produced, or does it endure for some time ?’ The objection that if cognition were evanescent, the perception of things would be always indistinct, like the indistinct perception of colour during lightning-flash—is answered by saying that the very reason put forward (viz. cognition is evanescent) implies the admission of what is sought to be denied; further even if it is evanescent, the perception of things can be distinct like the distinct perception of the continuous series of lamp-flames. 46–55 establish that consciousness is not a quality of the body even though it is believed to be found when the body is present and absent when the body is absent, objections and analogies put forth by the opponent being refuted. 56–59 say that there is only one mind in one body and that it is atomic as against the view that there must be a plurality of minds as we perceive a number of actions (—cognitions—) appearing simultaneously. 60–72 show that the body is formed under the influence of the persistence of the effect of previous actions and not independently of *karman* as the Nāstikas would have us believe. Here a number of absurdities are shown to be involved in the opponent’s position (*prasaṅgāpatti*).

4.1.3–9 give a classification of *doṣas* (defects) into three groups—*rāga* (desire), *dveṣa* (hatred) and *moha* (ignorance) by anticipating objections (—e.g. since between *moha* and the other two there is the relation of cause and effect, it follows that *moha* is something different from the *doṣas*—) and refuting them. 10–13 treat dialectically the problem of rebirth. *Sūtras* 14ff. state the views of different dialecticians (*Prāvādukas* as Vatsyāyana calls them) and refute them; even in between the argument an objection on the part of the opponent is anticipated and refuted, so that a fair chance is given to the opponent to justify his own position and only after that it is taken to be refuted. This is the usual practice of the *Nyāya-sūtra*. The views stated and refuted here are—(i) Things

are produced out of negation (14-18), (ii) God is the cause of the universe (19-21),³² (iii) the world is a result of chance (22-24), (iv) all things are non-eternal (25-28), (v) all things are eternal (29-33), (vi) everything is unique, there is no unity (34-36); (vii) all is mere void (37-40), (viii) *Samkhyaikānta*, dogmatic assertion with regard to the exact number of things (41-43). *Sūtras* 4.1.44-54 discuss fruition of action and prove that it comes after rebirth, and that it does not appear immediately. 55-58 examine the nature of pain and refute the belief of some that there can be no pleasure whatsoever. 59-68 treat final release (*apavarga*) by refuting the position that there can be no final release, since there is the concatenation of debts, afflictions (*kleśa*) and activity.

4.2.4-17 deal with components (*avayava*) and composite whole (*avayavin*) and at length state and repudiate the Buddhist's denial of *avayavin*. 18-25 say that according to the *Ānupalambhika* (Negationist) all things are non-existent, and accordingly he denies the atom also, but this is not true. 26-35 repudiate the denial of the external world and 36-37 the denial of all, including *buddhi* (consciousness).

From the above survey, it is evident that the *Nyāya-sūtra* conducts a sort of *Parikṣā* (examination) by pointing out why a doubt is likely to arise, postulating a *Pūrvapakṣa* and answering it by the *Uttara-pakṣa*. The different topics are treated as if they were subjects of controversy, especially in the part dealing with 'examination' (Chapters 2-4). The *Pūrvapakṣa* is given full scope in respect of presentation, and then it is refuted; even after this, fine objections or clarification on the part of the *Pūrvapakṣin* or a third party are anticipated and refuted. We find in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, a more logical criticism of the opponent's view on the basis of specific principles of dialectical criticism (such as *sādhyasama*, etc.) than we find in the other *Sūtras*. Moreover, in connection with the *Nyāya-sūtra*, Vātsyāyana clearly enunciates the procedure of dialectical examination; first the categories are enumerated, then they are defined and then this definition and the particular category as

such are examined.³³ The *Nyāya-sūtra* itself does not mention this procedure, but if we examine the order of the treatment we find that it is implicit though it cannot be said to be wholly lacking in, as for example, the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*.

Concluding we might say of the different *dārśanika Sūtras* that the *Yoga-sūtra* and the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra*, (especially the former) very rarely attempt any dialectical examination of their own tenets or categories, though this is not entirely missing in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. The *Yoga-sūtra*, in Chapter-4, while asserting and establishing the reality of things, has in view, as seen before, the Buddhist as the *pūrvapakṣin*. Similarly, the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* when it shows that there is no connection between *śabda* and *artha* is, as a matter of fact, refuting the contention of the Mīmāṃsakas that their relation is eternal. The *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā sūtra* and the *Brahma-sūtra* have each a *Tarka-pāda*. The *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* postulates a *pūrvapakṣa* in the discussion of each topic, especially so in the *Tarka-pāda* and the exposition of each topic assumes a dialectical form. This is true of the *Brahma-sūtra* also with this in addition that the important systems of philosophical thought are refuted in the *Tarka-pāda*. In fact the whole of the *Tarka-pāda* is dialectical in character. Though not attaching, in so many words, any importance to *tarka* in respect of the higher problems of philosophy, the composition of the *Brahma-sūtra* is dialectical in character. In the course of refutation, arguments on the part of the *Pūrvapakṣin* or a third party are anticipated (*iti cet*) and repudiated. The exposition of the *Nyāya-sūtra* also is highly dialectical in character. After enumerating and defining the categories, it examines them critically, and presupposes powerful arguments against them as accepted by the Nyāya school. Arguments against the validity of the *pramāṇas* also are stated and answered.

Sāṃkhya Kārikā—A contemporary *sūtra* of the Sāṃkhya system is not extant, but we may consider here the *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* (second cent.–fourth cent. A.D.) of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, the earliest extant Sāṃkhya work. The very first *kārikā* comprises

a question or objection and its answer : "There being in this world an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain (*duḥkha*), there arises a desire for enquiring into the means of alleviating them. And if it is urged that the enquiry is superfluous on account of there being known cures for the same, we answer that it is not so, because these latter are neither certain nor final."³⁴ The revealed (Vedic) is like the perceived. It is associated with impurity, destruction and inequality. Other than that is better—proceeding as it does from the right cognition of the manifest (*mahat*, etc), the unmanifest (*Pradhāna*) and the knower (*puruṣa*) (1-2). Here the author is trying to justify the Sāṃkhya position by pointing out its indispensability if pain is to be absolutely eliminated. We have here clearly a proper type of dialectical argument. First the problem of Sāṃkhya philosophy is stated, then a rejoinder is formulated as the *pūrvapakṣa* and this in its turn is denied by proper arguments and then the final position is stated. This becomes the justification of the whole system. The Vedic rites are here criticised as impure and involving destruction and inequality.

We find an important principle of critical investigation laid down in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, viz. a knowable is established by means of a source of valid knowledge (*prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi*—SK. 4). All dialecticians are unanimous in recognising this as the fundamental principle of discussion. Even the sceptical thinkers repudiate all the categories of thought by postulating this as the accepted standard of dialectical criticism and showing the inconsistencies involved in the different conceptions of the *pramāṇas* and consequently of the *prameyas* or knowables. The formulation of this principle was thus an important landmark in the history of dialectical thought. *Kārikā* 7 states the factors due to which even an existent thing may not be perceived. This signifies that it is wrong to argue that an entity is not existent because it is not perceived. *Prakṛti* is one such entity which though existent is not perceived on account of its subtlety, but can be ascertained from its effects—*mahat*, etc.

(SK. 8. This implies the refutation of the position that what cannot be perceived is non-existent. *Kārikā* 9 gives reasons to establish that the effect is existent in the cause. It may be stated here that argumentation (*ūha*) is mentioned first among the eight *siddhis* (accomplishments), along with oral instruction, study, the three-fold suppression of pain, intercourse of friends and gifts—ignorance (*viparyaya*), incapacity (*aśakti*) and contentment (*tusṭi*) being the three-fold curb on *siddhis*.³³ This shows the importance the Sāṃkhyas, or rather all thinkers, attach to reasoning or the spirit of critical inquiry. The *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, it is noteworthy, establishes the Sāṃkhya categories on the basis of reasoning.

The early Commentaries on the *Sūtras*—We may now briefly examine the *Bhāṣyas* (commentaries) on the *Sūtras* of the different systems of philosophy to enable us to form an idea how dialectical discussions entered the texture of the philosophy of the different systems of thought.

Vātsyāyana (fourth century A.D.) who has written a *Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāya-sūtra*, adopts the style of a teacher expounding philosophical problems to his disciple. The question '*kasmāt*' ('why so?') is repeatedly asked and answered. As a matter of fact, the Indian *bhāṣyakāra* always has in view an audience. In his introductory remarks on *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.1, Vātsyāyana has explained the effectiveness of the *pramāṇas* and has shown that the real nature of things is dependent (for its being accepted or rejected or treated with indifference) on the *pramātṛ* (cogniser), *pramāṇa* (source of valid cognition), *prameya* (cognised object, knowable) and *pramiti* (valid cognition). He further explains what the 'real nature' of things signifies. It is nothing else but 'being' or 'existence' in the case of that which 'is', and 'non-being' or 'non-existence' in the case of that which 'is not'. That is to say, when something that 'is' is apprehended as being or existent, so that it is apprehended as what it really is and not as something of a contrary nature (i.e. as non-existent), and when a non-entity is apprehended as such, i.e. as what it really is and not as

something of a contrary nature, then that which is thus apprehended constitutes the true nature of the thing. Raising the question how a non-entity can be cognised by means of a *pramāṇa*, he answers it. In explaining *sūtra* 1.1.1, Vātsyāyana explains the purpose and connection of the treatise and anticipating an objection why doubt, etc. are mentioned when they can be included in either the *pramāṇas* or the *prameyas*, answers it. He shows that doubt and the other topics form integral factors of the science of reasoning, and also explains what motive (*prayojana*) could be present in the three kinds of debate—*vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā* mentioned among the topics, especially the last, because the true *vaitaṇḍika* does not accept anything. It is a practice with Indian commentators to expound at the very outset the four *anubandhas* (bonds of connection, moving considerations) which should also be referred to implicitly in the *maṅgala* stanza if any. The four *anubandhas* are (i) *adhiḥkārin*, person qualified, or *adhiḥkāra*, what qualifications are required for the study, (ii) *visaya*, subject-matter, (iii) *sambandha*, what connection there is between the subject-matter and the book itself (*pratipādyā-pratipādakabhāva*), and (iv) *prayojana*, purpose to be served by the study.³⁶ The commentator also tries to justify the order in which the different topics are mentioned and discussed. The method of treatment has been clearly analysed by Vātsyāyana when he says : *Trividhā cā'sya śāstrasya pravṛttiḥ—uddeśo lakṣaṇaṁ parīkṣā ceti* (—NB, 1.1.3)—The procedure of this *śāstra* is three-fold—enumeration of topics, definition and examination. This last involves criticism of definitions on the basis of the criteria of the definition being narrow (*avpāpti*), too wide (*ativyāpti*), etc. and the faults of vicious infinite series (*anavasthā*), self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*), *itaretarāśraya* (mutual dependence), etc. These comprehend the main elements of a dialectical discussion.

Commenting on *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.3 which enumerates the *pramāṇas* recognised by the Nyāya system, Vātsyāyana raises

an important question : Do the *pramāṇas* have common objects, that is to say, can the different *pramāṇas* operate with respect to one object (*pramāṇa-samplava*), or is the scope of the *pramāṇas* restricted within mutually exclusive limits (*—pramāṇa-viplava*)? This is in view of the Buddhists who are *pramāṇa-viplavavādins*, or in whose view the *pramāṇas* have their own exclusive objects—*svalakṣaṇa*, unique particular being the object of perception, and *sāmānya*, universal that of inference. While giving an exposition of the definition of perception (1.1.4), Vātsyāyana explains the significance of every term and justifies why other factors (e.g. mind) contributing to the rise of perceptual cognition are not mentioned. Commenting on the term '*avyapadeśya*' 'not expressible,' 'devoid of verbal expression,' he says that it is meant to refute the view of those who hold that no perception is free from verbal representation and examines it at length. In his commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.22 which defines final release as absolute freedom from pain, etc. he refutes at length the Vedāntin's view that in the state of emancipation there is manifested the eternal happiness of the soul just like its ubiquity, and when that happiness is manifested the soul is absolutely free and becomes happy. He repeatedly anticipates arguments in support of the Vedāntin's view, as also the Vedāntin's objections to the Nyāya position and repudiates these by showing the anomalies involved. The discussion is highly dialectical in character.

Commenting on *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.32 which enumerates the members (*avayava*) of a syllogism, Vātsyāyana refers to some logicians who recognise ten members—desire to know (*jijñāṣā*), doubt (*saṁśaya*), capacity to accomplish what is desired (*śakya-prāpti*), purpose (*prayojana*) and dispelling of doubt (*saṁśaya-vyudāsa*) in addition to the five mentioned in the *Sūtra*—and explains that the author of the *Nyāya-sūtra* has not recognised the former five members as they are not cognitive in character and so cannot prove anything directly. It may be noted that the nature of these also is dialectical in

character, the ten members jointly giving rise to a picture of a debate inasmuch as they show how the question arises, what is the cause of doubt, and the like. They were eliminated to prune the syllogism of its practical associations and make it more theoretical and logical. Even so it retains a dialectical character, the different *avayavas* being like answers to questions. Vātsyāyana similarly refutes a suggested interpretation of the *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.2.9 defining the fallacious probans *kālātṛta* (belated), in view of the Buddhist view with regard to *kālātṛta*, reversal of the order of the *avayavas* of the syllogism. In his *Bhāṣya* on *Nyāya-sūtra* 2.1.19 he has anticipated a number of objections on the part of the opponent and answered them especially because this pertains to an important point, whether *pramāṇa* (cognition) is self-luminous or not, and the *Nyāya-sūtra* apparently seems to favour the view that *pramāṇa* is self-luminous—which goes against the Nyāya view. Vātsyāyana establishes at length the reality of the *avayavin* (composite whole) as distinct from the *avayavas* (components) in his commentary on *Nyāya-sūtra* 2.1.35 as this was again one of the points of controversy with the Buddhists who do not recognise the reality of the *avayavin*. Discussing the authoritativeness of the *Veda*, Vātsyāyana refutes the Mīmāṃsā view that word (*śabda*) is eternal (2.1.68).

In the fourth chapter of the *Nyāya-sūtra* there is, as stated above, the refutation of rival views. In the commentary on this chapter Vātsyāyana's dialectical skill is revealed. He has criticised the opponent's view by exposing all the anomalies involved in his line of argument; here he has employed many of the principles of dialectical criticism laid down in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, fallacies, *anavasthā* and the like *tarkas* and so on. To take one instance, *Nyāya-sūtra* 4.1.37 states the Śūnyavādin's view before refuting it. All things must be non-entities, because all things are known to be mere negations of one another (*sarvam abhāvo bhāveṣv itaretarābhāva-siddheḥ*). The author of the *Nyāya-sūtra* himself refutes this in 4.1.38, but before that Vātsyāyana offers his own answer to the Śūnya-

vādin's contention and this answer is expressed in a typically dialectical fashion : The assertion put forward cannot be right because there is contradiction (a) between the two terms of the proposition, viz. 'all things' and 'non-entities' (—if they be things they cannot be non-entities), and (b) between the proposition and the statement of the probans (—If all things are non entities, it is not possible for things to be the negation of one another and if things are negation of one another, then 'all things' cannot be 'non-entities').³⁷ Here *vyāghāta* (contradiction) in the opponent's assertion is exposed.

It can be seen that though Vātsyāyana is quite early among the commentators whose works are extant (fourth century A.D.), he has refuted the theories of rival views very often. The *Nyāya-sūtra* is itself dialectical in character, so Vātsyāyana rarely got a chance to introduce discussions and refutations of his own. But he critically and dialectically examined the categories of the Nyāya system and repudiated rival views whenever he got an opportunity. His dialectical skill is fully revealed in such passages. The *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana provided Diñnāga (perhaps his contemporary) the ground and the material for attacks on realism. Uddyotakara (635 A.D.), author of the *Nyāya-vārttika* defended Vātsyāyana against the attacks of Diñnāga and vehemently warded off and demolished the criticisms of Diñnāga. Uddyotakara has very carefully examined the categories of the Nyāya system and tried to fortify it against all possible attacks at weak points by refining and rendering precise the presentation of different problems. He is very tenacious, though not always just in his dialectical criticisms which often take the shape of a *jalpa* (see his criticism of the Buddhist definition of *Pratyeksa*—NV. 1.1 4, pp. ff). Vācaspati (841 A.D.) devotes a major portion of his *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya ṭīkā* to the exposition and repudiation of Buddhist theories. He is well known for his exemplary impartiality, open-mindedness and true philosophic spirit. To take but one instance he was, along with others who are mostly forgotten, mainly responsible for the introduction of

the concept of *nirvikalpa pratyaksa* (indeterminate perception) into the classical Nyāya system, though it had earlier entered the Brāhmaṇical field through the formulation of the theory of perception by Praśastapāda and Kumārila, probably due to the influence of the Buddhist view of perception. Praśastapāda and Prabhākara and Kumārila also were influenced by Buddhist views through they were original thinkers and though they tried to dialectically examine and repudiate Buddhist theories. We can say that the period between the fourth or fifth century A.D. and the tenth century and beyond was the age of controversies and polemical writings of a high order, in which the different systems criticised one another and even while defending themselves against rival attacks benefited and were inspired to develop their philosophical views on account of the influence of other philosophical systems and in view of some just criticism levelled at one another. Udayana (tenth century A.D.) among other Naiyāyikas is well known for his dialectical skill as evinced by his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and *Ātmatattva-viveka*. He has, further, enhanced the scope of different dialectical categories, as we have seen before, by accommodating the different dialectical devices and principles of dialectical criticism, employed in actual debates and in polemical works, within the scheme or framework of the *Nyāya-sūtra*.

Praśastapāda (fifth century A.D.) gives in his *Bhāṣya* a systematic account of the Vaiśeṣika system by way of a running commentary. He hardly ever indulges in the criticism of rival views, though when he gives at length the arguments to prove the existence of a soul he must have had in view the tenets of some who did not accept a soul, or did not accept that it could be established by inference. At times he pre-supposes and states possible objections on the part of the opponent and answers them (e.g. while treating *viśeṣa* particularity, and *samavāya*, inherence). In his ontological views, Praśastapāda remained thoroughly realistic, but his logic was very strongly influenced by Buddhist views as can be seen from his *Bhāṣya*.

The commentaries *Vyomavati* of Vyomaśiva and *Kandalī* of Śrīdhara, are highly polemical in character and state and refute the views and definitions of rival schools, especially the Buddhists.

Śabara (fifth century A.D.) has, in his commentary on the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* adopted a dialectical style. He repeatedly anticipates an objection on the part of the *pūrvapakṣin* and answers it. Thus he examines all possible interpretations and all possible alternatives in the explanation of a *sūtra* or the formulation of a theory (see 1.1.2, 1.1.5 where he discusses the relation of word with its meaning and the trustworthy character of the *Veda*). Śabara has introduced the question whether cognitions have or do not have corresponding objects in the external world. Here he intends to refute the Vijñānavādins. The *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* themselves are dialectical in character; moreover, they are mostly concerned with matters pertaining to *dharma*, its knowledge from the *Veda*, the trustworthy character of the *Veda*, the authority of *śruti* and *smṛti* and the interpretation of Vedic passages in relation to the performance of sacrificial rites and the like topics. Consequently there is not much scope for an independent critical examination or refutation of rival philosophical views and Śabara therefore, could not display his knowledge and dialectical skill in this respect, though as said above his commentary mostly assumes the form of a controversy.

Kumārila plunged headlong into the stormy waters of polemics and stated and criticised, in his *Ślokavārttika*, rival theories of knowledge, sources of knowledge and the like. While commenting on 1.1.4 in his *Ślokavārttika*, Kumārila has critically examined the definition of *pratyakṣa* (perception) as given in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* and its interpretation by earlier commentators. He also states at length the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the functioning of the sense-organs in relation to their objects, with a view to establish the 'contact-theory' in opposition to the Buddhist view. He repeatedly refers to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist views on problems associated

with the process of perception. Kumārila also tries to justify why Śabara initiated the discussion of cognition being with or without corresponding objects in the external world. He shows that if cognitions were without corresponding external objects as held by the Vijñānavādins, all the doctrines and subjects treated in the Mīmāṃsā would be baseless and a treatment of these altogether unreasonable. He has stated and refuted at length the Nirālambanavāda (Idealism) and the Śūnyavāda. Giving an exposition of inference, Kumārila treats at length the Nyāya view regarding the probandum (*sādhya*) the probans (*hetu*) and the like. He further raises objections to the division of inference into *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa-sambandha* (where the relation of concomitance between the *hetu* and the *sādhya* is said to have been directly perceived elsewhere) and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-sambandha* (where it is determined on the basis of analogy) and refuses to see any difference between them (138 ff). He discusses at length the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika view that *śabda* (verbal testimony) can be included in *anumāna* (inference) as against the Sāṃkhya view which accepts them as distinct without pointing out any adequate grounds of difference. He has also controverted the Nyāya theory that the object of *upamāna* is the recognition of the denotation of the name, e.g. *gavaya*. He takes great pains to establish *arthāpatti* (implication) and *abhāva* (negation) as *pramāṇas* (sources of knowledge) and anticipates and answers objections for the purpose. He has dealt with the problems of *spṛṣṭa*, the denotation of word (—*ākṛti* according to Kumārila), the relation of word and meaning, the existence of the soul, eternality of word and has answered objections raised against the eternality of the Veda. He has also refuted the Apohavāda (—the theory that 'cow' signifies negation of non-cow—) of the Buddhists. It may be noted here that Kumārila (and for the matter of that, the Mīmāṃsaka) stands almost by himself (except for the company of the Cārvāka) in his refusal to accept that any person could be omniscient (see *Ślokavārttika*, sū. 2, 117 ff). The *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila is thus a

philosophical work highly dialectical in character, the author's polemic being chiefly directed against Buddhism, though one cannot say that the Mīmāṃsakas were completely free from Buddhist influence.³⁸ Pārthasārathi Miśra's commentary on the *Ślokavārttika* and his *Śāstradīpikā* are very good dialectical supplements to Kumārila's works. Pārthasārathi Miśra very often controverts the views of Prabhākara and his followers. The schools of Prabhākara and Kumārila are well known for their mutual criticism, and dialectical treatment of philosophical problems.

The *Yoga-sūtras* hardly afford any scope for polemics so Vyāsa (fourth century) the author of a commentary on the *Yoga-sūtra* merely gives a clear exposition of the *sūtras* and does not enter of his own into much dialectical criticism. Māṭhara (fifth century A.D.) who has written a *vṛtti* on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* has shown his dialectical skill in comparing the *Sāṃkhya* conception of *puruṣa* with that of the Vedāntins and the Vaiśeṣikas (kā. 19) and in the refutation of the different theories of the creation of the world (kā.61). Māṭhara's style of explaining the *kārikās* is very lucid and persuasive; he takes the reader from one step to another and shows the significance of one expression after another. The unknown author of the *Yuktidīpikā* refers to the different views of *Sāṃkhya* Ācāryas—while commenting on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* and expounding the *Sāṃkhya* principles. Vācaspati has fully brought out in his *Tattva-kaumudī* the dialectical argument of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*. While commenting on *Kārikā* 5, he refers to the different views as regards the number of *pramāṇas* and justifies the *Sāṃkhya* position with regard to *pramāṇas* by showing that it is necessary to recognise inference and verbal testimony along with perception and that the other *pramāṇas* can be included in these three. While doing so he has refuted the views and definitions of other schools of thought. Similarly, in his commentary on *kārikās* 8-9, Vācaspati alludes to the different theories of causality as upheld by the Buddhist, the Vedāntin, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the *Sāṃkhya*,

and shows the weakness of the former three. (This has been done briefly by the earlier commentators also.) Here his exposition is highly dialectical in character. He anticipates objections on the part of the opponent and answers them. The *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, as noted above, establishes the Sāṃkhya principles on the strength of reasoning and Vācaspati has throughout very well brought out the dialectical implication of the argument. Vijñānabhikṣu is a later writer, so it is needless to say that his commentary is dialectical in character.

The earliest extant commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* is that of Śaṅkarācārya (788-820 A.D.) by whose time it had become a practice to avail of the slightest chance to examine and criticise rival views. We may note here that before Śaṅkara, his grand preceptor had in his *Kārikās* established Ajātivāda (Acosmism) mainly on the strength of reasoning, perhaps under the impact of Mahāyāna Buddhistic thought and the logical implications of the absolutistic trend of Vedāntic thought. Gauḍapāda has in his *Kārikās* referred to the different views prevalent regarding the world, and shown that these are meaningless as there is no creation or origination whatsoever. He has brought out the contradictions and absurdities involved in the recognition of the reality of the phenomenal world and in that of the different theories of causality. The influence of Nāgārjuna's dialectical method is evident in his repudiation of the concept of causality and the reality of the world. Gauḍapāda pits the arguments of one school against those of another and finally establishes his own view, as can be seen in the refutation of causality. Śaṅkara was profoundly impressed by Gauḍapāda's view, and he also like Gauḍapāda regarded the phenomenal world as unreal or even a non-entity when viewed apart from Brahman. Śaṅkara commented on the *Brahma-sūtra*, the *Guā* and the like so he did not get much scope to display his originality, yet his dialectical method is quite evident in his writings. His exposition always assumes the form of a controversy wherein the opponent is repeatedly given a chance to clarify

his own position or raise objections. At times in an *adhikaraṇa*, especially in one pertaining to the consistency of Upaniṣadic passages, several persons are one after the other made to refute the view of the opponent or put forth a counter-balancing proof and argue out a case of their own if they have any (—see *Br Sū. Śāṅkarabhāṣya* 2.3—first *adhikaraṇa* discussing whether *ākāśa*, ether is originated or not). Śāṅkara has employed the different principles of dialectical criticism, such as the faults of self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*), mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*) and the principle that faults common to both parties cannot be urged against one of them, and the like. Many arguments that can be said to be of the *jāti* type or that can be said to involve *sāmānya-chāla* are easily detectable in his writings though in most cases he makes the opponent object to such arguments.

Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa (eighth century) belonging to a section of the Lokāyatikas was a thorough-going sceptic. In his *Tattvopaplava-siṃha*, he has adopted the method of setting forth at the outset all possible alternatives with respect to a problem or the implications of a definition, and then showing the absurdities involved in each one of them. This has been sufficiently illustrated in the Chapter on 'Is Knowledge Possible?' This is not to suggest that Jayarāśi was the innovator of this dialectical style. The Mādhyamikas were the pioneers in this respect, and we find it highly elaborated, especially in the centuries after Jayarāśi. Almost all later dialecticians have adopted this practice. We see the influence of the style of the Mādhyamika Buddhists in the works of Jayarāśi, Gauḍapāda, Śāṅkara, Vādi Devasūri, Abhayadeva and others, more so in the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhāḍya* of Śrīharṣa and the *Tattvapradīpikā* or *Citsukhi* of Citsukha and the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and such other works, especially of Śāṅkara Vedānta which was interested in the repudiation of all entities except Brahman which could be known by the Supreme Vision alone.

It is not necessary to pursue this inquiry further as we have already come to a period when polemics and dialectical

criticism had become the order of the day as is clear from the works of Uddyotakara, Kumārila, Śaṅkara, Śrīdhara, Udayana, Pārthasārathi Miśra and others. In most cases as the fervour of discussion and disputation settled down a bit and assumed more of an intellectual and academic tone rather than having a practical and worldly significance, the statement of the *pūrvapakṣa* came to be more impartial and correct and just and the refutation also more within the limits of reason. The philosophical writers also made the formulation and statement of theories as precise as possible, each new writer improving on and refining and clarifying the expressions used by the previous ones in order to escape refutation and to prove convincing.

Dialectical Criticism in Post-*Piṭaka* Buddhist works—About a hundred years after the departure of Buddha, a schism occurred and the Mahāsaṅghikas, a progressive group, severed their connection with the orthodox group. The Mahāyāna school of Buddhism was a later product of the Mahāsaṅghikas. The most distinctive in doctrine and probably the oldest of the Mahāyāna works are the *Prajñāpāramitās* (Books of the Perfection of Wisdom). Some of these *Sūtras*—which are in the form of dialogues, long replies to questions put by Mahāmāti—may be as early as the first century B.C. and we may take them as evidence that at the time when they appeared the new teaching was being systematically promulgated in the schools. There is nevertheless hardly any reasoned out statement in the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras* which set forth the doctrine of *Śūnya* in a popular form. There is no attempt here at explanation or proof, the assertions and denials being made dogmatically. Yet these *Sūtras* have an important place in the history of dialectical criticism inasmuch as they inspired Nāgārjuna (second century A.D.) whose works are the earliest written record of the reasoned out system which probably lay at the root of these *Sūtras* from the beginning.

The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* is later than the *Prajñāpāramitās*. Instructing the Bodhisattva Mahāmāti, Buddha refers to the

erroneous teachings accepted by philosophers. They do not recognise the objective world to be of Mind (*citta*) itself which is erroneously discriminated; and not understanding the nature of the *viñānas* which are also no more than manifestations of Mind, simple as they are they cherish the dualism of being and non-being where there is but one first principle. Buddha also comments on erroneous views held by some Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas concerning causation, continuation etc.³⁹ Buddha shows that the reality of things has nothing to do with the prevalence of words which are only conventional symbols; it is not right to argue that a thing must be existent because there is a word denoting it. We have a word like 'hare's horn' and yet no reality corresponding to it.⁴⁰ The unreality of phenomenal things is explained by means of illustrations like dream, reflection etc. Mahāmati raises a question that it is equivalent to self-contradiction to say that things are not produced and that they are like *māyā*. Buddha explains that he has to give the simile only for the sake of those ignorant persons who are obsessed with the notion of causality or origination, otherwise it is only right to say that they have no origination.⁴¹ Absence of contradiction was thus always insisted on and any apparent contradiction explained away.

The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* offers an explanation of *avyākṛta* (inexplicable) questions. "These *avyākṛtas* are not taken up for consideration by the Tathāgatas in order to keep people away from their wrong views and theories of speculators." "Mahāmati, the speculators may say, 'What soul is, that is the body, or soul is one thing, body is another.' These are inexplicable statements. Entirely bewildered by the idea of causality, they make an inexplicable statement, but that is not found in my teaching. There is no discrimination in my teaching, because I teach to stand above grasped and grasping. How could there be any setting aside here? But Mahāmati, to those who are obsessed with grasped and grasping, since they do not have a thorough understanding of the world which is no more than what is seen of the Mind (*Citta*) itself, there is something

to be set aside (*sthāpanīya*) (as inexplicable). The Tathāgatas, Arhats, Fully-Enlightened Ones teach the Dharma to all beings by means of the four forms of questioning and answering. As to the propositions that are set aside as inexplicable, Mahāmāti, they are made use of by me on some other occasions for those whose senses are not fully matured, but for those of matured senses there is nothing to set aside."⁴³ The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* thus gives one of the explanations offered for the inexplicable questions which were set aside by Buddha. The four kinds of explanation referred to are, as we have seen before, direct statement, questioning, answering after analysis, and setting aside. The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* says that the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika teach origination from being or from non-being; all that is proclaimed by them are the inexplicables. When the nature or essence of all things is examined by reason, it is found to be not determined. Therefore they are essenceless and inexplicable.⁴³

In the third chapter there is a condemning reference to the Lokāyatika skilled in various forms of incantation and in the art of persuasive eloquence, who puts the mind of the ignorant in utter confusion by means of various reasonings, by clever manipulation of words and phrases, neither in accordance with reason nor in unison with sense. Buddha here condemns all philosophy other than his own of not coming and going (*an-āya-vyaya*—not-origination-and-destruction) as Lokāyata.⁴⁴ Lokāyata signified, it seems, in the time of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* everything clever, deceptive, not true to reason. In this chapter different views regarding *Nirvāṇa* are refuted,⁴⁵ and eight different views regarding impermanence or non-eternality (*anityatā*) are set aside as Buddha is neither for eternality nor for non-eternality, as nothing in the world is accepted but the Mind (*citta*) itself and so no discrimination occurs.⁴⁶

We can say from this that the practice of examining one's tenets and of stating and refuting those of others was in vogue round about the first century B.C. to the first century A.D. though we do not find much by way of reasoned argument

in support or refutation of a view or theory. *Jalpa*, or idle disputation was condemned as leading to suffering, and away from truth, in Buddhist circles and the path of Buddha recommended.⁴⁷

Among the Buddhist *dārśanikas*, Nāgārjuna (second century A.D.) was a great dialectician who challenged the very potency of the *pramāṇas* (sources of knowledge) to yield the truth (—in *Vigrahavyāvartanī*) and consequently the reality of the categories recognised by philosophers (especially the *Vaibhāṣikas*), not excluding *Nirvāṇa* (in the *Mādhyamika-kārikā*). With regard to *Nirvāṇa* Nāgārjuna would argue that compounded things whose nature is arising and passing away are neither bound nor released, nor is a being either bound or released. The bound is not released and the the not-bound likewise is nothing to be released from. If the bound were released, bondage and release would be simultaneous. What is meant is that there is no abandoning of anything in *Nirvāṇa*, nor the ceasing of anything: *Nirvāṇa* is the destruction of all false imaginings. The conclusion is drawn that *Nirvāṇa* is neither existent nor non-existent nor existent—and-non-existent, nor not-existent—and-non-existent. This shows the connection of Nāgārjuna's dialectical method with the treatment of the *avyākata* (inexplicable) questions about the existence of a Tathāgata after death, in the Pāli Canon, and with Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta's sceptical position. What Nāgārjuna means is that the ultimately real cannot be grasped in terms of empirical concepts. Nothing can be said of it but 'No', 'No', as the Upaniṣads also say, though not so firmly. All knowledge of the senses can be dismantled when analysed, for the definition of one concept is dependent on and presupposes another; nothing is self-sufficient, and so no definition can be upheld, and consequently the reality of no definable (category) can be upheld. The conflict of Reason blocks the recognition of things of the world. The analysis of any proposition or argument shows that it involves contradiction of one's own tenets or involves self-contradiction or some such anomaly. For instance, we talk

of passion or coloration (*rāga*) and the person affected by it (*rakta*). If the *rakta* were devoid of *rāga* before the rise of *rāga*, then *rāga* would arise as depending on the *rakta* devoid of *rāga*. In that case it is proper to say that the *rāga* would arise in the *rakta*; it is not possible that one devoid of *rāga* should be *rakta*, for then there would be the contingency of *rāga* even in the case of Arhats. If there be not *rāga* in a *rakta*, how could there be *rāga* in the absence of the *rakta*, when it could have no substrate? This is also true of *rakta* when the *rāga* is existent or non-existent. *Rāga* and *rakta* could not arise simultaneously, for then they would be independent of each other. If they be one, they could not be co-existent, for a thing cannot be co-existent with itself; if they be different how could they be at all co-existent? If there is said to be co-existence when there is oneness or difference, then there would be co-existence, even when a thing is alone or existing separately. If there is said to be co-existence when there is difference, we ask: Is the distinct existence of *rāga* and *rakta* established, so that they could be co-existent? And if they are proved to have distinct existence, why do you imagine them to be co-existent? If you postulate co-existence because they are not established as distinct, you will have to postulate again difference in order to prove co-existence, and this would involve mutual dependence. Distinct existence not being proved, co-existence is not proved, for the two are relative. Thus *rakta* and *rāga* are neither simultaneous nor temporally separated, and similarly all entities, e.g. hatred and one affected by it (*dveṣa-dviṣta*), stupidity and stupid (*moha-mūḍha*) cannot be proved to be simultaneous or temporally separated.⁴⁸ Nāgārjuna exploits to his advantage the argument detecting the defects of contradiction, impossibility, mutual dependence and the like.

Nāgārjuna was, we might say, the first to pointedly note the conflict of reason and thereby dismantle everything by critical examination. Taking the clue from philosophers like Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta he formulated a dialectic for the Mādhyamikas, which greatly influenced all later dialectical criticism

whether sceptical or not. Nāgārjuna has, in his *Vigraha-vyāvartanī*, adopted the method of first allowing the *pūrvapakṣin* to state his view and then refuting the arguments one after another, and even anticipating and answering objections in the course of the refutation where necessary. The works of Nāgārjuna may be said to be the chief inspiring force of all dialectical criticism.

Āryadeva was a disciple of Nāgārjuna, and there is no difference in their philosophical views, though the former's expression at times shows leanings towards Vijñānavāda. In his *Catuhśataka*, Āryadeva has attempted to prove that the things generally recognised by us as real are essenceless (*nihsvabhāva*), Chapters 9-16 being called *Vigrahaśataka*, (two centuries of stanzas regarding disputation) by the commentator Dharmapāla. The dialectical character of the work is thus obvious. Chapter nine states the repudiation of things regarded as eternal, Chapter ten of *ātman*, eleven of Time, twelve of wrong or heretical views, thirteen of senses and their objects, fourteen of adherence to the extremes (*antagraha*), fifteen of compound things; and Chapter sixteen deals with the discussion between the teacher and the pupil: 'How is it possible, when everything is void?' In Chapter eight, Āryadeva answers an objection and makes an important clarification. It may be urged by some that the doctrine of *Śūnyatā* was propounded just to infuse a sense of detachment, and did not, as a matter of fact, imply the unreal nature of the world of appearance. But Āryadeva assures us that *Nirvāṇa* can never be attained by a false view of things.⁴⁹ He answers further doubts and objections pertaining to the path of renunciation (*nivṛtti*) leading to *nirvāṇa* and gives practical advice when the doctrine of *Śūnyatā* should be taught. In Chapter ten he refutes the existence of *ātman* and also the Sāṃkhya position of *Prakṛti* being insentient and yet an agent, and the different views regarding the soul and its size in the different schools of philosophical thought. Similarly in Chapter 11, while repudiating Time, Āryadeva refutes the Sarvāstivādin's view regarding the existence of things in all the three times,

and the *satkāryavāda* (doctrine of the effect being latent in the cause even before its manifestation) (of the Sāmkhyas and the Vaibhāṣikas) and the *asatkāryavāda* (doctrine of the production of a novel effect) (of the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sautrāntikas and the Vijñānavādins, according to Candrakīrti). Āryadeva states, in chapter fourteen, that the method of refutation which he has illustrated can be employed against all dialecticians. *Sat* (existent), *asat* (non-existent), *sadasat* (both existent and non-existent) and *sad-asad na* (neither existent nor non-existent)—this order of putting forth the alternatives and refuting them should be adopted by the learned everywhere in respect of oneness and the like.⁵⁰ The commentator explains this by applying this mode to the view of the *satkāryavādin*, who believes that the cause and the effect are one; or cloth and whiteness—Are they one or different or both or neither? None of these positions is valid and thus things cannot be said to have a nature of their own independent of others.⁵¹ It can be seen that Āryadeva's dialectical mode is similar to that of Nāgārjuna, and he also resorts to arguments based on impossibility, mutual dependence and the like for the refutation of the different philosophical concepts.

Chapter sixteen of the *Catuhśataka* brings up an important issue. If the speaker, the thing spoken of and the statement be *śūnya*, then it is meaningless to have attempted these fifteen chapters or we may say, to teach or discuss; but all the three are existent, so they are *sasvabhāva* (having an essence or nature of their own) and not *nihsvabhāva* (essenceless) as stated. The answer to this is that the speaker, that which is spoken of and the statement are known as such in relation to one another, so they do not have an essential nature of their own. But then everything would come to be a non-entity like hare's horn, while we find the senses and their objects to be real! The answer to this is: If *aśūnyatva* (non-voidness) can be established for fear of some fault in the position of *śūnyatā* then why should *śūnyatā* not get established if a fault is

detected in the position that things are *aśūnya* or non-void ? * If the world were not *śūnya*, it would be eternal, non-produced non-destroyed. But this is not what we find. Therefore the world must be *śūnya*. Thus the person attacking Śūnyavāda cannot even establish his own position. It may be said that there must be something which is *aśūnya* for there being something which is *śūnya*; thus everything cannot be said to be *śūnya*. The answer to this is that this difficulty arises only because the stand that *śūnya* is not an entity, though not propounded as a doctrine of *śūnyatā* is accepted as a doctrine or view. It is not proper to say that a *pakṣa* (doctrine or view) is not possible without a *vipakṣa* (contrary-view) and so the *vipakṣa* must be there and in that case all things are established. If there were any view left unrefuted or upheld then it would serve as a view though not meant to be one. But when the *pakṣa* is not there, what could become the *vipakṣa* ? Āryadeva boldly says at the end that it is not possible to repudiate one who holds no position of his own.⁵² Such a person answers the opponent on the strength of the views and dialectical principles accepted by the latter only, but the opponent cannot detect any flaw in his argument or view for he does not recognise the ultimate validity of anything.

The *Śataśāstra*, also of Āryadeva, is a polemical work, the scope of which is to establish the exact doctrine of *śūnya* after refuting other views. The criticism is directed not only against the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṃkhyas, but also against the various Hīnayāna schools. We find the method of question-answer adopted here, the opponent raises an objection at every step. Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva can thus be said to be great pioneers in the field of dialectics, especially in proving that empirical concepts involve self-contradiction or other anomalies and absurdities and so cannot yield any truth. They start from the stand-point of logic and refute the opponent even while for the time being accepting what he has to say. They have no thesis of their own to propound and so do not advance any argument to establish Śūnyavāda.

* Argument of the *pratibandhi* or *samavacana* type.

It may be mentioned here that Buddhapālita (sixth century) did not make use of reasoning to establish Śūnyavāda. But Bhāvaviveka or Bhavya (sixth century) of the Svātantrika school argued that even the Mādhyamikas admitted the empirical validity of logic, so reasoning could be employed to establish Śūnyavāda, as also to refute other philosophical views. Candrakīrti, a staunch champion of the Mādhyamika Prāsaṅgika school repudiated Bhāvaviveka's contention at great length in his commentary on the *Mādhyamika Kārikā*. Here we find the adherents of one school criticising one another. Moreover, Candrakīrti rejected Diṇnāga's reform in Buddhist logic and preferred the realistic logic of the Brāhmaṇical school, but later philosophers deemed it possible to accept the reform of Diṇnāga with the same proviso as Candrakīrti's, viz the absolute can never be cognised by logical means. Śāntarakṣita (seventh or eighth century) and his pupil Kamalaśīla have, in the *Tattva-saṅgraha* and its *Pañjikā*, refuted the theories and doctrines of rival systems of thought—Vedic Buddhist, Jaina and the like. They state the *pūrvapakṣa* at length and with exemplary faithfulness to the original doctrine and its statement in the texts of the respective schools, and then point out the anomalies involved, allowing the *pūrvapakṣin* opportunity to express his doubts and objections even while the refutation is going on. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla give some positive exposition of *śūnya* as the Ultimate Reality and the character of their teaching is not as completely negative as that of Nāgārjuna and other purist Mādhyamikas, so they are regarded by some as belonging to the mixed school of Mādhyamika-Yogācāras or Mādhyamika Svātantrikas.

Coming to the Vijñānavāda school, we may briefly consider the method of treatment adopted in the *Vimśikā* and the *Trimśikā* of Vasubandhu (fourth-fifth century A.D.). In the *Vimśikā* and the auto-commentary on it, as also in the *Trimśikā*, Vasubandhu proves that the world-appearance is nothing but a manifestation of consciousness and has no reality apart from

consciousness pure and simple; that is to say, the worldly phenomena have no external status and are merely subjective ideas. He anticipates objections from the realist to the following effect: If consciousness were to be entirely independent of external reality, how could the spatio-temporal determinations of experienced objects be explained? An experience is found to occur in a particular place and at a particular time and not just anywhere or at all times. Again, such experiences occur to all individuals who happen to be there; and not to a particular individual, whereas illusions like double-moon are private, confined to the cognising individual. Moreover, the tuft of hair and the like experienced by a man of diseased vision, or poison, etc. seen in a dream are found to be incapable of discharging the functions of real hair, etc. or of killing anyone and the like, whereas such objects as are experienced by normal persons do exist and produce real consequences. Hence it is not right to say that these objects are unreal. Vasubandhu proceeds to explain away these objections, and to show that the external existence of things is not a necessary condition of experience. It is evident that the objections anticipated are very appealing and sound and it requires exceptional courage and confidence to anticipate and state so convincingly these objections. In the course of the argument Vasubandhu proves dialectically by putting forth different alternatives that the whole (*avayavin*) is not an entity distinct from the constituent parts (*avayavas*).

The *Trimśikā* is not on the whole as explicitly dialectical in character as the *Viṃśikā*. Yet even here Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati repudiate the suggestion of those extreme idealists who deny the reality of consciousness on grounds of interdependence or relativity. Nevertheless, we do not find any very important principles of dialectical criticism employed in these works.

Diñnāga (fifth century A.D.), the stabiliser of Buddhist logic, has in his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* and his own commentary on it criticised the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika definitions and

concepts of perception (Ch.1-*Pratyakṣa Pariccheda*), the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika definitions of inference and their concepts of invariable concomitance, and the relation between the *liṅga* (probans) and the *sādhya* (probandum) underlying the rule of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) (Ch. 2-*Svārthānumāna Pariccheda*). He has also criticised the *hetvābhāsas* (fallacies of reason) as they are recognised by the Vaiśeṣikas (chapter 3 -*Parārthānumāna Pariccheda*) and examined the Vaiśeṣika view regarding *dṛṣṭānta* (illustration) (chapter 4-*Dṛṣṭānta-Pariccheda*). Dinnāga has similarly criticised Vasubandhu's definition of perception in his commentary on chapter one, as it can be interpreted to presuppose the reality of the external object.⁵³ Besides, Dinnāga has criticised the metaphysical views of the Sāṃkhya and others with subtlety. Till the time of Dinnāga, Buddhist logic had no distinctive character of its own. It was Dinnāga, regarded as the father of Buddhist mediaeval logic, who for the first time examined the *pramāṇas* (sources of valid knowledge) and the like of the Brāhmaṇical schools and established a distinct theory of *pramāṇas*. Dinnāga is well known for his intellectual attacks on Vātsyāyana, and Uddyotakara had to make special efforts to defend Vātsyāyana and criticise Dinnāga.

Dharmakīrti (seventh century A.D.) was a great logician and he can be said to have systematised Buddhist logic once for all. His works—*Pramāṇa-vārttika* (his main and most important work with auto-commentary on the chapter on *Svārthānumāna*), *Sambandhaparīkṣā* with auto-commentary, *Codanā-prakaraṇa* (a treatise on the art of carrying on disputations), *Santānāntarasiddhi*, *Nyāyabindu*, *Pramāṇa-viniścaya*, *Hetubindu*—especially the first four, are highly dialectical in character; objections from thinkers of different schools are anticipated and refuted. The chapter on the validity of knowledge in the *Pramāṇa-vārttika* is supposed to be a comment upon the initial stanza of Dinnāga's work (*Pramāṇabhūtiyā jagaddhitaiṣiṇe...*). The whole of Mahāyānistic Buddhology and all the proofs for the existence of the Absolute Being

are discussed under that head. In the course of his exposition, Dharmakīrti refutes the reality of God (1.10.30). While establishing Buddha as *pramāṇa*, he says he is such because he has the knowledge of the means leading to the removal of misery in the world and not because he is omniscient in the sense that he knows how many insects exist in the universe—this knowledge being useless. If capacity to see things at a distance is regarded as a sign of omniscience we should worship eagles. (1.33–35). Here Dharmakīrti is pointedly criticising the Jaina view of *avadhi* and *kevala-jñāna* (omniscience). He further refutes the view that the material elements give rise to consciousness as an epiphenomenon and consciousness has no existence apart from the elements (1.37 ff) and establishes the reality of consciousness alone. He also refutes the concepts of *avayavin* (whole as distinct from the constituents), *saṃyoga* (conjunction), *saṃavāya* (inherence), the separate existence of *guṇa* (quality), *karma* (action), *sāmānya* (universal), etc. as distinct from the *svalakṣaṇa* (point-instant of reality). It is our discursive intellect that makes such abstractions; what is real is the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) which admits of no qualifier or division. He has clarified the concept of spiritual evolution and elevation especially when the Buddhists do not admit any permanent eternal unchanging consciousness, but only an eternal stream of point-instants of consciousness (*citta-kṣaṇas*) (1.122 ff).

In the chapter on Perception, he has explained why the Buddhists accepted two *pramāṇas* (*pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*) and has refuted at length *sāmānya* as having any objective reality; it is just a mental construction. He has further proved that all the sense-organs can yield knowledge simultaneously (2. 136) as against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that the mind being atomic, experience cannot be simultaneous. He criticises the Sāṃkhya view that *sukha* (pleasure), etc. are external to the soul as they are modifications of the *citta* (mind) and do not inhere in the soul (2.268). In the chapter on *Svārthānumāna*, he criticises Dinnāga of his own school for having accepted

the negative reason (*vyatireki-hetu*) (3.15-19) and criticises the manner of reasoning of the Cārvākas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṃkhya and the Jains who reason from non-perception (3.20 ff). Examining *śabda-pramāṇa* (verbal or scriptural testimony), he refutes the view upholding the validity and *apauruṣeyatva* (its not having been composed by a person) of the Veda and refutes *Sphoṭa* as also the concept of the fixity of the order of Vedic words. He similarly examines the concept of *āpta* (trustworthy person) (3.219ff). Here his arguments are mostly against the Mīmāṃsakas. He repeatedly resorts to the *prasaṅga* method, that of exposing the contingencies—positions implied which the other party also is not prepared to accept—or the absurdities involved in the other party's position. In the chapter on *Parārthānumāna*, he has shown that the *pratijñā* is not a necessary member of a syllogism and demarcates the sphere of inference or reasoning and *āgama* (verbal testimony) which is to be set aside if it conflicts with reasoning (4.48 ff). While discussing the members of a syllogism he repeatedly criticises the Naiyāyikas (e.g. 4.195) and even Dinnāga. In the *Nyāyabindu* he refutes the Jaina argument that trees are sentient beings because they are organisms which die when the covering texture is stripped off (*Nyāyabindu* 3.61-*Asiddha*). He criticises Dinnāga for considering the variety of concealed contrary reason as a special variety of contrary reason (*viruddha*) (3.89-94). He has added some fallacies to the scheme of Dinnāga as we have seen in the chapter on logical fallacies.⁵⁴

Dharmakīrti, it can be seen, was a great dialectician of the Buddhist school, comparable to Kumāṛila and Uddyotakāra. It may be said to his credit that he generally does not twist the argument of the *pūrvapakṣin* but does full justice to the reasoning behind it. The Buddhist logicians and commentators after Dharmakīrti indulged in polemics and dialectical criticism for the sake of explaining precisely and convincingly their own views and concepts—some important names among them being Dharmottara (800 A.D.), Prajñākaragupta (eighth century A.D.),

Arcata (ninth cent.) Jñānaśrī (tenth cent.), Durveka (1100 A.D.). We need not pursue this inquiry further.

We may now consider the Sarvāstivāda literature from our point of view. The Sarvāstivādins, as is well known, did not accept the authority and even the authenticity of the Pāli Canon of the Theravādins. They reconstructed a canon of their own. Their *Abhidharma* consisted, like the *Abhidhamma*, of seven works attributed not to the Buddha directly but to his disciples. A huge commentary called the *Mahāvibhāṣā* was written on these works, from which was derived the name 'Vaibhāṣika'. Vasubandhu has given the substance of this commentary in his *Abhidharmakośa* in which he has clearly formulated the system of categories of the Vaibhāṣika school based on the teachings of Buddha as recorded in the Buddhist Canon acceptable to the Vaibhāṣikas. In his own *Bhāṣya* on the *Abhidharmakośa*, Vasubandhu's leaning towards, and even affiliation to, the Sautrāntika school is evident "In his characteristically powerful style Vasubandhu critically examined the Dravya-vāda (doctrine of enduring substance) of the Vaibhāṣikas, accused them of being literalists, ridiculed their dogmatism, and compared them with such heretical schools as the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika. Yaśomitra [author of *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*] rightly observes that Vasubandhu belongs to the Sautrāntika school."⁵⁵ The Sautrāntika leaning of Vasubandhu especially while commenting on a work on Abhidharma brought hostile reactions from his contemporary Vaibhāṣikas. Saṅghabhadra composed two works, viz. *Nyāyānusāra* and *Samayapradīpikā* in refutation of the *Bhāṣya*. *Abhidharmadīpa* with its *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* by Vimalamitra (450-550 A.D.) is a similar work primarily written to refute the Sautrāntika views upheld in the *Bhāṣya*. All these works in their contents and their presentation take the *Kośa* as their model and retain those parts of the *Bhāṣya* which are not objectionable to them. They hold identical views on almost all controversial points, their main difference lying in the fact that the works of Saṅghabhadra are based on the *kārikās*

of the *Abhidharmakośa*, whereas the *Abhidharmadīpa* has its own *kārikās* notwithstanding their correspondence to those of the *Kośa*. The works of Saṅghabhadra have not come down to us in their original form (—they are available only in Chinese translations). The *Abhidharmadīpa*, however fragmentary it may be, is therefore a lone witness, as far as we are concerned, with regard to the controversies between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas' reactions to the *Bhāṣya* of Vasubandhu.

Vasubandhu's treatment of the categories of the Vaibhāṣika system in his *Abhidharmakośa* is very systematic. He gives a detailed exposition of the *dharma*s which constitute the subject of the *Abhidharma* in Kośasthāna 1, *kārikās* 1 ff. He gives definitions of 'avijñapti', etc. and etymological explanations of words like 'rūpa', *dhātu*, etc. (kā. 11 ff) and shows how the *bhūta*s (elements) can be established on the strength of their specific characteristics *dhṛti* (fixity), *saṅgraha* (coming together or agglutination), *pakti* (heat), *vyūhana* (spreading) (kā. 12). *Kārikās* 1. 32-33 and 2.33 take up the question whether *vitarka* (initial gross application of the mind to the object) and *vicāra* (subsequent subtle sustained application) can operate simultaneously or not. Vasubandhu in his *Bhāṣya* on 2.33, after quoting and criticising several views on this controversy from the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, explains the Sautrāntika view that *vitarka* and *vicāra* are two different names given to gross and subtle states of *saṃskāra*s that produce corresponding gross or subtle speech and therefore cannot operate together, but only each to the exclusion of the other. Vasubandhu agrees with this view and explains away scriptural passages which seem to convey the opposite of this. The author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* reproduces this controversy from the *Bhāṣya* and severely criticises Vasubandhu for his theory which goes against the Vaibhāṣika view that *vitarka* and *vicāra* co-exist in one moment of consciousness, though they do not operate simultaneously. This view is identical with the view of Saṅghabhadra quoted

and criticised by Yaśomitra in his *Vyākhyā* on the *Bhāṣya*. Yaśomitra finds Sanghabhadra's explanation unconvincing. True, a certain factor of an aggregate alone manifests itself in a given condition and not the other, but *vitarka* and *vicāra* cannot be said to be two different *dharma*s (entities) as their characteristics are not fully differentiated. Their respective grossness and subtlety do not establish any specific difference of kind, but only a difference of degree, so *vitarka* and *vicāra* are not two different entities but only different states of a single *dharma*. It may be noted that further speculations on these are recorded in the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* of Asaṅga, and in Sthiramati's *Bhāṣya* on Vasubandhu's *Trīṃśikā* also, from which we can say that the Vijñānavādins regarded *vitarka* and *vicāra* as different by attributing to them the functions of enquiry and judgment respectively, which can appear only successively and not simultaneously. From this controversy it appears that originally the Vaibhāṣikas, like the Theravādins, held these two to be simultaneously active, but modified their view owing to Vasubandhu's criticism.⁵⁶

Another such controversy pertaining to cognition is raised in the *Abhidharmakośa*: Does the eye see or the eye-consciousness (*cakṣur-vijñāna*)? The former view is held by the Vaibhāṣikas and the latter by the Dārṣṭāntikas or the Sautrāntikas. The Vaibhāṣikas contend that the function of the eye is to see and that of *vijñāna* is to know; they argue that eye-consciousness cannot see if any object intervenes between the eye and the visible object. The Sautrāntika answer to this is that the eye-consciousness sees in spite of intervening factors like glass, water etc. Further it is by the light thrown upon an object that it is visible and therefore one must not say that the eye sees. These and the like arguments are advanced by the Sautrāntikas to refute the contention of the Vaibhāṣikas and both cite texts in support of their own contention (see *Bhāṣya* and *Vyākhyā* 1-42 and *Abhidharmadīpa*, pp. 32ff; Introduction pp. 74 ff). The author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* (*kārikā* 4)† refutes the different views that the eye or the eye-consciousness

or *prajñā* (outlook, right or wrong) or finally the aggregate of all these and such other causes as the light, etc. can be said to perform the function of seeing and then asserts the Vaibhāṣika view that the eye sees and the consciousness knows or comprehends its object. He repudiates Vasubandhu's criticism of the Vaibhāṣika view and accuses him of ignorance as also leanings towards Mahāyāna.

The second Kośasthāna opens with a comment on the word '*indriya*' which means *ādhipatya*, supremacy, and devotes the first twenty-one *kārikās* to the exposition of the twenty-two *indriyas* as found in Buddhist works. '*Indriya*' meaning *ādhipatya* signifies the five organs of knowledge: *cakṣu* etc. may be explained as the predominating factors for a person's appearance (*ātmabhāvaśobhā*), withdrawing oneself or protection (*parikarsaṇa*), knowledge (*viññāna*) and distinctiveness (*asādhāraṇakaraṇatva*). The Sautrāntikas contend that *ādhipatya* should be attributed not to *cakṣu*, etc. but to *cakṣurviññāna* etc. and that they would define '*ādhipatya*' as '*adhikam prabhutvam*' i.e. greater activity. The author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* refers to this as the view of the Paurāṇa (older) Ācāryas, but Vasubandhu does not say so. According to the author of the *Abhidharmadīpa*, the Vaibhāṣikās hold that the *ādhipatya* of *cakṣu*, etc. consists in the cognising by them of their object. Vasubandhu also agrees and has nothing original to add. The Sautrāntikas do not accept anything to be directly perceptible. So they contend that *ādhipatya* should be attributed not to *cakṣu*, etc. but to *cakṣur-viññāna* etc. and they define '*ādhipatya*' as '*adhikam prabhutvam*' i.e. greater efficiency in cognising the object (see *Abhidharmadīpa*, pp. 46-48). Similarly, discussing as to which *indriyas* are *savipāka* (a result of previous *karman*), Vasubandhu states in kā. 10 that *jīvitendriya* (life) is *savipāka*, that is to say, the length of one's life is subject to the fruits of the *karman* of previous births. He has in his mind the well known controversy whether the life-span can be prolonged by yogic powers arising from the legend of Buddha's statement, (*Dīgha Nikāya* 16.3.3) that on account of his mastery over

the four paths of *ṛddhi* he could live in the same life for a *kalpa* or a *kalpāvasēsa*. Vasubandhu personally maintains contrary to the accepted Vaibhāṣika theory that in the case of such prolongation of life by Buddha, the yogic powers supersede *karman* and produce a new life born of *saṃādhi* as against the life which is *vipākaja* (a result of *karman*). The author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* (pp. 98 ff) has criticised Vasubandhu's view.

Of the four *cittaviprayuktas*, *jāti* (origin), *jarā* (decay), *sthiti* (sustenance) and *anityatā* (impermanence or *nāśa*), there is a good deal of controversy regarding *sthiti* as it is not admitted by all the Buddhists (see *kārikās* 35 ff). In the teachings of Buddha only three *lakṣaṇas* (characteristics) of constituted objects appear, viz. *utpāda* (*jāti*), *vyaya* (*anityatā*) and *sthityanyathātva* (*jarā*). To these the Vaibhāṣikas add the fourth, *sthiti* saying that the *sūtras* are suggestive and not enumerative (*Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* 2, p. 94), or that 'sthityanyathātva' asserts both *sthiti* and *jarā*. The Sautrāntikas contend that *sthiti-lakṣaṇa* can only be applied to the *asaṃskṛtas* (non-composites), it could not be a *lakṣaṇa* of the *saṃskṛtas* (composite or constituted things). The *sthiti-lakṣaṇa* if upheld would go against the Kṣaṇikavāda of the Vaibhāṣikas that everything is momentary (—There is a lengthy and learned discussion on the conception of *kṣaṇa*, point-instant and *pravāha*, continuum in the *Vyākhyā*, pp. 98–104). Again, the Sautrāntikas hold that *jāti*, *jarā*, etc. are only *lakṣaṇas* and not *dravyas* as their existence cannot be established by any of the *pramāṇas*. Vasubandhu favours this view in the *Bhāṣya* (see also *Abhidharmadīpa*, pp. 104 ff). *Abhidharmakośa* 2.47–48 deals with the three *citta-viprayuktas*—*nāma* (word), *pada* (sentence) and *vyañjana* (articulate sound). The Sautrāntikas hold that *nāma*, *pada*, *vyañjana* are not different from *vāk-śabda* (sound of speech) and so should be treated as *rūpa*, and it is not necessary to invent such new categories outside the group of Matter. Vasubandhu favours this view and ridicules the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of the *citta-viprayukta saṃskāras*. The

author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* (pp. 108ff) in turn answers Vasubandhu's arguments and also criticises the Mīmāṃsā, Vyākaraṇa and Vaiśeṣika theories of *śabda*.

There have been controversies on a number of points between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas and these are found recorded in works like the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu and the *Abhidharmadīpa* with its *Vṛtti* by Vimalamitra. We may only note here that *Abhidharmakośa* 5.25-26 gives the fundamental principle of the Sarvāstivāda school—*'tadastivādāt Sarvāstivādī mataḥ*.—25. a Sarvāstivādin is so called because he admits the reality of things in all the three times. The Sarvāstivādins believe that *dharmas* (entities) exist in essence (*dravyataḥ*) in all times—past, future and present and consequently they are confronted with the problem of giving a rational explanation of the nature of the *dharmas* associated with the three times, as also of the nature of change that takes place when a future *dharma* enters into the past through the present. Vasubandhu records four distinct views of the ancient exponents of the school viz. Dharmatrāta, Ghoṣaka, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva and also gives an illuminating and lively criticism of these views. We are familiar with this controversy through the works of Stcherbatsky and others. The author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* (pp. 257 ff) has made a very bold attempt to save the Sarvāstivāda position. The controversy between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas is almost an interminable one like many other controversies, as neither party is prepared to give up its position. All the same there is this advantage that clarification of issues is the result on either side due to such controversies, and both traditions have benefited thereby.

We have thus seen that Vasubandhu shows Sautrāntika leanings in his commentary on his own *Abhidharmakośa* and he criticises several Vaibhāṣika views and refers to several Buddhist thinkers and their theories in his *Bhāṣya*. Vimalamitra in his *Vṛtti* on the *Abhidharmadīpa* takes up all such passages

for special consideration and refutes Vasubandhu in particular and the Sautrāntika position in general in connection with several points of controversy between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas and restates with greater persuasion the Vaibhāṣika system of philosophy. He mentions some topics that were overlooked or not mentioned by Vasubandhu, and also examines at places the doctrine of Śūnyavāda, the Parināma-vāda of the Sāṃkhya and the like theories and views. (See *Abhidharmadīpa* kā. 289–324). He also mentions different views and theories of the earlier Buddhist thinkers. Prof. Jaini has treated all these points in his Introduction to the *Abhidharmadīpa*,⁵⁷ so we shall not go into further details. What is interesting to note is that there were a number of discussions among the different sections and schools of the Buddhists—a clear picture of which is presented by the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and a still clearer one by the *Abhidharmadīpa* and its *Vṛtti*. This also explains how in the Buddhist fold four main schools or systems of philosophy with distinctive views and theories could emerge and how they tried to rationalise their own position against the attacks of rival schools—Buddhist and non-Buddhist—thus contributing to the development of dialectical thought and showing the different ways in which the same scriptural texts could be interpreted. We may note in passing that Vasubandhu's boldness in passing on from the Vaibhāṣika school to the Sautrāntika and later to the Vijñānavāda is worthy of appreciation, and gives us an idea of the dialectic in his mind—a mind struggling with itself in an intellectual dual.

We may finally refer here to the introductory part of *Aṭṭhasālinī*, a Pāli commentary by one Buddhaghōṣa (fourth or fifth century A.D.) on the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*. The introductory *Nidāna-kathā* opens with the interpretation of the word 'Abhidhamma' as Higher Dharma in that there is an absolute method of treatment in it (1.2–3) and names the various treatises included in it (1.4). The author then refers to the controversy raised by some *vitaṇḍavādins* (disputationists) about

including *Kathāvattha* in the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* since it has been ascribed to Moggaliputta Tissa (1.5.-9) and gives the names of the subjects mentioned in the chapters of the seven treatises of the *Abhidhammā* (1.24-28) and shows the importance of the last one of these (1.29-35). The author seems to be aware of the objections raised by some against including *Abhidhamma* in the Buddha's 'word' and gives quotations from the *Sutta Piṭaka* and the *Vinaya Piṭaka* to support its inclusion in it (1.70-71). He answers at length the objection that the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* cannot be 'Buddha's word' as it does not contain, like other works ascribed to the Buddha, a prefatory remark (*nidāna*) like 'Once upon a time, Buddha was living at Rājagṛha.....' (1.73 ff).⁵⁸ Thus the author of the *Aṭṭhasālinī* has tried to give a critical account of the Buddhist Canon before commenting on one of the canonical works and has stated and answered objections wherever he thought it necessary to do so. It seems that in the fourth and fifth centuries it was thought fit by some Buddhist writers to attempt to explain and interpret critically and systematically the Buddha's word in Pāli (—compare *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa who was slightly older than the author of the *Aṭṭhasālinī*, as Kundakunda and Jinabhadra made similar attempts in Prākṛta in the Jaina school of thought. The author of the *Aṭṭhasālinī* has made full use of the dialectical method, giving the arguments on both the sides of a point and arriving at the final conclusion which is in consonance with the view of his own school.⁵⁹ He tries to explain away conflicting statements in the Buddhist Canon by some such argument as, "The statement of the *Sutta Piṭaka* is a relative one (*pariyāya desanā*) while we are here dealing with absolute statements (*nippariyāya desanā*)" (3 304, 484, etc.). At times not finding a sound argument, he ridicules the opponent or even curses him.⁶⁰

It can be said that the Buddhist thinkers were very great dialecticians of their day and it was their sound and healthy criticism of rival views (especially in respect of the reality of the enduring substance or the soul entity and of

external objects) which mainly set the ball of dialectical criticism rolling, the momentum being an enormous one. The Buddhists indulged in the examination of the traditional interpretation of the teachings of Buddha with the result that the Buddhist current of thought split up into a number of sub-currents, four of them being main among them. Other thinkers—Vedic and Jaina—rose to the occasion and indulged in dialectical reasoning to establish their own doctrines and defend them against rival attacks. Thus dialectical criticism came into vogue and was employed in works of logic and philosophy and even other *vidyās* (sciences) for the refutation of the theories of rival schools and the establishing of one's own.

Dialectical thought in Post-Āgamic Jaina Works—Some of the outstanding early Jaina philosophers and authors are Kundakunda (first century A.D.), Umāsvāti (believed to be his pupil), (—according to some, Kundakunda is much later—), Siddhasena Divākara (fifth–sixth century A.D.), Jinabhadra (sixth century), Samantabhadra (seventh century A.D.), Akalaṅka (seventh–eighth century), Vidyānanda (ninth century), Haribhadra (eighth century), Prabhācandra (eleventh century), Vādi Devasūri (eleventh–twelfth century) and Hemacandra (eleventh–twelfth century). We need not go ahead.

The relative seniority of Kundakunda and Umāsvāti has not been incontestably decided. But they can be regarded as early Jaina writers who have attempted to treat problems of Jaina philosophical thought systematically, Kundakunda using the Śaurasenī Prākṛta language and Umāsvāti Sanskrit. Both rely mainly on the teachings of Mahāvīra and support them with the help of reason. Umāsvāti has given us the sum and substance of the Āgamic texts in his *Tattvārthasūtra*. He has not entered into the field of polemics, though he was familiar with the major philosophical currents of the period as can be seen from his own commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra*.⁶¹

Kundakundācārya even while deriving and basing his views on the teachings of Mahāvīra, has treated various

philosophical problems in the light of contemporary philosophical doctrines. The Digambaras rejected the authenticity of the texts accepted by the Śvetāmbaras as the *Āgamas*, so perhaps to supplant them Kundakunda wrote a number of works in Prākṛta on different topics to satisfy the requirements of the Digambaras. In his days the doctrine of Non-dualism (whether it be Brahmādvaita or Śūnyādvaita or Vijñānādvaita) was very popular and it was very difficult to defend the relative pluralism of the Jainas in its midst. Now, *nīścayanaya* (true and full or noumenal point of view) and *bhāva-niksepa* (present or phenomenal aspect) were known to the Jaina tradition. Resorting to these, Kundakunda presented the Jaina philosophy in a new light altogether and showed that the self, in its pure unconditioned state, radiates its pristine glory through all its wealth of infinite qualities, but in the conditioned state its intrinsic glory is dimmed on account of the meshes of the material environment. Thus also, the distinctions of *dravya* (substance) and *pariyāya* (mode), *dharma* (quality) and *dharmin* (substance), part and whole and the like melt into unity. This enabled the people of the Jaina faith to get the joy of Advaita even in the Jaina school. Kundakunda's description of the soul from the *nīścaya* point of view is at par with the description of the Absolute Brahman of the *Upaniṣads*. Thus he treated Jaina philosophy in a newer perspective which would make it appear similar to the current Advaitism, though not so in reality (see *Samayasāra*).

Kundakunda states in his *Samayasāra*, 44ff different 'erroneous' views regarding the soul—viz. some believe the soul to be identical with attachment or with *karman* or with the operation of *karman* or with the result of the intense and mild nature of the fruition of *karman* or believe it to be the soul and *karman* combined together or to be the result of the combination of *karman*—and states the 'true' nature of the soul. Similarly, in *Samayasāra*, 92 while discussing *karmic* matter transforming itself into the eight-fold *karmic* forms,

Kundakunda says that if *karmic* matter were not to thus transform itself there would result the non-existence of mundane existence (*samsāra*), or the Sāṃkhya view that souls are eternally pure would be established (*Samayasāra*, 124). There is a similar reference to the Sāṃkhya view according to which the souls are inactive (366). He also criticises those who believe the soul to be momentary or transient or absolutely unchangeable (351–352). But it can be seen that in all these cases Kundakunda is more interested in showing that any one of these theories is right from a particular point of view and does not give the whole truth, rather than in severely condemning the rival views. Jaina dialectical thought is, as a matter of fact, a relativistic one. Kundakunda has also discussed the problem of knowledge illuminating others while being self-illuminating (*Niyamasāra*, 160–170).

The problem of the simultaneity or priority–posteriority of *darśana* (indeterminate awareness) and *jñāna* (determinate knowledge) in the case of a *kevalin* (omniscient soul) was a controversial one among the Jaina philosophers. In the Digambara tradition we do not find any reference to it till Kundakunda who believes in their simultaneity.⁹² He must have newly formulated the doctrine or accepted and supported the doctrine traditionally handed down. The Śvetāmbaras must have discussed it from very early times for we find thinkers actively discussing this problem in their works. The works of Siddhasena (*Sanmati-prakaraṇa* 2 4-31) and Jinabhadra (*Viśeṣaṇavati*, 184-280 and *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, 3089 ff) are instances in point. Siddhasena (fifth–sixth century) and Jinabhadra (sixth century) seem to have put this doctrine in a logical set-up. Jinabhadra regards the two as *kramika*, one occurring after the other, whereas Siddhasena regards the two as identical in the case of a *kevalin*. The latter first establishes the two as simultaneous in order to refute the *kramika-vāda* and then proves that there is only one *upayoga* (conscious attention) in the case of a *kevalin* all whose obstructions have been removed and suggests his own way of interpreting Āgamic texts so that they do not

seem to contradict what is proved by means of reason. Whereas Jinabhadra in his works condemns the identity of *upayoga* and establishes *darśana* and *jñāna* as *kramika*, Siddhasena refutes the view that they are *kramika* and establishes their identity. We cannot say which of these philosophers was the earlier of the two or whether they were contemporaries, but it may be noted that all the arguments of the one have not been taken note of by the other; some are unnoticed, while additional ones are taken note of. This means that there must have been other philosophical works in both the traditions, upholding the *kramavāda* and the *abhedavāda*, this being corroborated by the use of words 'kecit' (some) and 'anye' (others) used by Jinabhadra while stating the views pertaining to *abhedavāda*. There must have been much dialectical thought exercised on this problem from very early times. Mallavādin, the author of *Dvādaśāranayacakra* was regarded as the best *tārkika* by Hemacandra (*anumallavādinam tārikikāḥ—Siddhahema* 2.2.39). Abhayadeva, the commentator of *Sanmati* regards Mallavādin as the pioneer of the view of the simultaneity of the *upayogas* in the case of a *kevalin* (*yugapada-upayogavāda*), and this Mallavādin is said to have commented on the *Sanmati* of Siddhasena. Perhaps they were contemporaries or even teacher and disciple.

A similar discussion occurred in respect of the identity or otherwise of *guṇa* (quality) and *paryāya* (mode). Kunda-kunda and Umāsvāti followed the Āgamic teaching and when defining *dravya* (substance) as possessed of *guṇa* (quality) and *paryāya* (mode) regarded the two as distinct and gave an exposition of them accordingly.⁶³ Siddhasena raised an objection against this and proved that *guṇa* and *paryāya* are one and that both words convey the idea of only one thing. Siddhasena's arguments were so sound and convincing that even Akalaṅka, a follower of Kundakunda, and Yaśovijaya had to accept that as a matter of fact a *guṇa* has no reality distinct from the *paryāya*, and the distinction is but an idle abstraction. It can be seen that Siddhasena was a great original

thinker who was not afraid of going against the traditional interpretation of the *Āgamas* if it was not supported by logical reasoning or if reason established something else.

We find a similar leap taken by Siddhasena in the field of logic. He was the first among the Jaina logicians to bring Jaina logic in line with the logic of other schools by dividing knowledge into *pratyaksa* (direct) and *paroksa* (indirect), where *pratyaksa* signified sensuous perception besides the *Āgamic* type of perception comprising *manah-paryāya* (intuition of mental modes), *avadhi* (intuition of all things having shape and form) and *kevala-jñāna* (omniscience).⁶⁴ Jinabhadra too admitted *pratyaksa* in a two-fold sense—direct perception by the soul or the *Āgamic* perception, and *sāmvyavahārika pratyaksa* or empirical perception as accepted by the other schools of logic.⁶⁵ This was accepted by most of the later Jaina logicians as this facilitated debates and discussions with philosophers and scholars of other schools of thought as the need for it arose.⁶⁶ This also encouraged the growth of dialectical thought. Recommending the non-absolutistic point of view Siddhasena has shown that the different theories of causation or origination (*Kāla*, *Svabhāva*, etc.) are false if one sits tight upon any one of them alone; they are right from the non-absolutistic point of view as the capacity to produce cannot be denied of any one of them (*Sanmatī* 3.53). He states that the views which uphold that the soul does not exist, is not eternal, is inactive, is not an enjoyer of the fruits of action, there is no emancipation for it or that there are no means leading to *moksa* or emancipation are erroneous and the views which hold that the soul exists, is imperishable, is a doer, is an enjoyer, it is emancipated and there are means leading to emancipation are right (3.54–55). This suffices to prove that Siddhasena was a great dialectician and an original thinker.

Jinabhadra has written a number of works of which *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* and *Viśeṣaṇavati*—both in Prākṛta stanzas are useful from our point of view. The *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* is a commentary on Bhadrabāhu's *Niryukti* on the first

adhyayana (*Sāmayika*-pertaining to the rules of conduct) of the *Āvaśyakasūtra*, so Jinabhadra has followed the original in the treatment of topics. But so skilful is his composition that he has interwoven discussions on numerous topics while adhering to the thread of the original. In this work, especially in the Gaṇadhāravāda section of it Jinabhadra has made Indrabhūti and others raise a number of doubts with regard to the existence of the soul and *karman*, whether the soul and the body are one, whether the elements exist; with regard to the similarity of this world and the other world, whether there is anything like bondage and emancipation and with regard to the reality of gods, hellish beings, good and evil (*puṇya-pāpa*), the other world and *nirvāṇa* (emancipation). The *pūrvapakṣa* is stated and then it is refuted; even in the course of refutation doubts, objections and defence on the part of the *pūrvapakṣin* are anticipated and set aside. Thus the dialectical mode offers great opportunities to criticise the Lokāyatikas, the Svabhāvavādins, the Buddhists and the like (*gāthās* 1549-2024).

Jinabhadra's method is very critical. He tries to explain important technical terms from different angles. He anticipates objections from the *pūrvapakṣin* with regard to the smallest topic under consideration and tries to convince the *pūrvapakṣin* by means of sound arguments as also by referring to the *Āgamas*. In the Gaṇadhāravāda an attempt is made to interpret the Vedic texts in the light of Jaina doctrines so as to bring them in line with the Jaina *Āgamas* and assimilate their teaching and thus show a respectful attitude towards the Vedic *Śruti*. He cites a number of popular illustrations and parables to prove his point.⁶⁷ Thus while giving an exposition he always keeps in view an audience and even a rival thinker holding a different theory and his exposition thus becomes dialectical in character. Jinabhadra attached much importance and authority to the *Āgamas*, so in his *Viśeṣaṇavati* he has tried to resolve all apparent inconsistencies in them. He has attempted to show that the mutually conflicting statements

only appear to be so; as a matter of fact they have different approaches in view according to what is meant to be conveyed. He has also refuted certain views of Jaina thinkers which were not in accordance with the teaching of the *Āgamas*, as for instance, the view of those who maintain the simultaneity or oneness of the *upayogas* of *darśana* and *jñāna* in the case of a *kevalin* and has tried to support or strengthen the *Āgamic* view (viz. *kramika upayoga*; see *gāthās* 153–249). Jinabhadra holds that reason can only support or corroborate the *Āgamic* teaching but never contradict it (*gāthās* 249, 274, etc.). Siddhasena on the other hand has demarcated the range of reason and of *Āgama* in his *Sanmatitarka* 343–45 and thus averted occasions of conflict between them. The difference between the approaches of Siddhasena and Jinabhadra is evident though both were great thinkers and dialecticians in their own way.

The depth which Indian philosophy attained within a span of two to four centuries and the development of the logical and philosophical discipline in the Jaina tradition account for the difference in the style and method of treatment of Kundakunda and Umāsvāti on the one hand and Siddhasena, Jinabhadra and Samantabhadra on the other. With the latter it became almost a fixed pattern to give a logical and systematic statement of one's own doctrines and strengthen and corroborate it by arguing out a case against rival views. By the time of Samantabhadra, dialectical criticism became current in philosophical writings. In the *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā*, Samantabhadra gives reasons why the Jina is an *Āpta* (authority) as against others whose statements and nature bear no sign of their being *āpta*. The *Mīmāṃsakas* regarded the *Veda* as authoritative because it is beginningless and not composed by any person. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and others believe that the *Veda* is created by the Supreme Person—omniscient God—and therefore it is authoritative. The third view was that any scriptural text should be regarded as authoritative if it came from an *āpta*—a person as authoritative as God—Kapila,

Buddha, Mahāvīra and the like. We do not know who was originally responsible for this view, but we can say with confidence that the greatest contribution and support to this view came from the followers of Buddha and Mahāvīra. *Sanmati* of Siddhasena and *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra have been specially composed to clarify and demonstrate the nature and teachings of such an omniscient *āpta*. While giving this exposition, Samantabhadra always has in view an opponent who holds a brief for someone else whom he considers to be an *āpta* or who does not recognise any *āpta*. In the course of this discussion, Samantabhadra refutes the views dogmatically upholding non-duality, duality or plurality (24ff), absolute eternity or momentariness (37ff), consciousness alone as ultimately real, or external objects alone as real (79ff) and the like extreme views in order to show the importance and superiority of Anekāntavāda or the non-absolutistic standpoint. The *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra is thus dialectical in character and this has been fully brought out by Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda in their *Aṣṭaśaṭi* and *Aṣṭasaḥasrī* respectively.

Akalaṅka has written a number of works—*Aṣṭaśaṭi*, *Nyāyaviniścaya*, *Siddhiviniścaya*, etc. in which he has precisely formulated and established Jaina logic by criticising the definitions of *pramāṇas*, etc. given by logicians of other schools and also by assimilating acceptable elements of those schools. Akalaṅka is well known for his criticism of Dharmakīrti besides others, and refutation of his theories.⁶⁸ Vidyānanda carried on this task in his works which bear witness to his great scholarship and rational outlook. He was a worthy commentator of Akalaṅka and elucidated a number of points in the light of other schools of thought. We may here mention by the way that the subject which benefited most as a result of dialectical criticism was logic, in which great development is noticed in the period between the fourth century (after Vasubandhu, Vātsyāyana and even Dinnāga) and tenth century (Praśastapāda; Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara; Kumārila; Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, Udayana, Jayanta, Bhāsarvajña; Siddhasena,

Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda and others).⁶⁹ This helped the development of dialectical thought in philosophical literature. Gradually it became a practice with Jaina writers to refute rival views while giving an exposition of their logic and philosophy. We find this fully illustrated in the works of Vidyānanda, Hari-bhadra, Pūjyapāda, Abhayadeva, Prabhācandra, Vādi Devasūri and Hemacandra, to mention but a few, some of whose works (e.g. *Syādvādaratnākara* of Vādi Devasūri, a commentary on his own *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra*; Abhayadevasūri's commentary *Tattvabodhavidhāyini* on Siddhasena's *Sanmatitarka* and Prabhācandra's commentary *Nyāyakumudacandra* on Akalaṅka's *Laghyastraya*) have assumed an encyclopaedic character from the point of view of both volume and content. In these works the opponent's view is analysed by putting forth all possible alternative interpretations of it and then all these are repudiated and thus the hollowness of the view is exposed. The influence of the dialectical mode of the Mādhyamikas and of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa is quite evident here.

We need not proceed further. The practice of dialectical criticism can be said to have come into vogue in Jaina philosophical literature with Siddhasena and Jinabhadra, markedly the latter, though Kundakunda indulged in occasional refutation, especially of the extreme views in respect of certain problems. The task before Siddhasena and Jinabhadra was to give a rational interpretation of the Jaina *Āgamas* and to defend Jaina tenets against adverse criticism as also to criticise the views of other schools and establish the doctrines of the Jaina school of thought. Later thinkers and writers carried this task ahead to the benefit of all the parties involved in the controversies and of dialectical criticism. Siddhasena criticises only broad points of rival thought whenever necessary but there is hardly any attempt to go into the niceties of refutation and to explain away likely objections against minor points. This is true of Samantabhadra also. None of these gives as fine and detailed a critique as Dharmakīrti or Kumārila or Uddyotakara. Probably it was not necessary for them

to do so, though the element of criticism present in their works is brought out by their commentators. However, Jinabhadra showed great acumen in dialectical criticism. That his *gāthās* are in Prakrit redound to his credit as the precise philosophical style had not developed in Prakrit except in the rare case of Kundakunda. Jinabhadra can be said to be the first real Jaina '*malla*' in the arena of dialectics. So systematic and pointed are his arguments that all later dialecticians like Haribhadra, and even Yaśovijaya (seventeenth century), who was an extraordinary student of Navya Nyāya, utilise them, the latter fashioning them in the dialectical mode of the Navya Naiyāyikas. This gave a great impetus to all later Jaina dialecticians whose writings are at par with those of the Brahmanical and the Buddhist dialecticians with this added qualification that the Jaina writers state the *pūrvapakṣa* at great length and very faithfully too, mostly even using the very words of the great writers they are attempting to criticise, so that it is at times possible to obtain many pages of lost works, especially of the Buddhist writers. For instance, Muni Śrī Jambūvijayaḥ has thrown considerable light on the history of the Vaiśeṣika system and Buddhist logic with the help of references from the *Dvādaśāranayacakra* of Ācārya Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa which he has edited.⁷⁰ Other examples of such commentaries are the *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* of Abhayadeva on *Sanmati*, *Nyāyakumudacandra* of Prabhācandra, the *Syādvādaratnākara* of Vādi Devasūri and even the *Aṣṭasahasrī* of Vidyānanda.

After about the tenth century and notably after Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya (thirteenth century) a novel technique was introduced in dialectical criticism. Definitions came to be examined by anticipating all possible objections based on vagueness or lack of precision in expression leading to the faults of the definition being too wide or too narrow and the like. The Navya-Naiyāyikas were mainly responsible for this methodology, and the adherents of all the schools of thought

later employed the technique of the Navya Naiyāyikas, so it is necessary to examine in a somewhat detailed manner the methodology of Navya-Nyāya.

NOTES

- 1 See Gāyatrī Ākhyāyikā, *Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa*, 8.4. Ait. Br. 3.3.25 ff; Ait. Br. 3.1.9 where terms like *praiṣa*, *puroruk*, *vedi*, *nivid*, *graha* are explained.
- 2 Ahīyata Kalyāṇaḥ, anṛtaṁ hi so'vadit, sa eṣa śvitraḥ.—*Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa*, 12.11; yasmāt so'nṛtaṁ vitathaṁ avadat tasmād ahīyata, sa eṣo'satyavādī śvitraḥ śvetakuṣṭhi dīśyate.—Sāyaṇa's comm. on the above.
- 3 Te devā abruvan eṣa vāva pitā yo mantrakṛd iti.— *Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa*, 13.3.
- 4 Ardhoḥaivā eṣa ātmano yaj jāyā, tasmād yavaj jāyām na vindate naiva tāvat prajāyate'sarvo hi tāvad bhavaty atha yadaiva jāyām vindate'tha prajāyate tarhi sa sarvo bhavati.—Śata. Br. 5.2.1.10.
- 5 Sa vā eṣa na kadācanāstam eti nodeti, taṁ yad astam etīti manyante'hna eva tadantam itvā'thā'tmānam viparyasyate rātrīm evā'vastāt kurute'haḥ parastāt, atha yad enaṁ prātar udetīti manyante rātrir eva tadantam itvā'thā'tmānam viparyasyate'har evā'vastāt kurute rātrīm parastāt, sa vā eṣa na kadācana nimrocati.—Ait. Br. 3.4.44.
- 6 We find different views on the same point referred to in the Ait. Br. 3.5.47 (in connection with the *devikā* oblations). In Ait. Br. 7.4.25, a question is raised as to how the initiation (*dikṣā*) which in the case of a Brāhmaṇa is announced by the formula 'The Brāhmaṇa is initiated', should be promulgated in the case of the sacrificer being a kṣatriya.
- 7 See A.B. Dhruva's Paper on 'Trividham Anumānam'—First All India Oriental Conference, 1919, Poona.
- 8 Bṛh. Up. 3.8; 2.1; 4.1-3; Ch. Up. 5,6,7, etc.
- 9 See also *Īśā*, 4; *Kena Up.* 1.3 ff; 2.1 ff, *Kaṭha Up.* 2.3.12, etc.
- 10 See the dialogue of Buddha and Upāli on the question whether the sins of the mind are the heaviest as Buddha teaches, or the sins of the body as the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.
- 11 See Vāseṭṭha Sutta, Soṇadaṇḍa Sutta (*Dīgha Nikāya*).

- 12 See 'The Central Philosophy of Buddhism', pp. 47 ff. T.R.V. Murti.
- 13 Compare Kaṣībhāradvāja Sutta in the *Sutta Piṭaka* where Kaṣībhāradvāja reproaches Buddha with idleness. This shows that even in those days people were alert as to the hypocrisy prevailing amongst certain mendicants.
- 14 Vide Brahmajālasutta etc.; *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1.12; 2.1. etc.
- 15 See *Lokāyatam, Dictionary of the Pāli Language*—R.C. Childers. This is significant especially as an interpretation of Lokāyata. The Lokāyatikas were reputed as extreme rationalists and this also accounts for Jayarāsi being an adherent of the Lokāyata school, though he does not recognise any of the elements generally accepted by Lokāyatikas or Cārvākas. A section of them were extremely sceptical in their views.
- 16 See Sāmaññaphala Sutta, 21; Brahmajāla Sutta, 65 (*Digha-Nikāya*).
- 17 Brahmajāla Sutta, 65 (*Digha Nikāya*, 1).
- 18 In a dialogue between King Pasenadi and the nun Khemā (in the *Samyutta Nikāya*), the king puts his questions about the existence or the non-existence of the Tathāgata after death in the same formulas as Sañjaya is made to employ in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta.
- 19 *Jaina Sūtras*, Part II, Introduction, p.xxviii—Jacobi—SBE Vol. XLV.
- 20 *Jaina Sūtras*, Part II, Introduction, p. xxvii—SBE Vol. XLV.
- 21 Bhandarkar, *Report* for 1883-4, pp. 95 ff as cited in *Jaina Sūtras*, Part II, Introduction, p. xxviii, SBE Vol. XLV.
- 22 Hermann Jacobi has discussed at length the influence of Makkhali Gosāla on the religious and philosophical views of Mahāvīra and the moral code he laid down, especially where he differed from Pārśva. See *Jaina Sūtras*, Part II, Introduction, pp. xxix ff—SBE vol. XLV.
- 23 See 'The Great Epic of India', Ch. 3, pp. 83-190—E.W. Hopkins, 1920; also *Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa*, 108 for Cārvāka arguments.
- 24 *Āśvamedhika Parva*, 48 refers to a number of views that were prevalent in that period. The people were consequently almost perplexed as to the right view to be adopted. Hence the need for teachings like those of the *Bhugavad Gītā* and the like, especially to strengthen the Vedic faith. *Evaṃ vyutthāpīte dharme bahudhā vipradhāvati; niścayaṃ nādhigacchāmaḥ samnūdhāḥ surasattama.* 14.48.25.
- 25 Bhavanti sudurāvartā hetumanto'pi paṇḍitāḥ;
dṛḍhapūrve smṛtā mūḍhā naitad astīti vādināḥ.
amṛtasyāvamantāro vaktāro jana-saṃsadi;
caranti vasudhām kṛtsnām vāvadūkāḥ bahuśrutāḥ.

- 26 'Tatropanīśadam tāta pariśesaṁ tu pārthiva;
mathnāmi manasā tātu dṛṣṭvā cā'nvīksikīm parām.'
—MBH as quoted by Viśvanātha in his *Nyāya-īrti*, 1.1.1.
- 27 Cittāntaradr̥ṣye buddhi-buddher atiprasaṅgah smṛtisāṅkaraś ca.—*Yoga-sūtra* 4.21. It may be noted that the Buddhist *citta* is sentient, whereas the *buddhi* of Sāṅkhya-Yoga is insentient, and hence there is the need for an additional *puruṣa* (sentient principle) in the latter. This has been lost sight of here.
- 28 For details see *Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtra* 2.1 46-49 and *Śābara-bhāṣya* on it; also Translation by Gaṅgānātha Jhā (GOS).
- 29 The following ācāryas are mentioned in the *Brahma-sūtra*:—Ātreya (3.4.44); Āśmarathya (1.2.29, 1 4.20), Audulomi (1 4.21, 3.4.45; 4.4.6); Kārṣṇājini (3.1.9); Kāśakṛtsna (1.4 22), Jaimini (1 2.28,31); Bādari (1.2.20); Bādarāyana (1 3 26.33).
- 30 The *sūtra* 'Na, *pradīpa-prakāśa-siddhiyat tat-siddheḥ*'. (2.1.19) is a bit confusing. It seems to mean that the *pramāṇas* are self-luminous. Perhaps this was the original view which was later given up when problems regarding *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* (intrinsic validity) and *parataḥ prāmāṇya* (extrinsic validity) came up for discussion and were decided in favour of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya* in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school as against *svataḥ prāmāṇya* accepted by the Mīmāṃsā and other schools.
- 31 'Kvacin nivṛttidarśanād anivṛttidarśanāc ca kvacid anekāntaḥ' is found as sū. 20 (2.1.20) in certain editions.
- 32 It is surprising that the *Nyāya-sūtra* refutes this view when the Nyāya school itself regards God as the creator of the world. Does this mean that there was no place for God originally in the Nyāya system? The commentators have tried to justify this refutation in different ways—God is not the constituent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) of the world; God does not create the world independently of the *karman* of living beings and so on.
- 33 Trividhā cā'sya śāstrasya pravṛttih—uddeśo lakṣaṇaṁ parīkṣā ceti. tatra nāmadheyena padārthamātrasyā'bhīdhānam ūddeśaḥ, tatroddiṣṭasya tattva-vyavacchedako dharmo lakṣaṇaṁ; lakṣitasya yathā lakṣaṇam upapadyate na veti pramāṇair avadhānaṁ parīkṣā.—NB, *Introductory to NS*. 1.1.3.
- 34 Duhkhatrayābhigātāj jijnāsā tad-apaghātake hetau;
dṛṣṭe sā'pārthā cen naikāntātyantato'bhāvāt.—SK, 1.
- 35 Ūhah śabda'dhyayanam duhkha-vighātās trayah suhṛt-prāptih;
dānam ca siddhayo'ṣṭau siddheḥ pūrvo'ṅkuṣas trividhaḥ.—SK, 51.

- 36 Visayaś cādhikāri ca sambandhaś ca prayojanam .
vinānubandham granthādaṁ maṅgalaṁ na praśasyate./
- 37 Pratijñā-vākye padayoh pratijñā-hetvoś ca vyāghātād ayuktam, anekasyā'-
śesatā sarva-śabdasyā'rtho bhāva-pratishedhaś cā'bhāvaśabdasyā'rthaḥ.
pūrvam sopākhyam uttaram nirupākhyam, tatra samupākhyāyamānam
katham nirupākhyam abhāvaḥ syād iti. na jātṛ abhāvo nirupākhyo'-
nekhatayā'śesatayā śakyah pratijñātum iti. sarvam etad abhāva iti
cet, yad idaṁ sarvam iti manyase tadabhāva iti? evaṁ cet anivṛtto
vyāghātaḥ, anekam aśesaṁ ceti nābhāvapratyayaena śakyam bhavitum,
asti cāyam pratyayah sarvam iti, tasmān nābhāva iti. pratijñā-hetvoś
ca vyāghātaḥ. sarvam abhāva iti bhāva-pratishedhaḥ pratijñā, bhāveṣu
itaretarābhāvasiddher iti Letuh, bhāveṣv itaretarābhāvam anujñāyā"-
śṛitya cetaretarābhāvasiddhyā sarvam abhāva ity ucyate yadi sarvam
abhāvo bhāveṣv itaretarābhāva-siddher iti nopapadyate. atha bhāveṣv
itaretarābhāva-siddhiḥ, sarvam abhāva iti nopapadyate.-NB. 4.1.37
- 38 Of Kumārila, Stcherbatsky writes in his *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 51 :
"The chief work of Kumārila, the *Ślokavārtika* is an enormous compo-
sition of about 3500 stanzas entirely filled with a polemic against
Buddhism The information to be gathered from this work about the
teachings of Buddhist logicians is, however, scanty and very often
unclear. The author is an ardent controversialist and cares much more
for brilliant repartees and witty retorts than for impartial quotation
of his enemy's opinions. His commentator Pārthasārathi Miśra very
often fills up the gaps. He is also the author of an independent treatise,
Śāstradīpikā devoted mainly to the refutation of Buddhism."
- This is true to some extent of Uddyotakara and even the great
Śaṅkarācārya, but this probably reflects the urgency of the time to
defend the Brāhmaṇical faith and philosophy and to stem the tide of
the popularity and superior intellectual attacks of the Buddhists.
This polemical upsurge was, it seems, very powerful in the southern
part of India.
- 39 See *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, Ch. 2, 7 (Kyoto, Otani University Press, 1956);
also Translation by D. T. Suzuki (George Routledge and Sons, London,
1932),
- 40 *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, Ch. 2, p. 87ff. In the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* we have
an argument that air, space, etc. must be real entities, because we
have names for these. The *Vaiśeṣikāśyaka Bhāṣya* contends that words
which are not compounded and which can be grammatically explained
invariably denote a real entity (see *Vaiśeṣikāśyaka bhāṣya*, Ganadharavāda,
Gā. 1575).

- 41 *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, Ch. 2, p. 111,
- 42 Tathāgataḥ arhantaḥ samyak-sambuddhāḥ uttrāsapaḍa-vivarjanārtham sattvānāṃ na vyākurvanti, avyākṛtāṇy api ca Mahāmate tīrthakaradṛṣṭi-vādavyudāsārtham nopadiśyante tathāgataiḥ. tīrthakaraḥ hi Mahāmate evam vādinō yad uta sa jīvas tac charīraṃ anyo jivo'nyac charīraṃ ity evamādye'-vyākṛtavādaḥ. tīrthakaraṇāṃ hi Mahāmate kāraṇa-visammūḍhānāṃ avyākṛtaṃ na tu mat-pravacane, mat-pravacane tu Mahāmate grāhya grāhaka-visamyukte yikalpo na pravartate, teṣāṃ kathanī sthāpyaṃ bhavet. ye tu Mahāmate grāhya-grāhakaḥ bhiniṇiṣāḥ svacittadṛśyamātrā'-navadhāritamatayas teṣāṃ sthāpyaṃ bhavati. caturvidha-padapraśna-vyākaraṇena Mahāmate tathāgataḥ arhantaḥ samyak-sambuddhāḥ sattvebhyo dharmāṃ deśayanti. sthāpaniyam iti Mahāmate kalāntaradeśanaiśāmayā kṛtā'paripakvendriyāṇāṃ na tu paripakvendriyāṇāṃ sthāpyaṃ bhavati.—*Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, Ch. 2, pp. 114-115
- 43 Caturvidham vyākaraṇam ekāṃśam pariṣcchanam;
vibhajyam sthāpaniyam ca tīrthavādanivāraṇam.
sadasato hy anutpādaḥ Sāṃkhya-Vaiśeṣikāiḥ smṛtaḥ;
avyākṛtāni sarvāṇi tair eva hi prakāśitā.
buddhyā vivecyamānānāṃ svabhāvo nā'vadhāryate;
tasmād anabhilāpyās te niḥsvabhāvas ca deśitāḥ.
—*Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, p. 116 (vv. 173-175).
- 44 See *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, pp. 173 ff.
- 45 *Ibid.*, pp. 185-186
- 46 *Ibid.*, pp. 204ff.
- 47 Jalpa-prapañcābhiratā hi bālās tattve nā kurvanti matim viśālāṃ;
Jalpo hi traidhātukaduḥkhaṇiṣṭhāṇi tattvaṃ hi duḥkhasya vināśahetuḥ.
—*Ibid.*, p. 186 (v. 73).
- 48 MK, seventh chapter.
- 49 *Catuhśataka* 8.7.
- 50 Sad asat sadasac ceti sadasan neti ca kramah;
eṣa prayojyo vidvadbhir ekatvādiṣu nityaśaḥ. —*Ibid.*, 14.21
- 51 Pratītya sambhavo yasya sa svatanthro na jāyate;
na svatantram idaṃ sarvaṃ svayaṃ tena na vidyate. —*Ibid.*, 14.32.
- 52 sad asat sadasac ceti yasya pakṣo na vidyate;
upalambhaś cireṇāpi tasya vaktum na śakyate. —*Ibid.*, 15.25.
- 53 See Appendix 7, *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* of Kanāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda—Muni Śrī Jambūvijayaḥ—GOS 1961.

- 54 For details see *Buddhist Logic*, Vol I, pp. 327-340—Th. Stcherbatsky.
- 55 *Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, Introduction, p. 71—P. S. Jaini (K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1959).
- 56 See *Abhidharmadīpa*, pp. 81-83, text and footnotes; also Introduction, pp. 83 ff.
- 57 I could examine only *Abhidharmakośa* edited by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana and *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* of Yaśomitra 1-3, edited by Narendra Nath Law. Prof. Jaini's introduction and foot-notes have been very helpful in writing this brief account as he has consulted the press copy of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu edited by Prof. Prahlād Pradhan and has noted the places where Vimalamitra has condemned Vasubandhu for the Sautrāntika and even Mahāyāna leanings shown by him in his *Bhāṣya*. Prof. Jaini has also written a section on 'Some Major Controversies between the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra' (Introduction, pp. 69ff).
- 58 See Introduction, pp. xv ff to *Aṭṭhasālini*—P. V. Bapat and R. D. Vadekar (Bhandarkar Oriental Series, 1942).
- 59 See the controversy pertaining to *Kathāvatthu* (1.5.9), *Abhidhamma* (1.70 ff), *jaratā* and *aniccatā* (4.114 ff); *middhassa rūparūpakathā* (5.80ff).
- 60 Tava vāde soḷasa saccāni āpajjanti, tvam buddhehi pi adiṭṭham passasi, bhusaccako nāma tvam.—*Aṭṭhasālini*, 3.531. 'Gaccha vighāsādo hutvā jīvissassīti.—*Ibid.*, 1.72
- 61 Asadabhidhānam aṇṭam.—*Tattvārthasūtra* 7 14; asad iti sadbhāva-pratiṣedho'rthāntaram garhā ca. tatra sadbhāva-pratiṣedho nāma bhūtanīhnavāḥ abhūtodbhāvanam ca; tad yathā nāsty ātmā nāsti paraloka ityādiḥ bhūtanīhnavāḥ; śyāmāka-taṇḍulamātro'yam ātmā, aṅguṣṭha-parvamātro'yam ātmā, ādityavarṇaḥ, niṣkriya ity evamādy abhūtodbhāvanam. arthāntaram yo gām bravīty aśvam aśvam cā gaur iti. garheti hīmsā-pāruṣya-paiśunya-diyuktam vacaḥ satyam api garhitam eva bhavati.—Commentary.
- 62 See *Pravacanasāra* 1.51; *Niyamasāra*, 159.
- 63 See *Pañcāstikāya*, 10; *Tattvārthasūtra* 5.38.
- 64 See NyA, 4 ff.
- 65 See ViB, 95.

- 66 For details see *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā*, Notes (in Hindi), p. 19 ff—Pt. Sukhlal Sanghavi and *Nyāyavatāra-Vārttika-Vṛtti*, Introduction, pp. 144-145—Pt. Dalsukh Malavania.
- 67 See V1B, *Gāthās* 1145 ff; 1425ff,
- 68 See *Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka—A Criticism of the Former by the Latter*—N. J. Shah (L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad).
- 69 For details see *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā*, Notes (in Hindi) pp. 5ff, 11ff, 16ff, 19ff, 50ff etc.—Pt. Sukhlal Sanghavi.
- 70 See Appendix 6, *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* of Kaṇāda with the commentary of Candrānanda (GOS, 1961).
-

CHAPTER 16

METHODOLOGY OF NAVYA-NYĀYA

In the history of the development of the Nyāya system, three stages are discernible. The first comprises the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, the *Vārttika* of Uddyotakara and the *Tātparyāṅkā* of Vācaspati besides the works of Bhāsarvajña and Jayanta. Udayanācārya who wrote the *Parīśuddhi* on the *Tātparyāṅkā* of Vācaspati Miśra forms so to say a link between the 'Prācīna' (old) Nyāya and the later developments. The second can be said to be the stage when an attempt was made to evolve a syncretic philosophy out of the tenets of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools. Śivāditya, Bhāsarvajña and even Udayana can be said to be the pioneers of syncretism. The third stage culminating in the Navya-Nyāya has its main inspiration from Gaṅgeśa (thirteenth century) though Udayana also can be looked upon as one of the early harbingers of the new school of Nyāya. These are not three clear-cut divisions of the history of the Nyāya system. One roughly overlaps on the other and even extends far into it. Or, one may say that there was the stage of the propounding and the dialectical examination and even advancement within the precincts of the system itself, and the other was the stage when the Nyāya system received a thorough re-examination from all the then-conceivable points of view and it was attempted to carefully syncretise it with the Vaiśeṣika system and to bring precision and subtlety to the definitions and assertions of the Nyāya school as also mainly concentrate on epistemological problems.

Udayana (tenth century), as said above, can be looked upon as the pioneer of the new school of Nyāya, and Gaṅgeśa (thirteenth century) is very much indebted to him. But, as Prof. Saikari Mookerjee says, "The greatest achievement of

Gaṅgeśa consists in the marshalling of the arguments of all previous writers in his work with an accuracy and ingenuity which evoke spontaneous admiration".¹ Gaṅgeśa's main contribution consists in a newness of style and an originality in method. He is far more precise and careful in defining his terms than his predecessors, and although the Navya-Naiyāyikas have continued to improve their techniques almost down to the present times, the boundaries of their subject-matter are set by the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa and by the commentaries of his son Vardhamāna. Some new ground was broken by Ragnunātha Śiromaṇi (1475-1550 A.D.), an original thinker of the Navya-Nyāya school, who revolutionised the concept of the ontological categories of the Nyāya school. It may however be observed that between the time of Udayana and that of Gaṅgeśa there were a number of logicians who were concerned with giving, in a novel and precise fashion, definitions, especially those of *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) as can be seen from the definitions of *vyāpti* that have been critically examined and rejected by Gaṅgeśa. Their efforts paved the way to the New Logic and it was in this period, as seen above, that the Mahāvidyā syllogisms came to be invented, propounded and criticised.

Those not ushered into the inner recesses of Navya-Nyāya complain of the undue waste of skill and ingenuity on the elaborate structure of definitions and the attention devoted to the consideration of linguistic problems. Though verbal accuracy may seem to some to have been pushed too far when the definitions seem to be more of the nature of a mathematical formula, yet the results on the whole have proved to be wholesome. "The room for misunderstanding due to careless expression has been narrowed down to the minimum extent and a course of discipline in Nyāya is a sure propaedeutic for philosophical accuracy."¹ It is not surprising therefore that the scholarship of a student of the philosophy of any school of thought was looked at askance unless he produced proof of his acquaintance with Navya-Nyāya methods. As

the importance of precise definitions is being realised in Modern European philosophy owing to the attacks of the Neo-Realists of Europe and America, the Navya-Nyāya method is coming to be more and more appreciated by modern scholars. The Navya-Nyāya invented a wonderful complex system of what Prof. Ingalls calls 'clichés' by which it expresses a great deal that we could never think of expressing without symbols.² These clichés are of great value as logical instruments of the language of intellectual discourse. It is true that the style of the later Navya-Naiyāyikas is as formidable as one could imagine. Jagadīśa and Gadādhara (seventeenth century) formulate their system almost entirely by means of technical terms and their sentences contain long compounds, one such compound even extending over a full page of writing. But even here we must appreciate the Navya-Naiyāyika's groping for a methodology which would lead to greater clarity, lack of ambiguity, accuracy and consistency. The Navya-Naiyāyika does not want to leave any loop-hole in his definitions which would on that account be liable to be misunderstood or deliberately misinterpreted and become subject to criticism. If it is true that the establishing of knowables or categories rests on correct and proper definitions (cf. '*sallakṣaṇa-nibandhanā prameya-vyavasthitiḥ*') then one cannot find fault with the Navya-Naiyāyika for concentrating on the preciseness of his definitions.

In order to understand the technique of Navya-Nyāya, we shall initially consider briefly how the definitions of early Nyāya writers were likely to be vague and to be wrongly interpreted and found fault with, and consider how Neo-logic tried to rectify and strengthen these definitions and consequently their position.

Navya-Nyāya, in order to bring precision to its definition and to the expression of the relation between the *sādhya* (probandum) and the *hetu* (probans) in an inference has attempted to specify its terms and relations by devising a technical terminology for the purpose. An entity, for instance, becomes a *sādhya* or a *hetu* by being connected with other entities, and it is

necessary to specify these connections. The knowledge that a *sādhya* stands in the relation of contact (*saṃyoga*) is quite different from the knowledge that the *sādhya* stands in the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). The *sādhya* fire may be in the relation of contact (*saṃyoga*) with a mountain or kitchen, but it is not connected with these by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). (*Samyoga-sambandhena vahnimān parvataḥ na tu samavāya-sambandhena*, or *parvataḥ saṃyogatvāvachchinna-sambandhena vahnimān, na tu samavāyatvāvachhinna-sambandhena*). The connection is not any connection, it is a particular one—of the type of *saṃyoga* (contact) in the present case, and not any other. It is therefore said to be limited or determined (*avacchinna*) by the *avacchedaka* (limitor or determinant) *saṃyogatva* (contactness). This may also be expressed by saying '*Vahnimān dhūmād ity atra dhūma-niṣṭha-hetutāyāḥ saṃyoga-sambandhāvacchinnatvam*' (the *hetutā* in smoke is limited by contact) or '*dhūmaḥ saṃyoga-sambandhenaiva vahnivyāpyaḥ*' (smoke is pervaded by fire by the relation of contact only). Hence the statement '*Parvato vahnimān dhūmāt* (Mountain possesses fire because it possesses smoke) is an ambiguous expression of an inference where smoke is *hetu* and fire is *sādhya*. If 'It possesses smoke' is interpreted to mean 'It possesses smoke by inherence', the inference will be false for smoke resides by inherence only in atoms of smoke, and these are not loci of fire. The inference will be correct only if 'It possesses smoke' means 'It possesses smoke by contact'. The relation has therefore to be specified as above. In the same way, the *sādhya* fire, if the inference is to be valid, must be determined by contact ('*vahni-niṣṭha-sādhya-tāyāḥ saṃyoga-sambandhāvacchinnatvam*' or '*vahniḥ saṃyoga-sambandhena dhūma-vyāpakāḥ*'. Therefore, when *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) is defined as '*sādhya-avad-anyasminnasambandhaḥ*', 'absence of relation (of the *hetu*, reason) with anything other than what has the thing to be inferred', the absence of the *hetu* in objects other than those having the thing to be inferred is to be understood in respect of the relation that the *hetu* bears to the subject

(*pakṣa*), e.g. contact in the case of smoke as residing in mountain and leading to the inference of fire. Hence though smoke is present by the relation of inherence in its parts, which are objects other than those having the thing to be inferred (viz fire), the definition is not faulty, because smoke is not present there by the relation of *saṁyoga*, but by the relation of *samavāya*.³

Specific relations are important, as seen above, in the expression of *vyāpti* and *anumāna*. They are also important in speaking of superstratum (*ādheya*) and substratum (*ādihāra*). Thus when a jar is in contact with ground or when a jar inheres in its halves (*kapāla*), it can be said that an *ādheyatā* (superstratumness) limited by *ghaṭatva* (jariness) resides in jar (*ghaṭaniṣṭhādheyatāyāḥ ghaṭatvāvacchinnatvam*). But there is nevertheless a difference between the two *ādheyatās*. There resides in the first case, in jar an *ādheyatā* limited by contact and jariness, and in the second an *ādheyatā* limited by inherence and jariness (*ghaṭaniṣṭhādheyatāyāḥ saṁyogāvachinna-ghaṭatvāvacchinnatvam*; *ghaṭaniṣṭhādheyatāyāḥ samavāyāvacchinnatvāvacchinnatvam*). As a general principle it may be said that "a relational abstract residing in an entity may always be termed limited by the specific relation in which that entity as a locus of the said abstract occurs"⁴

An abstract determinantness or limitorness (*avacchedakatā*) can also be conceived, and the *avacchedakatā* will also be determined. For example, in the inference 'It possesses fire because it possesses smoke', the *avacchedaka* of the *sādhyatā* in fire is fireness, and there resides in this fireness an *avacchedakatā* itself determined by firenessness and inherence (*vahniṭvasya vahni-niṣṭha-sādhyatāvacchedakatā*; *vahniṭvaniṣṭhāvacchedakatāyāś ca samavāya-sambandhāvacchinnatvāvacchinnatvam*).

This method of specifying relations by *avacchedakas* has proved very useful to the Navya-Naiyāyikas in bringing precision to definitions and the statement of inferences. Another such device is that of expressing by means of the technical

terms *nirūpita* (described) and *nirūpaka* (describer). To take an instance, if we speak of a thing being a locus, this is vague unless it is specified of what other thing it is the locus; in the technical language of Navya-Nyāya, the locusness has to be described by the superstratum. The Navya-Naiyāyika would analyse the situation 'A mountain is the locus of fire' by saying 'The locusness resident in mountain is described by fire' (*parvataniṣṭhādhikaraṇatā sā vahni-nirūpitā*). He may also say that the locusness is described by fireness (*vahnitva-nirūpitā*). Fire or fireness may here be called the describer (*nirūpaka*) of the locusness in mountain. [The abstract (e.g. fireness) is used in place of the simple (e.g. fire) generally, in order to refer to several instances. For instance, where mountain, kitchen, quadrangular place are each a locus of a different fire, the locusness of all three would be said to be described by fireness rather than by a fire.] The above mentioned situation can also be analysed by saying that the locusness in mountain is described by the superstratumness in fire (*parvatanisṭhādhikaraṇatā sā vahniniṣṭhādheyatā-nirūpitā*) for wherever a locusness (*adhikaraṇatā*) appears in knowledge, a superstratumness (*ādheyatā*) is implied. Or if the same situation is differently expressed as 'Fire is a superstratum of mountain', it can be analysed as 'The superstratumness in fire is described by the locusness in mountain' (*vahniniṣṭhādheyatā sā parvata-niṣṭhādhikaraṇatā-nirūpitā*). Most properties that abstract a relation between two terms have a companion abstract with which they are mutually dependent. Examples of such mutually dependent pairs are *viśeṣyatā* (qualificandness) and *viśeṣaṇatā* (qualifierness) *kāraṇatā* (causeness) and *kāryatā* (effectness) *viśayīā* (knowledgeness, subjectness) and *viśayatā* (contentness, objectness), *lakṣaṇatā* (characteristicness) and *lakṣyatā* (characterisedness). For instance, when earth is defined as possessed of smell (*prthvī gandhavatī*), we can say *prthvīniṣṭha-lakṣyatā gandhaniṣṭha lakṣaṇatā-nirūpitā* or *gandha-niṣṭha-lakṣaṇatā prthvīniṣṭha-lakṣyatā-nirūpitā*. These can be further analysed as '*prthvīniṣṭhā sā prthvīvāvacchedena gandhanisṭha-lakṣaṇatā-nirūpita-lakṣyatā*' and '*gandhanisṭhā sā gandhatvāvacchedena*

pr̥thvinīṣṭha-lakṣyatā-nirūpita-lakṣaṇatā, or '*pr̥thvītvam gandha-niṣṭha-lakṣaṇatā-nirūpita-lakṣyatāvachedakam*' and '*gandha-tvam pr̥thvinīṣṭha-lakṣyatā-nirūpita-lakṣaṇatāvachedakam*', It may be noted that 'described by' expresses a reversible relation only when it is used between two relational abstracts. But one cannot reverse '*parvata-niṣṭhādhikaraṇatā sū vahni-nirūpitā*' (The locusness resident in mountain is described by fire) and say *vahnitvam parvataniṣṭhādhikaraṇatā-nirūpitam* (Fireness or one may even say fire is described by the locusness in mountain), since fireness is not a relation. It may also be observed that the reversible relation cannot be expressed even where the second term is bound to the first. e.g X is the *pratiyogin*(counterpositive)of absence of X—counterpositiveness abstracts a relation between X and absence of X, and not between X and Y as in the case of the reversible relations. Counterpositiveness is described by its absence—(*vahniniṣṭha-pratiyogitā sū vahnityantābhāva-nirūpitā*). Here 'is described by' does not express a reversible relation for absence is not a relational abstract. When one wishes to specify with reference to a number of negations that the counterpositiveness to no one of these is described by mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*), that is to say, when all are cases of *atyantābhāva*, one may speak of counterpositiveness described by constant-absenceness (*atyantābhāvatā*). One may similarly speak of counterpositiveness described by mutual-absenceness (*anyonyābhāvatā*) when one wants to specify with regard to a number of negations that the counterpositiveness to no one of these is described by a constant absence (*atyantābhāva*) or that all are cases of *anyonyābhāva*. An absence the counter-positiveness to which is determined by a generic character common to several entities is termed a generic absence (*sāmānyābhāva*) as opposed to a specific absence (*viśeṣābhāva*). Generic absences can negate all particulars of a given class. For instance, '*Hradaḥ saṃyoga-sambandhāvacchinna-vahnitvāvacchinna – pratiyogitā – nirūpaka-vahnityantābhāvavān*' (A lake is a locus of constant-absence of fire which describes the counter-positiveness determined

by fireness and contact). When an absence is determined (*avacchinna*) by absenceness and the relation in which the absence stands, it is distinguished from everything which is not an absence. But to distinguish one absence from another a different system of *avaccheda* (determination) is necessary. What distinguishes one absence from another is the difference in that which is negated. So an absence can also be *avacchinna* (determined or limited) by the *avacchedakas* (determinants or limitors) of the counterpositiveness described by it. For instance, *guṇādaṁ sattādeḥ saṁyogasambandhāvacchinābhāvaḥ* [there is an absence, limited by the relation of contact, of existence, (*sattā*) etc. in quality, etc.]. Here the relation of contact is denied of the counterpositive, existence; that is to say, contact determines the counterpositiveness described by the *abhāva* (denial); but in the above expression it is said to be an *avacchedaka* of the *abhāva* also. Another such example is: *sādhyatāvacchedaka-sambandhāvacchinna-sādhyābhāva*—absence of the *sādhyā*, which absence is determined by the relation determining the *sādhyatā*. (See *Vyāptipāñcaka-rahasya* 96-3-5, 51.5-Materials.....pp. 138, 109).

Both a locusness and an absence may be determined by the *avacchedakas* of other entities, viz., of *ādheyatā* or *vṛttitva* (superstratumness or occurrentness) and of *pratiyogitā* (counterpositiveness) respectively. As a result of this, a piece of knowledge may be expressed as (a) *saṁyoga-sambandhāvacchinna-vahnitvāvacchinnādhikaraṇatā* (locusness determined by fireness and contact) or (b) *saṁyoga-sambandhāvacchinna-vahnitvāvacchinnādheyatā-nirūpitādhikaraṇatā* (locusness described by a superstratumness determined by fireness and contact). Here (b) is a gloss of (a) and is called the *paryavasāya*, extraction or *paryavasitārtha*, extracted meaning of (a). Thus (b) extracts and actually expresses an entity *ādheyatā*, superstratumness that is only implicit in (a). Similarly in the expressions: (c) *sādhyatāvacchedaka-sambandhāvacchinnābhāvaḥ* (absence limited by the limiting relation of the *sādhyatā*) and (d) *sādhyatāvacchedaka-sambandhāvacchinna-pratiyogitā*—

nirūpakābhāvaḥ (an absence **describing** a counterpositiveness determined by the limiting relation of the *sādhya*), (d) is the extraction of (c).

It may be observed that *avacchedakas* are mainly of two types--resident limitors (*niṣṭhatva-sambandhena avacchedaka*) and describer-limitors (*nirūpitatva-sambandhena avacchedaka*). For instance, when we say ' *dhūmatvāvacchinna-dhūmaniṣṭhā-dheyatā-nirūpitādhikaraṇatāvān parvataḥ* ', *dhūmatva* is a resident limitor of *dhūmaniṣṭhā-ādheyatā*; but this expression can be shortened as '*dhūmatvāvacchinna-dhikaraṇatāvān parvataḥ*' (mountain has locusness described by smokeness) and here *dhūmatva* is a describer limitor of *adhikaraṇatā*. Similarly when we say ' *dhūmatvāvacchinna-pratiyogitā-nirūpako'bhāvaḥ* ', *dhūmatva* is a resident limitor of *pratiyogitā*; but if this is shortened as ' *dhūmatvāvacchinno'bhāvaḥ* ', *dhūmatva* is a describer-limitor. The resident limitor resides in that in which also resides the limited (*avacchinna*) relational abstract, whereas the describer limitor resides in that which describes the limited (*avacchinna*) relational abstract. Thus in the first set of examples both the *avacchedaka dhūmatva* and the *avacchinna ādheyatā* reside in *dhūma*, whereas in the second *dhūmatva* resides in *dhūma* which describes the *adhikaraṇatā* of *parvata*.

We have seen how Navya-Nyāya specifies its relations by describer-described pairs (*nirūpaka-nirūpita*) and limitors (*avacchedaka*). It has many other similar instruments, e.g. *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier), *dharma* (abstract properties). Determinate knowledge (*savikalpa-jñāna*), as is well known, is defined as 'knowledge penetrating the relation between a qualificand (*viśeṣya*, e.g. jar) and a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*, e.g. jariness) (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇayoḥ sambandhāvagāhi jñānam*). Such a knowledge may be expressed simply as ' This is a jar ' (*-ghaṭatva-viśiṣṭaḥ ghaṭaḥ*). A qualificand may have many qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*); for instance, when we say ' the boy is naughty ' (*bālo'yaṁ capalaḥ*) both boyness (*bālatva*) and naughtiness (*capalatā*) are qualifiers of boy. But every *viśeṣya* must have at least one

viśeṣaṇa, the broadest *viśeṣaṇa* of which it is capable. In a knowledge of man, for instance, no matter what other *viśeṣaṇas* man (*nara*) may have he will always have the *viśeṣaṇa* 'manness' (*naratva*). These qualifiers are always either *jāti* (generic characters) or *upādhi* (imposed properties). A qualifier which does not have the necessary requirement of a *jāti*⁵ is an *upādhi*, e.g. Devadattaness (which belongs to nothing else in the world than Devadatta), *ghaṭatvatva*, etc. Devadattatva is said to reside in Devadatta not by the relation of *samavāya* (inherence) but by a *svārūpa-sambandha* (relation peculiar to the pair it connects) or by a *viśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa-sambandha* (particular qualification relation). Where a qualificand has more than one qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), the one expressed in the predicate is distinguished as the *prakāra* (chief qualifier). Thus in the knowledge 'The fair boy is naughty', fairness is simply a *viśeṣaṇa*, whereas naughtiness is a *prakāra*. Where a qualificand has only one qualifier, as in 'This is a man' (manness being the qualifier), the terms qualifier and chief-qualifier are interchangeable (*Naro'yam=naratvaparakārako'yam*). A qualifier or chief qualifier may in turn have other qualifiers.

The terms *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* are most frequently used where the entities expressed by the subject (i.e. the *viśeṣya*) and the predicate (i.e. the *viśeṣaṇa*) are connected by a relation other than *saṁyoga* (contact) or *samavāya* (inherence). Thus in the knowledge '*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*' or '*bhūtale ghaṭābhāvaḥ*' (a jar is not on the ground), *ghaṭābhāva* (absence of jar) is the *viśeṣya*; while in the knowledge '*ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtaḥ*' (the ground possesses absence of jar), ground (*bhūtaḥ*) is the *viśeṣya*. As Ingalls says, the reason why the expressions *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* are used more frequently in these cases is that Nyāya epistemology can explain such a knowledge as 'The jar is not on the ground' only by the absence's nature of being a *viśeṣya* of the ground with which a sense-organ (eye) is in contact. In such a knowledge as '*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*' (jar is on the ground), there is a grammatical use but no epistemological significance of the terms *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* (*Materials.....*, pp. 42-43, F.N, 52).

We have referred to counterpositiveness above. We may consider this concept in a slightly greater detail as many definitions of Navya-Nyāya, especially those of *vyāpti*, are worded in terms of absence and its *pratiyogi* (counterpositive). '*Pratiyogi*' has another significance also. All relations in Nyāya are conceived as present between two terms, one of them being the *pratiyogi* (adjunct) of the relation and the other the *anuyogi* (subjunct). Wherever the relation is such that one term may be said to occur in or on the other, that is to say in all *vṛtti-niyāmaka* (occurrence-exacting) relations, it is the superstratum, unless it be absence, that is termed the *pratiyogi* and the substratum the *anuyogi*. The relations of *samavāya* and *svarūpa-sambandha* are always *vṛtti-niyāmaka*; *saṃyoga* is sometimes *vṛtti-niyāmaka* and sometimes not, as for example the contact between two things standing vertically. The relation of *vyāpti* also is not a *vṛtti-niyāmaka* one, as the *vyāpaka* does not occur in the *vyāpya*; it occurs in the loci of the *vyāpya*. In all non-*vṛtti-niyāmaka* relations it is the qualificand that is termed the *pratiyogi* and the qualifier the *anuyogi*. Thus in 'My right hand is in contact with my left', the right hand is the *pratiyogi*. The terms *pratiyogi* and *anuyogi* are also used of negative knowledge. In the knowledge 'There is constant absence of fire in lake', fire may be called the *pratiyogi* and lake the *anuyogi* of the constant absence (*atyantābhāva*) of fire. We have seen above how counter-positiveness is determined or limited (*avacchinna*).

These are only some of the ways in which relations are specified and the expression of them made precise so that no loop-hole can be found in it. The later Navya-Naiyāyikas anticipated likely objections by rivals to the different definitions formulated by Gaṅgeśa and his immediate followers and attempted to make them more and more precise and unattackable, by their armament of *avacchedakas*, *nirūpakas*, *upādhis* and so on. But the use of these terms when one *avacchedaka* is piled upon another becomes difficult to comprehend.

We may briefly consider the definition of *vyāpti* (pervasion) as given by Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. He first gives five provisional definitions of *vyāpti* (*vyāpti-pañcaka*) and rejects them as they do not apply to a *kevalānvayi anumāna* (purely affirmative inference). Then he gives two other definitions called the *Simhavyāghroktā-vyāpti-lakṣaṇa*, and shows why they are defective. He similarly examines other definitions of *vyāpti* given by previous logicians and rejects them and then finally gives the *siddhānta-lakṣaṇa* acceptable to him. We shall briefly note some of these definitions as they give us some idea of the Navya-Nyāya methodology.⁶

The first definition of the *vyāpti-pañcaka* is :

(i) '*Sādhyaābhāvavad-avṛttitvam*'—non-occurrence (of *hetu*) in the locus of the absence of the *sādhya*. Gaṅgeśa rejects this definition because it does not apply to a valid inference like 'It possesses absence of contact with a monkey, because it is existent' (*kapi-samyogābhāvavān sattvād*—here the *sādhya* is universally present, for it occurs where it does not occur as well as where it does, so one cannot speak of the locus of the absence of *sādhya*). Moreover, however much logicians may try to save the position, it cannot be denied that in the case of contact which is non-occurrence—exacting (*avṛttiniyāmaka*), contact (e.g. of monkey) and absence of contact of monkey can reside in the same locus, so an inference like 'It possesses contact with a monkey because it is this tree' (*kapi-samyogī etad-vṛkṣatvāt*)—where the *hetu* is also co-existent with the absence of *sādhya*—would seem to be rendered invalid by such a definition.

(ii) The second definition is therefore given as '*sādhya-ābhinnā-sādhyaābhāvavad-avṛttitvam*' which requires that the *hetu* must not occur in a locus of absence of *sādhya* which absence occurs in what is different from a locus of *sādhya*. This definition also will not apply to cases where the *sādhya* is universally present and will not apply to a valid inference like 'It possesses absence of the alternation/jariness/contact of

jar and ether, because it is ether (*ghaṭatva-ghaṭākāśasamyogā-nyatarā'bhāvavān gaganatvāt*)—here the *hetu* is correct, as there is in ether *ghaṭākāśa-samyogābhāva* in the area of ether which is not a locus of *ghaṭa*. The definition is at fault since that case of absence of *sādhya* which occurs in what is other than the locus of *sādhya* (i.e. other than the area of ether not in contact with jar) is in the form of contact of jar and ether and occurs in ether, and the *hetu* etherness also occurs in ether. (Absence of *sādhya* here=jarness or contact of jar and ether. An alternation resides where either alternate resides or both reside).

(iii) The third definition given is '*sādhya-*pratiyogikā-nyonyābhāvāsāmānādhikaraṇyam**'—where the *hetu* is required to have a different locus from that of the *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence) whose *pratiyogi* is a locus of the *sādhya*. But even this definition will not apply when the *sādhya* has many loci; e.g. in the inference 'It possesses fire because it possesses smoke (*vahnimān dhūmāt*). The *hetu* occurs in such cases in the loci of *anyonyābhāvas* whose counterpositivenesses are limited by this or that manifestation of a locus of the *sādhya* (—the *hetu* smoke, for instance, occurs in a kitchen which is the locus of the *anyonyābhāva* of mountain which is one of the loci of the *sādhya*, fire).

(iv) The fourth definition attempted is '*sakala-sādhya-bhāvavanniṣṭhābhāva-*pratiyogitvam**' (the *hetu's* being the counter-positive of an absence which resides in all loci of the absence of the *sādhya*). This definition also will not apply to a valid inference such as 'It possesses absence of contact with a monkey, because it is existent (*kapi-samyogābhāvavān sattvāt*), because no unlimited locusness described by absence of *sādhya* i.e. contact with monkey can be found

(v) The fifth definition of the *vyāpti-pañcaka* is *sādhya-vad-anyāvṛttivam* (non-occurrentness of the *hetu* in what is other than the locus of the *sādhya*). This definition too is unacceptable as it does not apply to *kevalānvayi anumāna* where the *sādhya* is universally present.

These definitions are faulty since they do not apply to cases where the *sādhya* is universally positive, that is to say to purely affirmative inferences (*kevalānvyai anumāna*) where the *sādhya* is nowhere absent (e.g. This is nameable, because it is knowable), and so there is no locus of its absence in which the *hetu* also would be absent, and so on.

The *Simha-vyāpti-lakṣaṇa* is—'*sādhyaśāmānādhikaraṇyā-nadhikaraṇatvam*'—the *hetu*'s not being present in a locus which is not also a locus of the *sādhya*. The *Vyāghra-vyāpti-lakṣaṇa* is—'*sādhya-vaiyadhikaraṇyā-nadhikaraṇatvam*'—the *hetu*'s not being present in a locus which is different from the locus of the *sādhya*. Gaṅgeśa observes that both these definitions are defective since they are meant to show that the *hetu* has not a locus which is also not the locus of the *sādhya*, whereas we find that the *hetu* often has a locus which is not the locus of the *sādhya*. For instance, smoke on a hill has a locus which is not the locus of fire in a kitchen. These definitions also will not apply to a purely affirmative inference, where there is nothing which is not the locus of the *sādhya*.

There is another group of fourteen definitions of *vyāpti* called *caturdaśa-lakṣaṇi*. These definitions are applicable to all the three kinds of inferences, as they are based on the doctrine that things might as well be defined by properties they do not possess as by those they do. This technique was first enunciated by Sondaḍa or Sondala Upādhyāya and is technically known as *vyādhikaraṇādharmāvacchinnābhāva* (negation of self-contradictories, lit. negation determined by a property residing in a different locus). It is two-fold—(a) absence describing a counterpositiveness limited by a contradictory property (*vyādhikaraṇādharmāvacchinna-pratīyogitā-nirūpakābhāva*), e.g. absence of jar limited by clothness (*paṭatvāvacchinna-ghaṭābhāva*). (Here clothness is contradictory to, or occurs in a different locus from the counter-positive jar); (b) absence describing a counter-positiveness limited by a contradictory relation (*vyādhikaraṇa-sambandhāvacchinna-*

pratiyogitā-nirūpakābhāva), e.g. absence of quality limited by contact (*saṃyoga-sambandhāvacchinna-guṇābhāva*) (— quality can only inhere, it is never related by *saṃyoga*, contact). Thus *saṃyoga* is contradictory to or occurs in a different locus from the counterpositive quality (See *Materials...* pp. 81–82—Ingalls; *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, pp. 295 ff—BI). Most of the definitions of *vyapti* do not apply to a *kevalānvayi anumāna*, so to make the absence of the *sādhya* possible even in such cases, some logicians assume a negation or absence whose counterpositiveness is determined by a property residing in a locus different from the counter-positive. Gaṅgeśa does not approve of this because a property which does not occur in the counter-positive cannot determine the counter-positiveness (*pratiyogy-avṛttiś ca dharmo na pratiyogitāvacchedakaḥ*).

The *Siddhānta-lakṣaṇa* given by Gaṅgeśa is : *Pratiyogy-asamānādhikaraṇa-yatsamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāva-pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnaṃ yan na bhavati tena samam tasya sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ vyāptiḥ* (*Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, p. 610—BI)—*Vyāpti* is the co-presence of the *hetu* with that (*sādhya*) which is not limited by the limitor of the counter-positiveness of that constant absence which has the same locus as the *hetu*, but has a different locus from the counterpositive.

To take an example, there is co-presence of the *hetu* smoke with the *sādhya* fire which is not limited by jariness the limitor of the jar which is the counter-positive of the *atyantābhāva* of jar, this *atyantābhāva* having the same locus as smoke, but having a different locus from jar. This definition covers the case of the *kevalānvayi* inference also, inasmuch as it does not involve the non-existence of the *sādhya* and the *sādhya* is not the *pratiyogi* of that absence which has the same locus as the *hetu*. In 'This is nameable because knowable' (*abhidheyatva-jñeyatvāt*) there is co-presence of the knowable with the nameable which is not limited by jariness (though jar is limited by *abhidheyatva*, nameableness), and the *atyantābhāva* whose *pratiyogi* jar is, abides in the same locus with knowability, but in a different locus from jar.

Gaṅgeśa anticipates objections to this *siddhānta-lakṣaṇa* that fires are manifold owing to the difference of their loci, e.g. fire of a kitchen, of a sacrificial ground and so on, there is absence of these fires excepting one in the locus of a particular case of smoke, and this by making fire the counter-positive of that absence which has the same locus as smoke, altogether upsets the definition. The answer to this is that though in the locus of smoke there is the absence of various fires, the *avacchedakas* of the counter-positives of these absences are not one and the same, viz. *vahnitva*, but are different. It is therefore necessary to admit an absence of fire of the general form or generic absence (*sāmānyābhāva*) of fire which is determined by a generic character (viz. fire-ness) and not by a particular one.⁷

The commentators attempted to modify these definitions so as to avert all possible objections and make them as perfect as possible. For instance, the fifth definition of the *vyāpti-pañcaka* was attempted to be refined or expanded as follows :

The definition is ' *sādhya-advaita-vyāpti* '—What does ' *sādhya-advaita* ' signify? It signifies an entity possessed of *bheda* (difference) or mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*) whose counter-positiveness is limited by the locusness of the *sādhya* (*sādhya-vatvāvacchinna-pratīyogitākabheda*) So the definition would mean—*sādhya-advaita-adhikaraṇa nirūpita-vyāpti*—the absence of occurrence of the *hetu*, which is described by the locus of the difference or mutual absence of the locus of *sādhya*. Therefore though smoke may be present in, for instance, a kitchen which is other than any particular object having fire such as the mountain, the definition is not affected thereby. Here ' *sādhya's locus* ' (*sādhya-vat*) should be understood to have the *sādhya* by the same relation by which the *sādhya* is sought to be proved to exist in the *pakṣa*. For example, the inference of fire on a mountain from smoke, seeks to prove the existence of fire on mountain by *samyoga-sambandha*, So smoke should not reside in what is other than

the locus of fire by *sāmyoga-sambandha* though it may reside in what is different from fire's locus by *samavāya-sambandha* (e.g. kitchen is other than the particles of fire possessing fire by *samavāya-sambandha*). Thus the definition should in order to convey this be modified as : ' *sādhyatāvacchedaka-sambandhāvacchinna-sādhyavad-bheda adhikaraṇa nirūpita-vṛttitvā-bhāvavattvaṃ hetoh*' (or better still ' *sādhyatāvacchedaka-sambandhāvacchinna-sādhyādhikaraṇatāvad-bheda-adhikaraṇa-nirūpita-vṛttitvābhāvavattvaṃ hetoh*', for what needs *avaccheda* is a relational abstract like *adhikaraṇatā* and not what possesses it). Moreover *sādhyā*'s locus should mean 'all loci of *sādhyā*'. Thus, smoke should not reside in what is different from all loci of fire, though it may reside in any locus of fire, e.g. a mountain, which may be different from one particular locus of fire and yet possess smoke and so also fire. Therefore, the definition requires to be modified as : *sādhyatāvacchedaka-sambandhāvacchinna-sādhyavatvāvacchinna-pratīyogitākabheda - adhikaraṇa - nirūpita - vṛttitvābhāvavattvaṃ hetoh* (This was actually meant when *sādhyavad-anyah* was explained as *sādhyavattvāvacchinna-pratīyogitākabhedavān*). Further '*hetu* must not reside' means '*hetu* must not reside by the relation by which it is found to exist in the *pakṣa*'. For example, smoke resides in mountain by *sāmyoga-sambandha*, so it should not reside by *sāmyoga-sambandha* in what is different from all loci of fire, though it may reside in such a locus by *samavāya sambandha* (e.g. smoke in particles of smoke which are different from all loci of fire). Hence the definition should be read as : *sādhyatāvacchedaka-sambandhāvacchinna-sādhyavattvāvacchinna-pratīyogitākabheda-adhikaraṇa-nirūpita-hetutāvacchedaka-sambandhāvacchinna-vṛttitvābhāvavattvaṃ hetoh*. Again, 'the non-occurrence of the *hetu* in what is other than the locus of *sādhyā*' (*sādhyavad-anyāvṛttitvaṃ*) signifies an absence whose counterpositive is that which is limited by occurrenceness (lit. occurrent-nessness) in that which is different from the locus of *sādhyā* (*sādhyavad-anyā-vṛttitvāvacchinna-pratīyogitākābhāvah*).

That is to say, the *hetu* must in no case reside in what is other than the locus of *sādhya*. For example, in the invalid inference, 'Mountain has smoke because it has fire', fire does not reside in certain non-loci of smoke (e.g. lake), but it does reside in certain other non-loci of smoke (e.g. red-hot iron-ball). Thus the definition becomes: "*sādhya-tāvācchedaka-sambandhāvacchinna-sādhya-vattvā-vacchinna-pratiyogitākabheda-adhikaraṇa-nirūpita-hetutāvācchedaka-sambandhāvacchinna-vṛttitāva-avacchinna-pratiyogitāka-abhāvavattvaṁ hetoḥ*."

Still another difficulty is that 'non-occurrence of the *hetu*' means non-occurrence of the *hetu* as possessor of the *hetutāvācchedaka-dharma*. For instance, smoke has both smokeness as also substanceness but it is only as the possessor of smokeness that it is the *hetu*. Hence things possessing smokeness should not reside in the non-locus of fire though things possessing substanceness may. The example usually considered is a different one. In the inference, 'It is substance, because it has *sattā* not qualified by either *guṇa* (quality) or *karma* (action)' [—according to the Nyāya school, *sattā* (existence) being a generic character belongs to *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma* but not to the other four categories]—here the *hetutāvācchedaka-dharma* is 'existence-not-belonging-to-qualities-and-actions-ness' and not 'pure existenceness.' The argument is valid because 'existence-not-belonging-to-qualities-and-actions' does not belong to non-substance, though pure existence belongs to non-substance like qualities and actions. The definition should therefore be modified as: "*sādhya-tāvācchedaka-sambandhāvacchinna-sādhya-vattvā-vacchinna-pratiyogitāka-bheda-adhikaraṇa-nirūpita-hetutāvācchedaka-sambandhāvacchinna-vṛttitāva-avācchedaka-hetutāvācchedaka-dharmavattvaṁ-hetoḥ*." (See *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, 68).

The *siddhānta-lakṣaṇa* also can be refined and expanded. The final definition as given by Viśvanātha is—'*Hetumannīṣṭha-virahāpratiyoginā sādhyena hetor aikādhikaraṇyaṁ vyāptih*'—*Vyāpti* is the co-existence of the *hetu* with the *sādhya*

which is not the counter-positive of an absence that abides in the locus of *hetu*; that is to say, no absence co-existing with *hetu* should have the *sādhya* for its counterpositive, and such a *hetu* should co-exist with such a *sādhya*. This can be expressed by : '*hetvadhikaraṇavṛtty-abhāva-apratiyogi-sādhya-sāmānādhikaraṇyam hetoḥ*.' Now in an inference like 'The mountain has fire because it has smoke', particular fires belonging to other places are the counter-positives of their absence in the substratum of this *hetu*, viz. smoke, so the definition may seem too narrow. It has therefore to be modified as : '*Hetvadhikaraṇa-vṛtty-abhāva-pratīyogitā-anavacchedaka-sādhya-tāvacchedakāvacchinna sādhya-sāmānādhikaraṇyam hetoḥ*.'—The *hetu* is co-present with the *sādhya* limited by the limitor of the *sādhya-tā*, which is not the limitor of the counter-positiveness to the *abhāva* existing in the locus of the *hetu*. The *sādhya* as possessor of the *sādhya-tāvacchedaka-dharma* does not have absence-in-relation-to-a-locus-of-*hetu*. Thus, in the above-mentioned inference though there may be absence of fire as the kitchen-fire in a mountain, it is not absent there as fire. Similarly in the valid inference, "It has quality because it has substanceness", substanceness does not co-exist with absence of all quality whatsoever though it may co-exist with absence of this or that quality. The *hetu* should not co-exist with absence of the totality of things possessing the *sādhya-tāvacchedaka dharma*, though it can well be co-present with absence of this or that possessor of the *sādhya-tāvacchedaka-dharma*.

Further '*hetvadhikaraṇa-vṛtty-abhāva*' (absence co-present with *hetu*) means 'absence co-existing with the *hetu* as possessing the *hetu-tāvacchedaka-dharma*'. Thus in the valid inference, 'It is substance because it has *sattva* not belonging to qualities and actions' (*dravyam guṇa-karmānyatva-viśiṣṭa-sattvāt*), absence of substanceness does not co-exist with *sattva*-not-belonging-to-qualities and actions, though it does co-exist with pure *sattva* in quality and action; yet the inference is valid because it is the *sattva*-not-belonging-to-qualities-and-

action (and not pure *saṁtva*) that is the possessor of the *hetutāvacchedakadharmā*. And '*hetvadhikaraṇa-vṛtti-abhāva*' also signifies absence co-present in the locus of *hetu* by the same relation by which the *hetu* is found to occur in the *pakṣa*. Hence in the inference of fire on the mountain from smoke though fire is the counter-positive of the absence abiding in the locus of smoke by the relation of inherence (e.g. in the particles of smoke), yet the inference is not invalid as fire is not the counter-positive of the absence abiding in the locus of smoke by the relation of contact by which smoke is present in the mountain. In view of these considerations the definition should be modified as : *hetutāvacchedakā'vacchinna-hetutāvacchedaka - sambandhāvacchinna-hetvadhikaraṇavṛtti - abhāva-pratīyogitā'navacchedaka-sādhya-tāvacchedakāvacchinna-sādhya-sāmānādhikaraṇyam hetoḥ* (—*hetvadhikaraṇa* should more precisely be '*hetvadhikaraṇatāvad*' as it is an abstract relation that requires to be limited). It should moreover be borne in mind that *abhāva* means absence which does not co-exist with its counter-positive (*pratīyogī-vyadhikaraṇa-abhāva*). Thus in the inference 'This has conjunction with monkey because it is this tree' (*kapi-samyogī etad-vṛkṣatvāt*), this-tree-ness co-exists with absence of conjunction-with-monkey; but since absence of conjunction is an absence which co-exists with its counter-positive, the inference is not invalid. The definition thus is : "*pratīyogī-vyadhikaraṇa-hetutāvacchedakatāvacchinna-hetutāvacchedaka-sambandhāvacchinna - hetvadhikaraṇavṛtti-abhāva-pratīyogitā'navacchedaka-sādhya-tāvacchedakāvacchinna-sādhya-sāmānādhikaraṇyam hetoḥ*." The absence must be present in a substratum of the reason that is not the substratum of its counter-positive.

Still further clarification is attempted to avert certain objections regarding absence co-existing with its counter-positive. '*Pratīyogyanadhikaraṇatva*' means not being the locus of that which is limited by the limitor of the counter-positive-ness (*pratīyogitāvacchedakāvacchinna' nadhikaraṇatvam*) by the very relation which is the limitor of the *sādhya-tā*, i.e. by

which the *sādhya* resides in the *pakṣa*. Hence in a fallacious inference like 'It (soul) has knowledge, because it has existence', though jar, etc. which are loci of existence are the loci of knowledge by virtue of being an object, the definition is unaffected (—is not too wide—), as knowledge resides in these by *viśayatā-sambandha* and not by *samavāya-sambandha*. Hence the definition becomes—

Pratīyogitāvacchedakāvachinna-sādhya-tāvacchedakasambandhā vacchinna—pratīyogī-vyadhikaraṇa-hetutāvacchedakā'vacchinna—hetutāvacchedaka—sambandhāvachinna—hetvadhikaraṇavṛtty—abhāva—pratyogitānavacchedaka-sādhya-tāvacchedakā'vacchinna—sādhya-sāmānādhikaraṇyam hetoh. ”

Thus even though in the inference, 'It has fire, because it has smoke', there is the absence of fire by the relation of inherence in the substratum of smoke (e.g. mountain), the definition is intact since the *sādhya-tāvacchedaka-sambandha* is conjunction and not inherence (see *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, 69). This definition can similarly be even further clarified if found necessary in view of occurrence in the same temporal-locus and so on.

It must have been observed that the definitions of *vyāpti* are expressed in the form 'No locus of *hetu* is a locus of the absence of *sādhya*', rather than in the form 'All loci of *hetu* are loci of *sādhya*'. The reason is that the Naiyāyika's terminology cannot properly express a proposition of the form 'All loci of *hetu* are loci of *sādhya*'. For instance, the Naiyāyika could say 'Some smoke or other occurs in a particular place where there is fire (*dhūmatvāvachhinna-vṛttitā-nirūpitā'dhikaraṇatāvad etad vahnimat-sthālam*), or some fire or other exists in a particular place where there occurs smoke (*vahrītvāvachhinna-vṛttitā nirūpitādhikaraṇatāvad etad dhūmat-sthālam*). But these cannot yield the idea that 'all smoke occurs in a place where there occurs fire' or 'all loci of *hetu* are loci of *sādhya*'. On the other hand, the Naiyāyika can every well express the idea 'No locus of *hetu* (smoke) is a locus of the absence of *sādhya* (fire)', or the *hetu* is non-occurrent in the locus of the absence of *sādhya* (*sādhya-bhāvavad-avṛttivam*

hetuḥ —the first definition of the *Vyāpti-pañcaka*). This can be expanded as above— “*Sādhyatāvacchedaka-sambandhā* ‘-*vacchinna* – *sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinna* – *pratiyogitākā*’ *bhāvādhikaraṇa* – *nirūpita* – *hetutāvacchedaka* – *sambandhāvacchinna* – *vṛttitātvāvacchinna*–*pratiyogitākā*’ *bhāvavān hetuḥ* ”—There is in *hetu* absence of occurrence which is limited by occurrence-ness limited by the limiting relation of *hetu*-ness which is described by the (*sādhya* which is the) locus of the absence whose counter-positive is limited by a limitor of the *sādhya*-ness and is limited by the limiting relation of *sādhya*-ness.’

It can be seen that the Navya-Naiyāyikas concerned themselves more with the dialectical examination of definitions than with anything else. Each later logician anticipated a likely objection to a definition that was formulated by his predecessor and modified it so as to avoid the flaw. This resulted in piling of *avacchedakas* and *nirūpakas* in an attempt to pointedly specify the relation intended to be expressed and to free the definition of the faults of *ativyāpti* (being too wide), *avyāpti* (being too narrow) and *asambhava* (impossibility). Newer methods were evolved to keep away such flaws, and every term and affix was attempted to be accounted for. For bringing precision to definitions the Navya-Naiyāyikas devised certain relational concepts, and properties and the like. We have already referred to *svarūpa-sambandha* (peculiar relation), *upādhi* and *vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāva* besides *avacchedakas*, *nirūpakas* and the like. Some relations appear to be flimsy but they were occasioned by particular dilemmas as the Naiyāyikas had to face. Two such relations are *paryāpti-sambandha* and *viśiṣṭanirūpitādhāratā sambandha* (relation where the locus-ness is described by a qualified entity). The old Naiyāyikas regarded number (*saṅkhyā*) as a quality, which like other qualities inheres in its locus, and they said that twoness (*dvitva*), for instance, inheres in the first jar and in the second. The Navya-Naiyāyika would say that there are two sorts of two-ness. One of these is a *jāti* inhering in each member of pairs: the other is an *upādhi* related by what is called *paryāpti*

(completion, wholeness) not to the members of pairs but to the pairs themselves. Two-ness, etc. are related by *pariyāpti* only to two, three etc. not to each of the two, three, etc.; they are related to each by *samavāya* (inherence) This *pariyāpti* is a sort of *svārūpa-sambandha* giving rise to the concepts: 'This is one pot', 'These are two pots', etc.; and the loci of twoness, threeness, etc. are mutually exclusive; that is to say, threeness does not occur in the locus of twoness and so on. The Indian logicians developed this theory to resolve a contradiction in their system of categories. Number is defined as a quality in older works of Nyāya, and it is held that quality can only inhere in a substance. How is then one to explain such a phrase as 'four qualities'. The concept of *pariyāpti* helps the Naiyāyika out of the dilemma.

The Naiyāyika not only conceives a relation *pariyāpti* in which two-ness, threeness stand to their loci (the sum of the individuals), but calls twoness, threeness, etc. *vyāsajya-vṛtti* properties, properties that occur in loci (the sum of the individuals) whose individual constituents adhere to each other, that is to say, are inseparable. "The term *vyāsajya-vṛtti-dharma* is usually mentioned in connection with a special sort of sophistry which consists in substituting 'different from 2x' for 'different from x'..." The mutual absence of mango (*āmrānyonyābhāva*) is a mutual absence the counterpositiveness to which is limited by mango-ness (*āmratvāvacchinna-pratiyogitākābhāvaḥ*). The mutual absence of two mangoes (*āmra-dvayānyonyābhāva*) is a mutual absence the counterpositiveness to which is limited by the *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property two-ness (*vyāsajyavṛtityātmaka-dvitvāvacchinna-pratiyogitākābhāvaḥ*). It is likewise a mutual absence which occurs in its counter-positive (*sva-pratiyogi-vṛtity-anyonyābhāvaḥ*), for mango number one is part of the counter-positive of mutual absence of two mangoes and mutual absence of two mangoes occurs in mango number one. Whenever the term '*anyonyābhāva*' is employed in a definition, the Nyāya commentator finds it necessary to insert one of two phrases to prevent the sophistical substitution

of 'mutual absence of 2 *x*' for 'mutual absence of *x*' — '*vyāśajya-vṛtti-dharmānavacchinna-pratīyogitākābhāvaḥ* (a mutual absence the counterpositiveness to which is not limited by a *vyāśajya-vṛtti* property), or '*sva-pratīyogy-avṛtity-anyonyābhāvaḥ* (a mutual absence which does not occur in its own counter-positive).⁸ (See *Materials*... pp. 77-88—Ingalls). For example, commenting on the third definition of *vyāpti* in the *Vyāpti-pañcaka* (*sādhyavatpratīyogikānyonyābhāvā'sāmānādhikaraṇyam*)

Mathurānātha says that the mutual absence must be specified as not occurring in its counter-positive, so that there will be no impossibility even though the *hetu* occurs in the locus of a mutual absence of locus of *sādhyā* the counter-positiveness to which absence is limited by a *vyāśajya-vṛtti* property.

The concept of *viśiṣṭa-nirūpitādhārāī-sambandha* (relation where the locusness is described by a qualified entity) is employed to explain the Navya-Nyāya view regarding the identity of a pure entity with a qualified one, because otherwise it would not be that entity at all. The difficulty before the Naiyāyikas is that if a qualified entity is regarded as identical with a pure entity, the substitution of one for the other will give rise to fallacies, for then *guṇa* (quality) which has *sattā* qualified by otherness-than-substance-or-action could be said to have pure *sattā*, and so on. The Naiyāyika faces these difficulties by expressing the difference where he conceives it to lie, viz. in the qualifiers of the essentially identical entities and in the locusness they describe. For example, "It possesses *dravyatva* (substanceness) because it possesses qualified *sattā* (i.e. *sattā* qualified by otherness-than-quality-or-action)" — is valid because though *sattā* qualified simply by *sattā* cannot be said to fail to occur in quality and action (—the *vipaksas*), it does fail to occur there in so far as it is qualified by otherness-than-quality-and-action. *Vyāpti* requires that the *hetu* as qualified by all its qualifiers does not occur in any locus of absence of *sādhyā*.

Another way out is to state that qualified *sattā* is not pervaded by substanceness by the relation inherence at all, but

by the relation—where—the-locusness—is—described—by—a-qualified-entity (*viśiṣṭa-nirūpitādhāratā-sambandha*). The above inference will be false unless it is interpreted to mean, “It possesses substanceness because it possesses by ‘*viśiṣṭa-nirūpitādhāratā-sambandha*’, *sattā*-qualified-by-otherness-than-quality-or-action”; and thus there is no harm even if pure *sattā* does occur by inherence in a locus of absence of *sādhya* (See *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, pp. 79–80, 69–71).

Temporal relation (*kālika-sambandha*) is of two sorts, direct (*sākṣāt*) and indirect (*paramparayā*). Time (*kāla*) is regarded as a single formless substance and everything resides directly in time by *kālika-sambandha*. Direct relation is of two kinds—(a) the relation by which all entities, eternal or non-eternal, reside directly in universal time (*mahā-kāla*)—this relation is of little importance to logic; (b) the relation by which all non-eternal entities reside directly in portions of time (day, month, etc.) posited due to or in view of adventitious circumstances. An indirect relation between entities is admitted through time. Two things can be said to be related on account of their residing in a division of time. Since the division of time may be of any size short of the whole of time, all entities other than eternal ones are related to each other by *kālika sambandha*. All things eternal or non-eternal can be similarly said to be related by *kālika-sambandha* on account of their residing in universal time (*mahā-kāla*). But little use is made of this sort of *kālika-sambandha*. The employment of the *kālika-sambandha* enables the Naiyāyika to construct an infinite number of apparent paradoxes. For example, smoke and a lake occur in the same division of time, so one may say that smoke occurs in a lake by (indirect) temporal relation. As Prof. Ingalls says, perhaps a fuller knowledge of Navya-Nyāya will show that such paradoxes serve some purpose other than the obvious one of confusing the layman (*Materials*....p. 79).

A relation is said to be of incomplete occurrence (*avyāpya-vṛtti*) if one of the entities thus related occurs in only a part of the other. Contact and the absence of an entity by contact are the only relations of this sort the Naiyāyika is generally concerned with—though Raghunātha considers *samavāya* also to be a relation of incomplete occurrence since a black bull may have a white face, and though redness is said to inhere in a red pot, yet when we break the pot we may find that only the outsides of the shards are red and the rest black. If a monkey is in a tree, the monkey is related by contact to only a part of the tree or even to a part of one of its branches. Similarly, *atyantābhāva* of monkey by contact is related by absential particular relation (*abhāviya-viśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa-sambandha* or *abhāviya-svarūpa-sambandha*—the relation between an absence and its locus) to only a part of the tree, viz. the parts such as the roots with which the monkey is not in contact. In such cases, *atyantābhāva* occurs in the same locus as does its counter-positive or is an instance of *pratiyogi-samānādhikaraṇā'tyantābhāva*. The Navya-Naiyāyikas try to resolve this apparent contradiction by arguing that the contact with monkey does not have its occurrentness in this tree limited by this-tree-ness; its occurrentness in this tree is limited by the part of this tree in contact with monkey, e.g., a particular branch. Similarly, the occurrentness in this tree of absence of monkey-by-contact is limited by the part of this tree that is not in contact with monkey, e.g. roots. While the locusness residing in a locus of an entity of incomplete occurrence is termed limited locusness (*avacchinñādhikaraṇatā*), the locusness residing in a locus of an entity of complete occurrence is termed an unlimited locusness (*anavacchinñādhikaraṇatā*).

The Navya-Naiyāyikas anticipated objections to their definitions and arguments on the ground of the relation of incomplete occurrence and consequently the paradox of *atyantābhāva* occurring in the same locus as its counterpositive, on the ground of relation between things (whose connection

would render the inference fallacious) by *kālika-sambandha*, on the basis of *vyāsajya-vṛtti* properties and so on. It can also be argued when the relation between the *hetu* and the *pakṣa* is not specified—as for instance, in the inference of fire from smoke, smoke is present in the mountain by *samyoga-sambandha* but it is not present in it by *samavāya-sambandha*—that fire cannot be inferred from smoke. In answering these objections, they attempted to precisely specify the relations of the things that enter into them. Thus the definitions of Navya-Nyāya came to be very precisely formulated and were intended to ward off all possible objections. And the development of Navya-Nyāya logic is mostly in the direction of greater precision aiming at perfection of statement, the attempt being to see that no objection however flimsy and from whatever point of view could be raised against any proposition, though a logician like Raghunātha would also try to examine the metaphysical categories of the old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and put them on a more logical basis by cancelling those that cannot stand the test of rigorous logic and positing new ones. The Navya-Naiyāyikas employed already existing words like *avaccheda*, *nirūpaka*, etc. by assigning them a strictly technical character and use, and also devised some new ones. Terms like *avaccheda*, *avacchedya*, *avacchedaka* had come to be employed in works to specify relations even at the time of Ānandavardhana (author of *Dhvanyāloka*, ninth century) and Udayana but Gaṅgeśa popularised their use in logic and works of a dialectical character and gave them a strictly technical sense. The old works of Nyāya were concerned with giving definitions of things which could specify their distinguishing character and differentiate them from others. The works of Navya-Nyāya work out of these definitions which seem terribly intricate but reveal a fine precision and subtlety, and so are an excellent training for the intellect.

This character of Navya-Nyāya logic was appreciated even by thinkers of other schools, especially because this facilitated the raising of objections and answering them; it was remarkably useful in the dialectical treatment of topics

and resulted in a precise knowledge of the subject to which nothing was required to be supplied. Later works of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (about the fourteenth-fifteenth century), Vedānta (e.g. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, *Advaita-siddhi*, etc.), Vyākaraṇa (—the works of Nāgeśa for example), Kāvyaśāstra (—the works of Jagannātha and others), and in fact, of all the śāstras adopted the peculiar style of Navya-Nyāya logic in the dialectical examination of topics.

The main purpose of Navya-Nyāya is to treat the four *pramāṇas*—*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*, and in the course of their treatment of topics the writers of the Navya-Nyāya school have besides giving a dialectical exposition of the topics of their own schools, criticised the views of rival schools. In the first part of his work *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* dealing with *pratyakṣa*, Gaṅgeśa has discussed all the relevant problems connected with the epistemology of perception—its source, conditions and result. The division of perceptual knowledge into *nirvikalpa* (indeterminate) and *savikalpa* (determinate) is thoroughly treated and the rival schools of thought, pre-eminently that of Prabhākara, are criticised. As a consequence of the disappearance of the Buddhist dialecticians from the Indian arena, the refutation of the Buddhist views and doctrines must have remained only a matter of abstract academic interest and so the attention of the Navya-Naiyāyikas was directed against the school of Prabhākara, who had close affinities with the Buddhist philosophers in respect of certain fundamentals, and the school of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in general which had much that was original to contribute to epistemology. The most outstanding contribution of Gaṅgeśa is found in his treatment of the problem of truth and validity of knowledge. The positions of Kumārila, Prabhākara and Murāri Miśra, who were advocates of the theory of self-validity of knowledge (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*), are thoroughly discussed and criticised, and the Navya-Nyāya position of *parataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda* which believes in the correspondence theory of truth and the ascertainment of truth by verification, is

established. Gaṅgeśa criticises the three positions of Prabhākara, Kumārila and Murāri Miśra as thoroughly untenable on the ground of contradiction of experience, since if all knowledge were self-validated there would be no occasion for a doubt which is dispelled only by means of verification by another piece of knowledge. We have considered this in our chapter on 'The Problem of Truth'. Scarcely any new argument is to be found here as Udayana has given all these arguments in his works, but new issues have been raised and the problem has been studied afresh. It is in the chapter on inference (*anumāna*) that Gaṅgeśa and the other Navya-Naiyāyikas have shown exceptional ingenuity, remarkably so in the problem of *vyāpti* (universal concomitance of two things), and the possibility of the knowledge of *vyāpti*. The position of the sceptics is shown to be absurd as leading to self-contradiction and making practical life impossible. The later developments of logical speculations were necessitated by the hostile criticism of Nyāya concepts and definitions by Śrīharṣa and Citsukha and other Vedāntins who delighted in indulging in criticism to show the absurdity of the attempt of the Naiyāyikas in particular and the realists in general to explain the world in terms of reality. Gaṅgeśa came after Śrīharṣa and took upon himself the task of vindicating the orthodox Naiyāyika standpoint. The sceptical philosophers had repudiated the reality of categories by showing the absurdity of their definitions. The Navya-Naiyāyikas, therefore, sought to modify and strengthen the definitions of the different categories so that they became formidable and this they did by specifying relations and bringing precision by the use of their unique terminology. Of course this did not bring an end to the dialectical struggle between the Naiyāyikas and the thinkers of other schools, notably the Vedāntins. But this does not detract from the worth of the Nyāya speculations. The chief value of Navya-Nyāya consists in its contributions to method and terminology, which have been invariably adopted by all other schools of thought. The consequence has been that it became

an established practice in India that whatever one's school of thought or philosophical conviction or *sāstra*, one must speak in the language of the Naiyāyikas.¹⁰

NOTES

- 1 *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. I—'The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System of Philosophy', p. 413—Satkarī Mookerī (Ramkrishna Centenary Memorial Volume I, Calcutta). This article contains a fine appreciation of the method of Navya-Nyāya.
- 2 *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, Introduction, p. 2—Daniel H. H. Ingalls (Harvard Oriental Series, 1951). This book by Ingalls is a very valuable one and all who write something on Navya-Nyāya derive help and guidance from this work. The exposition of the Navya-Nyāya methodology in this chapter is largely based on the exposition given by Ingalls supplemented by illustrations only where necessary, from *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (BI) and Viśvanātha's *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* and its commentaries and from the *Tarka-saṅgraha-dīpikā* of Annaṁbhaṭṭa.
- 3 Vyāptiḥ sādhyad-anyasminnasambandha udāhṛtaḥ. 68. atra yena sambandhena hetutā tenaiva sambandhena sādhyavad-anyaḥ vṛttitvaṁ bodhyaṁ, tena sādhyavad-nyasmin dhūmāvayave dhūmasya samavāya-sambandhena sattve'pi na kṣatiḥ.—*Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, 68.
- 4 *Materials*....., p. 51—Ingalls
- 5 Vide the six impediments to generic character (*jātibadhaka*)—
'Vyakter abhedas tulyatvaṁ saṅkaro' thā'navasthitiḥ:
rūpahanir asambandho jāti-bādhaka-saṅgrahaḥ. —
Siddhāntamuktāvalī, 8.
- 6 I have derived much help from the translation and exposition of the *Vyāpti-pañcaka* given by Prof. Ingalls, and from *A History of Indian Logic*, pp. 421 ff. —S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa. See also *Tattvacintāmaṇi* with the *Didhiti-vivṛti* (pp. 233 ff) by Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya (BI).
- 7 Annaṁbhaṭṭa gives the following definition of *vyāpti*—'*Hetu-samānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvapratiyogi-sādhyā-samānādhikaraṇaṁ vyāptiḥ*'—*vyāpti* is the occurrence of the *hetu* in the locus of the *sādhyā* which is not the counter-positive of any *atyantābhāva* (constant negation) co-present with the *hetu*. Commentators however are not satisfied with this circumlocution for there is still a doubt as to whether the *hetu* and *sādhyā* are all

things denoted by the words or only individual things referred to on particular occasions. That the former meaning is to be taken is made clear by the insertion of the term 'avacchinna' and the definition is thus enlarged by Nilakaṇṭha—'*Hetu-samānādhikaranātyantābhāva-pratīyogitā-navacchedaka-sādhya-tāvacchedakāvacchinna sādhyā - samānādhikaraṇa-vṛtti hetu tāvacchedakatvam*'—Vyāpti signifies being the limiter of *hetuṭā* residing in a thing occurring in the same locus with a *sādhyā* that is limited by the limiter of the *sādhyaṭā*, but is not the limiter of the counter-positiveness of the constant absence (*atyantābhāva*) occurring in the same locus with the *hetu* (See *Tarkasaṅgraha* with *Dipikā*, p. 35; Notes, pp. 244 ff—Athalye and Bōdas, also—*Vyāptiḥ sādhyavad-*

anyasminnasambandha udāhṛtaḥ. 68

atha vā hetuman-niṣṭhāvirahā'pratīyoginā;

sādhyena hetor aikādhikaraṇyam vyāptir ucyate. 69 -

Bhāṣā-pariccheda of Viśvanātha has discussed the second definition at length in his *Siddhāntamuktāvali*.

- 8 See the third definition of *vyāpti* in *Vyāpti-pañcaka* and its commentary by Mathurānātha (*Materials* . ., p. 134).:—'*Sādhya-avāt-pratīyogikā'nyonyābhāva'samānādhikaraṇyam*'—the *hetu's* having a different locus from that of a mutual absence whose counter-positive is a locus of *sādhyā*. Commentary—*sādhya-avāt-pratīyogikānyonyābhāvādhikaraṇa-nirūpita-vṛttivābhāva ity arthaḥ*. *anyonyābhāva's ca pratīyogi-avṛttitvena viśeṣaṇīyaḥ*, *tena sādhyavato vyāsa-jya-vṛtti-dharmāvacchinna—pratīyogitākānyonyābhāvavati hetor vṛttau api nāsambhavaḥ*.

'A mutual absence whose counter-positive is a locus of *sādhyā*'—

The meaning is : When there is an absence of occurrence resident in *hetu* and described by a locus of a mutual absence whose counter-positive is a locus of *sādhyā*, the mutual absence must be specified as not occurring in its counter-positive, so that there will be no impossibility even though the *hetu* occurs in the locus of a mutual absence of locus of *sādhyā* the counter-positiveness to which absence is limited by a *vyāsa-jya-vṛtti* property.

- 9 Yady api dravyam guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭa-sattvād ity ādau vis'iṣṭa-sattāyāḥ śuddha-sattāyāś caikyāt sādhyavadanyasmin guṇādāv avṛttitvaṁ nāsti, tathāpi hetutāvacchedaka-rūpeṇā'vṛttitvaṁ vācyam, hetutāvaccheda-kam vṛttitānavacchedakam iti phalito'rthaḥ (-*Siddhānta Muktāvali*, 68.

- 10 See 'The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System of Philosophy', pp. 410 ff. -Satkari Mookerjee—in *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol 1—(Ramkrishna Centenary Memorial, Vol. 1, Calcutta)—There is not much material on

the Navya-Nyāya methodology and Prof. Ingalls has rendered unique service to Indian logic and philosophy by collecting systematically and appreciatively '*Materials for the study of Navya-Nyāya logic*'. This chapter, as said above, is mostly based on the work of Prof. Ingalls to which I here acknowledge my debt. I have also sought guidance and corroboration from Mr. Diksīt's Thesis on '*Indian Logic-Its Problems as treated by its Schools*' (Appendix 2—The Neo-Naiyāyika's Technical Terminology and his definitions of *Vyāpti* expressed with the help thereof'). Mr. Diksīt was kind enough to lend his thesis to me though it was not yet printed. My debt to these authors is greater than could ordinarily be permitted, and the formidable nature of Navya-Nyāya terminology can be the only excuse, however feeble, for it.

CHAPTER 17

DIALECTICAL CRITICISM IN OTHER *VIDYĀS* (BRANCHES OF LEARNING)

Every branch of learning has its own set of *pramāṇas* (sources of knowledge) and its own methodology and arrives at its conclusions as a result of dialectical examination of topics. This is as much true of *Arthaśāstra* and *Dharmaśāstra*, *Vyākaraṇa-śāstra*, *Kāvya-śāstra*, *Āyurveda*, *Kāma-śāstra* and the like as of *Darśana-śāstra* and *Pramāṇa-śāstra*. In this chapter we shall briefly discuss the element of dialectical criticism in the works of some of the *vidyās* other than *Darśana-śāstra* and *Pramāṇa-śāstra*.

Dialectical Criticism in works on *Dharma-śāstra* and *Artha-śāstra*

The growth of *Dharma-śāstra* has witnessed three main stages of development though religion has always been assumed to be the final arbiter—the period (i) when political institutions were gradually emerging, (ii) when economic and political considerations assumed a dominant role, as is evident in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* (third or second century B.C.) and the *Nārada-Smṛti* (100 A.D.) and (iii) the period of the re-assertion of the dominance of *Dharma-śāstra* over *Artha-śāstra* as in the days of *Yājñavalkya-Smṛti* (100-300 A.D.) according to which the legal texts of *Dharma-śāstra* are more authoritative than the *Artha-śāstra*. We shall consider here mainly the *Artha-śāstra* of Kauṭilya as its approach is dialectical in method and pragmatic in aim. Kauṭilya professes to have taken into consideration in the preparation of his work the views of almost all the earlier Ācāryas who had set forth the legal and political code for the acquisition and protection of land. He commences with a salutation to Śukra and Bṛhaspati, who are also known to be the founders of the

Lokāyata system besides being early law-givers and so who were outright non-religious in their attitude.¹

We shall at the outset note a few topics in the *Arthaśāstra* which bear evidence of dialectical thought in the legal and political literature of India. In *Arthaśāstra* 1.2 Kauṭilya enumerates the major branches of learning (*vidyā*) which should form part of a prince's education. Ānvīkṣikī (Dialectic), Trayī (Vedas), Vārttā (Trade and Commerce), Daṇḍa-nīti (Political Science) are the major *Vidyās*. He cites the views of earlier writers. According to Manu and his followers, Trayī, Vārttā and Daṇḍanīti are the *Vidyās*, because Ānvīkṣikī is only a branch of Trayī. This shows that these law-givers were prepared to accept logic and dialectic only in so far as it served to interpret the Vedic teachings and was in accordance with them. What is important is that Kauṭilya gives the reason why a school held a particular view. The school of Brhaspati was of the view that Vārttā and Daṇḍanīti are the only two *vidyās*, for Trayī is merely a cloak used in order to convince people by those who know how to maintain the social order. Uśanas and his followers accept Daṇḍanīti alone as a *Vidyā* because all the other branches are connected with it. Kauṭilya himself recognises all the four *vidyās* mentioned in the beginning though he regards Ānvīkṣikī (the science of ratiocination or dialectic) as a controlling force in all decisions. The problem is : A prince has to be educated. What should be his different disciplines? Kauṭilya, it can be seen, discusses this topic in the following way. First he states his own view. Then he mentions the different views and accounts for them by stating reasons. Finally he re-states his own view which is meant to supersede the others as being the most comprehensive.

Discussing Daṇḍanīti (1. 4), Kauṭilya says that according to the Ācāryas, the King's *daṇḍa* (power to restrain or control) is the best means to bring about law and order. But Kauṭilya disagrees. The subjects soon get disgusted with a King who exercises authority harshly as they make little

of a weak one. But a King moderate and discriminating in his governance is held in high esteem. One who is unrestrained or ill-disciplined on account of his passion or hot temper or just indifference incites to agitation even the *vānaprasthas* and the *parivrājakas* (wandering *sannyāsins*), much more so the *gṛhasthas* (house-holders) And if he cannot wield power at all he gives rise to a situation in which Might is Right. He can command awe only by the discriminating use of *danḍa*.—Here also the dialectical method is adopted.

Let us take another example which is even more interesting from our point of view—the topic (1. 8) of the recruitment of ministers. Bharadvāja's view is that the King's co-students should be made ministers as the King would have full knowledge of their integrity and abilities and so could have confidence in them. Viśālākṣa demurs because they would take him lightly on account of their being his playmates. But those who share a secret with him should be made ministers as they would have common character, conduct and passion. They would be exposing and involving themselves in trying to give out the King's secret and so they would never commit any offence as he also would be sharing their secret. The Pārāśaras argue that this fault is there in either case. The King also would have to act according to their wishes as they would be sharing his secret. The King becomes a slave to as many persons as he divulges his secret to. So only those should be made ministers who would stand by him in adversities, even in those likely to involve loss of life, as their love for him would be thus put to the test. Piśuna differs. Such people would be highly devoted but they would not have the quality of intelligence. So only those should be appointed ministers who being appointed to undertake activities calculated to bring about a certain gain or benefit would accomplish the task accordingly or even better than estimated, because the King would be aware of their merits. Kauṇapadanta does not agree for such persons would not be endowed with the other qualities essential by way of the equipment of ministers Those related

on the father's side to the King should be appointed ministers as he would be fully aware of their pure character. And being his kinsmen they would not abandon him even if he were to misbehave, as this tendency is found even in the animals. But, Vātavyādhi's contention is that these relations would control everything of the King as if they were the real masters. Therefore those who are well-versed in the Political Science and are fresh (and so not hardened in the routine) should be appointed as ministers. Such freshers would look upon the King as a substitute of Yama and so would not commit any offence. Bāhudantīputra says that this is not true. Such a person may have theoretical knowledge but being one without practical experience he would land into trouble. Therefore one should appoint as ministers those who are of noble birth and are intelligent, pure, devoted and brave. Kauṭilya says that there is truth in all these views. A person's efficiency is known by the efficiency of his actions.

It can be seen that here a view is put forth along with a reason to support it; then its drawback is shown and another opinion is set forth with a reason to support it. This is again repudiated and a third view is stated and so on, till the final view is expressed, which is expected to be followed. This treatment of topics is in a truly dialectical mode.

There is a similar discussion where Kauṭilya treats the topic of the number of councillors (*mantrin*) a King should have and how he should seek their counsel without very much divulging his secret move and thus landing into trouble. According to the Mānavas, the *mantri-pariṣad* (council) should consist of twelve persons, according to the Bārhaspatyas of sixteen, according to the Auśanasas of twenty, whereas Kauṭilya says that it all depends on the need and their efficiency. Kauṭilya, it may be noted in passing, gives a very rational interpretation of Indra's being '*sahasrākṣa*'—his *mantri-pariṣad* consists of a thousand *ṛṣis*, they are his eyes so even while having two eyes he is said to have a thousand eyes (1. 15. 57).

This will suffice to illustrate the dialectical mode of treatment in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* as also that adopted in works on law and political science.

Dialectical Criticism in works on Vyākaraṇa-śāstra (Grammar)

The *Prātiśākhya*s are perhaps the earliest works on Grammar that we know of. They were known to Yāska also who refers to them in discussing whether *saṁhitā* is *pada-prakṛti* (the source of words, or having words as the cause—*pada-prakṛtiḥ saṁhitā*—*Nirukta* 1. 17). We cannot say anything definitely regarding the date of the *Prātiśākhya*s, but we can certainly form some idea of the method of treatment adopted in them from the extant treatises, though these are of a comparatively late origin. The author of the *Rk-Prātiśākhya* while mentioning his own view quotes or refers to the views of a number of ācāryas on the same subject (see *Paṭala* 1. 15–16, 46, 51, 63–64, 75; 2. 16–17; 11 17–21, etc.). But the style of the *Prātiśākhya*s being *sūtra*-like, the author does not give an exposition of these views of other Ācāryas or criticise them.

There is ample evidence to indicate that different schools of Vyākaraṇa and Nirukta were in existence when Yāska (seventh century B. C.) wrote his famous commentary *Nirukta* on the *Nighaṇṭu*. *Nirukta* itself is a remnant of a vast Nirukta literature, even as Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* alone has survived the numerous systems of grammar such as those of Śākalya, Śākāṭāyana, Gārgya, Gālava, Senaka, Sphoṭāyana, Bhāradvāja, Āpiśali, Kāśakṛtsna, Vyādi, Vājaṇṭya and Pauṣkarasādi. Among the teachers mentioned by Yāska, there are four, viz. Śākāṭāyana, Gārgya, Gālava and Śākalya who are credited with having founded their respective schools of grammar and whose works seem to have been existing even in the days of Pāṇini (fifth or fourth century B.C.) It may be assumed from this that there must have been much discussion on different problems of Grammar.

The style of Yāska's *Nirukta* is highly dialectical in character. He presents problems in the form of a controversy.

For instance, he raises the question whether word is eternal by quoting the view of Audumbarāyaṇa that it is 'indriyanitya' and urging the contingencies involved and then showing how these difficulties do not arise even if word is regarded as eternal (*Nirukta* 1. 1). Yāska has similarly discussed the question whether prepositions (*upasarga*) have any meaning by themselves or only when connected with a noun or verb, and quotes different views on the point (*Nirukta*, 1. 3). He further relates the controversy between Śākaṭāyana and the Nairuktakas on the one hand and Gārgya and the Vaiyākaraṇas on the other (1. 12 ff) in respect of the reducibility of all nouns to roots (*Nāmāṇy ākhyātājānti Śākaṭāyano Nairukta-samayaś ca; na sarvāṇṛti Gārgyo Vaiyākaraṇānām caike--Nirukta* 1. 12). He gives the arguments of the respective schools, and ultimately sides with Śākaṭāyana and the Nairuktakas. He has also given a detailed exposition of Kautsa's view that *mantras* carry no meaning (*anarthakā mantrāḥ*). Citing the arguments advanced by Kautsa in support of his view, he refutes them at length (*Nirukta*, 1. 15 ff). He repeatedly stresses that if the etymology of a word cannot be traced, or if a *mantra* cannot be properly interpreted, one must not jump to rash conclusions such as that all words cannot be reduced to roots, or *mantras* are meaningless; the fault lies with the man and not with the science as such. It is not the fault of a poet that a person does not see it and bangs against it (*naiṣa sthāṇor aparādho yad enam andho na paśyati; puruṣā-parādhaḥ sa bhavati--Nirukta* 1. 16). Similarly in the seventh chapter of the *Nirukta* he has given a dialectical exposition of the classification of the deities, their form, their concomitants and so on and referred to the views of different schools and teachers. He gives at places the interpretation of Vedic legends as attempted by the Nairuktas and the Aitihāsikas and others (see *Nirukta* 2. 16).

Yāska's mode of treatment is throughout dialectical in character, and at places, especially when a controversial problem is being discussed, one feels as if one were reading a work

of the same category as Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, of course making concessions for the difference in style. When referring to the *pūrvapakṣin's* argument which he wants to refute, he introduces it by 'yatho etat' (*Nir.* 1. 14 ff) meaning 'as to what you said against us'. Yāska's *Nirukta* is a work of great importance from the point of view of the growth of dialectical criticism.

The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini is the first extant systematic work of Grammar in India. Pāṇini mentions the names of Ācāryas who held different views; at times he states the *pūrvapakṣa* (prima-facie view) and refutes it (e.g. in 1. 2. 51ff), but on the whole we have a direct presentation rather than a dialectical exposition of the subject. The *Vārttikas* of Kātyāyana (350 B.C.) consider whether anything has been omitted in the *sūtras* of Pāṇini that should have been stated, and whether there is in them anything that is superfluous, faulty or objectionable.³ As Kielhorn says, the object of the *Vārttikas* is to discuss, without bias or prejudice, such objections as might be raised against the rules of Pāṇini's grammar. He tries both to justify Pāṇini by defending him against unfounded criticism and to correct, reject and add to the rules laid down by him where defence and justification are not possible. The *vārttikas* thus furnish good specimens of dialectical criticism of that early period.³ In explaining the *sūtras*, Kātyāyana adopts the method which is generally used in dealing with an *adhikaraṇa* (topic) by stating the *pūrvapakṣa*, answering the points raised and finally giving the *siddhānta*. He also explains grammatical points on the analogy of commonsense experience and behaviour as also Vedic practice and from the experience of the world, from nature, and from *nyāyas* or maxims like those of the Dharma-śāstra.⁴ His seeking confirmation from Vedic and worldly usage and practice is noteworthy from the point of view of dialectics.

The *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali (150 B.C.) is in the first instance a commentary or critical discussion on the *Vārttikas*

of Kātyāyana; it is also a commentary on the *sūtras* of Pāṇini as the *iṣṭis* are original *vārttikas* on such *sūtras* of Pāṇini as called for Patañjali's remarks. Patañjali mentions his own view boldly where he differs from the *Vārttikas* of Kātyāyana.⁵ Patañjali's work is called *Mahābhāṣya* (Great Commentary) inasmuch as it is not only a treatise on Grammar but also the fountain source of all *nyāyas*.⁶ The spirit of independent thought, combined with keen critical acumen and deep understanding, pervades the whole of the *Mahābhāṣya*. The *Mahābhāṣya* not only comments on the *sūtras* and the *vārttikas*, but also discusses critically the necessity of these *sūtras* and *vārttikas*. Patañjali shows hereina that some of the *sūtras* are not necessary, and at places disagrees with the criticism of Pāṇini by the *Vārttikakāra* and supports Pāṇini's position by forceful arguments. He proves his point by analogy with *nyāyas* current in the world. The first *āhnika* of the *Mahābhāṣya* is named 'Paspasāhnika'. The word 'paspasā' is derived from the root 'spaś' which means 'to see, observe, consider'. This *āhnika* treats of the preliminaries of the Vyākaraṇa-śāstra and refutes the arguments of others, that is to say, is dialectical in character. As a matter of fact, grammar can be said to have been the first science to give scope to dialectical presentation as Mīmāṃsā gave the dialectic of interpretation. The first *āhnika* is very interesting inasmuch as it shows how philosophical problems were raised and how philosophical speculations entered the field of grammar as a result of contact with different schools of thought. It also illustrates Patañjali's dialectical skill in the treatment of controversial points, though the other *āhnikas* too give us an idea of Patañjali's mode of dialectical criticism and of his dialectical skill, especially when he gives a clear exposition of the *vārttikas* or refutes the view of the *Vārttikakāra* where he differs from him.

Enunciating the subject *Śabdānuśāsana*, the science wherein the derivation of words is explained, Patañjali says that both the current (*laukika*) words as also the Vedic words are treated in the *sūtras* of Pāṇini. Then he raises a question,

"When one says '*gauḥ*', what is *śabda*? (*gauḥ ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ*)—The object with the dew-lap, etc.?" No, it is called *dravya* (substance). Is it then its movement, etc.? No, these are called *kriyā* (action). Is it the whiteness, blueness, etc.? No, these are called *guṇa* (quality). Is it then the *sāmānya* (universal) which exists unaffected even when the individuals are broken or destroyed.? No, this is designated *ākṛti*. What is *śabda* then? *Śabda* is that on the utterance or manifestation of which the correct knowledge of the object with the dewlap, tail, etc. is produced: or the sound whose meaning is known is *śabda*. This is clear from the fact that one who makes *śabda* (sound, noise) is told: 'Make *śabda*', 'Do not make *śabda*', 'This boy makes *śabda*'. Hence *śabda* signifies *dhvani*.⁷

Patañjali then introduces the topic of the benefits that accrue from the study of grammar, and later goes on to discuss the method that is to be adopted in the exposition of *Śabdānuśāsana*. Should a list of correct words be given or of corrupt words? It can be done in either way, since the other set can be inferred. But which is the better of the two methods? The enumeration of correct words is simpler and shorter, since for every correct word there are many corrupt (*apabhraṁśa*) forms of it (e.g. for *gauḥ*, we have *gāvi*, *goṇi*, *gotā*, *gopotalikā*, etc.). Moreover in this method we have the additional advantage of the direct enumeration of the words that we require.⁸

Patañjali's dialectical mode of treatment becomes apparent from these illustrations. He raises a question and puts forth a number of alternative solutions asking each time if a particular alternative is possible and denying it by giving reasons for this denial, and finally gives his own view supporting it by reasons. Other questions similarly raised and treated are: "Should an inventory of all correct words be given?" "Does a word signify genus or individual?" "Is *śabda* eternal (*nitya*) or an effect (*kārya*)?" It may be noted that, as Patañjali observes, the question whether *śabda* is eternal or an effect was examined

earlier in the '*Saṅgraha*' of Vyāḍi, wherein arguments on both sides of the question were put forth.

This serves as an introduction to the first *Vārttika* which runs as follows—" *siddhe śabdārtha-saṁbandhe lokato'rtha-prayukte śabda-prayoge śāstreṇa dharma-niyamaḥ yathā laukika-vaidikeṣu*"—When word, its meaning and their connection are known to be eternal (*siddha*) from the world and word is used only in such meanings as are current there, the Śāstra enjoins the use of correct words for the sake of *dharma* as in the case of matters, worldly and vedic. Patañjali treats in detail the meanings of *siddhe*, *artha*, etc. and discusses why if *siddha* means eternal, the word '*nitya*' is not used, whether *artha* denotes genus or individual, and how the compound '*śabdārthasambandhe*' should be dissolved in view of the word '*siddha*' (eternal) and so on. Patañjali gives a definition of '*nitya*' and shows therein his acquaintance with Kūṭasthavāda (doctrine of absolute unchangingness) and Parīṇāmavāda (doctrine of transformation or persistence in the midst of change). The meaning of the first *vārttika* having been explained, a doubt is raised whether a word that is not current in the world (e.g. *ūṣa*, *tera*, *cakra*, *peca*) is correct or not, since it has been said that a word is used in only such meanings as are current in the world. Here the controversy is very interesting and consists of witty repartees and powerful arguments on either side. One almost feels driven to quote it in its full length. The topic is forcefully set forth at the outset as follows: "It is contradictory to say that there are words but they are not in usage; if they are there they could not have fallen out of use, and if they have fallen out of use, they cannot exist. You use words and say in the same breath that they are out of use. Moreover, only usage can determine the correctness of words." The opponent is allowed to ask questions even while the arguments in support of the conclusion to be arrived at are being advanced. Kātyāyana himself seems to have raised the doubt whether a word that

is not current in the world is correct or not since it has been said that it is used in such meanings as are current in the world.

Another dialectical problem connected with the interpretation of the *Vārttika* is : Does *dharma* (merit, good) accrue from the knowledge of correct words or from the use of correct words? (*kim punaḥ śabdasya jñāne dharmāḥ āhosvit prayoge*)? And if *dharma* accrues from knowledge so also will *adharma* (sin) accrue for he who knows correct words knows their corrupt forms also; or greater *adharma* will accrue since for every correct word there are more than one corrupt forms. If *dharma* be said to accrue from *prayoga* (use) of correct words, the whole world will get *dharma* and the effort of the students of grammar will be fruitless. A humorous remark is made that it is also seen that those who have studied grammar are not able to use words correctly whereas those who have not are able to do so, hence the fruit will also be reversed. Therefore according to Kātyāyana, *dharma* accrues from *prayoga* (use of correct words) backed by the study of grammar. Patañjali seems to differ and so opens the topic again : Or let *dharma* accrue only from knowledge. *Śabda pramāṇa* says that *dharma* results from the knowledge of correct words and not that *adharma* results from the knowledge of corrupt words, so there is no difficulty. A fine argument advanced is : A well-sinker though he is stuck in the mud and is covered with dust in the process of sinking a well, gets himself rid of the mud and dust with water as seen as he reaches it and gets plenty of good from it. Even so though *adharma* may accrue from the knowledge of corrupt forms, yet since this leads to knowledge of correct forms, *dharma* would rise from this latter, and this *dharma* destroying the effect of the *adharma* would lead to much good.⁹

Patañjali like a true *bhāṣyakāra* has made it a practice to leave nothing unexplained, to raise questions that might have been implied in the original and to discuss them dialectically and philosophically. He does not fail to discuss in this way

even the method adopted by him or expected to be adopted by one giving an exposition. Patañjali, as said earlier, has made use of a number of varieties of *tarka*, arguments urging an undesirable contingency if the opponent's view is accepted. In short, Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* can stand a fair comparison with the works of Dharmakīrti and Kumārila, and one even feels a bit surprised that works on grammar appear to be more advanced in respect of dialectical criticism than the works of other *śāstras* including Darśana-śāstra. But as a matter of fact there is no real ground for surprise. This might be so because to the Vedic Āryans speech appeared to have far-reaching consequences in the context of Vedic sacrifices and occult rites and hence the early thinkers must have been driven to attempt to understand the relation of word and meaning and to go deep into the mystery of speech. But there is also a deeper reason for this. Human speech and thought are so intimately related that it is but natural that language should be the earliest subject that was discussed philosophically. The relation of word and meaning must have first puzzled thinkers and attracted philosophical interest in the development of human reasoning. We find Patañjali giving expression to many such inquiries and systematically recording in his own original way the discussions and controversies carried on by the thinkers with others and with their own minds. Patañjali thus is a very good instance of an early dialectician who can go deep into the subtleties of thought.

We have seen that philosophical problems pertaining to the eternity or otherwise of *śabda* (word), the relation of word and meaning and the like came to be discussed in the school of Grammar from even before the times of Yāska (seventh century B.C.), and associated with these was the problem of change or modification. The six *bhāva-vikāras* (modes of becoming) were analysed and propounded by Vārṣayāṇi and both Yāska and Patañjali quote his words ('*jāyate asti vipariṇamate vardhate'pakṣyate vinaśyati*'). Patañjali gives a very good definition of two kinds of *nityatā* (eternality)—*kūṭastha* (abso-

lutely unchanging) and *pariṇāmin* (changing, undergoing modification). The grammarians generally hold that *śabda* being eternal cannot be modified; even when *sandhi* takes place, another letter is substituted, but words do not undergo a change. The influence of different trends of philosophical thought, especially of Sāṃkhya, Vedānta, Śaivism, came to be felt even in non-metaphysical subjects, e.g. Vyākaraṇa, Kāvya-Śāstra, etc. and made the propounders of these subjects treat their categories in their light. This inspired later grammarians, notably Bhartṛhari (fifth century A.D.) and others to go ahead, and we find Bhartṛhari and others speaking of Śabda-Brahman (Logos) and evolving a philosophy of Language. In the opening verse of the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari has referred to the doctrine of *vivarta* (unreal projection; according to some *vivarta* = *pariṇāma*) with a view to show the process by which the world is said to have evolved in the shape of *artha* (object, meaning) from the imperishable *śabda-tattva*. The Grammarians especially those coming after Bhartṛhari regard *śabda* as identical with Brahman. This shows the eminence to which *Vāk*, speech was raised as a philosophical subject and the amount of thinking and contemplation that enabled the thinkers to arrive at this conclusion. To them *śabda* is not just a lifeless mechanism invented as a symbol for denoting an object, but represents the thought-stuff which accounts for the creation of the world. This *śabda* is of the nature of *Sphoṭa*.

The Vaiyākaraṇas, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas in particular have devoted much attention to, and indulged in, polemics in connection with the doctrine of *Sphoṭa*; entire *prakaraṇas* (manuals) were written to support and confute this doctrine. The doctrine of *Sphoṭa* can be clearly traced from the times of Patañjali if not earlier (—it may be noted that Pāṇini mentions one *Sphotāyana*—), but it gained strength and greater importance after the philosophical speculations of Bhartṛhari (see *Vākyapadīya* 1.23, 73 ff). Later grammarians, especially Śeṣakṛṣṇa (! 600 A.D.), Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita (1630 A.D.), Koṇḍabhaṭṭa (Bhaṭṭoji's nephew) and Nāgeśa (latter part of seventeenth century) have dealt with the problem of *Sphoṭa*.

in greater detail and advanced arguments in defence of *Sphoṭa*. Their works are of a dialectical character and they have shown prolixity in enunciating as many as eight different forms of *Sphoṭa* — *varṇa-sphoṭa*, *pada-sphoṭa*, *vākya-sphoṭa*, *akhaṇḍapada-sphoṭa*, *akhaṇḍa-vākya-sphoṭa*, *varṇajāti-sphoṭa*, *padajāti-sphoṭa*, *vākya-jāti-sphoṭa* (see Bhattoji's *Śabdakaustubha* in which all these classifications have been dealt with). In order to show that *Sphoṭa* alone is expressive of sense, Nāgeśa attempts to explain the origin of *vāk* with reference to cosmogony. After the annihilation of the cosmic world, accompanied by a complete cessation of all activity, *Māyā*, the creative function is finally absorbed in the infinite consciousness. When the Supreme being feels the necessity of creation, His potentiality takes the form of a *bindu*—a subtle point retaining in itself immense power and combining the three *guṇas*. This is, in reality, an inexhaustible source of energy (*śakti-tattva*). The unconscious part is called *bīja*; the part representing a mixture of both *cit* (consciousness) and *acit* (unconsciousness) is known as *nāda* (sound) and the intelligent element is called *bindu*. Regarded as the ultimate source of all forms of *vāk*, this *nāda* is called *Śabda-brahman*.¹⁰ The inspiration of the Tāntrika school is evident here.

Coming to Bhartṛhari again, though his mode of treatment is generally a direct one, he at times criticises the views of other schools of thought. Vātsyāyana, the author of the *Nyāya-Sūtra* states in his definition of perception (1. 1. 4.) that it is *avyapadeśya* (inexpressible); that is to say, words do not form a part of perceptual knowledge though it may be conveyed in terms of words. The Buddhists hold that words refer to only concepts and have no reference whatsoever to reality. Bhartṛhari on the other hand is emphatically of the opinion that there can be no knowledge without words which enter into the very texture of all knowledge. It is only through the instrumentality of *vāk* that the internal consciousness assumes an audible form and communication is possible. 'No language, no thought' argues Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari further

says that *vāk* represents all different branches of science and arts, and that names or distinguishing stamps are given to objects only through the medium of *vāk*, otherwise the world would have remained an unnameable and indiscernible concatenation of things. Definition and classification have been made possible only by virtue of *vāk*.¹¹ Bhartṛhari has taken note of the different views current among the ancient teachers in respect of the origin of sound, and has shown how air, atom and knowledge have each been treated as capable of developing into *śabda*.¹²

Bhartṛhari has similarly discussed the view of the Pada-vādins and the Vākyavādins among the grammarians. Though the adherents of the doctrine of *sphoṭa* take all *śabda* to be indivisible and eternal and look upon all disintegration (e.g. of a word into *prakṛti* and *pratyaya*) as purely artificial, the value of such a procedure that furnishes an instrument to get at the meaning of words cannot be denied. There are three forms in which words generally appear—sentence, inflected form and the radical element. Of these, a sentence is the logical unit or the significant part of speech. Words have no independent existence apart from a sentence. According to the Vākyavādins who take a sentence to be indivisible and the only significant unit, the analysis of a sentence into its constituents i.e. *padas* is only artificial, but recourse is taken to this process however imaginary, as it provides the only means of showing the meaning of a sentence. The Padavādins, on the other hand, hold that *padas* are real and seek to prove the unreality of a *vākya* as an indivisible unit. A sentence is nothing but an aggregate of *padas* and as such has no existence apart from its constituents, viz. *padas*. The *padas* though essentially indivisible are analysed into *prakṛti* and *pratyaya* in order to bring out their significance. The view of Pāṇini and Patañjali as explained by Bhartṛhari shows that they were on the side of the Vākyavādins.¹³ We need not pursue this inquiry further as this is sufficient to show that the dialectical mode of presentation was very much used in the schools of grammar also.

Śabda is pre-eminently the basis on which the structure of the grammatical science rests. As *śabda* is intimately related to thought and logic, the scope of grammar becomes immensely wide. The categories of grammar, viewed widely, comprehend almost all those enumerated by the Vaiśeṣikas — *jāti-vyakti*, *sāmānādhikaraṇya* (co-inherence), *samavāya*, *hetu* and *karaṇa*, *dravya*, *guṇa*, *sambandha*, *avayava-avayavin*, *prakṛti-vikṛti* and *śakti* (potency). The inclusion of *śakti* in the grammatical categories is a departure from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view-point. The grammarians regard space and time (*dik-kāla*) not as *dravya* as the Naiyāyikas do, but as *śakti* inherent in objects. The concept of *anvaya-vyatireka* is common to both grammar and logic from very early times. Language has moreover its peculiar logic, that is to say, it follows a number of principles, as one finds in the rules of grammar, e.g. A verb should agree with the subject in number and person and so on. These *paribhāṣās* or generalised statements have been classified as (a) *vācanikī*, used as *sūtra* by older grammarians; (b) *jñāpaka*, deduced from the interpretation of Pāṇini's rules; (c) *nyāya*—referring to the axioms either taken from the experience of ordinary life or established by logical deductions. There are two forms of *nyāya*—*nyāya siddha* (logical deduction), and *lokanyāya-siddha* (whose truth is proved by the facts of daily life; e.g. (*na vā*) *sannipātu-lakṣaṇo vidhir animittam tad-vighātasya* (Kātyāyana's *Paribhāṣā-vārttika*, 3 under 1.1 39) —That which is taught in a rule the application of which is occasioned by the combination (of two things), does not become the cause of the destruction of that combination. This (*paribhāṣā*) is founded on the maxim that one must not be the cause of the destruction of that wherefrom it derives its very existence.

Thus grammar like all philosophical systems has its own categories and is ultimately based on principles that are strictly rational. The study of grammar on philosophical lines started mainly with Patañjali who in his *Mahābhāṣya* has given the problems of grammar a philosophical character. The system of

grammar has been treated by Mādhavācārya in his *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* as a system of philosophy (Pāṇinīya-darśana). Grammar at a very early period ceased to be looked upon as merely an artifice, and was regarded as embodying the principles of spontaneous growth. A careful study of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* enabled Bhartṛhari to explain the principles of grammar from a purely philosophical stand point. With him grammar became a real philosophy of language and he himself treated it as such. The philosophy of Grammar is a very good instance showing how in early times man's urge to know and his reasoning faculty accompanied by some intuitive insight could take him to philosophical heights.

Grammar has influenced Kāvyaśāstra (Poetics) to a very great extent as can be seen from the classification of the figures of speech, especially *upamā* (simile), and the treatment of *sphoṭa*, meaning of word and the like problems. The discipline that has greatly encroached upon the field of grammar is Logic which has given the stamp of subtlety to all later speculations on grammar. The advent of the school of Navya-Nyāya with its precise though scholastic construction and phraseology exercised such a tremendous influence on grammar that it became almost impossible to free the later grammatical speculations from the grip of Neo-logic. Jagadīśa (the author of the *Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā*) and Gadādhara (the author of the *Vyutpattivāda*) have treated the problems of grammar in such a way as to turn grammar into a branch of study offering immense opportunities for the display of logical niceties. Their works though dealing with grammatical topics pertain more to logic than to grammar as such. Nevertheless this adds to the clarification of the grammatical topics as well.

This will give an idea of what proliferation grammar acquired mainly due to dialectical inquiries and criticisms and discussions with adherents of other schools. Dialectical criticism within the schools of grammar itself has helped immensely in the development of grammatical theories and given it the status of a system of philosophy (*darśana*).

Dialectical Criticism in works on Kāvyaśāstra (Poetics)

In the field of Poetics likewise we find much by way of growth as a result of dialectical examination and refutation of theories, and the gradual rise and development of the schools of *Rasa* (sentiment), *Alaṅkāra*, *Rīti* (style) and *Dhvani* (suggestion) and *Vakrokti* (artistic expression). These theories were not really in conflict with one another for all recognised that *rasa*, etc. are indispensable in good literature. But different schools attached relatively more importance to any one of these than to the rest, and this accounts for the different definitions of *kāvya*. Important questions pertaining to *rasa* that were asked and attempted to be answered in different ways were : Where does *rasa* reside ? What is the nature of *rasa* ? How is it evolved and realised ? How many *rasas* are there ? and so on

These gave rise to different theories, viz. *Utpattivāda* of Lollaṭa, *Anumitivāda* of Śaṅkuka, *Bhuktivāda* of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (about 1000 A.D.) and *Abhivyaktivāda* of Abhinavagupta (980–1020 A.D.) and his followers like Mammaṭa (1050–1100 A.D.), Hemacandra and others, holding respectively that *rasa* is produced, inferred, relished and manifested through suggestion. The significance of ‘*alaṅkāra*’, the recognition of the importance of *alaṅkāra* in *kāvya*, and the number of *alaṅkāras* recognised have also varied from time to time. Bhāmaha (seventh century) and Daṇḍin along with Udbhaṭa (800 A.D.), Rudraṇa (ninth century) and Pratihārenduraja (tenth century) are the main exponents of the *Alaṅkāra* school. Vāmana (about 800 A.D.) is the foremost known representative of the *Rīti*-school, and even Daṇḍin gives a lengthy exposition of what are called *ritis* by others. Ānandavardhana (ninth century) makes little of *ritis*; instead he dilates on *saṅghaṭanā* (composition), and recommends that in a good *kāvya* we must look for its inner or suggested meaning which is its real essence. With the *Dhvanivādins*, notably Abhinavagupta, poetics turns into a subject that can stand logical treatment and results in a philosophy of poetry which sees in the aesthetic feel an

experience comparable to the spiritual experience of one who has realised Brahman though Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka also earlier gave this very comparison. The Dhvani theory is controverted by Mahimabhaṭṭa (eleventh century), who in his *Vyaktiviveka*, sees no reason for recognising *dhvani* (suggestion) as a special mode of thought because it can be subsumed under inference. Kuntaka, the author of the *Vakrokti* held that artistic expression (*vakrokti*) is the very life-breath of poetry. Before the theory of *Dhvani* secured general acceptance, it was fiercely criticised by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Pratiḥarendurāja, Mahimabhaṭṭa and others.

Some of the problems and topics that came up most for discussion are : What is the distinguishing faculty that makes a poet—*pratibhā* (genius or creative imagination) primarily, to be cultivated by *vyutpatti* (study, scholarship) and *abhyāsa* (practice), or all the three together? What is the definition of *kāvya*? What is *kāvya* conducive to? Should poetic conventions be adhered to? Should the reading of *kāvya* be encouraged, especially in view of the fact that it deals with unreal, imaginary things? Are *doṣas* (defects) positive or are they negations of *guṇas* (excellences), and similarly are *guṇas* mere negations of *doṣas*, or are they positive in character? How many *rasas* are there? There were also mutual criticisms and controversies with regard to minor and finer points e.g. the kinds of poetry, the divisions of *upamā*, the division of *śleṣa* (paronomasia) into *śabda-śleṣa* and *artha-śleṣa* and its relation to other figures of speech, interpretation of expressions and figures of speech, meaning of words and the like topics.¹⁴

From this we can get an idea of the continuous growth Kāvya-śāstra or Alaṅkāra-śāstra witnessed through the centuries and the questions that were repeatedly asked and discussed and answered in connection with *kāvya* (literature). In this process, the knowledge of other branches of learning, especially grammar, logic and philosophy played an important part. The word '*dhvani*' was borrowed from the grammarians who employed the word '*dhvani*' to signify sound which manifests *Sphoṭa*. The discussion as to the meaning of words (individual, genus,

etc.) is mostly based on the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Vākyapadīya*. The subdivisions of *upamā* (simile) have been based on the rules of grammar by Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha (fourteenth century) and others. Vāmana deals in the fifth *adhikaraṇa* of his *Kāvyaṭīkāra-sūtra* with the grammatical purity of words and so does Bhāmaha in the sixth *pariccheda* of his *Kāvyaṭīkāra*. Tarkaśāstra deals with the denotative power (*abhidhā-śakti*) of words and the same topic is discussed in works on Poetics. Ālaṅkārikas regard *anumāna* as a figure of speech, and the name *Kāvyaṭīkāra* is also suggested by the Nyāya terminology, only here the *līṅga* is a poetical one, Mahimabhaṭṭa wrote his *Vyaktiviveka*, abounding in polemics, to establish that *dhvani* comes under *anumāna* or logical inference; and Śaṅkuka appears to have held that *rasa* is *anumeya* and the *vibhāvas* are *anumāpaka*. Logic and Grammar along with other disciplines are regarded as indispensable constituents of the equipment of a writer.

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā has similarly given some doctrines and figures of speech (e.g. *arthūpatti*, *parisaṅkhyā*) to Poetics. While discussing the meaning of words, the Ālaṅkārikas refer to the Abhihitānvayavāda and Anvitābhidhānavāda and even admit their indebtedness to works on Vyākaraṇa and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. The Buddhist theory of *apoha* is also referred to and criticised. In dealing with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory of *rasa* frequent reference is made to the three *guṇas* of Sāṃkhya philosophy. The word '*bhoga*' recalls the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the correlation of *purusa* and *Prakṛti*. Philosophy, especially the Vedānta philosophy, has given rise to the concept of 'the soul of poetry' (*kāvyaśya ātmā*) and some writers e.g. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa and Jagannātha (seventeenth century) equate the state of *rasa*-realisation with that of Brahman-realisation. The view as to the state of *rasa*-realisation also differs according as the Sāṃkhya or the Vedānta or the Pratyabhijñā view is adhered to. Thus the Ālaṅkārikas derived their inspiration for the growth and dialectical examination of the theories of poetics from different branches of

learning and schools of philosophical thought, and the mode of exposition adopted in *Alaṅkāraśāstra* consequently became all the richer. The later *Ālaṅkārikas* did not even fail to adopt the methodology of Navya-Nyāya for the discussion of their problems. Jagannātha's *Rasagaṅgādhara* bears ample testimony to the influence on him of the Navya-Nyāya methodology and dialectical criticism of his age, so also do the works of Appayya Dīksita and Viśveśvara. Discussion of poetical theories in this novel method adds clarity and precision both in thought and language, though at times this results in much hair-splitting.

All theorists from Bhāmaha or Daṇḍin to Jagannātha regard *śabda* (word) and *artha* (meaning) as constituting what they call the 'body' of poetry (*kāvya-śarīra*). Vāmana can be said to have initiated the search for the 'soul' of poetry (*kāvyaśya ātmā*) when he regarded *riti* (style, as the soul of poetry; the Dhvanikāra i.e. Ānandavardhana completes the metaphor when he defines the relation of the body and the soul of poetry and implies in *Dhvanyāloka* 2.7 that the suggestion of sentiment is this soul, the *guṇas* being compared to natural qualities like courage, etc. which inhere in it and the *alaṅkāras* to external ornaments like bracelets which adorn the body. We shall consider the dialectical examination of a few problems of *Alaṅkāra-śāstra* as found in the works of some of the main *Ālaṅkārikas* so as to form some estimate of their dialectical skill and modes.

Dealing with the adornment of poetry, Bhāmaha states that its adornment, *rūpaka* (metaphor) and the like, is propounded by some in several ways; even the charming face of a damsel does not shine if stripped of ornament. Others say that *rūpaka* and the like embellishments are extraneous; they regard the proper formation of words or grammatical correctness as adornment. But the proper presentation of ideas is not the same as that. Bhāmaha prefers a combination of both, viz. elegant words and elegant ideas.¹⁵ Bhāmaha attacks the two-fold classification of poetry into Vaidarbha and Gauḍīya

(*Kāvya-lanikāra* 1.31-33). He warns the poets against making their poetry obscure, as of the character of *prahelikā* (riddles), etc. If such compositions which are intelligible with the help of commentaries constitute poems poetry means joy for wise men only, and the dull-witted persons are damned.¹⁶ Bhāmaha not recognising *hetu*, *sūkṣma* and *leśa* as *alanikāras* argues that the statement of matters of routine does not involve any artistic expression. "The sun has set, the moon shines; birds fly to their nests"—Is all this poetry? Verily, it is a matter-of-fact description¹⁷ Bhāmaha contends that there is an element of *atiśayokti* or *vakrokti* (artistic expression) in all poetry (2.85-87). Bhāmaha, it can be seen, states the views of others and then states and gives a brief exposition of his own view, but his manner of refutation is not a fully reasoned out one. Similarly, Daṇḍin while discussing the controversy regarding the figure of speech in '*limpatva tamo'ṅgāni...*' refers to the sentence-meaning according to the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiyākaraṇas (*Kāvya-darśa*, II 226-233).

In the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana, we find discussions which fully reveal his dialectical skill as also the dialectical modes prevalent at the time. We may, by way of an instance, consider Ānandavardhana's arguments establishing the independent existence of the suggested meaning apart from the expressed meaning. He initiates this discussion in the first Uddyota (1 ff) of his work and carries it on and even improves upon it in the third Uddyota (33). Poets are justified in availing themselves initially of the conventional meaning though the suggested meaning is aimed at. Just as the purport of a sentence is grasped only through the meaning of individual words, so the knowledge of the suggested meaning is arrived at only through the medium of the expressed meaning. Though by its own power the word-import conveys the sentence-purport, it escapes notice once this latter has been conveyed; similarly the suggested meaning flashes suddenly across the truth-perceiving minds of appreciative persons when they are indifferent towards the conventional meaning. That kind of

poetry, wherein either the (conventional) meaning or the word renders itself or its meaning secondary and suggests the implied meaning, is designated by the learned as *dhvani* or suggestive poetry (1.10.13).

Before establishing his theory of *Dhvani*, Ānandavardhana takes note dialectically of the rival view of the Abhāvavādins, those who negative it or regard it as the same as *lakṣaṇā*, and of those who regard it as beyond expression. A prima-facie view is that there is nothing like *dhvani* (suggestion) that is different from the *guṇas*, figures of sound and sense, *rīti* (style) or *vṛtti* (literary modes of diction) which add charm to poetry whose body is constituted by sound and sense. Others may contend: Suggestion does not exist indeed, for a species of poetry opposed to all well-known canons necessarily ceases to be poetry. And just because a coterie of critics unanimously bring into currency a designation '*dhvani*' this cannot win the universal acceptance of the learned. Some others explain the non-existence of *dhvani* differently. No novel thing like *dhvani* can be possible. Since it is not distinct from a source of charm, it naturally comes under the causes of charm, *alāṅkāra*, etc. Just giving a new name to one of them will not make it an independent category by itself. Moreover, since the ways of speech are endless, even if there be some insignificant element left unexplained by the famous framers of the rules of poetry, there is no reason why persons should close their eyes under the assumed illusion of being *sahṛdayas* (cultured critics) and dance about with joy saying that they have discovered '*dhvani*' among these. Thousands of great men have expounded and are expounding figurative elements of speech. But we do not hear of any such state from them. Therefore, *dhvani* (suggestion) is only an idle supposition which cannot stand any scrutiny. Another such view (—that of Udbhaṭa—) is that it is the indicated sense that is the soul of poetry, and suggestion is not different from the secondary usage of words. Still others, who fight shy of framing a definition, say that the true nature of *dhvani* is beyond all

words and is discernible only by the minds of cultured critics (*sahṛdaya*)¹⁸

Ānandavardhana refutes these arguments. As to what is said, viz. Suggestion does not exist, for a species of poetry opposed to all well known canons will necessarily cease to be poetry—it is unsound. This is so because it may be unfamiliar to writers on poetics who are concerned with giving definitions; but if one examines the best specimens of literature, one finds that *dhvani* alone emerges as the most intrinsic principle of poetry, delighting all *sahṛdayas*, and not word and sense. All else is only pictorial (*citram eva*). The other objection that *dhvani* can be included under the recognised sources of charm, and so should not be regarded as distinct, is also not proper. Can suggestion which is based on the relation of the suggested sense to the suggesting word be comprehended by a theory which is based on the relation of only the conventional meaning to the denotative word? The sources of charm of the conventional meaning and words can only be ancillary to *dhvani*, but never identical with it. It may be argued that such instances (of figures of speech) (e.g. *anuprāsa*, etc.) in which no implied meaning is clearly discernible may be regarded as incapable of subsuming *dhvani*, but *dhvani* can certainly be subsumed under such *alaṅkāras* (figures of speech) as *samāsokti*, *ākṣepa*, *viśeṣokti*, *paryāyokta*, *apahnuti*, *dīpaka*, etc. as the implied meaning is clearly discerned here. But it is in order to refute such an argument that Ānandavardhana inserts the expression 'renders itself or its meaning secondary' while explaining the concept of *dhvani* (1.13). The idea is that when in a work of poetry an explicit meaning renders itself secondary or when a word renders its own denotative meaning secondary, and each of these suggests another sense, we call it *dhvani-kāvya* (suggestive poetry). How can this suggestion be subsumed under the said *alaṅkāras*? Suggestion is possible only when the suggested element is exclusively important. Ānandavardhana explains why this is not the case with *samāsokti*, etc. Moreover, *alaṅkāras*, *guṇas*, *vṛttis* are only the limbs (*aṅga*) of

poetry (*kāvya*), whereas poetry in its entirety, of which these are the limbs, is called *dhvani*. A part cannot be separately looked upon as the whole. Even if identity is possible in some instances, suggestive poetry cannot be looked upon as conditioned by its *aṅgas*, since its sphere is very extensive. That is to say, the *aṅgas* may be subsumed under *dhvani*, but *dhvani* can under no circumstances be subsumed under the *aṅgas* ¹⁹

The expression 'is designated by the learned' brings out the fact that this designation was first devised by the learned and that it has not gained currency in a haphazard fashion. The foremost among the learned are grammarians, because all studies are rooted in grammar. The grammarians refer to articulate letters by the term '*dhvani*'. In the same way, since the element of *vyāñjakatva* (suggestivity) was common to both, not only the word and its meaning but its essential verbal power and also that which is usually referred to by the term '*kāvya*' were called '*dhvani*' by other learned men who were the followers of the grammarians, and who had a profound insight into the fundamental truth of poetry. The treatment then of such a comprehensive concept as *dhvani* with all its divisions and subdivisions is not at all at par with the enumeration of the particular well-known figures of speech and hence the enthusiasm of persons who can appreciate the value of suggestion is quite proper, and no one should out of jealousy direct vitiated or misguided intelligence against them. The advocates of the view that *dhvani* is non-existent have been thus refuted.

The view that Suggestion is the same as Indication is answered as follows : Suggestion (*dhvani*) is not identical with Indication (*lakṣaṇā*), because there is difference of nature between the two. *Dhvani* cannot also be defined by that, as the faults of the definition being too wide (*ativyāpti*) and too narrow (*avyāpti*) would result if this were admitted. Indication is only figurative application of words, while that

is *dhvani* wherein a sense different from the sense denoted and the denoting expression is conveyed by these by way of purport, the sense implied being exclusively important. One may perhaps urge that indication may not be identical with suggestion but it can at least be regarded as a defining characteristic of the latter. The answer to this is that such a definition would be too wide or too narrow. The fault of *ativyāpti* would be there since indication can exist even where there is no suggestion. Even in instances where no excessive charm due to suggestion is present, poets are seen to employ words figuratively in accordance with the established usage, e.g. 'This bed of lotus-leaves bespeaks the torment of the emaciated damsel who slept on it' (*Kṛśāṅgyāḥ santiāpam vadati bisinīpattraśayanam*). Only that word, which conveys a charm impossible of communication by any other expression and which is pregnant with suggestive force, is fit to be called 'suggestive'; whereas in the above-mentioned case, the word does not become a source of suggesting any charm that cannot be communicated by other expressions. Words which signify by common usage meanings other than what they primarily denote, as for instance, the word *lāvaṇya*, do not become instances of suggestion. As a matter of fact, indication is grounded on the primary denotative force of words. How can it possibly be a definition of suggestion (*dhvani*) whose sole support is suggestivity (*vyañjakatva*)? The definition that Suggestion is Indication is also too narrow as indication does not cover instances of suggestion like *vivakṣitānyaparavācya* (that with meant but further extending expressed sense). At the most, it might serve as a pointer to, or indicator (*upalakṣaṇa*) of one of the kinds of suggestion, and still if one asserts that suggestion is defined by indication, then one may as well say that the act of defining individual figures is sheer waste since the primary denotation of words defines the entire group of all individual figures. If it is said that the definition of suggestion has already been propounded by others, then this will only substantiate the doctrine of *Dhvani*, and the object of the Dhvanivādins, viz,

proving the existence of suggestion will have been realised without any special effort.²⁰

Even those who declare that the nature of suggestion is only within the experience of *sahṛdayas* and that it is inexpressible, betray only their lack of discernment. The general definition of suggestion and the definitions of its several varieties have been set forth by Ānandavardhana, and yet if it be thought of as 'inexpressible', then this would be true of everything in the world. If on the other hand by this exaggeration they are only giving expression to the all-surpassing nature of suggestion, then they also may be regarded as stating the truth itself.²¹

It may be noted that the analogy of word-import and sentence-purport given above to explain how the suggested sense is arrived at through the expressed sense (1.10) is revised in the third Uddyota (33) in view of strict logical accuracy. The analogy of word-import and sentence-import does not quite apply to the expressed and suggested senses since only some thinkers (not all) admit the reality of word-import (—in the opinion of others it is unreal). Even those who do not hold that it is unreal will have to agree that the analogy of the relation between the jar and its material cause will explain in a better way the relation between sentence-purport and word-import. Just as the material causes (viz. pot-sherds) of a jar cannot be apprehended separately after the jar has come into being, so also word and its sense are not apprehended separately after the sentence and its purport have been apprehended as a whole. If they could be recognised separately, the very apprehension of the whole sentence-purport would be brushed away. But this principle does not hold good in the case of the expressed and the suggested senses. When the suggested sense is apprehended the expressed sense is not brushed away, since the apprehension of the suggested sense is inseparably occasioned by the apprehension of the expressed. Hence the analogy of the jar and the lamp would fit them best. Just as the light of the lamp does not recede when the apprehension of jar

has arisen, so also the expressed sense continues to be apprehended even after the apprehension of the suggested sense has been acquired. Hence the remark in the first Uddyota (10) aims only at pointing out the similarity between the two in respect of their being means to some end, and the analogy is not intended to be pursued farther than this.²² Ānandavardhana again indulges in a lengthy discussion concerning the suggested sense, the distinction of suggestive power (*vyañjanā śakti*) from the power of denotation (*abhidhā*) and the power of indication (*lakṣaṇā*) and so on. He also explains how the theory of suggestion is compatible with the view of the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas. The author has recourse to dialectical modes in order to establish the suggestivity of words as this theory must have met with severe opposition from the adherents of the Ālaṅkāra and the Rīti schools. The discussion here is more subtle than in the first Uddyota.

Ānandavardhana, like all dialecticians, always has in view an opponent and expounds his theory by anticipating the arguments of opponents and refuting them. Like an exponent of any other school of thought he marshals his argument within the limit of the categories recognised by his school-men and goes ahead on the strength of these. He also tries to compare his theory of word and meaning with that of thinkers of other schools who have thought over this point. In subtlety of thought, critical acumen and dialectical skill, Ānandavardhana can be compared with some of the best exponents of other schools of philosophy. Abhinavagupta who commented on Bharata's *Nāṭya-śāstra* and Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* is also a profound thinker and he appears to be a greater adept in using dialectical arguments. With his profound insight and greater dialectical skill he is able to give a clearer and a more systematic exposition of the various problems of Poetics propounded before him. He gave a turn to the whole discipline of Poetics and a completeness unknown before him. Mammaṭa, in fact, largely crystallised the teachings of Abhinava in his *Kāvyaprakāśa*. Hemacandra repeatedly expresses his

indebtedness to Abhinavagupta. The writings of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta influenced greatly all later Ālaṅkārikas, among them being such great names as Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha. Mammaṭa's indirect criticism of Mahimabhaṭṭa's theory of *Kāvyaṇumiti*, (*Kāvya-prakāśa*, Ullāsa, 5) is full of logical terms and subtleties. And Viśvanātha's detailed exposition of the definition of *kāvya* in the light of the definitions given by others is a fine sample of dialectical criticism (*Sāhityadarpaṇa*, 1).

Jagannātha was skilful in the use of the dialectical mode of Navya-Nyāya, as can be seen from his great work *Rasagaṅgādhara*. We may, by way of illustration, see how he supports his definition of poetry. Jagannātha defines poetry as *śabda* (word, expression) expressing a beautiful sense (*ramaṇīyārtha-pratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ kāvyam*). Beauty (*ramaṇīyatā*) consists in being the object of a knowledge which causes transcendental (*lokottara*) pleasure (to *sahṛdayas*). *Lokottaratva* ('transcendence') is a particular class-character subsisting in pleasure, evidenced by experience and also called *camatkāratva* (strikingness). The knowledge giving rise to pleasure determined by *lokottaratva* is a particular kind of contemplation (*bhāvanā*) of the nature of repeated or continuous cognition. When a man is told, 'A son is born to you', or 'I shall give you wealth', he derives great pleasure, but this pleasure is not of the *lokottara* (transcendental) type; and so such sentences have no beauty and consequently do not come to be called poetry. Thus it comes to this that *kāvya* is *śabda* conveying a meaning which is the object of *bhāvanā* (contemplation) giving rise to *camatkāra* (strikingness or sense of surprise at the unusual), or it is word the contemplation of the meaning of which determines its productivity of *camatkāra*; or it is that which possesses *camatkāratva* on account of having the capacity to convey a meaning which determines the productivity (of transcendental pleasure) qualified by itself (*camatkāratva*)²³.

The utility of inserting 'bhāvanā' instead of *jñāna* as in the original definition is explained thus : *jñāna* can also comprehend *samūhā lambana-jñāna*, cognitive aggregation having a number of things and their *prakāras*(qualifiers) as its object; of these some may be *ramaṇīya*, others not; and yet the *samūhā lambana jñāna* would have to be recognised as giving rise to *camatkāra*; and a statement pertaining to jar, cloth and the like though expressing an *aramaṇīyārtha*, would have to be called a *kāvya* when it becomes the object of a *samūhā lambana jñāna* along with a *ramaṇīyārtha*. To exclude such cases, 'bhāvanā' is inserted in the place of 'jñāna'. *Bhāvanā* is a chain of repeated linking cognitions (*punaḥ-punar-anusandhāna*). Thus the definition is saved from the fault of *ativyāpti*. Nevertheless, *bhāvanā* can include *dhārāvāhika jñāna* or continuous cognition which may pertain to 'dry or *aramaṇīya* things, and not to *ramaṇīya* things alone. To avert this difficulty, Jagannātha adds that this *bhāvanā* must be such as produces *camatkāra*, the capacity to produce *camatkāra* being found in *kāvya* limited by *camatkāratva*. The last definition has the additional merit of being in a simpler and more convenient form. Thus Jagannātha has attempted to bring precision to his own definition of *kāvya* by limiting the meanings of words and thus overcoming flaws in the definition. 'Yat-tat' is dispensed with in the last definition.

Jagannātha then goes on to criticise the definitions given by Mammaṭa and others. According to Mammaṭa, word and sense devoid of *dosas* and full of *guṇas* and with or without *alamkṛti* (poetic embellishment) constitute a *kāvya* (*adoṣau śabdārihāv saguṇāv analamkṛtī punaḥ kvā pi—Kāvya prakāśa*, 1.4) Examining this definition, Jagannātha says that word and sense cannot together constitute *kāvya*, because there is no proof to support this. Universal usage (*viśvajanīna-vyavahāra*) such as 'Kāvya is read aloud', 'From *kāvya*, meaning is understood'; 'Kāvya is heard but meaning is not known' would convince us that the import of the term '*kāvya*' is only *śabda* (word) and not sense. It may be urged that the word *kāvya* in such cases secondarily means or indicates *śabda*

alone, whereas its primary meaning is *śabda* and *artha* together. The answer to this is that this would be so if there were some evidence to support this, but we see none, and a statement about which there are different opinions cannot be relied upon. When there is no evidence to show that '*kāvya*' means *śabda* and *artha* together, who can prevent the word '*kāvya*' from primarily denoting '*śabda*' as can be seen from the above-mentioned usage. In the absence of decisive proof (*vinigamanābhāva*) the view that *kāvya* means both *śabda* and *artha* cannot be upheld, and when it is thus shown that *kāvya* means a particular kind of *śabda*, the definition should be formulated accordingly and not in accordance with the meaning imagined by oneself. This is true of the definitions of *Veda*, *Purāṇa*, etc., otherwise the same endless difficulty will arise there also. The view that *kāvya* is that which is conducive to the realisation of relish (*rasa*) or unalloyed pleasure, and that this holds good in the case of both *śabda* and *artha*—is not proper. This definition is too wide and can include within its scope non-*kāvyas* like musical tunes and even ancillaries of a dramatic performance (viz. acting, costume, speech) which are also capable of producing a thrill in the audience, as admitted by *Ānandavardhana* and other *Ālaṅkārikas*. This also refutes the definition '*kāvyam rasodbodhakam*'. Moreover, does *kāvyatva* reside in *śabda* and *artha* together or separately? The former alternative is not tenable, since it will mean that since neither *śabda* nor *artha* alone is to be called *kāvya*, one will have to say that a sentence in the form of a beautiful verse is not *kāvya*, just as one says 'one is not two' (even though one and one make two). The other alternative is also not acceptable because of the fact that it would lead us to accept *śabda* and *artha* each by itself as *kāvya*, and then a single *kāvya* would come to be spoken of as two *kāvyas*. Therefore the definition of *kāvya* like that of *Veda* or *Purāṇa* rests on *śabda*. The insertion of *guṇa*, *alaṅkāra*, etc. also is not proper, because then the definition will not apply to such *kāvyas* as '*uditam maṇḍalam vidhoḥ*' (the orb of the moon has

arisen) which is uttered by a *dūti*, *abhisārikā* or *virahinī* and which is meant to suggest respectively that one should go out to meet the lover or not do so, or to suggest that life is flickering away, as also to such a *kāvya* as 'gato'stam arkaḥ', (the sun has set); and yet it is not possible to deny the name '*kāvya*' to it (—though devoid of *guṇa* and *alaṅkāra* they are very good instances of *kāvya* as they reveal a charming suggested sense). And what you recognise as *kāvya* can similarly be negated as one. The life-breath of *kāvya*, viz strikingness (*camatkāritva*) is as much present in the above two instances as in what you regard as *kāvya*. *Guṇa* and *alaṅkāra* are not found in all *kāvyas* and so should not be mentioned in the definition. *Guṇa* and *alaṅkāra* cannot be given any secondary meaning unless their primary meaning comes into conflict with the popular usage 'a bad poem'. It may be urged that even as a tree which is connected with a bird can also be said to have absence of connection, so even what is possessed of fault can be said to be devoid of fault (*dosa*). This is not tenable. We have the apprehension that a tree which is connected with a bird at its root is not so connected at the branch, but we do not find any universally acceptable awareness that a composition is a *kāvya* in one part and not a *kāvya* in another. It cannot be said that the connection with defect in the case of a *kāvya* is *avyūpya-vṛtti*, present in only a part; either the whole *kāvya* is a *kāvya* or it is not a *kāvya*. *Guṇas* are the qualities of the soul (of poetry) viz. *dhvani*, just as courage etc. are (of the soul), and so cannot possibly be the constituents of the body of poetry (*śabda* and *artha*); similarly *alaṅkāras* only embellish the body, like the necklace, etc., so they also cannot constitute the body of poetry; hence *guṇa* and *alaṅkāra* should not form a part of the definition.

The view of Viśvanātha (fourteenth century) that only a sentence endowed with *rasa* (sentiment) is *kāvya* (*rasavad eva kāvyam*) is also not tenable, because thus *kāvyas* in which the *vastu* (plot, theme), or *alaṅkāra* predominates would come to be non-*kāvya*, and this is not something desirable for this

would result in the upsetting of the convention of great poets. The force, fall, whirling, etc. of a current of water, and the pranks of monkeys, children, etc. are described by poets, and it cannot be said that there is somehow some tinge of *rasa* even in these, for such a slight tinge of *rasa* can be found in such dry non-poetic statements as 'Cow is going', 'Deer is running' and so is inefficacious; that is to say, is not conducive to *kāvya*tya. It may only be said here that every *artha* can be classified as *vibhāva* (excitant), *anubhāva* (emotional response), or *vyabhicārin* (passing mood), and so there must be some element of *rasa* in every sentence.²⁴

Another important problem discussed by Jagannātha is that of *rasa-nispatti*. Jagannātha explains most of the interpretations of Bharata's view by later writers and criticising them finally follows the interpretation of Abhinavagupta, who also in his *Abhinavabhārati* on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* has given a detailed and dialectical exposition of this point.²⁵ The views of Bhaṭṭalollata, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭatauta, Bhaṭṭanāyaka, the Navyas (moderns) and others are examined. Each gives his own interpretation of *nispatti* (*utpatti*, *anumiti*, etc.) and explains the psychological reaction of the audience to a dramatic scene.

Jagannātha has criticised most the views of Appayya Dīkṣita (latter part of the sixteenth century), one of the first-rate Ālaṅkārikas of the post-dhvani period. Jagannātha refutes in his *Rasagaṅgādhara* and *Citramīmāṃsā-khaṇḍana* some important views of Appayya Dīkṣita as expounded in his *Citramīmāṃsā* and other works. In one of the introductory verses of the *Citramīmāṃsā-khaṇḍana*, Jagannātha emphasises the logic of his refutations and challenges any one to meet these in a dispassionate way. He has criticised Appayya Dīkṣita in respect of the interpretation of certain stanzas so as to bring out the suggested meaning and in connection with the definition, classification and interpretation of figures of speech and the like. Nāgeśa (eighteenth century), Jagannātha's commentator has tried to vindicate Appayya Dīkṣita's standpoint at

many places. The works of these writers provide a good instance of the dialectical exercise in the sphere of Ālaṅkāra-śāstra.

The works on Ālaṅkāra-śāstra are far too numerous to allow systematic treatment in a few pages. We have therefore after briefly giving an account of the growth of dialectical problems considered the discussion of two topics by two well-known Ālaṅkārikas, one of them Jagannatha being also under the influence of Navya-Nyāya methodology. We may now note the topic of *doṣas* which has much in common with the *nigrahasthānas* of dialectic. These give us some idea of the minimum requirement expected of composition including the language of debates and dialectical writings. The faults mentioned by Bharata in his *Nāṭyaśāstra* (16. 84) are :— (1) *gūḍhārtha*, circumlocution or periphrasis, (2) *arthāntara*, irrelevant digression, (3) *arthahīna*, incoherence or multiplicity of meaning, (4) *bhinnārtha*—(a) rusticity or want of refined expression or (b) changing the desired sense by another sense, (5) *ekārtha*, tautology, (6) *abhiplutārtha*, aggregation of complete clauses or expressions without merging them into a complete sentence, (7) *nyāyād apeta*, defective logic, (8) *viṣama*, defective metre, (9) *visandhi*, disjunction in which the words are not well knit, (10) *śabda-hīna*, use of ungrammatical words.²⁶

The faults expounded by Bhāmaha in his *Kāvyaṭīkā* (fourth Pariccheda) are : (1) *apārtha*, absence of complete sense, (2) *vyartha*, incongruity with the opposite, (3) *ekārtha*, tautology (*punarukta*), (4) *sasamśaya*, ambiguity, (5) *apakrama*, violation of syntactical regularity, (6) *śabda-hīna*, use of words not approved by correct usage, (7) *yati-bhraṣṭa*, deviation from the rules of metrical pause, (8) *bhinnavṛtta*, use of long or short syllables in the wrong place in a metre, (9) *visandhi*, disjunction of euphonic liaison when it is necessary, (10) *deśa-kāla-kalā-loka-nyāyāgama-virodhi*, inconsistency in respect of place, time, the fine or mechanical arts, worldly practice, logic, dharma-śāstra. Bhāmaha adds another fault from the standpoint of the logic of poetry (in the fifth Pariccheda)—the *doṣa*

arising from a faulty logical proposition (*pratijñā*), a faulty middle term (*hetu*) and a faulty logical illustration (*drṣṭānta*). In another context while discussing the general characteristics of poetry (*Kāvyaśālikāra* 1.37 ff), Bhāmaha mentions ten other defects which a poet should avoid, viz. (a) *neyārtha*, far-fetchedness, when the sense does not follow from the order of the words, but has to be guessed from the general intention, (b) *kliṣṭa*, remote or intercepted expression, (c) *anyārtha*, disappearance of the sense, or arriving at the sense intended by the omission of a part of the expression, (d) *avācaka*, inexpressiveness, employment of round-about expressions to denote something which is not their meaning by direct denotation, (e) *gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna*, use of difficult and indirect expressions, whose meaning cannot be understood without a clue, (f) *ayuktimat*, impropriety e.g. making clouds, etc. messengers, (g) *śruti-duṣṭa*, indecent to hear, (h) *artha-duṣṭa*, implicitly indecent (where a statement suggests the idea of something indecent by means of words which denote it as well), (i) *kalpanā-duṣṭa*, faulty conception, where in the alliance of two words an undesirable sense is produced, (j) *śruti-kaṣṭa*, unmelodious or harsh to the hearing.

A large number of these faults, it can be seen, have their parallels in the *nigrahasṭhānas* enumerated in the *Nyāyasūtra* (5.2) and other works on dialectic.²⁷ From these we can infer the minimum requirement of any style or expression. There must not be unnecessary circumlocution or irrelevant digression or tautology; ungrammatical or grammatically wrong expressions should not be used. The words should be able to express the meaning intended to be conveyed and there should not be any ambiguity or violation of syntactical regularity. Nothing should be uttered which is not consistent with place, time, worldly practice, logic and scriptures. Words not widely known and difficult expressions should be avoided so that the meaning is not ambiguous or obscure. There should be nothing expressly or implicitly indecent. Nothing impossible should be stated. The logic of the statement

should not be faulty and the fallacies of the proposition (*pratijñā*), middle term (*hetu*) and illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*) should be avoided. The argument must be fully and systematically presented. These are the minimum requirements of any normally good speech, even when high excellence or poetical or oratorical effect is not aimed at. Some of the principles of dialectical criticism are common to all the branches of learning though they have their own framework within which all dialectical discussions are carried on.

As said before, every branch of learning has its own methodology and *pramāṇas*. The works of almost all the *śāstras* have a dialectical character, the author always having in view a critical inquirer or opponent who would question him at every step, and so always anticipating questions as to why a particular order is followed in the treatment of topics and justifying his method of treatment. We may consider, by way of example, the method of treatment adopted in the *Kāmasūtra* of Vātsyāyana. Even though it is a work primarily on erotics, it discusses the *puruṣārthas* (good things) aimed at and the periods of life to be devoted to these. The author starts with a salutation to *dharma* (rightouseness), *artha* (wealth), *kāma* (love) as these are the topics relevant to *Kāmasūtra*, and to the *ācāryas* giving instruction in the traditional lore pertaining to these as they are connected with this *śāstra*. The author then mentions the tradition of the early *ācāryas* and how the *śāstra* was handed down, and then enumerates the topics he intends to discuss in this work. The *Kāmasūtra* 1. 2 gives a programme of divisions of life in which *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, *mokṣa* should be predominantly pursued. It gives a justification for each statement and recommends how one can get instruction regarding the acquirement of these. *Kāma* is defined as the operation of the sense-organs presided over by mind joined to the soul in respect of their respective objects, and then explains how it is restricted to sexual love in particular (1. 2. 11-12). An objection is raised as to why one should study *Kāmasūtra* when the lower animals in which

also *kāma* is at work can do without it, that is to say, when it is instinctive; the author of the *Kāmasāstra* justifies the need for the study of *Kāmasāstra* (l. 2. 21-24). In order to establish the need for the *purusārthas*, Vātsyāyana sets forth forceful arguments against them and refutes them. He posits a *pūrva-pakṣa* that no one should think of pursuing *dharma* which does not yield fruit immediately, and so which can be said to be doubtful; better a bird in hand than two in the bush. Vātsyāyana answers this by saying that one should not be sceptical about the *śāstras*; magical rites are seen to have a result; moon, stars are seen to behave keeping in view the people as if they were doing so intelligently; this could not happen without the *adrṣṭa* (unseen potency) resulting from actions, good and bad; we find that the worldly career is actually graduated according to the four stages of life, and we find man abandoning a seed in hand for the grain that he is to get in the future. Therefore one must practise *dharma* (l. 2. 25-31). A similar discussion is enunciated with respect to *artha* and *kāma* especially in view of the fact that *artha* is accidental and *kāma* has its dangers, and these objections are answered (l. 2. 32 ff). With regard to *kāma*, the author says that it is as necessary for the well-being of the body as food is, and is the fruit of *dharma* and *artha*; only one must safeguard against its dangers. It is not that one does not serve food because there are beggars to disturb or does not sow seeds because there are animals to destroy them. One need not cheat oneself of the pleasures of *kāma* (l. 2. 48).

Again, Vātsyāyana recommends that not only men but women also must study *Kāmasāstra* before their marriage or after marriage with the consent of the husband. He does so because some *ācāryas* say that women need not study *Kāmasāstra* since they are concerned with only its practice. Vātsyāyana's answer to them is that all practice is based on theoretical knowledge and it is found in the case of horsemanship, etc. that all may not be the knowers of *vidyā*, yet they seek the advice of experts and train their horses accordingly. All are not

astronomers and astrologers, yet people do things on auspicious days after consulting them. Theoretical knowledge always proves to be a good restraint on practical behaviour, so even women must acquire knowledge of Kāmaśāstra from women in whom confidence can be reposed, as for instance, from mother's sister, elder sister, girl-friend of the same age and the like (1.3.1-35). Vātsyāyana mentions the *vidyās* which can be subservient to Kāmaśāstra and make it rich and fruitful (1.3.16).

We need not proceed further. Vātsyāyana has given a detailed exposition of everything connected with the problem of sexual love; at times he himself anticipates an objection why certain unwholesome practices have been dealt with and explains that they are expounded so that people could keep away from them just as the causes of diseases are described in a work on medicine so that people could avoid them. At times such details are given (e.g. different types of kisses) that one feels surprised at the use of the dialectical mode in respect of such subjects as can scarcely be thought of as coming within the range of dialectical scrutiny. This is true of most of the śāstras. But we can all the same appreciate the author's anxiety to discuss a topic fully so that no logical objection can be raised against his treatment, and the dialectical character of the works is a sufficient index of this intention of the author.

The dialectical character of the works, moreover, gives us an idea of the discussions and intellectual disputes carried on in those days, the knowledge of which was essential in the systematic exposition of topics, and also accounts for the growth and progress in the different branches of knowledge. The dialectical mode seems to have been indispensable in the treatment of different subjects in ancient India. At some places the discussion is of a highly scholastic and explicitly logical character; at others it is simpler. The definition of the different categories is generally examined dialectically and on the basis of this the discussion proceeds leading to greater clarity and precision.

We can see from this review of works of different branches of learning that progress in the treatment of the subject—be it grammar or law or political science, medicine, poetics or erotics—has been achieved by the dialectical modes. We have seen in this and the preceding chapters how dialectical criticism is an essential part of the development of different *vidyās*.

NOTES

- 1 Auṁ namaḥ Śukra-Bṛhaspatibhyām. Pṛthivyā lābhe pālāne ca yāvānty arthaśāstraṇi pūrvācāryaiḥ prasthāpitāni prāyaśas tāni sambhṛtyaikam idam arthaśāstraṁ kṛtam.—*Arthaśāstra* 1.1.1 (University of Bombay, 1960).
- 2 Uktānukta-duruktārthacintakāri tu vārttikam.—Hemacandra's definition of *vārttika*. See *Lectures on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. 1, Preface, p. XXVIII ff.—P. S. Subrahmanya Sastri (Second edition, 1960).
- 3 For details see *Lectures on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. 1, Preface, pp. XXVIII ff.—P. S. Subrahmanya Sastri; also *Kātyāyana and Patañjali*, p. 48—F. Kielhorn.
- 4 *Lectures on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya*, pp. XXXIV ff.—Yathā laukika-vaidikeṣu (under vrddhir ād aic—1.1.1, sthānivad ādeṣo'nalvidhau—1.1.56, ekah pūrva-parayoh—6.1.84); yathā loke under 6.1.84, ekāco dve prathamasya—6.1.1); lokavijñānāt siddham (under alontyāt pūrva upadhā—1.1.65, ācāryopasarjanaḥ cāntevāsi—6.2.36); lokavijñānān na siddhyati (under samāna-kartṛkayoḥ pūrvakāle—3.4.21), guruvad guruput্রে (under sthānivad ādeṣo'nalvidhau—1.1.56); dharmāśāstraṁ ca tathā (under sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau—1.2.64), apavādanyāyaḥ (under 1.3.9), etc.
- 5 Vyākhyātṛtve'pi asya iṣṭyādi-kathanena anvākhyātṛtvād itarabhāṣya-vailakṣanyena mahattvam.—Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa on *Mahābhāṣya*, 1.1.1.
- 6 Kṛte'tha Patañjalīnā guruṇā tīrtha-darśinā, sarveṣāṁ nyāya-bijānām Mahābhāṣye nibandhane....*Vākya-pādiya*, 2.285. Tac ca bhāṣyam na kevalaṁ vyākaraṇasya nibandhanaṁ yāvat sarveṣāṁ nyāya-bijānām boddhavyam ity ata eva sarvanyāya-bijahetutvād eva mahac-chabdena viśiṣya *Mahābhāṣyam* ity ucyate loke.—Puṇyarāja on the above.
- 7 Atha gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ? Kim yat tat sāsna-lāṅgūla-kakudakhura-viṣāṇyartharūpaṁ sa śabhaḥ. netyāha, dravyaṁ nama tat. yat tarhi tad iṅgitam ceṣṭitam nimiṣitam iti sa śabhaḥ. nety āha, kriyā

nāma sā. yat tarhi tat śuklo nīlaḥ kapilaḥ kapota iti sa śabdah. nety āha, guṇo nāma sah. yat tarhi tad bhinnesv abhinnaṁ chinneṣv acchinnam sāmānyabhūtam sa śabdah. nety āha, ākṛtir nāma sā. kas tarhi śabdah. yenoccaritena śasnā-lāṅgūla-kakuda-khura-viṣāṇinām sampratrayo bhavati sa śabdah; atha vā pratīta-padārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ity ucyate. tad yathā, śabdam kuru, mā śabdam kārṣiḥ, śabda-kāry ayam māṇavakaḥ iti dhvaniṁ kurvannevaṁ ucyate. tasmāt dhvaniḥ śabdah....*Paspaśāhnika*, p. 13 (P. S. Subrahmanya Sastri).

8 Ibid, pp. 37-38.

9 Ibid, pp. 50 ff.

10 See *Vaiyākaraṇa-siddhanta-mānjūṣā*, pp. 171-172. (Compare the tāntrika descriptions of *Vāk* in works like *Śaradatilaka* and other treatises.)

11 Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte.
anuviddham iva jñānam śabdena bhāṣate--*Vākya-pādiya*, 1.124.
Sā sarva-vidyā-śilpānām kalānām copabandhanī.
tadvaśād abhiniṣpannam sarvaṁ vastu vibhajyate..—*Ibid.*, 1.126.

12 Vāyor aṇūnām jñānasya śabdatvāpattir iṣyate.
kaiścid darśanabhedo hi pravādeṣv anavasthitaḥ..—*Ibid*, 1.108,

13 *Vākya-pādiya*, 2.57 ff.

14 For further details, see *History of Sanskrit Poetics* by P. V. Kane, *History of Sanskrit Poetics* by S. K. De, *Some Concepts of the Alaṅkāra Śāstra* and *The Number of Rasas* by V. Raghavan.

15 *Kāvya-lāṅkāra* 1. 13-15 of Bhāmaha,

16 Kāvyaṇy api yalimīni vyākhyā-gamyāni śāstravat,
utsavaḥ sudhiyām eva hanta durmedhaso hataḥ..—*Ibid*. 2.20

17 Ibid 2. 86-87. Daṇḍin, on the contrary, deals elaborately with these (*Kāvya-darśa* 2.235-272).

18 Kāvyaśāstrī tma dhvanir iti budhair yaḥ samāmnātapūrvas,
tasyā'bhāvaṁ jagadur apare, bhāktam āhus tam anye;
kecid vācām sthitam aviśaye tattvam ūcus tadīyam,
tena brūmaḥ saḥṛdaya-manaḥ-prīṭaye tat-svarūpam.
... tatra kecid ācakṣiran-śabdārtha-śarīram tāvat kāvyam. tatra ca śabda-gatāś cārutva-hetavo'nuprāsādayaḥ prasiddhā eva. arthagatāś copamā-dayaḥ; varṇasaṅghaṭanādharmaś ca ye mādhyādayas tepi pratiyante. tad-anatirikta-vṛttayo vṛttayo'pi yāḥ kaiścid upanāgarikāḍīyāḥ prakāśitāḥ, tā api gatāḥ śravaṇa-gocaram. rītayaś ca vaidarbhi-prabhṛtayaḥ; tad-vyatiriktaḥ ko' yam dhvanir nāmeti. anye brūyuh--nāsty eva dhvaniḥ. prasiddha-prasthāna-vyatirekiṇaḥ kāvyā-prakāśasya kāvyatvāhāneḥ. saḥṛdayāhlādi-śabdārthamayatvam eve kāvyā-lakṣaṇam. na cōkta-

prasthānātirekiṇo mārṅasya tat sambhavati. na ca tat-samayāntaḥ-pātināḥ sahr̥dayān kām̐scit parikalpya tatprasiddhyā dhvanau kāvya-vyapadeṣaḥ pravartito'pi sakalavidvanmanogrāhitām avalambate.....
bhāktam āhus tam anye. anye tam dhvani-samjñitam kavyātmānam guṇa-vṛttir ity āhuḥ.. ...kecit punar-lakṣaṇa-karaṇa-śālinabuddhayo dhvanes tattvaṁ girāṁ agocaraṁ sahr̥daya-hṛdaya-samvedyam eva samākhyātavantāḥ.—*Dhvanyāloka*, 1, 1.

- 19 Itāś ca nāntarbhāyaḥ, yataḥ kāvya-viśeṣo'ṅgi dhvanir iti kathitaḥ; tasya punar aṅgāni—alaṅkāraḥ guṇa vṛttayaś ceti pratipādayiṣyante. na cāvayava eva prthagbhūto'vayavīti prasiddhaḥ. aprthagbhāve tu tad-aṅgatvaṁ tasya. na tu tattvaṁ eva. yatrāpi vā tattvaṁ tatrāpi dhvaner mahāviśayatvān na tanniṣṭhatvaṁ eva.—*Dhvanyāloka*, 1, 13.
- 20 Bhaktyā bibharti naikatvaṁ rūpabhedād ayaṁ dhvaniḥ, ativyāpter athā'vyāpter na cā'sau lakṣyate tayā. 14
 uktyantareṇā'śakyam yat tac cārutvaṁ prakāśayan, śabdo vyañjakatām bibhrad dhvanyukter viśayībhavet. 15
 rūḍhā ye viśaye'nyatra śabdāḥ svaviśayād api, lāvanyādyāḥ prayuktāś te na bhavanti padaṁ dhvaneḥ. 16.
 vācakatvā''śrayeṇaiva guṇavṛttir vyavasthītā, vyañjakatvaikamūlasya dhvaneḥ syāl lakṣaṇam katham. 18.
 kasyacid dhvani-bhedasya sā tu syād upalakṣaṇam, lakṣaṇe'nyaiḥ kṛte cā'sya pakṣasaṁsiddhir eva naḥ. 19.
 —*Ibid*, 1, 14-16, 18-19,
- 21 Ye' pi sahr̥daya-hṛdaya-samvedyam anākhyeyam eva dhvaner ātmānam āmnāsiṣuḥ, te pi na parikṣyavādināḥ, yata uktayā nityā vakṣyamāṇayā ca dhvaneḥ sāmānyaviśeṣalakṣaṇe pratipādite'pi yady anākhyeyatvaṁ tat sarveṣāṁ eva vastūnām tat prasaktaṁ. yadi punar dhvaner atiśayoktyā'nayā kāvyāntarātiśāyi svarūpam ākhyāyate tat te' pi yuktābhidhāyina eva.—*Ibid*. 1, 19.
- 22 *Ibid*. 3. 33. I have derived much help from Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy's Translation of *Dhvanyāloka* (or *Theory of Suggestion in Poetry*) (Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1955) though I may have differed at places. I have mostly adopted his renderings of the technical terms of Alaṅkāra-śāstra.
- 23 Ramaṇiyatā ca lokottarā'hḷādajanaka-jñāna-gocaratā. lokottaratvaṁ cā hḷadagataś camatkarātvaṁ paraparyāyo' nubhava-sākṣiko jātiviśeṣaḥ. karaṇam ca tadavacchinno bhāvanā-viśeṣaḥ punaḥ punarānusan-

dhānātmā... ittham ca camatkārajanaka-bhāvanā-viśayārtha-pratipādaśabdatvaṁ, yat pratipāditārtha-viśayaka-bhāvanātvam camatkārajanakatāvacchedakam tattvaṁ, svaviśiṣṭa-janakatāvacchedakārtha-pratipādakatā-samsargeṇa camatkāratvavattvam eva vā kāvyatvam iti phalitam.—*Rasagaṅgādhara*, Vol 1, pp. 7-8 (Tilaka Mahārāṣṭra Vidyā-piṭha, Poona).

24 *Ibid*, pp. 11-16.

25 -See *Nāṭya-śāstra*, with *Abhinavabhāratī*, Vol. 1, pp. 274 ff (GOS) and *Rasagaṅgādhara*, Vol. 1, pp. 54 ff.

26 See *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Vol. 2, pp. 8 ff—S. K. De; and *Śṅgāra-prakāśa*, Part 2, pp. 229-233—V. Raghavan.

27 Compare also the thirty-two *doṣas* mentioned in the *Anuyogadvāra*, pp. 261 ff (Āgamodaya Samiti).

CHAPTER 18

ACTUAL DEBATES AND CONTROVERSIES— PHILOSOPHICAL, RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL

Leaving aside the technical side of the question we shall examine here a few examples of debates and controversies recorded in Sanskrit literature, these being of a philosophical, religious, social or legal type. We shall see that these debates are generally covertly or overtly governed by the rules and procedure laid down for discussions and controversies.

We find a number of controversies recorded in the Upaniṣads, and Buddhist and Jaina scriptures. We have already very briefly referred to a few of them as also to the famous dialogue between Janaka and Sulabhā. Dinnāga is credited with having achieved the conquest of the world. Just as a universal monarch could bring under his sway the whole of India, so the successful victor in debates could become the propagator of his creed all over India. Debates and controversies were an outstanding feature of public life in ancient India. They were often arranged with great pomp and ceremony in the presence of the king and a large audience of people—monks and laymen. And the fate of the debater and even of his creed depended on the result of the debate. Dinnāga is said to have won his fame as a great logician in a famous debate with a brāhmana called Sudurjaya at the Nālandā monastery. After that he travelled from monastery to monastery, teaching, writing and partaking in public debates. This was true of most of the ācāryas and dialecticians, whose works bear testimony to this fact—they are written in the form of a controversy between two or more opposing parties.

We may note at the outset the details of the classic controversy between Śaṅkarācārya and Maṇḍana Miśra whose pet birds too chirped in philosophical language. The controversy

is described in detail in Canto 8 of *Śaṅkara-digvijaya* of Vidyāraṇya.

It may be stated at the very outset that Nīlakaṇṭha, Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara, and even Maṇḍana according to some, who are said to have entered into a philosophical debate or controversy with Śaṅkara, could not have been contemporaries of Śaṅkara, and so also Kumārila referred to in Vidyāraṇya's *Śaṅkara-digvijaya*. Thus there is no historical truth in these accounts, but they are nevertheless important as illustrating debates and dialectical modes and it is only thus that note is taken of them here.

Śaṅkarācārya desired a controversy with Kumārila who very humbly directed him to Maṇḍana. Śaṅkara told Maṇḍana in clear terms that as a *sannyāsin* having a right to alms he did not want ordinary alms (*bhikṣā*) but he wanted discussion on condition that he who was defeated should become the **disciple** of the other. Thus there would be a thorough examination of the relative merits of the path of ritualistic practice as taught in the *Vedas* and the *Brāhmaṇas* and the path of renunciation as described in the *Upaniṣads*. Maṇḍana was confident of himself that he would never renounce his Vedic way of life and resort to the life of a *muni* (recluse), yet he had all along been wishing for a fine debate with an expert exponent of the life of renunciation, so this proposal was a matter of joy for him. All their learning and scholarship in the *śāstras* would get a chance to assert itself and would thus be blessed (36-45). But Maṇḍana was anxious to appoint a *madhyastha* (judge) who would decide the result of the debate. A debate after all is not meant for merely drying the throat with loud speeches, for what the two parties in a controversy aim at is victory. In a debate, the two parties take up different and opposite positions, so a *madhyastha* is indispensable in such a debate in order to judge the respective theses or propositions, to decide what sort of proof is required and such other details. He wanted Jaimini and Vyāsa who were

with him to act as judges, but they suggested that Maṇḍana's learned wife Śāradā should play the role (46-51).

The next day the debate starts with Śāradā as the *madhyastha*. Śaṅkara sets forth his thesis: "The one pure Brahman which is existence and sentience, is alone ultimately real and being enveloped in the vast *Avidyā*, it appears as the world of appearance, just as nacre appears as silver; *Nirvāṇa* which has no origin signifies the state of self-realisation in which the world of appearance along with knowledge is dissolved, and which is attained by the knowledge of Brahman.' He points out *Vedānta (Upaniṣads)* as the *pramāṇa* in support of his thesis and agrees to give up his mode of life as a *sannyāsin* and don white garments if he is defeated in this debate (57-62). Maṇḍana refutes this by arguing that Vedāntic scriptures are no proof regarding the Sentient Being as there is no consistency in them. It is the earlier portion of the *Veda* that is authoritative and it can be seen that the scriptures enjoin action. He asserts that emancipation can be attained by actions which are to be performed as long as one's life lasts. He also agrees to give up his way of life if he is defeated. Thus installing intelligent Śāradā as the *madhyastha*, they start indulging in the *jalpa* (disputation) type of debate with an eye on victory (57-66).

The two debaters devoted almost the whole day to their discussion or disputation. The lady-judge had to attend besides to house-hold duties. Whenever required to do so, she would put garlands of flowers round their necks saying that the garland of the defeated person would fade and thus she would be able to decide to whom victory or defeat went. Thus the debate continued for five or six days with a break only for lunch and such other necessary functions. Each was eager to defeat the other, but neither bore any ill will or malice towards the other. The debate grew in strength each day and was attended by a larger audience each day. Both appeared cheerful and neither showed any signs of nervousness or embarrassment like perspiration, shivering or gazing in the sky; and neither,

failing to find an appropriate answer, resorted in anger to verbal casuistry or quibbling (*vāk-chala*) (67-73).

Śaṅkara finding that Maṇḍana's scholarship stood the test of reason, reproaches him as one who has not clearly shown the stages (*kakṣā*) of the controversy in the presence of the learned men. Incited by this Maṇḍana desiring to refute the Advaitic doctrine tells Śaṅkara that he can find no proof in support of the absolute unity of the individual soul and the Highest Reality—the thesis set forth by Śaṅkara (76). Śaṅkara in turn cites as authority the Upaniṣadic passages in which Uddālaka and such other teachers impart this doctrine to their pupils—Śvetaketu and others (77). Maṇḍana replies that utterances like '*Tat tvam asi*' are not meant to convey any meaning but are meant to be muttered for the destruction of sins like charms like '*Hum*', '*Faṭ*', etc. Śaṅkara's answer is that if their meaning could not be understood as in the case of '*Hum*' etc., then only could they be meant for mutterance (*japa*). But their meaning is clear, so how could this be their only purpose? To this Maṇḍana argues that such statements convey the unity of *jīva* (individual soul) and *Īśvara* (Supreme Being) (God) only apparently; they are really meant to praise the performer of the sacrifice and so are subservient to acts or injunctions. Śaṅkara retorts that a sentence in the *Karmakāṇḍa* (section dealing with rites) may perhaps be subservient to injunctions, but he fails to understand how a statement in the *Jñānakāṇḍa* (section dealing with knowledge) could be subservient to action. To this Maṇḍana says that these statements may be to the effect that the soul should be looked upon as the Highest Self—Supreme Being, but this is only for the perfection of the rite, just as we are enjoined to look upon the mind or sun as Brahman; such statements may enjoin us to look upon what is not Brahman as Brahman but they can never be regarded as proof of the real unity of the individual soul and the Highest Self—Supreme Being (78-82). Śaṅkara argues against this that there is no injunction in '*Tat tvam asi*' as we have in the case of 'One should look upon

the mind as Brahman,' etc. and so no intelligent person would interpret '*Tat tvam asi*' and the like as injunctions enjoining *upāsanā* (meditation). Maṇḍana then puts forth a fresh argument: Just as on the basis of a statement about fruit in the form of 'being well-established' (*pratiṣṭhā*), it is possible to postulate an injunction about the performance of *Rātrisatra*, similarly the fruit in the form of becoming Brahman having been spoken of, it is possible to suppose an injunction like 'Being desirous of becoming Brahman one should acquire the knowledge of Brahman';¹ and thus even statements like '*Tat tvam asi*' can be subservient to injunctions of action, otherwise they would be meaningless. Śaṅkara retorts that in that case emancipation would be the fruit of action in the form of *upāsanā* and so would be perishable like heaven, etc. Moreover, *upāsanā* being a mental act is conative; it can be done, not done or done otherwise, whereas knowledge is invariably produced if its causal apparatus is present and straightaway leads to emancipation (83-85).

Maṇḍana then changes his ground: Such statements as '*Tat tvam asi*' may not enjoin *upāsanā*, but they cannot be cited as supporting the unity of *jīva* and *Īśvara*; they merely show their resemblance. Śaṅkara refutes this by analysing it. Do the statements show resemblance inasmuch as both are sentient or because they have qualities like omniscience, ubiquitousness, etc.? In the former case, it is too well known to require any exposition.* In the latter case, Maṇḍana's own view would be contradicted as that interpretation would result in the unity of *jīva* and *Īśvara*.[†] Hence statements like '*Tat tvam asi*' must be interpreted to teach the unity of *jīva* and *Īśvara*. Maṇḍana then argues that such statements can urge their resemblance in respect of such qualities of the soul as pleasure, knowledge, etc. (which are not known as they are obscured by *Avidyā*), on the strength of eternality alone. There should be no difficulty here. Śaṅkara answers that in that case one should not be obstinate or dogmatic about the view that the

* Cf. *Siddhasādhana*.

† Cf. *viruddha*.

statements propound that the two are different. As a matter of fact, Maṇḍana himself has removed the doubt as to why the *jīva* does not appear as the Supreme by speaking of the obscuration caused by *Avidyā*. Maṇḍana then argues that their resemblance extends only up to sentiency. By stating that the cause of this world is sentient, the statement repudiates the stand of the Śāṅkhyas and others who maintain that *Prakṛti*, atoms and the like insentient principles are the ultimate causes of the world. Whereon Śāṅkara rejoins that statements like 'He observed' (*sa aikṣata*), etc. remove all doubt as to the ultimate cause being insentient, so it is futile to raise this question again(86-91).

Maṇḍana than puts forth an argument on the strength of our empirical experience. That the statements should propound the unity of the individual soul and the Supreme Being is contradicted by our empirical perceptual experience and so these statements should not be accepted as such. On the contrary such statements should be looked upon as subservient to injunctions regarding *svādhāya* (study) and thus as useful in *japa* (mutterance). Śāṅkara answers that if the senses were to give us knowledge of difference or duality, the vedic statement about unity would be certainly contradicted. But *bheda* or difference is not an object of direct knowledge, so how could its knowledge contradict Vedic statements about unity? Maṇḍana argues : In cognitions like 'I am different from the Lord' (*bhinno'ham īśād*) we know difference as an epithet or qualification of the individual soul. Thus even in the absence of any contact between the senses and difference, there must be *viśeṣaṇatā sannikarsa* between them leading to the cognition of the negation of the Lord in the soul. Śāṅkara answers that if mere *viśeṣaṇatā sannikarṣa* sufficed, all things could be directly known—even a jar intercepted by a wall. But this is not true. Hence *viśeṣaṇatā sannikarṣa* can lead to the knowledge of *bheda* only when the substratum of *bheda* is in contact with the sense-organs, but in the present case we find that the soul is not in contact with the sense-organs. Maṇḍana

argues that it is wrong to say that the soul which is the substratum of *bheda* has no contact with the sense-organs. *Citta* (mind) and *ātman* (soul) both being substrates can be substrates of conjunction (*saṃyoga*). Śaṅkara answers that the soul could be ubiquitous or atomic. In either case its contact with divisible things is not possible. Maṇḍana should be aware of this; after all he was not a *yogin*.¹ It is observed that only things having constituent parts (*sāvayava*) can come into contact with things having constituent parts. Up to now Śaṅkara has accepted for the sake of argument that mind is a sense-organ, but as a matter of fact it is not a sense-organ, it only helps the sense-organs to perceive, as light does. Thus rebuffed Maṇḍana argues that if the cognition of difference (*bheda*) does not arise from the sense-organs it must be of the nature of the witness-self. As such how could statements like '*Tat tvam asi*' be capable of teaching the unity of *jīva* and *Īśa* as there would still be conflict with the cognition of *bheda* (difference). Śaṅkara answers this by saying: True, perception, which is of the nature of the witness-self, shows the *bheda* of *jīva* and *Īśa* as possessed of *Avidyā* and *Māyā* respectively; *Śruti* on the other hand shows the unity of the absolute in *jīva* and *Īśvara*; so there is no conflict between the two. And if there is any conflict, the initial perception being weak is fit to be set aside by the final and more powerful *Śruti* according to the set rule of setting aside or demolishing. Maṇḍana rejoins that even so the *Śruti* regarding unity would be in conflict with the following inference: *Jīva* has difference described by *Brahman*, because it is non-omniscient, like jar (*ayaṃ brahma-nirūpitena-bhedena yukto ghaṭādivat*-102). Śaṅkara argues, "Is this difference that is proved real or imaginary? In the former case there would be absence of illustration (—the fallacy of *dr̥ṣṭāntāsiddha*), because jar and the like are lacking in the said difference and are not the adjuncts (*pratiyogin*) of it. If the latter be accepted, imaginary difference is recognised by us also, and it is not necessary to prove it (—otherwise there

would be the fault of *siddhasādhana*)." Maṇḍana answers this by saying that what is to be proved is the *jiva*'s being the substratum of difference described by Brahman, and this is certainly found in jar etc. and is not contradicted by *sva-pratyaya*, knowledge of the self. Thus there is not the fault of lack of illustration and because Śaṅkara does not accept that difference cannot be sublated by knowledge of the self, it has to be proved, and so the argument is faultless. Śaṅkara refutes this argument also : What is meant by '*sva*'?—the self as possessed of pleasure, etc. called the individual soul, or the soul bereft of them? If the former, this is what Śaṅkara himself accepts and so it is not necessary to prove it. In the latter case, again there will be *dr̥ṣṭānta-hāni* (lack of illustration) as the jar etc. being just fictions of ignorance in the self bereft of pleasure etc. are capable of being sublated by the knowledge of the self and so there is no *bheda* (difference) which cannot be sublated by the knowledge of the self. Maṇḍana explains that when he mentioned *bheda*, he meant *bheda* not due to any adventitious factor (*upādhi*), so it was necessary to prove it, and there could not be the fault of *siddha-sādhana* (proving what is already established). Śaṅkara regards the difference of *Īśvara* and *jiva* as due to an adventitious factor, but regards the difference of jar and *Īśvara* as not due to an adventitious factor, so the fault of *dr̥ṣṭānta-hāni* could not be said to be present. At this point Śaṅkara rejoins that he regards *Avidyā* as an adventitious factor (*upādhi*) responsible for even the difference of *Īśvara* and jar, and that not being present in the state of the knowledge of the self, there would be *dr̥ṣṭānta-hāni*. Moreover, in the inferences put forth by Maṇḍana, *jaḍatva* (insentientcy) is an *upādhi*; jar etc. being cognised as insentient are false, so their cognition cannot be set aside by *Ajñāna* which is the cause of jar and its difference; here their being possessed of difference which cannot be sublated by knowledge of the self is due to *jaḍatva* which is thus an *upādhi*, and there is the fallacy of *vyāpyatvasiddha*. Moreover, an argument like the following can counter-balance the inference

regarding the self being different from the Highest—The self is not different from the Highest, because it is sentient, like the Highest. Thus Maṇḍana's argument is a counter-balanced one(102-107).

Maṇḍana then attempts to show that these fallacies are not there in his argument: Śaṅkara holds that the difference of soul (from Brahman) can be sublated by the knowledge of Brahman, but that it cannot be sublated by the cognition of jar, etc. whereas Maṇḍana wishes to prove that the difference from Brahman which knows no transmigration, cannot be sublated by the knowledge of Brahman, so there is not the fault of *siddha-sādhana* as also of *dṛṣṭānta-hāni* as Śaṅkara himself recognises that such difference cannot be sublated by the cognition of jar, etc. Śaṅkara in order to clarify the position asks: "Is it not sublated by all knowledge of the *dharmin* (i.e. Brahman) or by the cognition of some souls? Now it is recognised that even the difference of the soul from jar and the like is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman, so it cannot be said that it is not sublated by all knowledge of Brahman. Thus there would be *dṛṣṭānta-hāni* and the first alternative is not feasible. In the second case the souls are different from jar, etc. as they are from Brahman and Śaṅkara and his adherents also accept that the difference of souls from Brahman cannot be sublated by the soul's cognition of jar. Therefore there is the fault of *siddhasādhana*. Again, what is meant by the *dharmin* (thing, subject)—the qualityless or the qualified? Not the latter, because difference is recognised as something that cannot be sublated by its cognition and there would be the fault of *siddha-sādhana*. Nor is the former alternative possible, because it would involve a fault whether it is regarded as cognised or not. Is the qualityless Brahman the *pakṣa* (subject) of the inference when cognised or not cognised? In the latter case we would have the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*; in the former case, the absolute being established as different from the souls, there would follow the violation of the *Vedānta-pramāṇa* giving us knowledge of the *dharmin* (Brahman), and so there being conflict

with the *Veda*, there would be the fallacy of *bādhita* (108-111).

Maṇḍana rebuffed on many grounds and unable to refute Śaṅkara's argument, sets forth an argument based on *Śruti* passages. *Śruti* passages like '*Dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā...*' refer to the difference of soul and God, one of whom eats the *pippala*, while the other does not. Many such passages are in conflict with passages propounding non-difference. Sankara answers that in respect of the difference of the Highest and the individual soul which is established by perception and which does not yield any fruit, the *Śruti* passages cannot be a proof, because even according to the Mīmāṃsakas, the *Śruti* is authoritative inasmuch as it yields unique or new knowledge; otherwise an *arthavāda* passage (intended merely to praise or condemn) though it does not intend to convey its literal meaning would be *pramāṇa* (proof). Maṇḍana argues that as a *Śruti* sentence giving us information about a thing already known from the *Smṛtis* is recognised as proof as being their source, so a sentence speaking about a thing (e.g. difference) which is already established by perception must be regarded as a proof as being its basis. Śaṅkara rejoins: *Śruti* is a proof in respect of things known from the *Smṛti* not because it is its source, but because it gives unique knowledge as the knowledge of the things discussed in the *Smṛti* was originally derived from the *Śruti*; that is all the more reason why *Śruti* should not be a proof because it is the source in respect of things known by a person who has no inkling of the knowledge of the *Śruti*, that is to say, in respect of *bheda* (difference) which is known by perception and the like by the ignorant. Up to now Śaṅkara has accepted Maṇḍana's position that the *Śruti* asserts the difference of *jīva* and *Īśvara*; but as a matter of fact, the *Śruti* distinguishes the soul from *buddhi* (intellect) and says that it is free from the mundane state involving pleasure, pain, etc. Maṇḍana objects: If the *Śruti* be said to speak of the difference of *buddhi* and embodied soul and not of the difference of embodied soul and *Īśvara*, how could the *Śruti* asserting the enjoyership of an insentient entity (*buddhi*)

be regarded as authoritative. Śaṅkara answers that there should be no scope for doubt as the *Paiṅgya-rahasya Brāhmaṇa* itself explains this by saying that that which eats or enjoys is the *sattva (buddhi)* and that which looks on is the witness soul. Maṇḍana's contention is that even in this *Brāhmaṇa*, *sattva* denotes the embodied soul and *ksetrajñā* denotes *Paramātmā* (the Highest Self), and so the sentence could not have any other meaning. Śaṅkara explains that from the sentence of the *Paiṅgya-rahasya*, '*Tad etat sattvaṃ yena svapnaṃ paśyaty atha yo'yaṃ śārīra upadrasīṣa sa ksetrajñas tāv etau sattva-ksetrajñau*' (That is the *sattva* by which it sees dreams and that which is the embodied witness is the *ksetrajñā*), it can be seen that '*sattva*' means *citta* (mind) and *ksetrajñā* refers to the embodied soul who is the witness. Maṇḍana in turn contends that he who is the agent of the act of seeing a dream is the individual soul and the witness of the dream who is referred to by the word '*ksetrajñā*' is the omniscient God. Śaṅkara's argument against this is that the affix '*tin*' denotes the subject, so the instrumental case must be accepted as signifying the instrument. The seer is qualified as '*śārīra*' (embodied), so he could not be *Īśvara*. Maṇḍana again argues that '*śārīra*' means that which is in the body. Cannot the omnipresent Lord be denoted by the word '*śārīra*'? Śaṅkara objects that *Īśvara* staying in places other than the body also cannot be termed '*śārīra*'; ether being ubiquitous, is present in the body also, still no one calls it '*śārīra*'. Maṇḍana answers that in that case the Vedic *mantra* would be rendered inauthoritative. If the *mantra* be taken as speaking of intellect and embodied soul instead of soul and God, then it would be referring to the insentient *buddhi* (intellect) as 'eating', 'enjoying' etc. How could such a *mantra* be authoritative? Śaṅkara answers that the power to burn is ascribed to iron which normally does not burn, on account of its contact with fire; similarly because it is permeated by sentience, the insentient *buddhi* can be said to be the enjoyer.

Maṇḍana again contends that we have *Śruti* passages saying

that the individual soul and the Highest Self are different; for instance, it is said in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* that *jīva* and *Īśvara* are as completely different as shade and light are. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*'s reference to 'the two drinking *ṛta*' can be regarded as setting aside *Śruti* passages speaking of unity. Śaṅkara answers that a *Śruti* passage speaking of difference which is empirically established cannot set aside a *Śruti* passage speaking of unity; on the contrary, the latter speaking of something unique is more powerful and so can set aside the former. This appears to be something strange to Maṇḍana. The *Śruti* passage about difference is supported by other sources of knowledge like perception, so it can very well set aside the passage about unity whose object is contradicted by other *pramāṇas* or sources of knowledge. Śaṅkara rejoins, "Oh leader of the wise, other *pramāṇas* cannot render *Śruti* stronger. On the contrary, it would mean that *Śruti* gives knowledge of something which falls within the scope of other *pramāṇas*, and is therefore not unique; giving knowledge of a thing already known, the *Śruti* would be rendered weaker or even *apramāṇa* (non-valid)" (112-130).

In this way, the dignified controversy goes on between the two, till on seeing Maṇḍana's garland faded Śāradā invites them for food and tells Śaṅkara that Durvāsas had inflicted a curse on her—Sarasvatī—which was to continue till Śaṅkara's victory. This having occurred, she starts to go to her original residence. But Śaṅkara stops her with the help of *araṇya-durgāmantra*, because he desires to defeat her also not for proving his omniscience, but in order to establish his own doctrine as the only true one (131-134).

Then Maṇḍana very humbly raises a question as to how the great Jaimini's teachings could be false, whereon Śaṅkara reconciles the teaching of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* with that of the *Brahma-sūtra*. Actions are important inasmuch as they purify the mind and make it fit for the higher pursuit and the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* does not deny God but only contends that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated by inference as

the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds. Hearing this interpretation, all are pleased—Maṇḍana and the *sabhāpatīs* (presidents) including Śāradā (—ninth canto, 2-16). Later Śāradā also is eager for a controversy with Śaṅkara though the latter is reluctant, as the great-famed do not enter into a debate with women. But the lady pleads that if one wants to preserve one's own doctrine against others, one must discuss with all including women. Did not Yājñavalkya discuss with Gārgī and King Janaka with Sulabhā? Where they not great and famous? (9.53-61). Śaṅkara and Śāradā discuss almost continuously for seventeen days, the discussion being couched in clever flowing words. Śāradā finding no other way of victory, asks him questions pertaining to the science of Erotics. Śaṅkara asks for a month's time for preparation—this was a practice in debates—after which Śāradā could never claim to be an expert in the science of Erotics.² This latter part of the episode appears to be strange and unbelievable.

The fifteenth canto of this work gives a description of the *digvijaya* (conquest) of Śaṅkara in the field of philosophical discussion. He moved from one place to another defeating rival thinkers—Śāktas and others. An account is given of his controversy with Nīlakaṇṭha, a Śaiva poet who sets forth and attempts to prove his view in the presence of Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara refutes his statements. Then Nīlakaṇṭha, instead of defending his position attacks Śaṅkara's doctrine of Absolute Non-dualism. His contention is that Śaṅkara's exposition of Vedāntic passages like '*Tat tvam asi*' (That thou art) is not amenable to reason. *Jīva* and *Īśvara* being as unlike each other as darkness and light cannot be one. The analogy of sun and its reflection cannot solve this difficulty. Vyomaśiva and other Pāśupata teachers have shown that the reflection in the mirror or water is false, so the question of unity does not arise at all. Even the followers of Śaṅkara hold that the reflection of the face in a mirror is different from the original face and is therefore false (15.43-45). It is not true to say that the ignorance of *jīva* and the omniscience of *Īśvara*, which are contradictory

qualities, being fictions of *Māyā*, will be sublated; and *jīva* and *Īśvara* both being equally of the nature of pure sentience, their unity alone is real. Difference (*bheda*) which is established by hundreds of proofs cannot be sublated, otherwise there would be nothing like difference; if 'horseness' (*hayatva*) and 'cowness' (*gotva*) which are contrary are sublated, horse and cow will be necessarily one. If it is not desirable to give up what is established by proofs, then it is not also desirable to set aside the difference of *jīva* and *Īśvara* which is established by our experience, viz. 'I am not God' (46-48).

Śaṅkara defends his own position by saying that the contradiction is only in the literal meaning of the expression and not in the indicated meaning arrived at through it. If the contradiction is averted by *bhāga-lakṣaṇā* (partial renunciation of the expressed meaning) as in '*so'sau*' (This is that), the two words can be seen to refer to one thing. The contingency urged will not arise; there is no proof demonstrating the oneness of horse and cow, so that by *bhāga-lakṣaṇā* the two could be understood as one. Nīlakaṇṭha argues that there is nothing besides ignorance and omniscience which constitute the nature of *jīva* and *Īśvara* respectively so that on the strength of it *lakṣaṇā* (indication) could be resorted to in '*Tat tvam asi*'. Śaṅkara answers this by saying that these respective characters of *jīva* and *Īśvara* are imaginary, hence it has to be accepted that the substratum on which they are superimposed is necessarily real. Even Nīlakaṇṭha would accept that the objects—body, etc. right up to *aham* (ego) are insentient; these being eliminated, what remains of the character of *jīva* has to be accepted as uniform and that is its real character. It can be established by reasoning that the world is false since it is indescribable. Some real character has to be accepted as its substratum and that has to be accepted as the character of *Īśvara*. Thus both the characters, ignorance and omniscience, cannot be real or not due to an adventitious factor (*upādhi*). The crystal by itself cannot be said to have redness which it assumes from the *japā* flower. If the cogni-

tions of difference be true, the *Śruti* would not say that he who perceives difference has reason to fear,³ as he alone who conceives wrongly is in danger of association with something undesirable (49–58). If non-difference though expounded in the *Śruti* be false, knowledge of non-difference could not be termed a *puruṣārtha* * Wrong conviction of the type 'I am not Śiva' (*aśivo'ham*) is set aside by the scriptures, just as our perception of the moon as of the size of a span is set aside by the texts of the sciences. Thus one has to admit that our imagination of difference though ordinarily uncontradicted can be sublated, but one can never admit the denial of the knowledge of the oneness of the individual soul and the Highest Self which is established by *Śruti*. No source of knowledge is known which is more authoritative than the Vedic word, so what is conveyed by it cannot be set aside (59–60).

At this stage, Nīlakaṇṭha argues that the *ṛṣi*-s (sages) have given diverse expositions of the Highest Self and the reality of *puruṣārtha*. How could Śaṅkara setting aside different views be dogmatic about the acceptance of one view alone, viz. that of Kevalādvaita (Absolute Non-dualism)? Śaṅkara answers that there is a rule of interpretation that when there is a conflict with the stronger proof of *Śruti*, the statements of the *Smṛtis* which are less authoritative have to be rejected or explained so as to be in agreement with the *Śruti* statements. Utterances of *ṛṣi*-s which are in conflict with the Vedas cannot be regarded as authoritative (61–62).

Nīlakaṇṭha rejoins that an utterance of a *ṛṣi* which is logically sound should be as much acceptable as a *Śruti* statement. It is but proper that the soul should be different in each body because the pleasure, pain, etc. of each are different from those of another and one does not experience the pleasure, pain, etc. of another. Thus there should be a plurality of souls. The ultimate goal is not *mokṣa* as conceived by Śaṅkara, but the extinction of pain, as all pleasure is adulterated with pain and should be avoided like poisoned food (63–66). Śaṅkara

then refutes these arguments : Pleasure, pain etc. are attributes of the mind so they cannot prove the souls to be different; they can only prove the existence of different minds in different bodies. Thus there is the fault of *pakṣāvṛtti* *hetu* or reason not existent in the *pakṣa* (subject), or the fallacy of *asiddha* (unreal reason) in Nīlakaṇṭha's argument. It is more reasonable to hold that agentship (*kartṛtā*) is present in the insentient body on account of its association with sentience and that grass, etc. cannot be agents on account of the absence of this. Sensuous pleasures arising out of objects are certainly mixed with pain, but the imperishable bliss of Brahman is not so adulterated, and it is this that is to be regarded as the *puruṣārtha* (desired end) and not the petty extinction of pain (67-69). Thus by a number of statements supported by reasoning, Śaṅkara established his own view, and simultaneously won over the Śaiva by his statements smashing the rival's system of thought. Nīlakaṇṭha became a follower of Śaṅkara, along with his disciples (70-71). There is also an account of Śaṅkara's controversies with Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara (80ff) and the Jāinas and such others.

It may be noted in passing that we have similar accounts of the intellectual *digvijayas* (conquests) of Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Madhva and others. Even from the times of Buddha and Mahāvīra this practice was in vogue of a teacher entering into an intellectual contest with another and he who was defeated became along with his disciples a follower of the one who was victorious or could convince the other. Indrabhūti and others whose account is found in the *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* and the *Gaṇadharavāda* of the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* are instances in point.

We have, moreover, an interesting play by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Nyāya-Maṇjarī*, called *Āgamaḍambara* as also *Śaṅmatanāṭaka*. It presents almost throughout controversies held between thinkers of rival parties, including one such debate sponsored by King Śaṅkaravarman (883-902) of Kashmir and his queen. The play presents the adherents of different schools

of philosophy as they prevailed during the life-time of the author—the Bauddha, the Jaina, the Cārvāka, the Mīmāṃsā, the Nyāya-cum-Śaiva, the Āgama (chiefly Pāñcarātra) and the depraved sects of the Śaiva, and the Nīlāmbara. The very first Act presents a debate between Saṅkarṣaṇa (a Snātaka well-versed in the Vedas, the Vedāṅgas and the Mīmāṃsā, who is later put in charge of religious affairs by the king) and Dharmottara (—a Buddhist), at which Viśvarūpa and other scholars of repute are present. The *prāśnikas* lay down the methods, standards and decorum to be followed in the debate. * Perhaps in order to save time, Saṅkarṣaṇa is allowed to summarise the 'pūrvapakṣa', the Buddhist view which he had overheard while Dharmottara was imparting instruction to his disciple. Dharmottara approves of Saṅkarṣaṇa's summary of the Buddhist doctrines and the latter opens his reply by showing that the doctrine of Kṣaṇabhaṅga could not be proved for lack of *hetu*. Dharmottara points out the *hetu* and the discussion goes on till in the heat of the exchange between the masters, the pupils of the two get excited and are about to assault each other physically.

All others intervene and the debate continues till the *prāśnikas* do not want any more debating on the point of Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda which has been ably refuted but want Vijñānavāda to be put to debate. The arguments go on and again the Bauddha Bhikṣu is silenced by Saṅkarṣaṇa, who leaves for his bath with the permission of the *prāśnikas* but only after telling Dharmottara that the Buddhist way of thinking and living is of no use for the attainment of salvation, but it might well be followed by hypocrites as a means of livelihood. Similarly, in the third Act, there is a very interesting debate between Vṛddhāmbi, a Cārvāka, and Dharmasīva Bhaṭṭāraka, a master of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, in the peaceful and beautiful Śaivāśrama of the latter. The problems of God

* *Nyāyam ced abhidhiyate parimitam siddhāntabijam vaco, heyam cec chala jāti-nigrahapada-prāyam kathādambaram; na dveṣo hṛdi vāci no paruṣatā na bhṛūvibhedo mukhe, sādḥūnām yadi vāda eṣa tad ime sarvatra sabhya vāyam.*
—Āgamaḍambara I 25 (Mithila Institute Darbhanga, 1964)

being the creator of the world, of *anumāna* (inference) being a *pramāṇa*, reality of *sāmānya* (universal), existence after death, *karman* and rebirth are discussed in the course of the debate. Vṛddhāmbi who is silenced says that he would discuss some time later and wants to leave. But Dharmaśiva stops him saying that he would prove God on the basis of the Āgamas. Vṛddhāmbi refuses to accept the Āgamas as authoritative. At this stage, Dharmaśiva, who feels fatigued, asks Saṅkarṣaṇa to continue the discussion which goes on for quite a long time (III. 31-41). On this question again, Vṛddhāmbi is silenced. In the fourth act the question of the Bhāgavata Āgama is thrashed out in a debate. The Queen has nominated Sāhaṭa alias Dhairyarāśi as umpire (*stheya*) in the debate between the Vaidikas and the other schools (the Āgamas). An officer Mañjira announces Dhairyarāśi, who is pleased to see that assembly which appears to have brought Brahmaloḥita to Bhāratavarṣa. He praises that place where all branches of knowledge, all kinds of observances, austerities and penances flourish (IV. 14). Dhairyarāśi is acclaimed by all the scholars present. Dhairyarāśi places before them the subject of the controversy, viz. Are Pāñcarātra and other Āgamas authoritative or not? Given leave by all the sides, Dhairyarāśi agrees to pose the arguments for and against the Āgamas on being assured that no one would interrupt him unasked. Dhairyarāśi does this task remarkably well and at length till almost the end of the play. First the Mīmāṃsā view of Veda as *anādi* and *apauruṣeya* is considered. As against this the Nyāya view of God as the creator of the Veda is propounded. That single God may be known as Brahmā, Viṣṇu or Rudra and He may be the single author of all kinds of Āgamas. If apparent contradictions could be explained they could similarly be explained in the Āgamas too. Moreover, they are all one so far as the ultimate good, emancipation or salvation, is concerned Their difference should be taken as one of diversity of path or approach, like the several doors to a single house, and it is by virtue of His compassion and abundance of

knowledge that the Lord has shown so many paths to suit diverse kinds of people. The one God by His own free will, takes manifold forms as Paśupati, Kapila, Viṣṇu, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Jina, Buddha and Manu and teaches the different Āgamas (IV. 56-57). Thus the arguments which prove the *Veda* as the work of an Āpta, prove also the Āgamas to be likewise. Whether the Āgamas are without beginning like the *Veda* or they are man-made, they should not be attacked out of jealousy, but should be accepted as authoritative on a par with any other reasonable utterance. They have not been expounded out of avarice or delusion, or for duping the people; and the tradition followed by the people devoted to them cannot be devoid of ultimate basis; nor have they been deluded by them. It is concluded, in order to safeguard against false claims to being authoritative, that where tradition has flowed uninterrupted from the hoary past, from which the noble ones have not turned away, whose practices are neither shunned by people nor are done secretly, and which by its very look does not appear new, which is not the teaching of the deluded or the motivated, a tradition which is such is authoritative, not just anything and everything (IV. 100-101). Those traditions in which something repelling is taught, promiscuity and indulgence and unclean eating and drinking are recommended or seen,—to them authoritativeness could not be conceded (IV. 103).

At the end, Dhairyarāśi asks if he has voiced the feelings of all present, and they all applaud him for his eloquent words of wisdom. Saṅkarṣaṇa says on their behalf : “With his penetrating analysis, eloquence, mastery of Śāstras, freedom from prejudice, which school has not been supported by Sāhaṭa, and who is there to excel Sāhaṭa ? (IV. 104). The gathering acclaims in one voice Saṅkarṣaṇa’s tribute to Sāhaṭa. Sankarṣaṇa promises all help and support from the state for the promotion of tolerance of good elements and eradication of all evil practices, wherever they be found.

The *Āgamaḍambara* of Jayanta gives us a realistic picture

of the part that debates on religious and philosophical points of controversy played in the social and political spheres of life in India. Coming as it does from the pen of Jayanta, a writer of keen acumen, the play is very interesting, as also intimately related to the *Nyāyamañjarī*, from which arguments are drawn (—there are a number of common or parallel passages). Nevertheless, we feel a little disappointed. Some debate somewhere could have been presented as of the type of *jalpa* or *vitaṇḍā*, in which free use could have been made, or attempted to have been made of *chala*, *jāti*, *nigrahassthāna* (—especially the different types of the last), which would have enhanced the charm and grip of the play. Or, the procedure of debates could have been more closely followed.

The *Prabhāvaka-carita* of Prabhācandra (13th century) gives us very interesting and even valuable accounts of the lives and intellectual contests of certain Jaina ācāryas. Mallavādin, the author of the *Nayacakra*, was one of the greatest of the Jaina dialecticians. Malla was the youngest of three brothers, the other two being Jitayaśas or Jinayaśas and Yakṣa. They had a maternal uncle who was a Śvetāmbara Jaina monk named Jinānanda Sūri, who was defeated by a Buddhist monk named Nanda or Buddhānanda in a public controversy at Bhrgukaccha (Broach). Jinānanda Sūri left Broach and came to Valabhī where he made his nephews his disciples. All the three nephews became masters of *śāstras*. Malla then went to Broach and defeated his uncle's opponent Buddhānanda in a public controversy in the royal assembly. He was given the title '*Vādin*' (dialectician, debater) as a token of victory. There may be some truth in this episode for we find Buddhism gradually disappearing from Gujarat and Jainism taking its place soon after the fall of Valabhī-power.⁵ Like Valabhī, Aṇahillapura developed into a great centre of intellectual activity in the time of King Bhīma I (eleventh century). Poets and dialecticians of different sects from different parts of India visited the capital of Gurjaradeśa and there was greater emphasis on Tarka (logic and dialectic), Sāhitya

(literature and poetics) and Lakṣaṇa (grammar and the philosophy of language)—these being some of the main subjects that formed the common field of intellectual activity in India. Proficiency in these subjects served as a pass-port to royal courts and assemblies of the learned. We can see from works like the *Prabhāvakacarita* that already in the time of Bhīma I (eleventh century), Aṇahillapura had, as said above, developed into a great centre of intellectual activity and poets and dialecticians of different sects from different parts of India visited the capital of Gurjaradeśa. The intellectual feats of Sūrācārya, pupil of Govindācārya and cousin of Bhīma I are described at length in the *Prabhāvakacarita* (18, pp 152-160). As a young man this Sūrācārya was a severe task-master of his pupils who once complained about his harshness to the elder *guru*, Govindācārya. The latter rebuked him and told him to show the power of his learning by conquering the learned assembly of Bhoja. The young dialectician understood the taunt and expressed his determination to proceed to Dhārā. His *guru* permitted him to go and King Bhīma sent him to Dhārā as his representative.

Another important figure of the times is the learned poet Dharma of Bhṛgukaccha. His account is given at length in the *Prabhāvakacarita* in connection with the poet Dhanapāla of Dhārā and Śāntiācārya, a great logician of Aṇahillapura. As a child Dharma was a dunce, so his learned father Sūradeva asked him to find out some employment for himself. He became a watchman in a sugar-cane field on the other side of the river Narmadā and while serving there developed uncommon intellectual powers through the favour of a *yoginī*. He went home, but was not welcomed by his father so he left his home in disgust abusing his Kaula sect in the choicest terms. He toured all the provinces, holding debates with learned men and defeating them. He also went to Dhārā and sent his challenge to King Bhoja. There he described himself as having defeated Śambhu of Gauḍa, Dviḥja in Dhārā, Viṣṇu in Bhaṭṭa-Manḍala and Paśupati in Śrī Kānyakubja. His challenge is that he could face anyone in Tarka, Lakṣaṇa and Sāhitya. He

easily defeats all the learned men of Bhoja's assembly. Bhoja sends for the poet Dhanapāla who had left him on feeling insulted in connection with his *Tilakamañjari* and appeals to his patriotism by saying, "Shall a foreigner—a Kaula—defeat Dhārā?" Dhanapāla returns from Satyapura (Sachor in Rajputana) and defeats Dharma who accepts his superiority saying that there is nobody who is Dhanapāla's equal. Dhanapāla asks him to visit Śāntisūri of Aṇahillapura. Dharma at his suggestion starts for Gurjaradeśa, and meets the great logician Śāntisūri in an open debate. The arguments that Dharma put forth were taken from the *Tattvopaplavasīmha* (of Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa), a dialectical work showing that nothing can be proved or known. Śāntyācārya answers all his arguments and Dharma recognises his superiority. The *Prabhāvakacarita* devotes a whole chapter to Śāntyācārya a great dialectician and poet. It may be noted in passing that in the culture of ancient India, logic and poetry were not divorced from each other. From the learned assembly of King Bhīma, Śāntyācārya got the titles Kavīndra (king of poets) and Vādicakrin (king of dialecticians). He went on Dhanapāla's request to Dhārā to critically examine the *Tilakamañjari* and wrote a commentary on it. King Bhoja welcomed him cordially and in order to see the intellectual powers of this 'Śvetabhikṣu' of Gurjaradeśa offered to give him a lac of coins for every *vādin* he defeated. Śāntisūri defeated eighty-four *vādins* and got the title Vādivetāla from Bhoja in addition to the promised sum of money which he spent in building temples. After his debate with Dharma, Śāntisūri met and defeated in debate a dialectician who had come to Aṇahillapura from the Drāviḍa country and who is represented as speaking in a strange language.

Śāntisūri had studied under Abhayadevasūri, the author of the voluminous commentary on the *Sanmatitarka* called *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* or even more significantly *Vādamahārṇava* and himself had thirty-two students studying Pramāṇa-śāstra (logic) under him. Buddhist logic was also taught and it was regarded as very difficult to grasp.⁶ A young Jaina monk of the ascetic

type named Muni Candra attended his lectures standing unknown for a fortnight. When Śāntisūri put certain questions to his students and nobody could answer them, Candra Sūri with Śāntisūri's permission answered them to his satisfaction. Śāntisūri was very much impressed and offered to teach him and even provided him with a residence behind the Mint (*Taṅkaśālā*), as he being a 'Suvihita' monk had great difficulty in finding one. This Muni Candra was the preceptor of Vādi-Devasūri, a great dialectician and logician, and the author of *Pramāṇanayatatvālokaśālikāra* and its commentary *Syādvādaratnākara*. Śāntisūri composed a commentary on the *Uttarādhyaṇa-sūtra* with the help of which Vādi-Devasūri defeated the Digambara dialectician Kumudacandra in the times of King Jayasimha.

We have also an account of Virācārya who is said to be a pupil of Govinda Sūri and a friend of Jayasimha. The *Prabhāvakacarita* relates that in the course of a friendly conversation Jayasimha told Virācārya that the greatness of learned men depended upon royal recognition. Virācārya's self-respect was wounded and Jayasimha, however much he wanted to, could not prevent him from leaving Aṇahillapura. After repeated requests and invitations from Jayasimha, Virācārya returned after an extensive tour in different parts of India, in the course of which he defeated several dialecticians, especially Buddhist ones in Mahābodhapura. Virācārya was highly honoured by the King of Gwalior. It is also related in the *Prabhāvakacarita* that a dialectician of the Sāṃkhya school named Vādisimha (— this looks more like a title than a name—) visited Aṇahillapura and challenged the learned men of the city to meet him in public debate. Jayasimha, who was very sensitive about the honour of his kingdom in matters of learning, approached Govindācārya who sent his pupil Virācārya to face the Sāṃkhya in an intellectual duel. We do not know whether this debate took place before Virācārya left Aṇahillapura or after he returned, but it is more

likely that Vīracārya met the Sāṃkhya *vādin* before he left Anahillapura. It can also be conjectured that it was this event that resulted in his intimacy with Jayasimha. Vīracārya also defeated in a debate one Kamalakīrti, a Digambara dialectician.

Vādi-Devasūri is one of the greatest names in the field of logic and dialectics. His activities were spread in the reigns of Siddharāja Jayasimha and Kumārapāla. He belonged, as we have seen, to the school of Muni Candra Sūri and his teacher Śāntisūri who himself was a student of Abhayadeva. In the early part of his career he became famous as a great debater who silenced dialecticians, one of them being Kumudacandra, a powerful Digambara dialectician. This defeat of Kumudacandra was a sort of landmark in the history of the Śvetāmbara Jains. As a verse attributed to Hemacandra says, there would have been no Śvetāmbara in Gujarat if Devasūri had not defeated Kumudacandra who had, according to the conditions of the debate, to leave this province. This incident forms the subject-matter of Yaśaścandra's play *Mudritakumudacandra* (Kumudacandra Silenced). It is also described in the *Prabhāvakacarita* (pp. 174 ff) in which we get some more details.

The *Mudritakumudacandra* presents the scene of the debate between Vādi-Devasūri and Kumudacandra in the court of Siddharāja Jayasimha of Gujarat. It was in Āśāpallī (—the older name of Karṇāvatī and the modern Ahmedabad—) that the seeds of discord between Kumudacandra and Devasūri were sown. Both of them were staying for the monsoon in that city, perhaps in the year 1124 A.D.. Devasūri did not, at first, mind the vauntings of Kumudacandra, in accordance with the practice of the religious duty of *śama* or control of anger. But his correlative and disciples would not put up with the boastings of this naked dialectician when they had an intellectual giant like Devasūri with them. So when an old nun was harassed by Kumudacandra, Devasūri's righteous indignation was roused and he decided to challenge Kumudacandra to enter into a debate with him. He sent word to the

Jaina Saṅgha of Aṇahillapura, who welcomed this decision. Devasūri sent an invitation to Kumudacandra to meet him in the court of Siddharāja which Kumudacandra readily accepted. It appears that there were attempts on the part of both sides to prejudice the issue. Devasūri however strictly forbade his party to try underhand means. At first, the minister Gāṅgila was prejudiced against him but ultimately he got a fair hearing in the court of Jayasimha.

Both the *vādin* and the *prativādin* were called to the debating hall—according to the *Prabhāvākacarita* on the full-moon day of Vaiśākha, Vikrama Samvat, 1181=1125 A.D.⁷ We are not told whether this was the first or the last day of the debate, as we are told in the *Prabhāvākacarita* that the debate lasted for sixteen days. A detailed description of the scene of the debate is given. The King himself is the *sabhāpati* whose decision is final. He is assisted by four *saḥhyas* (members) *Maharsi*, learned in Tarka (logic), *Bhārata* (*Mahabhārata*) and *Parāśara* (*Smṛti* of Parāśara); Utsāha, well known for his learning in Śāradādeśa i.e. Kashmir; Sāgara, an ocean of uncommon intelligence, and Rāma, well versed in logic and dialectics. On the side of Devasūri are the poet-laureate Śrīpāla and Bhābhū, a man of wonderful genius; and on the side of Kumudacandra the 'three Keśavas'. The general Śīlāṅka and at first the minister Gāṅgila are somehow against Devasūri. The Digambara ācārya is announced to be the *vādin* (proponent) and Vādi-Devasūri the *prativādin* (opponent). The question at issue is whether women (or souls in female embodiment) could liberate themselves. Kumudacandra is asked to set forth in a syllogistic form his view, viz. women cannot attain emancipation. Then Vādi-Devasūri says that a *prativādin* has a two-fold function to perform; he has to refute the stand-point of the other party as also demonstrate his own view. Accordingly Vādi-Devasūri refutes the argument of Kumudacandra and states his own view, viz. women can attain emancipation. Kumudacandra twice asks Devasūri to repeat his argument and even then without understanding it attempts to refute it. (He

could not demand further repetition of the argument as the 'check' *Ajñāna* would then be applied). Devasūri says that 'anavabodha' (that Kumudacandra had not grasped the point) could be the only answer. Normally it is accepted that a party before refuting the other party's position should reproduce it. But if the other party's argument is of the type of a sophistical refutation (*jāti* or *dūsaṇābhāsa*), it should not be reproduced but only the flaw should be pointed out, otherwise the person reproducing the sophistical argument would be subject to a *nigrahasthāna* ('check'). Maharṣi appreciates Devasūri's subtlety in not reproducing Kumudacandra's *jāti* type of argument. Kumudacandra now demands that the statement of the syllogism be written on paper. The king and the members of the assembly are convinced that Devasūri is victorious and that Kumudacandra is defeated, but the King only in order to satisfy Kumudacandra allows the statement to be written on paper. Keśava, a member on Kumudacandra's side writes it. Kumudacandra studies it and refutes it. Devasūri then reproduces his argument, refutes it and establishes his own position. In doing so he uses the word '*Koṭākoṭi*' to which Kumudacandra objects on the ground that it is grammatically wrong. The grammarian Utsāha—the king's member on the assembly—intervenes to say that according to Pāṇini all the three words—'*Koṭākoṭi*', '*Koṭikoṭi*' and '*Koṭkoṭi*' are correct. Devasūri reminds him of a statement in his own text '*antaḥ koṭākoṭi-sthitike sati karmaṇi*'. Kumudacandra then makes a very feeble and unsuccessful attempt to reproduce the opponent's argument and Devasūri makes fun of him by saying that even a tenth part has not been reproduced, leave alone refutation by pointing out flaws in the argument. Devasūri reproduces Kumudacandra's argument and refutes it. Kumudacandra does not dare to proceed further though the King exhorts him not to be indolent and to go ahead as he is there to ask the disputing parties to stop the argument when he thinks it proper to do so. Thus Vādi-Devasūri is victorious and Kumudacandra is defeated.

The King says that Kumudacandra, whose heat of arrogance has been pacified, no longer requires an umbrella, nor does he any more require *camaras* (fans) as flies would be whisked away by his deep sighs.

It is evident that the author of the play '*Mudritakumudacandra*' had in view the entire procedure and body of rules laid down for debates. We are told in the *Prabhāvakacarita* that Devasūri used his knowledge of the commentary of Śāntisūri on the *Uttarādhyayana* bearing on the topic of the emancipation of women and defeated Kumudacandra who could not answer his arguments.⁸ His career as a dialectician, perhaps prior to his becoming an *ācārya*, is described in the *Prabhāvakacarita*. In Dhavalaka (Dholka) he defeated a dialectician named Dhandha or Bandha of the Śivādvaita school (p. 172, v. 39). According to *Mudritakumudacandra*, however it was Municandrasūri, Devasūri's preceptor, who defeated the Śaiva who is described there as surpassing both Brhaspati and Śukrācārya (p. 17, v. 10). Perhaps Devasūri played an important role in helping his *guru* in the debate with this powerful Śaiva dialectician. The *Prabhāvakacarita* also refers to his meeting Kāśmīra Sāgara in Satyapura (or Sachor in Marwad), Guṇacandra, a Digambara in Nāgapur (or Nagor in Marwad), Śivabhūti of the Bhāgavata School in Citrakūṭa (or Citod), Gaṅgādhara in Gopagiri (or Gwalior), Dharaṇīdhara in Dhārā, Padmākara in Puṣkariṇī, and Kṛṣṇa, the leader of the Brāhmaṇas in Bhṛgukṣetra (p. 172, vv. 39-42). How much of this account is historical we cannot say, but the defeat of Guṇacandra is corroborated by the *Mudritakumudacandra* (pp. 16, 25). According to this play this debate was held in the court of Arjorāja of Sapādalakṣa whose protege the play-wright Yaśaścandra was. This debate took place before his famous debate with Kumudacandra, and was probably responsible for Kumudacandra's challenge to the Śvetāmbaras for a dialectical duel, though we have no definite information on this point. Kumudacandra is described in the *Prabhāvakacarita* (p. 174, vv. 83-86) as a southerner and the guru of Jayakeśin,

king of Karnāṭaka and the maternal grand-father of Jayasimha Siddharāja. He had defeated several dialecticians whose marionettes he used to tie to his left foot as so many tokens of dialectical conquests. He is represented as the very incarnation of pride. In the *Mudritakumudacandra*, Kumudacandra himself narrates his own exploits. His opponents included Buddhists, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, followers of Śaṅkara, and Kāpilas (i.e. Sāṃkhyas). How much historical truth there is in this narration we cannot say, but it is known that these schools of philosophical thought flourished in the south and that Digambara Jainism was then rich in philosophers and dialecticians of a very high order, some of whose works have survived to this day.

We have a work of not much importance, written in a verbose flowery language, called *Jalpakaḥpalatā*, the author of which is Ratnamaṇḍana of Tapāgaccha, disciple of Nandiratna, who was a disciple of Ratnaśekhara Sūri. It describes a debate between Māṇikya Muni, a disciple of Vādi-Devasūri and one Śaṅkara Naiyāyika, a native of Benares. Śaṅkara says that there is no conflict between dialectic and poetic talent. Literature and logic are not at daggers drawn. A very good example of this is the poet-philosopher Śrīharṣa. Śaṅkara sets forth an argument to prove that the world has a creator God, and says that there could be no fallacy in his reasoning. Māṇikya Muni then points out fallacies. Dialectical skill is very well exhibited in the arguments and answers of Māṇikya Muni and Śaṅkara.

This suffices to show that there were dialectical duels between dialecticians especially those belonging to different schools of thought or sects for the purpose of achieving royal favour and strengthening the position of one's creed or establishing one's superiority to others. Such debates seem to have been almost a regular feature in the court of the Indian kings, and in temples and in the precincts of monasteries. The dialectical discussions found in philosophical books are a result of, as also the fountain-source of, the arguments hurled at each other in such debates.

Poetical contests were equally popular, and even kings participated, of course through a poet in the kingdom. One such episode is related in the *Prabhāvakacarita*. The intellectual rivalry between Dhārā and Aṇahillapura, and Bhoja and Bhīma I has been referred to above. Bhoja in order to test the intelligence of Gurjaradeśa so that he could seize an opportunity to violate the peace-treaty sends a *gāthā*—a Prākṛta stanza—to Bhīma. The *gāthā* means that a lion whose prowess is seen in the ease with which he kills a powerful elephant does not care to make war or keep peace with a deer.⁹ The suggestion is clear. The several answers proposed by his court-poets do not satisfy Bhīma who wants to retort in an equally striking manner. His courtiers find one Govindācārya who was attending a dance performance with his pupil Sūrācārya. When the damsel perspiringly reposes on a stone-pillar, Govindācārya is requested to describe that graceful pose. He looks at Sūrācārya who composes a beautiful verse.¹⁰ The courtiers being impressed, request Govindācārya to accompany them. He is requested to prepare a befitting reply and again he looks at his pupil Sūrācārya prepares the answer in a Prākṛta *gāthā*—‘The creator created Bhīma the destroyer of the sons of the blind one; what does one matter to whom a hundred did not matter?’¹¹ Here there is a pun on the words ‘Bhīma’ and ‘Andhakasuta’. Bhīma the Pāṇḍava killed a hundred sons of the blind Dhṛtarāṣṭra, so this Bhīma will easily kill one son of the blind (Sindhula, the father of Bhoja who was deprived of his eye-sight by his brother Muñja). There is also an account in the *Prabhāvakacarita* of Devabodha of the Bhāgavata sect. He is called a great savant (*mahāvidvān*). He placed at the royal gate an enigmatic verse for the learned men of Aṇahillapura to explain. Devasūri solved this enigma after six months when he returned from the Arbuda mountain (Mount Abu) knowing that his *guru* Muni Candra Sūri would die within six months.¹² Philosophical contests also were held in this way by hanging a *patra* (enigmatic statement) on the wall of a temple and the like public places (see *Patraparikṣā* of Vidyānanda).

We have accounts of contests and competitions in the *Brāhmaṇas*. There was a competition between the gods and the asuras. They agreed that he who could not give a different gender of a term from that mentioned by the other party would be defeated. Accordingly the asuras supplied the words *ekā, dve, tisraḥ, catasraḥ* for *ekah, dvau, trayaḥ, catvāraḥ*, respectively, but could not supply a distinct word of the feminine gender for *pañca* (as this is used in the feminine gender also). So the gods won and the asuras were defeated (*Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa*, 21.13). From the story of Aṣṭāvakra in the *Mahābhārata* (*Āraṇyaka-parva*, 132-134) it can be seen that a contest as he had with Vandin required uncommon wit and an acquaintance with many branches of learning, in order that the parties to such a contest could on the spot say what things were of a particular number (one, two, three, etc.).

Brahmodyas were very popular in the Vedic days. *Brahmodya* meant a theological riddle or disputation on Vedic or spiritual matters. The legend of Uddālaka Āruṇi and Svaiddāyana Śaunaka gives a very good illustration of a *brahmodya* (see *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 11.4.1). It is said that in days of old it was a practice that the chosen offering priest whenever driving about used to carry a gold-piece with him (either for offering it for the sake of calling out the timid to a disputation as Eggeling explains, or with a view to his proposing a riddle or problem whenever he was afraid, as Geldner interprets it, or in order to give it to any learned Brāhmaṇa who would speak up against him as the reading of the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.3.6. would suggest). Accordingly Uddālaka carried a gold-piece with him. The Brāhmaṇas of the northern people were afraid that he would deprive them of their domain, so they decided to challenge him to a *brahmodya* and to have Svaiddāyana Śaunaka as their own champion. Svaiddāyana after the formal greeting straightaway began to question him: "He alone, O son of Gautama, may drive about amongst people as chosen (offering-priest) who knows in the Full and New-Moon sacrifices eight butter-portions (offered) previously, five portions

of sacrificial food in the middle, six (portions) of Prajāpati and eight butter portions (offered) subsequently.

“He alone, O son of Gautama, may drive about amongst people as chosen (priest), who knows from the Full and New Moon sacrifices, whereby it is that creatures here are born toothless, whereby they (the teeth) grow with them, whereby they decay with them, whereby they come to remain permanently with them; whereby, in the last stage of life they all decay again with them; whereby the lower ones grow first, then the upper ones, whereby the lower ones are smaller and the upper ones, broader; whereby the incisors are larger and whereby the molars are of equal size.

“He alone, O son of Gautama, may drive about amongst people as chosen (priest) who knows from the Full and New-Moon sacrifices, whereby creatures here are born with hair, whereby, for the second time, as it were, the hair of the beard and the arm-pits and other parts of the body grow on them; whereby it is on the head that one first becomes grey, and then, again, in the last stage, one becomes grey all over.

“He alone, O son of Gautama, may drive about amongst people as chosen (priest) who knows from the Full and New-Moon sacrifices, whereby the seed of the boy is not productive, whereby in the middle age it is productive, and whereby again in his last stage of life it is not productive;

“And he who knows the golden brilliant winged Gāyatrī, who bears the sacrificer to the heavenly world.” (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. 11.4.1.4-8, Eggeling's Translation, S.B.E.).

Uddālaka could not answer these questions and he gave away the gold-piece to Svaidāyana saying, “Thou art learned, Svaidāyana, and verily gold is given unto him who knows gold.” Later Uddālaka came back as a student to Svaidāyana to learn all this.*

* We have another version of this legend in the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, 1.3.6. I-109

The separate acts of the Darśapūrṇamāsa (New and Full Moon sacrifices) are correlated with facts and events in the development of the human body. A specimen of this correlation may be given here :

“And inasmuch as the fore-offerings (*prayāja*) are without invitatory formulas (*puro'nuvākyā*), therefore creatures are born here without teeth, and inasmuch as the chief oblations (*havis*) have invitatory formulas, therefore they (the teeth) grow in them; and inasmuch as the after-offerings (*anuyāja*) are without invitatory formulas, therefore they (the teeth) decay in them, and inasmuch as the *Patnīsamyāgas* have invitatory formulas, therefore they (the teeth) come to remain permanently with them: and inasmuch as the *Samistayajus* is without invitatory formula, therefore they all decay again in the last stage of life.” (11.4 1.12).

This is a mystic or occult explanation of the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice. We have a similar riddle-like theological discourse (*brahmodya*) between Proti (—according to the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, Predi) Kauśāmbeya Kausurubindi and his teacher Uddālaka Āruṇi (see *Śatapatha Br.* 12 2.2. 13–23; *Gopatha Br.* 1.4 24) in which the sacrifice, the year as the single one (*ekam*) is said to consist of respectively ten, nine, eight, etc. days. This is the mystic import of the year. A number of such curious or enigmatic problems are posed in the *Atharva Veda* also; for instance *Atharva Veda* 8.9.7 asserts the paradox, “They call *Virāj* (female) the father of Brahman.” (See also *Atharva Veda* 4.1; 5.1; 7.1; 8.9; 20. 129–133 etc.) Though some of these *brahmodyas* might appear puerile to us, they were not so to the sages of old, and what is more important were, as said earlier, the fruits of the untiring pursuit of the mind asking questions about each curious phenomenon. Such *brahmodyas* become the subjects of intellectual contests in the Vedic days.

In India, controversial problems—philosophical, religious, social, judicial, literary and the like—have always been decided in debates and controversies, in royal assemblies, temples, places

of learning, public squares and such other places. There is a work called *Vādāvali*, a collection of controversies establishing different doctrinal views of the Suddhādvaitins. Most of these *vādas* are those of Puruṣottama. The topics range from *ūrdhva-puṇḍra-dhāraṇa* (having the vertical religious mark on the forehead) and *mūrti-pūjā* (image-worship) to *khyātis* (theories of knowledge) and *ātman* (soul, self).¹³ These give us some idea of the kinds of controversies that were held in the assemblies of experts. The *Vajrasūci*, a later *upanīṣad*, discusses the problem of caste. In the Buddhist *Piṭakas* also we have many instances of the repudiation of the caste-system (*varṇa-vyavasthā*). In the *Assalāyana-sutta* (*Majjhima Nikāya*), Buddha's questions are very interesting and convincing, e.g. 'Is fire lit by a Brāhmaṇa brighter and more useful than that lit by others?' Similarly in the *Vāseṭṭha-sutta*, Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja well-versed in *pada* (metre?), *vyākaraṇa* (grammar), *nirukta* (etymology) and *jappa* (*jalpa* i.e. discourse, debate) cannot agree as to how one is a Brāhmaṇa,—by his birth or by his character. Buddha explains to them that there is a *liṅga* (mark) peculiar to different classes of living beings, but there is no such mark distinguishing the *jātis* or so-called castes of human beings from one another. There is no difference in their bodies. They are only conventionally addressed differently. In the *Sonadaṇḍa Sutta* (*Dīgha Nikāya*) also there is a discussion as to who is a true Brāhmaṇa.

We find an interesting episode recorded in *The Life of Hiuen Tsiang** which gives us an idea of the social and religious importance of controversies. Śīlādityarāja sent a messenger with a letter to the Nālandā convent to Śīlabhadra, the master of the Law in which he said, "Your Servant, whilst progressing through Orissa met some priests of the Little Vehicle, who adhere to a *Śāstra* which abuses the principles of the Great

* *The Life of Hiuen Tsiang* (p. 160 ff) by the Shaman Hui Li, with an Introduction containing an account of the works of I-tsing by Samuel Beal, with a Preface by L. Cranmer-Byng (London Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd, 1914).

Vehicle. They speak of the followers of that system as men of a different religion and they wish to hold a controversy with you on this point....." He begged Śīlabhadra to send four men 'of eminent ability, well acquainted with one and the other school, and also with the esoteric and exoteric doctrine, to the country of Orissa.' Śīlabhadra assembled the Congregation and after inquiry selected Sāgaramati, Prajñārāśmi, Simharaśmi and the Master of the Law (Hiuen Tsiang) as the four men in reply to the king's mandate. But Śīlādityarāja again sent a letter to the effect that there was no immediate pressure and they could wait and come later.

About this time there was a heretic of the Shun-si sect (—the Lokāyatis) who came to dispute with the Nālandā monks and he wrote out forty theses and hung them up at the Temple gate. "If any one within can refute these principles", he said, 'I will give my head as a proof of his victory'. Several days passed without any response to this challenge. Then Hiuen-Tsiang sent an attendant to go and pull down the writing, tear it to pieces and trample it under foot. The Brāhmaṇa was initially in a rage but on hearing the well-known name of Hiuen-Tsiang was abashed and would not enter into a dispute with him. Hiuen-Tsiang, therefore, asked him to come in and discuss the points. Then in the presence of Śīlabhadra he called on all the priests to be witnesses while he disputed with the Brāhmaṇa. He then noticed in succession the various opinions of the different heretical schools..... The Brāhmaṇa was silent and unable to reply. Hiuen-Tsiang did not take his life, but ordered him to act as servant and follow his directions (teaching or doctrine).

Now Hiuen-Tsiang being desirous to go to Orissa, inquired about getting the essay of the 'Little Vehicle' which proposed to destroy the principles of the 'Great Vehicle' in 700 ślokas. He found on examination several passages of a doubtful character. The Brāhmaṇa whom he had conquered had studied the principles of the 'Little Vehicle' five times, so Hiuen-Tsiang caused him to go through the entire work. Then having grasped

the errors of the work, he wrote a refutation of it in 1600 *ślokas* and called it 'The Destruction of Heresy', taking up the doctrines of the Great Vehicle point by point. Hiuen-Tsiang out of gratitude liberated the Brāhmaṇa who filled with joy went forth to Kāmarūpa in Eastern India and told Kumārarāja about the 'high qualities' of Hiuen-Tsiang.

King Śīlāditya after some time called an assembly in the town of Kānyakubja in order to exhibit the refinements of the Great Vehicle, and commanded all the Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas and heretics to attend. Hiuen-Tsiang began to extol the teaching of the Great Vehicle and he announced a subject for discussion and he got it exhibited to the members of the great Community. He also got a placard to be written and hung outside the door of the place of assembly exhibiting the same to all the people, and adding, "If there is any one who can find a single word in the proposition contrary to reason, or is able to entangle the argument, then at the request of the opponent I offer my head as a recompense".

Day after day for five days no one came forward to say a word. After five days had passed, the unbelievers of the Little Vehicle, seeing he had overturned their school, plotted to take his life. But the king hearing of it issued a proclamation of warning of severe consequences. From this time 'the followers of error' withdrew and disappeared, so that when eighteen days had passed and there had been no one to enter into the discussion, Hiuen-Tsiang was honoured by one and all. The congregation of the Great Vehicle called him 'Mahāyānadeva', while the followers of the Little Vehicle called him 'Mokṣadeva'.

We may say that though philosophical works and works pertaining to other disciplines do not record the parties or the occasion connected with a controversy or discussion, yet there is no doubt that such discussions in these works were originally necessitated by some such controversy—formal or otherwise—in the world of school-men, academicians or sectarians, and these served as guides for future discussions and debates.

Later it became a practice to incorporate such dialectical criticism of problems in almost every work. Even the early *Brāhmaṇa* works are a result of the controversies between different schools of ritualists regarding the manner of performance and the order of religious rites and such other controverted points connected with sacrifices. In some old documents we find records of debates pertaining to the rights and disabilities and the hierarchy of the different castes, and about social customs and even matters connected with marriage, divorce, dowry, social responsibilities and the like. The local *pañca* (assembly usually of five members) consisting of representatives from all castes or parties, and presided over by a Chairman usually decided such points after a proper consideration of the arguments advanced by the two parties.

The art of debate was considered an important acquisition among medical practitioners. Very often the rival practitioners showed off, or perhaps had to show off their skill and learning in debates on the occasion of the treatment of patients who were rich. Physicians also would discuss in order to arrive at a correct diagnosis, or in order to decide controversial points pertaining to Medicine at a conference. The fact that physicians in counsel earnestly discussed together in order to arrive at right conclusions regarding both the theoretical causes of diseases and their cures and their practical discernment in individual cases is quite clear from even a superficial study of the *Caraka Saṃhitā*. The entire work seems to be a collection of discussions of learned physicians with Atri as their chairman. Where differences of opinion were great, they are all found noted and Atri's own opinion on them is given and where there was more or less unanimity or where Atri himself lectured on particular problems his own opinion alone is given. It is also described, as we have seen, how a good and clever physician is to defeat his opponents in a controversy in a legitimate and scientific way and also by tricky devices if necessary. It was a practical necessity for these physicians to make their living in the face of strong competition, and it is

easy to see how the tricky devices of *chala*, *jāti* and *nigraha-sthāna* entered into the regular art of debate for gaining victory over opponents, though they were not always employed. Perhaps nowhere was the acquirement of this art so much looked upon as a practical necessity for earning living even in those early days as among the medical men. Dr. S. N. Dasgupta is of the view that since there is no mention of the development of this art in any other earlier literature it is reasonable to suppose that the art of debate and its accessories developed from early times in the traditional medical schools, whence they are found collected in Caraka's work.¹⁴

We have seen that the procedure in the courts of law influenced to a great degree the development of dialectic.

We have a fine illustration of a legal dispute in the *Mṛcchakaṭika* (Act 9) of Śūdraka (fourth or fifth century A.D.). Cārudatta is accused by Śākāra of the murder of Vasantasenā for the sake of her ornaments. The chief judge (*adhikaraṇika*) is assisted in his task by the *śreṣṭhin* (alderman) and a *kāyastha* (clerk of the court). The court chaprasi is sent out to find out who are the legal suitors. On knowing that Śākāra had presented himself, the judge wanted to adjourn the case, but Śākāra, the king's brother-in-law threatened to get him dismissed. A fool is capable of everything so the judge was cowed down and took the case in hand. It may be noted that we cannot generalise from such oddities; generally the judge's decision was final in all respects. Śākāra is ushered in and asked about his complaint. In his own foolish way he states that he saw Vasantasenā lying dead in the garden, having been murdered by some one, but not by him. The judge asks the *śreṣṭhin* and the *kāyastha* to take note of the words '*na mayā*' ('Not by me'). Śākāra realises his folly and cunningly explains that the woman 'was seen by me' (*mayaiva dr̥ṣṭā*), so they should not make unnecessary fuss. He rubs off what is written by the officials. Śākāra had said that the woman was murdered for her ornaments,

On being asked to explain this he says that the parts of the body where the ornament ought to be worn were bare, so the ornaments must have been removed. This explanation is found to be convincing. The *śreṣṭhin* and the *kāyastha* ask on whom the dispute rests. The judge answers that legal disputes are of two kinds—one based on statements and the other on the purport. The former is to be settled by considering the arguments of the plaintiff and the defendant. The latter is to be decided according to the discretion of the judge. This particular case rests upon the statement of Vasantasenā's mother, who is called there with great considerateness. She states that Vasantasenā had gone to her friend Cārudatta's house. Śākāra asks that these words be noted and contends that his dispute is with Cārudatta. The judge thereon says that the case now depends on Cārudatta and asks the *kāyastha* to note the first point in the dispute that Vasantasenā had gone to Cārudatta's house. He summons Cārudatta very politely to the court. Cārudatta admits that Vasantasenā was his friend and says that she had gone home after visiting him. The judge questions him specifically whether she had gone on foot or in a cart. Cārudatta answers that she did not leave his house in his presence, so he cannot say how she left. Meanwhile, Vīraka, the chief of police, comes and complains about Candanaka's ill treatment of him when he wanted to inspect Cārudatta's cart said to be carrying Vasantasenā (—as a matter of fact, Vīraka was in the cart). Śākāra draws the judge's attention to these words. Vīraka is sent to find out if the corpse of a woman is lying in the garden. He comes back and reports that he saw the corpse of a woman devoured by animals. He is asked how he could determine that it was the body of a woman. Vīraka replies that he could do so by examining what was left of hair, hands, arms, feet, etc.. The judge gives expression to the irony of worldly disputes; the more a case is investigated into, the more a person is landed into trouble.¹⁵ The judge then asks Cārudatta to tell the truth. Śākāra expresses his surprise that Cārudatta, the accused, is

still allowed to occupy a chair. Finding this against the rule, as a *prima-facie* case was made out against him, the judge has to admit the validity of Śakāra's demand and Cārudatta sits on the ground. He pleads innocence on the ground of his gentle nature which does not allow him even to pluck a flower, so he could never think of manhandling a beautiful woman. Meanwhile, Vidūṣaka who had gone to return Vasantasenā's ornaments enters and on knowing of Śakāra's accusation is enraged. There ensues a fight between the two and the ornaments fall from under his armpit. Śakāra points out these as the very ornaments for which Cārudatta had killed Vasantasenā. All were stunned. Cārudatta feels that telling the truth would now be in vain, and even the judge is pained at the calamity that has befallen him. The *śreṣṭhin* and the *kāyastha* ask Vasantasenā's mother to identify the ornaments. The old woman says that they are similar but not the same. Śakāra draws the attention of those present to the fact that her eyes had given out the secret but she did not admit it by word of mouth. Still she maintains that ornaments could be similar and the judge supports this. But Cārudatta admits that they are Vasantasenā's and that they were brought from his house, and with a pained heart even desperately admits that he had killed her. This settles the point and Cārudatta is arrested. The judge in his decision cites Manu's authority that a Brāhmaṇa though sinful shall not be put to death; at the most he can be exiled even while he remains in possession of his wealth and other belongings. But King Pālaka ordains that such a criminal should be put to death after proper publicity so that others might learn a lesson.

This is not an ideal trial or legal dispute, but even here we find an attempt to analyse and investigate a point fully before basing any conclusion on it. Dr. P. V. Kane says that the procedure in the drama is in essentials the same as that given in the *smṛtis* of Nārada, Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana who constitute the leading triumvirate on law and procedure and

who probably flourished a little before and after the drama.¹⁵ As said above, it is not proper to generalise from such oddities as those of Śākāra. Ordeals of fire, water, poison and balance were known, but no ordeal was granted in the case of Cārudatta because there were witnesses and circumstantial evidence against him.

The mention of ordeals reminds us of Udayana's debate with a Buddhist *ācārya* before the king of Mithilā, as related in the *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa-pariśiṣṭa*, Bhagavad-māhātmya, 30. The debate lasted for a number of days. When the Buddhist found that he would soon be defeated he appealed to the king that he was in the midst of enemies, and no one sided with him. He suggested another way of determining victory. If the *Śālagrāma* stone bearing the image of Hari changed into water on his view being stated his view should be regarded as the right one. If Udayana could turn it into stone again his view should be regarded as true. Udayana scented the mischief and said that it was obvious that if both these miracles happened the members of the assembly would be confounded and would regard both the views as true. Still he had no objection to submit to this test if later the Buddhist accepted his proposal. It happened as Udayana had predicted. The image became water on the Buddhist view being stated, but became stone again when Udayana asserted his view. Then Udayana suggested that both fall from a Tāla tree to decide whose view was true—the Buddhist saying '*Vedāḥ apramāṇam*' (the Vedas are not authoritative) and Udayana saying '*Vedāḥ pramāṇam*' (the Vedas are authoritative)—and the king should be converted to the view of the philosopher who remained alive and was thus proved to be victorious, and should punish the adherents of the other view and drown their literature in water. The Buddhist, it is said, fell dead with his body disfigured and, dismembered. Udayana was made the *rājaguru* (royal preceptor) and given villages as gift for his livelihood. This Udayana could boast on finding the doors of the temple of Jagannātha shut that the well-being of Lord Jagannātha

depended on him as long as the Buddhists were there and Jagannātha in all His glory could not afford to forget that. And, it is said that the doors of the temple opened of their own accord.¹⁶

These and such accounts might not have any historical truth in them, but they certainly show the place of debates in the social and cultural and intellectual life of India and also show how far controversies could go, and their result influence the future career of a person or the history of a sect or school of thought.

NOTES

- 1 'Pratitiṣṭhanti ha vā ya etā rātrīr upayanti'; 'Brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati', 'Brahma bubhṛṣur brahmavedanaṁ kuryāt.'
- 2 Iha māsa-mātram avadhiḥ kriyatām
anumanyate hi divasasya gaṇaḥ,
tadanantaram sudati hāsyasi
bhoḥ kusumāstraśāstra-nipunatvam api.
—*Śaṅkaradigvijayo*, 9.72 (of Vidyāraṇya).
- 3 Cf 'Mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati'-Brh. Up. 4.4.19, *Kaṭha Up.* 4. 10; Yādā hy evaiṣa etasminn udaram antaram kurute' tha tasya bhayaṁ bhavati.—*Taittiriya Up.* 2.7.
- 4 Tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvam anupaśyataḥ.—*Iśa Up.* 7.
- 5 See *Prabhāvakacarita*, 10 (Mallavādi-caritam). The story is somewhat differently told in the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi* and in the *Prabandhakośa*. There Mallavādin is associated with Śilāditya.
- 6 Atha pramāṇa-śāstrāṇi śiṣyaṁ dyātrimśatam tadā,
adhyāpayanti Śrīśāntisūrayaś caitya-samsthitaḥ. 70
prameyā duḥparicchedyā bauddha-tarka-samudbhavaḥ,
tenāvadhāritāḥ sarve'nyaprajñānavagāhitaḥ. 73
—*Prabhāvakacarita*, 16. 70,73 (Vādivetāla-Śāntisūricarita)
- 7 *Prabhāvakacarita*, p. 178, v. 193.
- 8 See *Prabhāvakacarita*, p. 178, v. 205. For an account of the whole debate, see *Ibid*, pp. 174 ff; and *Mudritakumudacandra*, pp. 44-51. See also *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* Part II—Introduction by Prof. Rasiklal C. Parikh (Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay, 1938).

- 9 Helā-niddaliya-gaimdukumbha-payāḍiyapayāvapasarassa,
Sihassa maena samarāṇa na viggaho neya samdhānaṇa.
—*Prabhāvakacarita*, p. 152, v. 15.
- 10 Yat kaṇkaṇābharaṇa-komalabāhuvallisaṅgāt kuraṅgakadḍṣor nava-
yauvanāyāḥ,
Na svidyasi pracalasi pravikampase tvaṁ tat satyam eva dṛsadā nanu
nirmito'si.—*Ibid* p. 152, v. 26.
- 11 Amdhaya suyāṇa kālo Bhīmo puhavī nimmi vihiṇā,
jena sayam pi na gaṇiyam kā gaṇāṇā tujja ikkassa.
—*Ibid* p. 153. v. 33
- 12 Anyadā Devabodhākhyāḥ Śrībhāgavata-darśanā,
bhūrivādajayonmudraḥ śrīmat pattanam āyayau. 61
avāḷambata patraṁ ca rājadvāre madoddhuraḥ,
tatra ślokaṁ durālokaṁ vibudhair alikhac ca sah. 62
tathā hi—
“Eka-dvi-tri-catuḥ-paṇca-ṣaṇmenakamane na kāḥ,
Devabodhe mayi kruddhe ṣaṇ menakamanenakāḥ”. 63
tataḥ sarve' pi vidvāṁsa enam ālokya sūryavat,
dṛṣo vipariyanti sma durbodhaṁ sudhiyāṁ api 64
ṣaṇmāsānte tadā cā'mbāprasādo bhūpateḥ puraḥ,
Devasūri-prabhuṁ vijñarājaṁ darśayati sma ca 65
Sa bhūpāla-puraḥ slokaṁ bibhedodbhedadhinidhiḥ,
kulattha-jalavad-gaṇḍa-śailaṁ rājñā mataḥ subṛt. 66
Athāśya ślokasya vivaraṇam—kai gai rai śabde. kāyantīti kvacit
da-pratyaye kāḥ śabdena vādinah. te ṣaṭkāḥ. santiṭi kriyādhyāhare ṣaḍ
vādino na santi. kva sati—Devabodhe mayi kruddhe sati. punaḥ katham-
bhūte—eka-dvi-tri-catuḥ-paṇca-ṣaṇ-menakamane. mākaṁ māṅka māṇe,
mānam māḥ kvip pramāṇam. ekaṁ pramāṇam pratyakṣa-rūpaṁ yeṣāṁ
te ekamāḥ, cārvaṅkāḥ, ekapramāṇavādinah. tathā dvimāḥ—dve pramāṇe
pratyakṣānumānarūpe yeṣāṁ te dvimāḥ, dvipramāṇavādino baudhāḥ
vaiśeṣikaś ca. tathā trimāḥ—triṇi pramāṇāni pratyakṣānumāṇā”gamarūpāṇi
yeṣāṁ te trimāḥ, tripramāṇavādinah sāmikhyāḥ. catvāri pratyakṣā-
numāṇā”gamopamānarūpāṇi pramāṇāni yeṣāṁ te caturmāḥ, catuḥ-
pramāṇavādino naiyāyikāḥ. tathā pañcamāḥ—pañca pratyakṣānumānāgamopamāṇā
rthāpattirūpāṇi pramāṇāni yeṣāṁ te pañcamāḥ, pañca-pramāṇa-
vādinah prābhākaraḥ. tathā ṣaṇmāḥ—ṣaṭ pratyakṣānumāṇā”gamopamāṇa-
rthāpattiyabhāvarūpāṇi pramāṇāni yeṣāṁ te ṣaṇmāḥ, ṣaṭpramāṇavādino
mīmāṃsakaḥ. teṣāṁ iṅśaḥ tadvetṭtvāt, tān kamate abhilasati, sa ekādvi-
tri-catuḥ-paṇca-ṣaṇ-menakamanaḥ tasmin mayi. tathā menakamanenakā
api na kāḥ na vādinah. mā lakṣmīḥ, tasyā inah svāmī Viṣṇuḥ, kamaṇo

Brahmā, ina Ādityaḥ, menakamanenāḥ, alpatvāt ka-pratyaye menakama-
nenakāḥ. te'pi Viṣṇu-Brahma-Sūryā mayi Devabodhe kruddhe sati
ajñānatvān na kāḥ na vādināḥ. yato devān bodhayati--iti śabdavyutpattya
te'pi mayā bodhitāḥ sujñānā bhavanti, tato mānuṣāṇām paṭuvādinān
viduṣām api kiṁ pramāṇam kā vārtā. iti patrālamba-vyākhyā.
—*Prabhāvakacarita*, pp. 172-173.

- 13 See *Vādāvali* (of Puruṣottama and others)—edited by Rāmanātha Śarmā, 1920.
- 14 *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 2, p. 402—S. N. Dasgupta.
- 15 *History of Dharma Śāstra*, Vol. 3, p. 279—P. V. Kane (1946).
- 16 Jagannātha suraśreṣṭha bhaktyahamkārāpūrvakam,
aiśvaryamada-matto'si mām avajñāya vartase. 68
upasthiteṣu bauddheṣu mad-adbhīnā tava sthitiḥ,
ity evam ukte śloke tu sahasodghāṭitāḥ svayam. 69
kapāṭās tatkaṣaṇād eva nr̥ṇām citram tu paśyatām,
tatas tatra sthitā yeṣu Jagannāthasya pūjakāḥ. 70
—*Bhavisya Purāṇa Pariśiṣṭa-Bhagavad-māhātmya*, 30.

RÉSUMÉ

We are drawing near the end of our inquiry. An account of Indian Dialectics is on the whole very interesting both from the theoretical and the historical and social points of view. The general impression is that Indian culture is predominantly mystically or spiritually inspired. This side is certainly there, but there is an intellectual side also, one of whose characteristic expressions is found in the development of dialectical thought in the important domains of life. It has been my attempt to show that the Indians have shown a pre-occupation with dialectics in all their thinking. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi has said :

*‘Kāvyesu komala-dhiyo vayam eva nānye
tarkeṣu karkaśa-dhiyo vayam eva nānye’*

(“We alone have minds of fine sensibility in respect of poetry, and not others; we alone have a rigorous intellect in dialectics and not others.”). This truly describes the intellectual culture of India in its varied aspects.

The intellectual, rational and dialectical aspect of Indian culture is revealed in the realm of higher thought. This is evident right from the Vedic literature—the earliest systematic documents of Indian life and culture that are available. The Aryan thinker has even in the Vedic hymns asked questions as to why he feels compelled to believe in those deities, why he feels the necessity to posit only one God or even an absolute entity, how the world could have arisen from this one entity and so on. With the passage of time these questions increased in number and probed deeper. Is this one entity sentient or can it be insentient? In either case what could be the relation between this entity and the world which bears evidence of both sentiency and insentiency? What could be

the order of creation, or did creation take place at all? and so on and so forth. Thus metaphysical theories and philosophical views grew and developed. The philosophical questions the Indian thinker has asked and attempted to answer are too well known to need any further emphasis. The Indian dialectical mind is visible everywhere.

We have seen that 'dialectic' primarily signifies the art of discussion, debate, controversy, the method of argument or disputation, the process of discursive or conversational thinking. The Sanskrit parallels are *sambhāṣā*, *kathā*, *tarka*. I have shown that the Indian thinkers applied their *tārkikatā*, dialectical bent of mind to different branches of learning and that the dialectical mode seems to have been indispensable in the treatment of the different subjects in ancient India, and to the development of the different *vidyās* both in their theoretical and practical aspects. As a matter of fact, dialectics is rooted in man's very being, for reasoning and discussion are natural to him. Man feels a sort of a veil of *Avidyā*, Nescience—both from the point of view of knowledge and conduct—covering his real nature and he is always striving to get out of it and realise himself and know things rightly. This has been the attempt of man throughout the ages. Whether he seems God-like or Satan-like, he is trying to find out the truth and realise his essential being. He has to justify his goal and the efforts he is making to achieve it, to others and much more so to himself. Reason being one of his important tools for acquiring knowledge and achieving success in practical ends, man delights in raising doubts in respect of every little action or belief of his and tries to resolve these and answer objections. We have seen that this is true of man in India throughout his history. Just as he was asking questions about the deities so he felt compelled to ask questions about the meaning and interpretation of the literature pertaining to deities and their worship, the speech he was using, the relation of word and meaning and thus find some rational justification for the religious and occult rites handed down

from one generation to another and discover some significance in them and the *Vāk* (speech) accompanying them. This inquiry also must have led to serious discussions and intellectual disputes as the Indian thinker attempted to fix some general rules of exegesis and arrive at a philosophy of word and meaning. It is generally believed that Indian logic has its source in the discussions of the ritualists, pertaining to sacrificial rites and the like in the long intervals between two sacrificial ceremonies, and in connection with the interpretation of Vedic texts, order of sacrificial rites and so on.

Two other vital needs of the ancient Indian might have led to the growth of dialectic and there is much evidence for this. These are his physical well-being and secondly the settlement of disputes which arise over inheritance, property, theft and so on, that is to say, disputes of a juridical character. These latter have to be settled in some way or the other so as to convince both parties of the truth and justice of the settlement and for this the plaint and the reply have to be properly weighed and a proper conclusion arrived at. We have seen that the legal terminology that gradually grew up has much in common with the terminology of logic and dialectic and there may have been much by way of mutual influence and parallel development. The procedures in a court of justice and in the intellectual arena have much in common. The other serious need for discussion was in connection with the physical well-being of man, the nature of the ailment if any and the cause of it and the means to remedy it and the procedure adopted. A good physician would reason out a case for his own diagnosis and then compare his view with that of others. We have seen that a section in great detail on dialectic has been included in the *Caraka-samhitā*. This development of the logic and the dialectic of diagnosis presupposes a coming together of physicians. This might be occasionally at the sick bed of a rich patient but more probably in frequent conferences or assemblies of physicians. The fact that physicians in counsel earnestly

discussed together in order to arrive at conclusions regarding the theoretical causes of diseases, their cures and their actual discernment in individual cases is quite clear, as said above, from even a superficial study of the *Caraka-samhitā*. The entire work seems to be a collection of discussions of learned physicians with Atri as the presiding sage. Where differences of opinion are great they are all noted, and Atri's own opinion on them is given, and where there was more or less unanimity or where Atri had something new to say his own opinion alone is given. We know from several independent sources that the practice of holding *samitis*, *saṅgītis*, *gosthis* or *pariṣads* for discussions and decisions on various theoretical and practical problems was prevalent. These *pariṣads* were held for discussing and deciding not only questions pertaining to ritual and religious practices and philosophy but also medical and juridical and the like problems. Such assemblies of the learned for art and literature are actually mentioned in the *Kāmasūtra* (1.4). Logic and dialectic possibly arose and developed from disputes and discourses in such assemblies.

The list of *jātis* (sophistical refutations) given in early works on logic indicates that thinkers systematically formulated the principles of logic after a careful examination of the arguments advanced by either party in actual disputes. Some arguments must have seemed obviously invalid or fallacious and must have been adjudged as such. But it was for the logician to find out where the fault actually lay and frame the principles of correct reasoning therefrom. Some of the *jātis* given are so specific that they seem to have been taken up directly from actual discussions without their being generalised, and strengthen our conclusion that these *jātis* were a list of types of arguments repeatedly and commonly advanced by debaters to shield their position, but obviously fallacious. A student of logic, it was thought, should be acquainted with such arguments or sophistical refutations so that he himself could avoid them or detect them as fallacious if put forth by

an opponent in a debate. In most cases such arguments were given as *jātis* in a general form, but in some cases the original was preserved in its specific form, perhaps because generalising it would have made it difficult to grasp. Similarly, tricks such as quibbling, repetition, digression, etc. employed by clever dialecticians to put the opponent off the track, supplied material to logic and dialectic for the section on *nigrahasthānas* which could be employed as 'checks' when a debater knowingly or unknowingly resorted to such practices.

The necessity of exposing fallacies in the arguments of the opponent preceded the systematic and scientific study of logic as a separate *śāstra*. We find that the distinction of *hetvābhāsas* (fallacies of reason), which are of a strictly logical character and value, from the faults and aberrations resulting from inadvertence and sophistical motives has been clearly recognised even in the *Sūtra* period. The *Nyāya-sūtra* recognises *hetvābhāsa* as a separate *padārtha* (topic) even when it is subsumed under *nigrahasthāna*. The *nigrahasthānas* (grounds of censure or defeat) are rightly believed to form a wider class, and comprehend *hetvābhāsas* within their scope as a particular variety but are never confounded with purely logical aberrations. The fallacies which are called fallacies *in dictione* by Aristotle and which arise from ambiguity in language are not regarded as fallacies proper in Indian logic and have been placed under the head of *chala*. (quibble). Many of the fallacies of the *extra dictionem* variety also are not regarded as *hetvābhāsas*, but are subsumed either under the head of *chala* or that of *nigrahasthānas* which are symptomatic of 'other than logical delinquency'. The fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi*, which consists in proving a conclusion other than what is intended to be proved, can be subsumed under *nigrahasthānas* like *arthāntara*, *pratijñāntara*, *pratijñā-hāni*. * Similarly the actual debates that were carried on must have been analysed

* See *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 353; and Prof. Satkari Mookerjee's article on 'The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System of Philosophy', p. 421 in *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. I (Ramkrishna Memorial, Vol. I),

from the point of view of their aim and procedure and debates were thus classified under broad heads such as *vāda* (discussion), *jalpa* (disputation) and *vitaṇḍā* (wrangling) in works on logic (and dialectic), though this division could not be historically justified for no party would profess to indulge in a *jalpa* or a *vitaṇḍā*. All would initially agree to participate in a *vāda* and it was the actual procedure and the manœuvres employed which made all the difference. The kinds of evidences and proofs cited in disputes, legal or otherwise, contributed to the growth of the concept of *pramāṇas* (proofs or sources of knowledge) in logic.

Logic in its early stages is primarily concerned with the treatment of debate and its technique, as can be seen from the *Nyāya-sūtra*, early Buddhist works and even the Jaina Canonical literature. As logic becomes more systematic and as the rules of correct reasoning come to be clearly formulated on the strength of the detection of fallacies, logic starts concerning itself with the *pramāṇas* and only secondarily with the technique of debate. Navya-Nyāya dropped the topic of debate altogether, as it did metaphysics to a large extent, and busied itself with bringing perfect precision to logical arguments and definitions by its novel method. It was thus that logic came to establish itself.

Science arises, as said above, to satisfy some vital need of man. To establish itself it has to resort to arguments in order to justify its theories, and in the process indulges in subtle and even hair-splitting arguments. It may also happen that these arguments appear even more intriguing, and that dialecticians try to solve the difficulties involved much more than they try to understand anything else, thus evolving a dialectic of dialectic and applying the rules dialectic has evolved to dialectic itself. Moreover, along with the discovery of some theories about the modes of reasoning, there sometimes grows in man a vanity priding itself upon this knowledge and expressing itself in hair-splitting subtleties some of which can scarcely be said to help in understanding or discovering truth.

For the development of this side of dialectic, man's vanity alone appears to be responsible. And society in general tolerates this because of the utility of the more serious part, and even out of curiosity.

Giving one's general reflections on India's intellectual culture, one may say that reason has been its driving force in matters coming under its purview as also in trying to understand the limits of reason. As we have seen, there was a school of scepticism which did not accept that any *pramāṇa* could yield true knowledge or that knowledge was possible. Even the absolutists resort to reason to show the limitations of reason; only they do not limit themselves to reason alone to know and discover truth; or rather, they do not commit the error of denying the possibility of apprehending truth and reality through ways and means other than the physical senses and the system of knowledge created out of their acquirement by reason, that is to say, empirical experience and reasoning.

The three most important *pramāṇas* of Indian logic are *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference) and *śabda* (verbal or scriptural testimony). Both psychological and logical considerations determine the treatment of these *pramāṇas*, but this need not prejudice any one, as the logical consideration is not in any way the sufferer thereby. *Pratyakṣa* is regarded as the most important *pramāṇa*, and sense perception which is direct experience guides all reasoning. Even the beliefs of the Indians in God and the like are claimed to be founded on *pratyakṣa*—the *yogi-pratyakṣa*, and it is to acquire the faculty of this sort of perception that the Indians pursue their *sādhana*. The Indian theory of inference does not suffer from the unnatural division into deduction and induction. In the *anumāna* theory in Indian logic, an inference is deductive as well as inductive because *vyāpti*, from which the conclusion is deduced, is supported and illustrated by experience by making it always necessary to cite an *udāharaṇa* in support of the *vyāpti*. The theory of inference is from very early times securely based on *vyāpti*, the relation of universal concomitance, as can be

seen from the treatment of *jātis* and the answers to them given in the *Nyāya-sūtra* and other works. The *jātis* are fallacious inasmuch as they are not firmly based on *vyāpti*, but only on possession of the same or contrary attributes by two entities or on any such ground that soon gives way. As said above, the Indians did not commit the error of denying the possibility of knowledge through means other than empirical experience and inference based on it. The Indian thinkers in the main recognised *anubhava* (intuitive experience) as one of the fundamental sources of knowledge and therefore they found a place for this source or *pramāṇa* in their scheme of *pramāṇas*. And the justification for finding a place for *śabda pramāṇa* lies in this inasmuch as the scriptures are believed to be expressions of such intuitive experience and therefore empirical experience and reasoned out inference are viewed consistently with it. I have discussed this point at some length in my book *Avidyā—a Problem of Truth and Reality*. The authority of the scriptures which were supposed to be based on intuition or the direct perception of the sages had its proper place in respect of problems beyond the purview of empirical knowledge. It may, however, be pointed out that this tendency of fully relying on texts even in such subjects as medicine or other empirical branches of knowledge, led to a sort of stagnation in later times.

It has been made a subject of damaging criticism that in most systems of Indian Philosophy reasoning is subservient to scriptural testimony and not free. This point is important and needs some discussion in a work on dialectic. In actual practice we find that the ancient thinkers have mostly resorted to reasoning and the mode of dialectical examination of topics in the exposition of the tenets of their systems of philosophy and in refuting rival views. Even in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* writers hardly ever quote a *śruti*. The *Sāṃkhya*s can easily quote a number of *upaniṣadic* passages in support of their view, but usually the *Sāṃkhya* writers do not; they rely mostly on reasoning in the exposition of their position and the

establishing of their categories. The Yoga school also relies very little on the Vedic texts. Whatever logic and epistemology the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā evolved was primarily for the purpose of proving the unquestionable validity of *Śruti*, but this was broad-based and was generally done independently of the Vedic texts. Even in the case of the Vedānta we find that the basic texts remaining the same, a number of schools with diverse views have arisen. This could happen only if the different thinkers had reasoned out their views more or less independently of the Vedānta texts. These conclusions, however, in their view, must have support in the respective scriptural texts, because they believed that the truth of reason cannot be fundamentally different from the intuitive truth expressed in the scriptures. To prove this they used all their exegetic and dialectical skill to interpret the scriptural texts in consonance with the truths more or less independently grasped by them. Among the heterodox schools, the Lokāyatikas do not admit the authority of any scriptural text as they accept only perception as a source of valid knowledge. The Jainas again, like the Vedāntins, believe in the authority of the Āgamic word—the teachings of Mahāvīra; but dialectical reasoning has found a secure place even in their method of exposition from very early times. In fact, controversies with thinkers of other schools were very common among the Jainas, as we have seen above, and in these they must have relied mostly on their dialectical skill rather than on the words of Mahāvīra which were not acceptable to the other party. The Buddhists refuse to have blind faith in the teaching of anyone including Buddha—unless their own reasoning and clear vision is in full accord with the testimony of others. The Buddhists can thus be called true rationalists in the modern sense of the term. Again, as in Vedānta, a number of schools with radically different views arose within the Buddhist fold on the strength of independent thinking, all believing that they had support and corroboration in the words of Buddha. This suffices to show that even though only such reasoning was to

be admitted as was not contradictory to the scriptural word (*āgamāvirodhi-tarka*), this did not actually come in the way of the free development of rational thought. As a matter of fact, the different schools of thought have never remained isolated from one another and there has been much growth and development in each of them as a result of discussions and controversies with thinkers of rival schools. The dialectical mode of treatment—in which a *pūrvapakṣin* or a rival thinker is presupposed and his objections anticipated and answered—is very commonly found in the text-books of not only the *darśana-śāstra*, but of all the other *śāstras* as we have seen in the preceding chapters. I have pointedly shown above that the dialectical mode of exposition is not confined to *pramāṇa-śāstra* and *darśana-śāstra* (this being more or less known) but is amply found in the works of other *vidyās* also. One has only to bear in mind that the Indian thinkers integrated different kinds of experience, both empirical and intuitive, and correlated the different types of knowledge derivable from them.

The Indian logicians directed their reason and dialectical skill to problems of knowledge also and evolved different theories of truth, the important ones being those of *yāthārthya* (correspondence), *avisamvāda* (coherence, non-incongruence) and *arthakriyākāritva* (pragmatism) (though one must beware of interpreting these solely in the light of western theories and loading them with the implications of the latter). These theories, like all other epistemological considerations, are viewed in harmony with the metaphysical or ontological views of the respective schools. The problem whether knowledge carries with it its validity or not is discussed in all the schools of philosophical thought, and so also the problem how knowledge itself is apprehended, and different views are stated with reasons to support them in the works of different schools of thought. Another question to which Indian thinkers devoted much attention and thought was: How do words express their meaning, and what is the relation of word and meaning?

The logicians submitted even the *pramāṇas* admitted by them to a dialectical examination in order to justify the acceptance of those *pramāṇas*, so the question of the number of *pramāṇas* became important in their discussions. The dialectical mode of justifying the plan of a work, the order of exposition, and so on is common to the works of almost all the *vidyās*.

Summing up, we may say that dialectic seems to have originated or at least developed out of the need to cure the body, settle disputes and understand the significance of the magnificent vedic sacrifices and its first theoretical use seems to have been in connection with the understanding of the mysteries of speech or the relation of word and meaning or the philosophy of language. Then it experienced great proliferation both in its theoretical and practical aspects and profoundly influenced the growth of all branches of learning.

It has been my attempt to show that dialectic was a live phenomenon in ancient India; it was not confined to a few *paṇḍitas* or scholars writing *bhāṣyas* or learned treatises. It permeated the intellectual culture of India in all its varied aspects.

I have tried in my humble way to draw attention to a much neglected aspect of Indian intellectual culture and to bring out some of its peculiarities in the hope that this would lead to a better understanding and appreciation of problems of Indian and European logic and dialectic. For this purpose I have translated, almost literally, lengthy dialectical discussions, so as to give a faithful idea of how such discussions were carried on in ancient India and in what milieu the ideas were set. I shall feel amply rewarded if attention is aroused in this direction, and a way is paved as a result of the further efforts of more competent persons, which could lead to a harmonious pattern of thought in which the methodology of Indian and European schools could be employed to their mutual benefit, thus leading to a more efficient 'Organ of Knowledge'.

APPENDIX 1

ŚĀSTRA-VINODA IN SOMEŚVARA'S MĀNASOLLĀSA

In numerous works we find small sections on logic and dialectic, or Kāvya-śāstra (poetics) and the like subjects. This indicates that some grounding in such subjects was thought to be an essential part of the equipment of the intelligentsia and so these subjects were given in a nutshell in works which assumed an encyclopaedic character. *Mānasollāsa* is one such work. It is a work of the twelfth century attributed to the Cālukya King Someśvara, son of Vikramāditya VI. The work treats of many subjects and is designated by the author as 'jagadācārya-pustaka', and the scope of the work is so extensive that it rightly deserves this epithet. Someśvara was an orthodox Hindu King and the *Mānasollāsa* presents a picture of the glories and the pomp and paraphernalia of an Indian court and royal household. In the *Vinoda-vimśati* (Twenty chapters on recreation), there is a chapter on *Śāstra-vinoda*. After dinner a King should, it is said, enter the assembly hall and invite the best poets, musicians, dialecticians and people well versed in different *śāstras* and make them seated around him. He should look at them with a smiling face and gracious looks. He should then call upon the poets to recite a good piece of poetry and initiate a discussion on its merits and drawbacks. Here the author gives an exposition of the principles and tenets of Kāvya-śāstra including dramaturgy. After this literary discussion, the King should, out of curiosity, make dialecticians dispute and the subject of the dispute should be *gīta*, *nṛtta* or *vādyā*. This shows either the author-king's fondness for these subjects or that these subjects are recommended for discussion because any logical or ph

sophical subject would prove to be tough and dry to the audience at a King's assembly. The author here gives an exposition of the dialectical categories, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *chala*, *jāti*, *nigrahasthāna*, *hetvābhāsa*. The king, it is said, should act as judge and distribute presents at the end. It may be noted that the names of two *nigrahasthānas*, viz. *nigrāhyopekṣaṇa* and *anigrāhyānuyoga* differ from those given in the *Nyāya-sūtra* where they appear as *paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇa* and *niranuyojoyānuyoga* respectively, and *ananubhāsaṇa* of the *Nyāya-sūtra* is here called *ananuvādana*.

According to this work, it may be necessary at times to employ *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* even in a *vāda* for the understanding of truth. Such a *vāda* becomes a *jalpa* if it is actuated by the desire for fame, etc., that is to say by worldly gains.

Manasollāsa (Vol. 2) Viṃśati 4, pp. 187-189 (GOS) :—

*Evam kāvya-kathāḥ śrutvā vicārya ca guṇāguṇau-
 tatas tu tārkikān rājā kautukena vivādayet
 kulena vidyayā khyātyā samayor vāda iṣyate,
 vādasya viśayo gītaṁ nṛtaṁ vā vādyam eva vā.
 sva-pakṣe sādhanam yatra parapakṣe ca dūṣaṇam;
 siddhāntenā virodhas ca sambandhas ca pratijñayā.
 hetu-dṛṣṭāntayor yogo nigamopanayau tathā;
 pakṣasya pratipakṣasya graho vādaḥ sa ucyatē.
 sādhyadharmā-viśiṣṭasya dharmiṇo yat tu kīrtanam;
 pratijñā nāma sū proktā hetus tat-sādhanam viduḥ.
 sādhyā-sādhanayor yatrā vinābhāvaḥ pradarśyate;
 tad udāharaṇam proktam nigamaḥ pakṣa-nirṇayaḥ.
 dṛṣṭānte kathita-vyāpter hetoḥ pakṣopasamhṛtiḥ;
 sa cāpy upanayaḥ pakṣadharmā-khyāpanāyocyate.
 upanayaḥ pakṣadharmā-khyāpanāyopayujyate;
 śiṣyasya guruṇā sārdham satīrthānām parasparam.
 vastu-tattvābodbhāya vādaḥ kāryo vimatsaram;
 itibhir nigrahasthānaiś chalair api samanvitaḥ.*

sa eva vādo jalpaḥ syāt khyāti-pūjādi-hetukaḥ;
 sthāpanam pratipakṣasya jalpe yasmin na vidyate.
 vitanḍā nāma sā proktā purvokta-phala-siddhaye;
 chalam asya vikalpena para-vākyopaghātanam
 sāmānyenopacāreṇa vacaneneti tat tridhā;
 prayukte sādhanē samyag-uttarā'pratibhāsanāt.
 samikaraṇabuddhyā yaḥ prasaṅgo jātir ity āsāu;
 pratidṛṣṭānta-saraṇam pratijñā-hānir isyate.
 arthāntarasya nirdeśaḥ pratijñāntaram ucyate;
 sa pratijñā-virōdho yad vairam hetu-pratijñayoḥ.
 pratijñāyāḥ parityāgas sa sannyāso vidhiyate;
 viśeṣa-rahite hetau dūṣite prativādinā.
 saviśeṣasya kathanam hetvuntaram udāhṛtam;
 prakṛtārtha-parityāgāt tad asambaddha-bhāṣaṇam.
 arthāntaram iti proktam nigrāhassthāna-sannidhau;
 vāra-tritayam ukto'pi parṣadā prativādinā.
 yan na vetti paraḥ samyag ajñānākhyam tad ucyate;
 pratijñādeḥ kramam tyaktvā krama-vyatyaya-saṅgrahaḥ.
 aprāptakālam tat proktam nigrāhassthāna-vedibhiḥ;
 kenāpy avayavenā'tra hīnam tan nyūnam ucyate.
 hetūdāharaṇādadhikyād adhikam tad vidūr budhāḥ;
 anuvādam parityajya punas tasyaiva bhāṣaṇam.
 śabdasyārthasya tat proktam punaruktaṁ manīṣibhiḥ;
 vijñātasya padārthasya trin vārān bhāṣitasya ca.
 nānuvādaḥ paroktasya bhavet tad anānuvādanam;
 uttarasya yad ajñānam uktā tv apratibhā budhaiḥ.
 anya kāryāt kathā-bhaṅgaḥ kathā-vikṣepa ucyate;
 abhyupetya nijam doṣam para-doṣasya bhāṣaṇam.
 matānujñeti sā proktā doṣodbhāvana-vedibhiḥ;
 prāptasya nigrāhassthānam tad-anudbhāvanam ca yat.
 nigrāhyopekṣaṇam nāma nigrāhassthānam ucyate;
 anigrahe nigrāhasya yad udbhāvanam ucya-

anigrāhyam tu yogo'yaṁ dūṣaṇatvena kīrtitaḥ;
sva-siddhāntaṁ parityajya yad ucchṛṅkhala-bhāṣaṇam .
apasiddhānta-nāmedam nigrahassthānam ucyate;
apakṣa-dharmo hetur yaḥ so'siddhaḥ parikīrtitaḥ.
sādhya-dharma-viruddho yaḥ viruddhuḥ parikīrtitaḥ;
pakṣa-tritaya-gāmi yaḥ so'naikāntika ucyate.
kālātyayāpadiṣṭo'yaṁ pakṣe yo'nyena bādhyate;
sandeha-hetubhūtena bādhyo yaḥ pratiheturā.
hetvābhāsaḥ sa vijñeyaḥ samaḥ prakaraṇena saḥ;
tato vivadamāneṣu nigrahassthāna-vartmani
sthitānām ajayam bruyād itareṣāṁ jayam nṛpaḥ,
iti śāstra-vinodena dina-śeṣam nayan nṛpaḥ.
kavīnām tārīkikāṇām ca prasādam bhūri dāpayet;
uktaḥ śāstra-vinodo'yaṁ Someśvara-mahābhujā.

*

*

*

APPENDIX II

Dialectical examination of the problem :

Is validity intrinsic in knowledge or is it extrinsic ?

— in Abhayadeva's *Tattvabodhavidhāyini* on
Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa*.

We may consider here the dialectical criticism of the problem of validity. The *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttara-pakṣa* in regard to this, as given in Abhayadeva's *Tattvabodha-vidhāyini*, rather in any standard philosophical work, give us almost a complete idea of the arguments set forth in favour of and against the view that knowledge carries with it its own validity. I have selected Abhayadeva's work here as the basis of exposition as it has not received as much recognition as it deserves. Similar arguments on both sides are found advanced in Jayanta's *Nyāya-Maṇjari*, I, pp. 146 ff; only Jayanta being a Naiyāyika concludes that both *prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya* are extrinsic (*parataḥ*) in all respects, whereas Abhayadeva being a Jaina writer is of the view that in respect of *jñapti* (apprehension), *prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya* are intrinsic (*svataḥ*) only in the case of familiar objects and circumstances, otherwise they are always extrinsic (*parataḥ*). Abhayadeva seems to be fully conscious that the controversy is mainly and primarily between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas, and that other schools formulated their own theories after them. While stating the *pūrvapakṣa* (prima-facie view), Abhayadeva has quoted Kumāriḥ's words. Jayanta also has done the same. This shows how honest many of the dialecticians were in faithfully reproducing the rival view without attempting in any way to misrepresent or damage it and then confuting it logically.

We now see how Abhayadeva discusses the problem (STT, Vol. 1, pp. 2ff) :

(The view that *prāmāṇya* is intrinsic)—The position of the Mīmāṃsakas is as follows : *Pramāṇa* signifies the operation of the knower which reveals the real nature of a thing, and its being the revealer of the true nature of the thing is its *prāmāṇya*, and it is intrinsic (*svataḥ*) in respect of genesis (*utpatti*), its own function (*svakārya*) of discerning a thing as it is, and its own apprehension (*jñapti*), because it does not depend (for these) on other causal factors such as excellence, etc. over and above the causal factors giving rise to cognition, on other *pramāṇas* and on the grasping of self-consciousness respectively. Not being dependent on these three, *prāmāṇya* (validity) is said to be intrinsic (*svataḥ*). The argument can be formulated as follows:—Those which are independent in respect of the presence of a particular thing are self-sufficient; as for instance, the full causal apparatus in respect of the production of a sprout; and *prāmāṇya* is not dependent on anything in respect of genesis, its own function and apprehension.

(The view that *prāmāṇya* is extrinsic)—Those who are the adherents of the theory that *prāmāṇya* is extrinsic (*parataḥ*) urge : That it is not dependent is unproven. For instance, in respect of genesis, *prāmāṇya* is dependent on other causes such as excellence, etc. over and above the causes giving rise to the cognition, because it is concomitant both positively and negatively with them. The argument is : That is dependent which agrees in respect of presence and absence with factors (viz. excellence, etc.) over and above the eyes, etc. like *aprāmāṇya*. And *prāmāṇya* is concomitant both positively and negatively with factors over and above eyes, etc., so the probans is one based on identity (*svabhāva-hetu*). Therefore, it is extrinsic in respect of its genesis (*utpatti*). Similarly, it is extrinsic in respect of its own function (*sva-kārya*) because it is dependent. To wit, those which await the rise of other cognitions are not self-sufficient in character, like *aprāmāṇya* etc.; and *prāmāṇya* awaits in this respect the rise of another cognition so it is found to be concomitant with the opposite (of what the Mīmāṃsaka wants to establish). Similarly, it is

extrinsic in respect of apprehension (*jñapti*) because it is dependent. To wit : Those on whose selves are imposed doubt or error, have their true nature determined by extraneous sources, like post, etc; the validity of some cognitions has doubt or error superimposed on itself, so the probans is one based on identity (*svabhāva-hetu*).

[Prima-facie view—(1) *Prāmāṇya* is intrinsic in respect of genesis (*utpatti*)]—It is not true to say that *prāmāṇya* is dependent for its genesis on causal factors such as excellence (*guṇa*) etc, over and above the causal factors giving rise to knowledge. Such factors are non-existent as can be seen from their non-apprehension by means of *pramāṇas* (organs of knowledge). To wit, perception is not capable of cognising the excellences present in the organs of perception, etc. Since the sense-organs are super-sensuous, their excellences also cannot be apprehended. Inference also cannot cognise the excellence of the sense-organs as it is accepted as arising on the strength of the ascertainment of the *liṅga* (probans or inferential mark) as connected (with the *sādhya* or probandum). It would have to be stated whether the connection or relation of the *liṅga* with the excellence of the sense-organs is cognised by perception or by inference. If it is said that perception cognises the relation of the *liṅga* with the excellence of the sense-organs, that is not proper because the excellence of the sense-organs being imperceptible, their relation also is imperceptible. It is said, 'Relation which resides in two cannot be apprehended when there is the apprehension of the character of (only) one.' It is not also true to say that the said relation is cognised by inference. For, is even this inference based on a *liṅga* whose relation has been cognised or on a *liṅga* whose relation has not been cognised? If it is based on a *liṅga* whose relation has not been cognised, then is it a source of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) or not? In the latter case, the relation it is meant to cognise cannot be cognised by it. In the former case, the *pramāṇa* cannot but be inference as perception is not possible as explained above, and an inference cannot function if the relation

between the probans and the probandum is not known. On the other hand, if it is an inference where the relation is known, then we ask: Is this relation also known by the very same inference or by another? In one case there is involved the fault of mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*) and in the other that of vicious infinite series (*anavasthā*)...Moreover, can this inference cognise the relation, when it has arisen from a *hetu* (reason) which is of the nature of effect (*kārya*), or identity (*svabhāva*) or non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*)? The Buddhist deny any other kind of *hetu* as determining the probandum...Of these the *svabhāva hetu* can be useful only in speaking of, or giving a name to a thing which has already been perceived; for instance, *śimśapātva*, etc. give the names 'tree' etc. And the relation of the *liṅga* with the excellence which is subsistent in a supersensuous substrate (e.g. sense-organs) is not cognised by perception so that inference arising on the strength of a *svabhāva-hetu* could enable us to speak of their relation. Nor can an inference based on *kārya-hetu* be helpful by its cognising the relation of the *liṅga* with the excellence of the sense-organs; when the relation of causality is established, the *kārya-hetu* (effect-probans) is accepted as the cause of the cognition of the cause, and the relation of cause-effect (i.e. causality) can be established by means of the *pramāṇas* called *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *anupalambha* (non-apprehension). Now, perception cannot cognise the relation of the *liṅga* which resides in the excellence of the eyes, etc. so that there could be the apprehension of some *liṅga* as the effect of the excellence. Therefore, there is not the cognition of the relation of the effect-probans also. *Anupalabdhi-hetu* cannot operate at all in respect of such an object because it is accepted as operating when negation is to be established. And as already said there is no other kind of *liṅga*. There is no *pramāṇa* other than perception and inference, so there can be no cognition of the excellence of the sense-organs. That which is not revealed by any of the *pramāṇas* cannot be spoken of as real, as for example, hare's horn. The excellences of the

insensible sense-organs that are postulated by the opponent cannot be revealed by any of the *pramāṇas* so how could they, existing over and above the causal factors producing cognition, bring about its validity?

If it is argued that the excellences are cognised on the strength of their effect, viz. true cognition, this is not tenable. If the nature of the effect, viz. cognition could be ascertained leaving aside its truth or falsity, then the particular character or feature (viz. truth) of the effect which is not brought about by the previous collocation of causal factors could make us hypostatise another cause (viz. excellence) for its origination; but when cognition, which is only true makes us infer the collocation of causal factors producing itself, how could there be the presence of excellence over and above the originating causes? Falsity, on the other hand, is a particular feature of the effect, which not being possible from the previous causal collocation, makes us hypostatise another apparatus for its origination; hence *aprāmāṇya* is said to be *parataḥ* (due to another) as it requires defects for its production. The purity (*nairmalya*, lit. freedom from defilement) of the sense-organs cannot be spoken of as their excellence, for it is their very nature and not an excellence brought about by an extraneous factor. Its being called so is due to the absence of defect. To wit, the sense-organ is said to be *nirmala* (pure) due to the absence of such defects as *kāmala* (excessive obstruction of bile), etc.; and when these are present it is said to be possessed of defect (or defective). The absence of torpor (*middha*), etc. is the very nature of the mind also and their presence is its defect (or abnormality). Stationariness, etc. similarly constitute the very nature of the object too, and its being moving is a defect (or abnormality). Even in the case of the knower, absence of hunger, etc. is the very nature and their presence is a defect. It is said, "This much causal apparatus gives rise to valid knowledge". Therefore the validity of cognition even as it arises is said to be *svataḥ* (intrinsic) inasmuch as

it does not require any excellence over and above the causes giving rise to the cognition. It may be urged: 'The nature of the factors producing it has been cognised from erroneous cognition; truth does not result from the nature of previous causal factors which are known from their effect, so how could it not make us hypostatise another causal apparatus called excellence? (It would certainly do so)'. But this is not tenable. The procedure can be imagined in the reverse way also. People generally do not infer a cause resident in the very nature (of the causal apparatus) from erroneous cognition, but do so from right cognition. And in such inference of the causal factors the procedure formerly mentioned cannot be repudiated. And as said above there is no third effect (leaving aside truth and falsity).

Moreover, *prāmāṇya* is of the form of the manifestation of the true nature of a thing, and if this is accepted as not arising even when the cognition arises from the causal apparatus such as eye, etc. you must state what (other) nature of cognition you accept. According to the opponent's view, cognition cannot have a nature over and above this character so that it could be accepted that validity not originated along with the cognition originates in it only at a later time, like a picture on a wall. Moreover, if *prāmāṇya* does not originate even when cognition originates from its own causal apparatus, but occurs later from a different apparatus, then due to the superimposition of opposite character and due to the difference of causes there would be difference between cognition and validity, otherwise the statement, "This alone is difference or the cause of difference, viz superimposition of opposite qualities and difference of cause; if this were not a differentiating factor, the world would be one." would be violated. Therefore from that very cause, the causal apparatus devoid of excellence, from which cognition (*viññāna*) originates validity (*prāmāṇya*) also originates. Hence the reason (*hetu*) 'because it agrees in presence and absence with the presence and absence of the eye, etc. endowed with excellence' is

unproven (*asiddha*), and hence also the reason 'because it does not depend upon another apparatus for its origination' is not unproven (*asiddha*) because 'dependence' which is opposed to 'independence' is present in dissimilar cases (*vipakṣa*), and the probans which is absent in the *vipakṣa* is necessarily pervaded by its own probandum, therefore the probans is not also *viruddha* (contrary) or *anaikāntika* (inconclusive) and hence the probans can establish its own probandum.

Further, *prāmāṇya* is the *śakti* (potency) of the form of the discernment of the true nature of a thing and potencies of all things occur intrinsically and are not dependent upon a collocation of causal factors. As Kumārila says. "You must understand that *prāmāṇya* is inherent in all *pramāṇas* since a potency which is itself non-existent cannot possibly be brought into existence by another agency." (Ślv. Su. 2, 47). This does not imply the acceptance of the theory of the Sāṃkhya that the effect is latent in the cause; but whatever character of the effect is present in the causal apparatus, that when the effect originates from the causal apparatus come into existence from that only, just as colour, etc. being present in the lump of clay, when the jar is produced from the lump of clay, arise in the jar due to the colour etc. of the lump of clay. On the other hand, the attributes of the effect which are not present in the cause, are not produced in the effect due to the cause when the effect comes into existence, but independently, as for instance, the potency of the jar to carry water. Similarly, in cognition also, the potency to determine the nature of the object, which is not present in the causes of cognition, viz. eye, etc. does not arise due to these causes but becomes manifest independently. Moreover, it is said, "Since it is only for the sake of its origination that a positive entity requires a cause, and when it has once acquired an existence, its application to the various effects proceeds naturally." (Ślv. Sū. 2, 48). For instance, "The jar is dependent for its origination on a lump of clay, staff, wheel, etc. but it does not require their help in bringing water". It may be

argued that since *prāmāṇya* arises from the causes of knowledge, viz. eye, etc., it is said to be arising from an extraneous cause. But this is what is acceptable to the Mīmāṃsakas also, because the origination of the validity of the *preraṇā-buddhi* (cognition of stimulation) which arises from the Vedic injunctory statement, having no author (i.e. which is *apauruṣeya*) is admitted. Similarly, inferential cognition which arises from the *liṅga* which does not require the help of anything other than the relation of invariable concomitance which is cognised, arises as acquiring *prāmāṇya* from it only. Thus *prāmāṇya* which arises not depending on any cause over and above the collocation of the causal factors of cognition, arises intrinsically (*svataḥ*). Therefore *prāmāṇya* does not depend on another in respect of origination.

[(2) *Prāmāṇya* is intrinsic in respect of its effect or function]—Nor can it be said that *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) proceeding to do its task of determining the true nature of the thing, does so depending on an instrument over and above the causal factors producing itself; for if it were to depend on another cause in this respect, would it depend on the notion of consistency, or on the excellence of the causes producing itself—these being the two possible alternatives? If the former alternative is accepted, there would be the fault of argument in a circle (*cakraka*). To wit, when the *pramāṇa* proceeds to do its work, then there is the activity of persons who wish to perform activity, and when they proceed to act, then there is *saṁvāda* or consistency of the nature of the origination of the knowledge of successful action; and depending on this *saṁvāda*, the *pramāṇa* proceeds to its function of the nature of the determination of the true nature of a thing. Therefore, as long as *pramāṇa* does not proceed to do its work, people desirous of successful action will not act, and without this there cannot be consistency or agreement with the knowledge of successful activity, and without its existence, *pramāṇa* which depends on it would not proceed to do its work; thus obviously, there is the fault

of arguing in a circle. It cannot be said that *pramāṇa* proceeds to do its work depending on the future cognition of consistency, as the future thing being non-existent, it cannot serve as an auxiliary to cognition proceeding to do its task. If the second alternative is accepted, again there are two alternatives: Do the excellences of the causes producing it, become the auxiliaries of *pramāṇa* proceeding to do its work on being cognised, or while remaining uncognised? It is not tenable that they do so being uncognised; the very existence of uncognised things cannot be known, leave alone their being auxiliaries. The other alternative also is not tenable as it involves *anavasthā* (infinite series). Depending on the excellences of its own cause, which are cognised, a *pramāṇa* (valid cognition) proceeds to do its work; the knowledge of the excellences of the cause also, depending on the knowledge of the excellences of its own cause, proceeds to do its work of the nature of apprehending the excellences of the cause of *pramāṇa*, and that also depending on the knowledge of the excellence of its own cause, and so on. Thus, the fault of *anavasthā* cannot be avoided. If it is urged that the knowledge of the excellence of the cause of *pramāṇa*, even without depending on the knowledge of the excellence of its own cause, proceeds to its work of apprehending the excellence of the cause of *pramāṇa*, then *pramāṇu* also, even without depending on the knowledge of the excellence of its own cause, will proceed to do its work of apprehending its object, so the dependence of *pramāṇa* on the knowledge of the excellence of its own cause is superfluous. Therefore, *pramāṇa* proceeding to do its work, is not dependent on anything. As Kumārila says, "If even on the rise of a cognition, the object thereof is not comprehended until the purity of its cause has been ascertained by means of another valid cognition, then in all cases we should have to wait for the rise of another cognition from another cause, for until the purity of the cause of a cognition has been ascertained, it is as good as a non-entity. And this (second) cognition cannot be valid if its causes are not pure (so it could be

regarded as valid only on the ascertainment of the purity of its cause); this is true of this (third) cognition also and so on *ad infinitum*." (Ślv. Sū. 2, 49-51). So the *hetu* (probans) in the argument 'Those which await the rise of another cognition . . . ' is unproven (*asiddha*). Therefore *pramāṇa* as it arises from its own causal apparatus arises as endowed with the potency to determine the nature of the object and so it proceeds to do its work *svataḥ* (independently).

[(3) *Prāmāṇya* is intrinsic in respect of ascertainment] — *Pramāṇa* is similarly not dependent upon another in respect of the ascertainment of *prāmāṇya* (validity), for being dependent, would it depend on the excellence of its own cause or on consistency (*samvāda*)? The view that it depends on the excellence of its cause, is incompatible, because it has already been proved that since the excellences of its cause are not cognised by perception and inference based on it, they are non-existent. It may be urged: "Whatever particular effect there is, is preceded by a particular cause having excellence, as for example, a particular palace, and the like. Now, the apprehension of an object as it is in reality is a particular effect, and is a probans based on identity (*svabhāva-hetu*) (proving that it must be due to a particular cause having excellence)." This is irrelevant, because the apprehension has not been established as being the apprehension of a thing as it is in reality. Would the apprehension be apprehension of a thing as it is in reality owing to its being produced by pure (i.e. non-defective) causal factors, or on account of its being consistent, or on account of its being free from contradiction, or on account of the object being such (i.e. on account of point to point correspondence with the object)? These are the different alternatives. If it is said that it is due to its being produced by a cause having excellence, that is not tenable, on account of the contingency of the fault of mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*). To wit, apprehension can be determined as the apprehension of a thing as it is on account of its being produced by a cause having excellence; and it can be determined

as produced by a cause having excellence on account of its being apprehension of a thing as it really is, thus mutual dependence is obvious. If cognition is known to be an apprehension of a thing as it is in reality on the strength of its being consistent (*saṁvāditva*) that also is not proper, because the fault of *cakraka* (argument in a circle) cannot be avoided. To wit, as long as the specific character of being of the nature of the determination of a thing as it is really is not established with regard to cognition, people concerned with its consistency (*saṁvāda*) would not act after the cognition, and as long as there is not activity, there cannot be consistency with successful action, and as long as there is not consistency, cognition cannot be established as being the apprehension of a thing as it really is—this contingency of argument in a circle has been expounded above. If cognition is determined as being the comprehension of a thing as it is really by its being free from contradiction, that also is not consistent, because thereby what the opponent himself accepts will be opposed. Absence of contradiction is a non-entity and is not accepted as existent or as a factor enabling one to know; if by resorting to negation of the type of exclusion (*paryudāsaṁṛittyā*), another cognition is taken as meant by negation of contradiction, then since the particular determination of cognition is not its object it cannot possibly establish it. If the particularity of cognition of being apprehension of a thing as it is really, is said to be determined by its correspondence with the object (lit. by the thing being such), that also is not proper, because there is the contingency of the fault of mutual dependence. Only when it is established that the thing has that nature, can the cognition be established as being the apprehension of the real nature of a thing, and only when this latter is established can the thing be established as having that nature; thus mutual dependence is obvious. Therefore, the cognition of *prāmāṇya* is not dependent on the excellence of the cause.

Further, if the determination of *prāmāṇya* is said to be dependent on *saṁvāda* (consistency), that also is not proper.

For, is the knowledge which renders it consistent (—is in agreement with it and so determines its consistency—*saṃvādaka jñāna*) accepted to be of the same type or of a different type? If the *saṃvādaka jñāna* is accepted to be of the same type, then here also it must be stated whether it originates in the same or in a different continuum. If it is accepted that another cognition, originated in a different continuum and of the same type as it, is the *saṃvādaka jñāna* that also is not tenable because this involves *atiprasaṅga* (absurd over-extension), because then in respect of Devadatta's cognition of jar even Yajñadatta's cognition of another jar would have to be accepted as *saṃvādaka*. If another cognition originated in the same continuum and of the same type is accepted as *saṃvādaka* then here too it should be stated whether it has as its object a thing cognised by a cognition recognised previously as *pramāṇa* or a different thing. It is not proper to accept that it has the same object for if there is one thing as the common object, there would be no difference between that which is rendered consistent (*saṃvādyā*) and that which renders consistent (*saṃvādaka*). It is like this: If there is one object, then as the previous one is not the *saṃvādaka* of the said later cognition originated in the same continuum and of the same type, so the later one also could not be the *saṃvādaka* of the one prior to it. Moreover, how is the later cognition of the same type and having the same object determined as *pramāṇa* (valid cognition) so that it could determine the validity of the prior one? If it be said that the later cognition is determined as such from a cognition of that type only, then the latter would have to be determined as such by another of that type only and so on endlessly. If the validity of the later cognition which is such be determined by the first *pramāṇa*, then the validity of the first would be determined by the later *pramāṇa* and of the later *pramāṇa* by the first one, so there would be mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*). It may be urged that though the prior and posterior cognitions have this in common that they have one object, they are of

one type and are originated in the same continuum, there is this difference that the posterior one occurs after the knowledge of the purity of the cause and because of this difference the posterior one can determine the validity of the prior one, but the prior one cannot determine the validity of the posterior one. The answer to this is that the comprehension of the purity of the cause is not possible without the comprehension of successful action, and there would be involved the fault of *cakraka* (argument in a circle) which has been explained above; so there would not be the knowledge of successful action; or if it is possible, since validity can be determined by it only, it is superfluous to imagine that the posterior cognition along with the particularity of the knowledge of purity of causes is the cause of the apprehension of the validity of the prior one. Therefore, the posterior cognition of the same type, originated in the same continuum and having the same object cannot determine the validity of the prior cognition. It is not also proper to say that the cognition which determines the validity of the earlier cognition has a different object, because in that case knowledge of nacre, which is such, would come to determine the validity of the cognition of silver in respect of nacre. Therefore, a posterior cognition of the same type cannot determine the validity of a prior cognition.

If it is accepted that the knowledge determining the validity (of another knowledge) is of a different type, even then it will have to be stated whether it is knowledge of successful action or another knowledge. It cannot be another, for then even the knowledge of jar could determine the validity of the knowledge of cloth. It is not proper to regard knowledge of successful or purposive action also as determining the validity of that knowledge, because in the absence of the determination of the validity of the knowledge of purposive action itself, there would be absence of action, etc.; and so due to the fault of *cakraka* (argument in circle) this is not possible. It may be

said that even in the absence of the determination of validity, activity is possible even from the suspicion or expectancy of it and so knowledge of purposive action will not be impossible. But then the determination of validity will be superfluous. To wit, a man proceeding to act even without having the determination of validity, lest he come to failure or inconsistency, being desirous of purposive action, seeks to determine validity. Now, since that activity has occurred even without the determination of validity the attempt to determine validity is superfluous. Moreover, how could knowledge of purposive or successful activity which is accepted as determining validity be determined to be valid? If by another knowledge of purposive action that would lead to a vicious infinite series (*anavasthā*); if by the previous knowledge, then the fault of mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*) which has been explained above would arise here also. If the validity of the knowledge of successful action be said to be determined intrinsically, then why should you have any prejudice against the first knowledge being determined as valid intrinsically? It is said, "Just as the first knowledge stands in need of *saṁvāda* (consistency) with it, so *saṁvāda* with *saṁvāda* would again have to be sought." "If any one cognition be accepted as having intrinsic validity then on what ground could one have any prejudice against the first's being such (i.e. having its validity determined intrinsically)?" (Ślv. sū. 2. 76). "If it be said that *saṁvāda* is valid due to its *saṁvāda* with the previous knowledge, then there would be mutual dependence and validity would not be possible".

It may be urged: "Knowledge of purposive or successful activity is not seen in the absence of the object, so it is not dependent on any thing for the determination of its validity; but the knowledge of instrument (—that which brings about purposive activity) is seen to arise even in the absence of the object, so it is dependent for the determination of its validity on the knowledge of successful action." This also is not cogent, because even knowledge of successful action is seen

to arise without the object in the dream-state, and there is no reason to differentiate between the waking and the dream states. It may be urged here : "Knowledge of successful activity is of the form of attainment of the result, so it is not dependent on another for the determination of its validity; whereas the cognition revealing the instrument is not of the form of the achievement of successful activity, so it is dependent on another in respect of the determination of its validity. For instance, when the knowledge revealing water arises, people who want to drink it or take a dive in it, becoming suspicious whether the water revealed in the knowledge would bring about the desired fruit or not, set about the investigation of its validity; but when the knowledge of the accomplishment of drinking or diving arises, since the result has already been attained, they do not apply their minds to the investigation of its validity." There is no truth in this. It is no answer to say, "Since the result has already been attained." Being of an inquiring frame of mind, they start inquiring whether the water revealed in the knowledge of water is existent or not existent, so they will start inquiring whether the thing revealed in the knowledge of the result or the fruit is existent or not. Otherwise, if the persons not setting about this suspect the non-existence of the thing revealed in it, the knowledge would be suspected to be not-valid as having a non-entity as its object, and the validity of the knowledge revealing water and inspiring one to activity would not be established. Then the other cognition being similar in form, there would not be the determination of validity, so how could it be proper to admit that 'attempt at purposive activity arises from knowledge whose validity has already been determined'?

Moreover, does the *saṃvādaka* cognition of a different type which is accepted as determining the validity of the prior cognition, have the same object or a different object? It is not proper to accept that it has the same object as this is not possible in the opponent's view. The cognition of touch or the like is of a different class from the cognition of colour, and

in it touch or the like is revealed, and not colour; whereas in the cognition of colour, colour is revealed and not touch and the like; and colour and touch are mutually different; and one whole entity (*avayavin*) is not accepted as an object of the cognitions of colour and touch, so that cognition having one object and belonging to a different type could determine the validity of the prior cognition. Again, even when it has one object, is that object revealed in the determining (*vyavasthāpaka*) cognition in the same character as it was revealed in in the cognition to be determined (*vyavasthāpya*), or in another? It is not reasonable to accept that it is revealed in the same character, because in that case, the determining cognition would have the same amount of attributes and things and so would be, like memory, non-*pramāṇa* (not-valid cognition), and therefore could not serve as *vyavasthāpaka*. If the thing is revealed in a different character, then the two cognitions would not have one object and it would be equivalent to accepting the second alternative and that is not tenable, because in that case there would be this contingency that all cognitions having different objects, originated in one continuum and of different types would become the determiners of validity.

Further does the cognition of successful activity determine the validity of the previous cognition as belonging to the same time as it does or to a different time? If it be simultaneous, again there would be two alternatives: Does it apprehend the knowledge revealing the instrument or does it not? It is not true to say that the knowledge is apprehended, since another cognition is not revealed in the cognitions by means of the eyes, etc. which latter are accepted as restricted to their specific objects, colour etc. It cannot also be said not to apprehend it, because then it could not determine the validity of that knowledge, for if it is not apprehended, the attributes present in it could not also be cognised. On the other hand, if it is said to belong to a different time, that also is not proper; the prior cognition being momentary would perish and so

would not be revealed in the cognition occurring at a later time; and if it is revealed, the later cognition would become invalid due to its having a non-existing thing as its object; and because of its apprehending it it could not determine its validity. And what belongs to a different time and does not apprehend it would all the more be a non-determiner of it. So even a non-simultaneous cognition, originated in the same continuum and of a different type cannot determine validity. Hence the determination of the validity of the previous *pramāṇa* is not dependent on *saṁvāda* (consistency).

Hence even in respect of apprehension, the probans in the argument 'Those which are independent in respect of the presence of a particular thing...' is not an unproven (*asiddha*) one. The *vyāpti* (rule of invariable concomitance) is one established by *pramāṇa*. And since the determination of *prāmāṇya* cannot possibly be *parataḥ*, there is the fallacy of unproven *vyāpti* (*vyāptyasiddhi*) in the argument, 'Those whose selves have been rendered objects of doubtful or erroneous cognition...' And the probans is *asiddha*, for in the case of all living beings there is the absence of doubt or erroneous conception in respect of *prāmāṇya*. To wit, as soon as knowledge arises all have the definite cognition, viz. 'This thing', and this is not possible if there is doubt or erroneous conception with regard to validity. As Kumārila says, "Before its cognition, *prāmāṇya* remains in its own essential form, and it is independent in respect of its function (of determining its objects rightly)". (Ślv. sū. 2,83). It is the function of *pramāṇa* to determine its object and this does not depend on cognition by another *pramāṇa*. This would not be possible if it were an object of doubt or erroneous cognition.

It is not true to say that *pramāṇa* (valid cognition) and *apramāṇa* (not valid cognition) have a similar character in respect of origination, so there could not be the determination of their validity and invalidity without *saṁvāda* (consistency) and *visaṁvāda* (inconsistency) respectively. In the case of *apramāṇa* there invariably arises at a later time a

contradictory cognition and cognition of a defect in the cause and there is thus the determination of invalidity with respect to it; but these are not there in the case of *pramāṇa*, so how could there be the suspicion of invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*)? If it is said that since these are seen in that which has a similar character there would be that suspicion even with respect to *pramāṇa*, the answer to this is that this also is not tenable because it (suspicion, doubt) would cease after three or four cognitions, but on account of this dependence it should not be suspected that knowledge has not intrinsic validity or that there will be the fault of *anavasthā* (vicious infinite series), because it only serves to dispel the suspicion of *aprāmāṇya* in respect of the determining cognition and because it does not depend on another cognition. It is like this : There is suspicion of *aprāmāṇya* in respect of a cognition which has not been contradicted because of its similarity to a cognition which is contradicted elsewhere; when this doubt arises, a third cognition is depended on; if this as it arises is in agreement with the first cognition then this does not determine the first cognition, but only dispels the suspicion of invalidity brought about by the second cognition. The first cognition has, all the same, intrinsic validity. This also applies to a case when doubt arising even in respect of the third cognition, there is dependence on a fourth cognition. As Kumārila says, "In this way we do not stand in need of postulating more than three or four cognitions, and it is for this reason that we adhere to the doctrine of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*." (Śl. sū. 2, 61). It is only this that is meant by 'That alone is wrong cognition which has a defiled cause or in respect of which there is a contradicting cognition.' The dependence on a fourth cognition is referred to only for satisfying the opponent by initially accepting his position, but as a matter of fact it is not required. It may be urged that if the third cognition is in agreement with the second cognition, then the first is determined to be not-valid. The answer to this is that this is actually admitted as being done by it, but it must be noted that the third

cognition only dispels the suspicion of invalidity in respect of the second cognition, but does not determine its validity. On the other hand, where with respect to a familiar thing a doubt does not arise as to its being such (as it is presented in cognition) or otherwise, a doubt made to arise forcibly by a person is harmful to him. This is what the Vārttikakāra has pointed out : “ One who through ignorance suspects a contradicting factor even if it has not arisen, being suspicious in all his empirical dealings would come to destruction.” And this is not just a curse, for destruction would as a rule follow due to the impossibility of any activity capable of acquiring what is desired and avoiding what is undesirable, in the case of those who want to acquire what is desirable and avoid what is undesirable and who are always suspicious—even in respect of a thing about which a doubt should not arise—as doubt based on one’s fancy would always be there.

The cognition produced by *preraṇā* (stimulating injunction) being produced by word (*śabda*) characterised by inspiration (*preraṇā*), which is free from defects as it has no person or author as its source (i.e. is *apauruseya*), is always and everywhere *pramāṇa* (valid cognition) like the cognition arising from a probans or the statement of a reliable person, or sensuous cognition. As Kumārila says, “ The cognition arising from a Vedic injunction being produced from causes free from faults is *pramāṇa* like inferential cognition, testimony of a reliable person and sensuous cognition.” (Ślv. sū. 2, 184). Therefore, it is established that *prāmāṇya* is intrinsic and *apramāṇya* extrinsic. (STT., pp. 2-8).

[**Final view (uttara-pakṣa) — (1) Refutation of the view that *prāmāṇya* is intrinsic in respect of its genesis**].—We answer : As to what was stated, viz. ‘ *pramāṇa* signifies an operation of the knower which reveals the real nature of a thing ’—that is not proper because the operation of the knower admitted by the opponent will be repudiated as a means of valid knowledge. As to the statement, viz. ‘ Its being the revealer of the true nature of the thing is its *prāmāṇya* and that is

intrinsic in respect of its genesis, because it is not dependent on excellence over and above the eye, etc. which are the causes of cognition'—here the genesis of *prāmāṇya* signifies the coming into existence of what was non-existent, and if it be causeless, then as shown elsewhere, there would be no restriction as to place, time, nature, etc. (—that is to say, *prāmāṇya* would arise just anywhere at any time). Moreover, there is seen to be apprehension of a thing as it is when there is the presence of eyes, etc. endowed with excellence, and it is not seen when these are not present, so it is established that eyes, etc. possessed of excellence are the cause of the apprehension of a thing as it is, since elsewhere also the relation of cause-effect is based on agreement in respect of presence and absence; otherwise wrong cognition also which agrees in respect of presence and absence with eyes, etc. possessed of defect would be *svataḥ* (intrinsic). And if this were accepted the following statement of Kumārila would be contradicted: "Of these, two (viz. error and doubt) being positive entities are brought about by defects in the cause." (Ślv. 2, 54 cd). As to the contention, viz. "Since perception cannot know the presence of excellence in the sense-organs which are supersensuous, inference also which is based on perception cannot cognise it, and the excellences of eye, etc. being thus non-existent, the concomitance, both positive and negative, of *prāmāṇya* with these in respect of origination is not tenable"—this is not proper, as this fault would be common to the origination of *aprāmāṇya* (invalidity) also, since defects of the eye, etc. also cannot be cognised and are therefore non-existent, and so positive and negative concomitance of *aprāmāṇya* with these is not established and thus *aprāmāṇya* also would be *svataḥ* (intrinsic).

Again, what has been said from "If it be said that these could be known from the effect in the form of right cognition" to "since, as a rule, people do not infer all productive cause from erroneous cognition, but do so from right cognition—that also is not tenable; for if *prāmāṇya* and

aprāmāṇya were to be established by relying on popular practice then-like *aprāmāṇya*, *prāmāṇya* also would have to be extrinsic. Just as people say that wrong knowledge arises from eyes, etc. which have defects, so they say that right knowledge arises from eyes, etc. endowed with excellence. So how could *prāmāṇya* also not be extrinsic in origination like *aprāmāṇya* in their view? Suppose a man whose eyes were affected with the defect *timira* (partial blindness) or the like, but who has now obtained the excellence of clarity of vision by the use of special medicine, is asked by a friend of his, "How are your eyes?" He would say, "Formerly they were defective (possessed of defect), but now they have acquired excellence". Therefore it cannot be said that people regard clarity as just absence of defects; because *timira*, etc. could then be said to be of the character of absence of excellence and thus *aprāmāṇya* also would, like *prāmāṇya*, be intrinsic. As to the argument 'And there is no third effect'—that also is not tenable; because even in the absence of the third effect, as explained above, *prāmāṇya* can be established as extrinsic in respect of origination. As to what is said from "*Prāmāṇya* is of the nature of manifestation of the true nature of a thing" to "The whole universe would be one"—this statement would be violated"—that also is stated without the knowledge of the opponent's (*paratah-prāmāṇyavādin's*) stand as he does not want to say that even though cognition is produced by the causal apparatus, eyes etc., *prāmāṇya* which consists in the manifestation of the true nature of the thing is produced later by another causal apparatus consisting of clarity of vision, etc.; what he wants to convey is that knowledge as it is produced from the causal apparatus consisting of eyes, etc. possessed of excellence is produced as having taken unto itself the character of validity. Like knowledge, *prāmāṇya* also which is non-different in nature from it is extrinsic, so it is dependent upon the causal apparatus, eyes, etc. possessed of excellence; thus the reason based on identity, viz. 'as it is

not dependent' in respect of the origination of *prāmāṇya* is 'asiddha'; therefore the statement, 'Therefore from whatever causal apparatus devoid of excellence', etc. is not proper. The following statement also is not proper, viz. "*Prāmāṇya* is the potency of the form of apprehension of the true nature of a thing, and the potencies of all things are intrinsic"; because if this is stated, then the potency of apprehension of a thing as it is not, which is of the form of *aprāmāṇya*, if it were non-existent, could not be brought about by anything, so it too would be intrinsic. The argument from 'This is not in any case said by resorting to the view that the effect is existent (latent in the cause), etc.' to 'It is not required'—that also is just silly prattle; as by this argument, *aprāmāṇya* also would like *prāmāṇya* be *svataḥ* (intrinsic); since that (*aprāmāṇya*) too of the character of the potency of the apprehension of a thing as the reverse of what it is, is not present in eyes, etc. which are connected with the defects, *timira*, etc. Moreover, we do not see any reason why the sense-organs should manifest the character of knowledge which is non-existent in themselves, and not the power of apprehension of a thing as it is. And whence did the potencies get this magnificence that they attained the greatness of being intrinsic in respect of origination, whereas the particular things believed to be their substrate (i.e. cognitions) are not such? Nor are these different from them so that even when a thing is produced from causes of the thing believed to be their substrate, they would not be originated from them only. If they were different, not being produced thence, they would not be related to their substrate, for things which are different cannot have any relation other than that of cause-effect; and the relation of supporter and supported also will be refuted, as involving extreme absurdity, in the event of the absence of the relation of cause-effect. (That is to say, only the cause can be the substratum or supporter and the effect the thing supported). It is also wrong to say that being a

thing it would be the substratum of potency, because unless there is dependence, that would not, as a matter of fact, be possible. And what is existent cannot be dependent, as it is independent of everything; nor can a non-existent thing, e.g. sky-flower, be dependent, even because it is non-existent; and being without a cause, these would not be subject to the restriction of place, time, substance; and then anything would or would not disappear just anywhere or anything would be dependent on, or independent of, anything. If the powers were devoid of all connection, they would not cease at all in the case of any one, so the possession on the part of things of specific powers would not be cognised by the *pramāṇas*. The view regarding potencies being different or non-different from their substrate should not be asserted till the faults of contradiction, vicious infinite and the flaws pointed out in both the theories are repudiated. And the view that it is neither is not proper, because of two characters which are mutually exclusive, the negation of one is necessarily connected with the assertion of the other; but what is asserted cannot itself be negated because assertion and negation would be contradictory in respect of one. But those who say, “*Prāmāṇya* which is of the form of a potency does not acquire its existence from the notion of consistency which occurs later, and so is said to be intrinsic; and it is not meant that it does not arise from the cause of cognition”—they also are not right as this involves the fault of proving what is already proved (*siddha-sādhyatā*); and thus even *aprāmāṇya* would be *svataḥ*. No one contends that when knowledge has originated it originates in it from the notion of disagreement or inconsistency which occurs later. If by the above-mentioned argument *prāmāṇya* of the nature of potency has been proved to be generated from a cause possessing excellence, how could it be so general when it is absent in wrong cognitions arising from vitiated causes, as characters which are mutually exclusive are not possible together? Thus the statement, “From excellence arises absence of defects; due to this absence of defects there

is the absence of the *apramāṇa* cognitions (doubt and error); and thus, the general rule stands unrefuted" (see Ślv. 2.65) is in vain. It is not proper also because one can formulate it contrarily thus—"Absence of excellence arises from faults and due to the absence of excellence there is the absence of two kinds of *prāmāṇya* and thus *apramāṇya* remains as a general rule". One's face is not deformed if one says this (i.e. we should not feel abashed to say this).¹

Moreover, as regards the argument 'The absence of faults arises from excellences', we say, 'absence of faults' which is a non-entity cannot be produced by the operation of excellences; the causal operation is not possible there if we examine it by setting forth the alternatives whether it is different or non-different, and because it is not accepted by the opponent also. Or, if *abhāva* be accepted as a non-entity, it would not behove one to say: "*Abhāva* which is different from another *bhāva* is a *bhāva*, positive entity here like *anupalambha* (—non-cognition of jar signifies cognition of cloth etc.). If *abhāva* be recognised, how could it not be one produced from a cause?" Therefore by the method of exclusion, *doṣābhāva* is understood to be of the nature of the adjunct viz. excellence, hence when one says 'Absence of faults arises from excellences', it would mean 'Excellences arise from excellences' (STT, p. 10, 1.23).

And excellences cannot arise from excellences non-different from the causes, and operation on itself involves contradiction, and there is found to be the origination of excellences from their own causes, so the absence of the two *apramāṇyas* due to the absence of defects is also said to be *prāmāṇya*. Therefore, if it is accepted that *prāmāṇya* arises from excellences, it would mean that *prāmāṇya* arises from extraneous sources. Therefore, if causes are required for the coming into being of *prāmāṇya* which is of the form of the potency to apprehend its own object, then what other activity could there be with reference to the effect which could happen independently? Therefore, it is not proper to say, "What

have come into existence function by themselves in respect of their effects".(Ślv. 2,48). Since the jar is produced in another form from its own cause prior to its operation of carrying water, it is proper that it proceeds to do its work independently of the causes, clay, etc. and so the example is a dissimilar one. And since knowledge is accepted as perishing immediately after its origination, how could what has come into existence operate by itself? It is said in the *Ślokavārttika* (4.55-56): "Not even for a moment does the cognition continue to exist nor is it ever produced as doubtful (or incorrect); and as such it can never subsequently operate towards the apprehension of things like the senses etc. Therefore, the only operation of cognition with regard to the objects consists in its being produced; that alone is *pramā* (valid knowledge), and the cognition itself as accompanied by this *pramā* is the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). [That is to say, an action, viz. the action of being produced, is postulated for the cognition and its effect *pramā* too is the manifestation of the object; and through the fact of its giving rise to such a result in the shape of *pramā* with regard to the particular object, the cognition itself comes to be the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*)]". Therefore since there is no operation of *buddhi* except origination, and since in respect of this, cognitions are said to be dependent on causes possessed of excellence, how could there be activity independently? And what is that effect of cognition, in respect of which having come into existence it is said to function independently? It cannot be apprehension of its object, since this being synonymous with knowledge, it would come to this that it brings about itself, and this is not proper. If it be said that it is the determination immediately afterwards, viz. 'It is *pramāṇa*', our rejoinder is that it is not so; on account of the presence of the cause of illusion there may be non determination or erroneous cognition at times. Therefore *prāmāṇya* which originates from eyes, etc. endowed with excellence is extrinsic (*parataḥ-siddha*) in respect of its origination; therefore what

was stated, viz. 'If you say that *prāmāṇya* is *parataḥ* inasmuch as it arises from causes of cognition such as eyes, that is acceptable to us"—that is not proper.

It is not proper to hold that the origination of *prāmāṇya* in cognition which arises from the injunctory statement (*vidhi-vākya*) which is *apauruṣeya* (authorless) is *svataḥ* because *apauruṣeyatva* not being an object of *pramāṇas* that are recognised as cognising it is non-existent; or even if it be existent since according to the opponent's theory, this constitutes its excellence, how could cognition arising from such a stimulation (*preraṇā*) (having the excellence *apauruṣeyatva*) not have validity which is extrinsic? Again, if the stimulating statement (*preraṇā-vākya*) be *apauruṣeya*, the *prāmāṇya* which is correctly ascertained in ordinary or mundane sentences composed by people having excellences, would not be there owing to composition by persons endowed with excellence being precluded. Then the stanza (Ślv. 2. 184), "Cognition produced by a *preraṇā* is *pramāṇa* (valid) because it is produced by causes free from defects like the cognition produced by the probans, word of an *āpta* (trustworthy person) and sense-organs" should be read as: "Cognition produced by *preraṇā* is *apramā* (invalid cognition) since it is produced by causes devoid of excellences, like cognition by non-reason, or the word of an unreliable person."²

It may be urged that the stimulating statement (*preraṇā-vākya*) being *apauruṣeya*, as excellences dependent on the fact of being composed by a person are absent, so the defects dependent on it are also absent; and in their absence, *aprāmāṇya* also is absent in *preraṇā*; and so *prāmāṇya* comes to be established intrinsically in respect of origination. The answer to this is that in the absence of its being composed by a person who is the substrate of excellences and defects, both *prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya* would be absent in a *preraṇā*, so cognition produced by *preraṇā* would be devoid of both *prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya*. Then the afore-mentioned stanza should be read as: "Cognition produced by *preraṇā* is neither

pramā nor *apramā* because it arises from causes which are devoid of both excellences and defects." ³ And the stanza which is read as—"Let it be investigated whether defects exist or not in *pauruṣeya* sentences; but we do not have the slightest suspicion of defect with respect to the *Veda* as it has no author" (similar to Ślv. 2.68 in meaning) should be read as—"Let it be investigated whether excellences exist or not in *pauruṣeya* sentences; we do not have the slightest suspicion of excellence with respect to the *Veda* as it has no author."⁴ And it should not be argued that where excellences are suspected to be the cause of validity, there also from excellence arises absence of defect and so on, as this has already been answered. Moreover, though *apauruṣeya preraṇā* does not intrinsically have the operation of giving rise to the cognition of its object, as otherwise it being always present there would be the contingency of continuous cognition; but it is dependent on the peculiar impressions manifested by the convention propounding the meaning that is established by men. And all these men are according to the opponent overpowered by passions, and so the impressions created by them could not be true, otherwise even *pauruṣeya* utterances would be true. Hence even if the *Veda* be accepted as *apauruṣeya*, there would be the presence of invalidity due to the defects of the person establishing the convention; so recognising *preraṇā* to be *apauruṣeya* is like an elephant's bath (ineffectual). It is said, "If there were no impressions left by men, it would necessarily be meaningless; and if impression be accepted, then obviously this would be elephant's bath." As to what was said, viz. inferential cognition arises from the *liṅga* which does not require the help of anything other than the relation of invariable concomitance which is grasped and so on,—even that is not tenable, because the determination of invariable connection is itself an excellence; and its non-determination or wrong determination is a defect. Thus it is established that *prāmāṇya* being dependent on excellence is extrinsic (*parataḥ*) in respect of *utpatti* (genesis).

[(2) Refutation of the view that validity is intrinsic in respect of its effect or function (*kārya*)]: As to what was said, viz. 'Pramāṇa does not function in respect of its effect or work (*kārya*) depending on other factors', that is not tenable, because if it is said that *pramāṇa* is not dependent on factors other than the causal apparatus producing the *kārya*, that is *siddha-sādhana*; if it is said that it is not dependent on factors other than the *pramāṇa*, which is a part of the causal apparatus, that also is not good, as one cannot possibly be the producer. The maxim that "One cannot produce anything, it is the apparatus that is the producer," has been established elsewhere. Moreover, only the apprehension of a thing is not the work of *pramāṇa*, as that is present in the case of *apramāṇa* also. What is it then? It is the apprehension of the true nature of a thing, and this is not brought about by the character of knowledge, as the character of knowledge is present in erroneous cognition also, and so there should be right apprehension of a thing even there. If it is urged that apprehension of a thing as it is brought about by a particularity and so there will not be this absurdity, then this particularity will have to be specified. Is it 'being the unique knowledge of a thing', or 'being decisive' or 'being devoid of contradiction' or 'being brought about by unvitiated causes' or is it 'being consistent'?⁵ If 'being the unique knowledge of an object' is the particularity, that is not proper, as this is present even in *taimirika-jñāna* (knowledge of a man with a defective eye). If it means being decisive, that also is not tenable, as this would be impossible in the view of the opponent who regards knowledge as indirect (—since knowledge arises via *vidhi*, a part of the *Veda*). If 'being free from contradiction' is the particular feature, that also is not proper; for is it a particular feature occurring at that time, or one occurring^{at a later time} later? It cannot be one occurring at that time as even in the case of false cognition there is the absence of contradiction occurring at that moment. If it be said to be one occurring

later even then it will have to be specified whether the particularity is cognised or uncognised. It cannot be uncognised, because the uncognised cannot be established even as existent. If the particular feature be a cognised one, even then it will have to be said whether the absence of contradiction occurring later is cognised by earlier cognition or by cognition occurring later. The absence of contradiction occurring later cannot possibly be known by earlier cognition; it may manifest blue, etc. which are near by and at that time, but it cannot tell us that the sublating cognition will not occur later also, because even those in respect of which the sublating cognition has not arisen earlier are seen to be refuted at a later time. If it is said to be known by a later cognition, may it be known. But how can the absence of contradiction which occurs later be the particular feature of the earlier cognition which has perished, since what occurs in a different time cannot be the particular feature of what has perished? Moreover, even though cognised the *keśaṇḍuka* (hair-apparition) etc. are seen to be unreal; similarly, even though absence of contradiction be known, how could it be real? If you say it is so because its cognition is true, we ask how it could be true. Not by the reality of the object known (*prameya*), as this would involve the fault of mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*). If you say it is known from another knowledge of the absence of contradiction, even that will have to be known by another knowledge of absence of contradiction and so on infinitely. If from consistency (*samvāda*), absence of contradiction occurring later is said to be known as true, then even consistency will have to be established as true by another knowledge of consistency, and its truth by still another knowledge of consistency and so on infinitely. Moreover, if the absence of contradiction, occurring after the cognition of consistency, being known is accepted as the particularity of the previous cognition, then *pramāṇa* dependent upon its own particularity which is known would proceed in respect of its

own effect, viz. apprehension of a thing as it is, so how could *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* owing to non-dependence on extraneous factors be there? Again, absence of contradiction would, in the opponent's view, be according to negation by exclusion of the form of consistency. One who says, 'Knowledge devoid of contradiction proceeds to its own work without depending on another', really means that it functions there depending on consistency (*samvāda*).

Moreover, there would be three alternatives: Is the nature of cognition sublated, or is the object known sublated, or is purposive activity (*arthakriyā*) sublated? If it is accepted that the nature of cognition is sublated, that is not tenable as it does not go beyond the two alternatives. To wit, cognition being sublated, is it sublated at the time of its own existence or at a later time? If it is said to be sublated in its own time, that is not proper, as cognition is always manifest in a very lucid form; and it cannot be said that cognition appearing lucidly is at the same time absent, because in that case, even cognition recognised as true would have to be regarded as absent. If it is said that it is sublated at a later time, that also is not proper, as it being admitted that it will perish just by itself at a later time, the operation of the sublating factor will not be able to do anything there. "Kimsūka flowers are red by their very destiny (so it is not necessary to dye them)." If it is accepted that the *prameya* (object known) is sublated, that also is not tenable for the *prameya* being sublated, is it sublated in the form that is manifested or in a form not manifest, characterised by touch, etc. that accompanies the form that is manifest? These two alternatives present themselves. If it is said to be sublated in its manifest form¹⁰ that is not proper because the form that is manifest cannot possibly be non-existent, otherwise that which is manifest in true cognition would be non-existent. If it is held that it is sublated in its non-manifest form, that also is not proper; the non-manifest form being other than the manifest form, one thing need not

be absent when the other is absent, for that would be extremely absurd (as everything would then be absent—the fault of *atiprasaṅga*). If it is said that purposive activity (*arthakriyā*) is sublated, is it also sublated when produced or when unproduced? If it is something produced, then it cannot be sublated, as it is existent. If it is unborn, even then it cannot be sublated, even because it is unborn. Moreover, purposive activity also is other than the thing, so it being sublated how could another be absent as this also would involve extreme absurdity (*atiprasaṅga*)? And when there is nothing that could be precluded, even the epithet 'devoid of contradiction' is improper and so even absence of contradiction cannot be a particularity of cognition. If 'being brought about by unvitiated causes' is regarded as the particularity, even that is not proper, as it could not be a particularity if it be unknown, and if it be known, how could the fact of being produced by unvitiated causes be known? If it is said to be known by means of another cognition brought about by unvitiated causes then that involves vicious infinite series (*anavasthā*). If it is held that it is known by *saṃvāda* (consistency), the particularity of the knowledge of consistency of being produced by unvitiated causes will be known by another knowledge of consistency produced by unvitiated causes,—thus you will come across the same vicious infinite series (*anavasthā*). Moreover, if depending on the particularity of being brought about by unvitiated causes which is dependent on knowledge, knowledge were to proceed to do its work, how could it not be said to do so *parataḥ* (depending on another)? And absence of defect in the cause signifies in the opponent's view, according to negation by exclusion, an excellence of the cause, so when he says 'brought about by unvitiated or non-defective causes', it comes to this, viz. 'brought about by causes possessed of excellence'. And excellences of causes, that are required by *pramāṇa* proceeding to do its own work, themselves require a *pramāṇa* determining them, and this *pramāṇa* also proceeds to its work being dependent on the determination of the excellences of its own causes, and thus there is the

fault of *anavasthā*. And thus what was urged as a contingency for the other party while, saying, 'Even when cognition is produced the object is not cognised so long as (the purity of the causes is not known by another *pramāṇa*,.....)'—comes to be for the opponent like raising an evil spirit for his own destruction. (*svavadhāya kṛtyotthāpanam bhavataḥ prasaktam*—STT, 1, p. 13.1.16).

If it is said that knowledge will proceed to do its work of determining its object, even without the determination of its being produced by unvitiated causes, that is not tenable; because *pramāṇa* which is an object of doubt cannot possibly determine its object; otherwise even an *apramāṇa* could determine its object. Therefore, according to the opponent's theory even the fact of being produced by unvitiated causes cannot possibly be a particularity.

If *saṃvāditva* (being consistent) is accepted as a *viśeṣa*, this is what is accepted by the *parataḥprāmāṇyavādin* also, but as will be shown later that cannot be known without the determination of the rise of the cognition of *saṃvāda*; thus *pramāṇa* would proceed to do its own work being dependent on it, so it would be dependent on another in respect of that. Thus non-dependence not being established as shown above, the *hetu* in the argument, 'Those which await the rise of another cognition are not self-sufficient' is not *asiddha* (unproven or unreal). This also refutes what has been said, viz. "unique cognition of a thing, which is decisive, devoid of contradiction, brought about by unvitiated causes is recognised by the people as *pramāṇa* (valid)." As to the argument viz. 'If *pramāṇa* depending on *saṃvāda* were to proceed to do its work, then there would be the contingency of *cakraka* (argument in a circle)', that is not proper. 'Pramāṇa is of the nature of true apprehension', so it will be shown that *pramāṇa* proceeding to do its work, viz. determination (of things), is dependent on *saṃvāda* (consistency) and yet there is not the fault of *cakraka* (argument in a circle). As to the statement, 'If the excellences of the causes

are known', that only reveals the opponent's ignorance of the other party's accepted view, for the other party does not accept that *pramāṇa* proceeds to do its work being dependent on the cognition of the excellence of its causes. As to the argument, '*pramāṇa* as it arises is possessed of the potency to apprehend its object', there the potency to apprehend the true nature of a thing is just non-inconsistency (*avisamvāditva*), and that is known from extraneous sources, and being dependent on it *pramāṇa* proceeds to do its work, so *prāmāṇya* is established in that respect to be extrinsic.

[(3) Refutation of the *svatastva* of *prāmāṇya* in respect of *niscaya* (ascertainment)]

As to what was said viz. *prāmāṇya* is not dependent on another with regard to its own ascertainment, that is not correct. For is the ascertainment occurring there one which is causeless, or is it one having a cause?—these two alternatives come up. It cannot be causeless as in that case there would be the contingency of absence of specific place, time and nature. Even if it is said to have a cause, does it have itself as the cause or does it have a cause other than itself? It cannot have itself as the cause, as the Mīmāṃsaka does not recognise *pramāṇa* which is self-apprehended. If it has an entity other than itself as the cause, even then it will have to be stated whether that cause is perception or inference, as there is not the possibility of anything else which could ascertain it. If it is said to be perception, that is not proper, as perception cannot operate in respect of that; it comes to get the name 'perception' as it comes into existence in respect of a thing which is in contact with the sense-organ through its operation; whereas the sense-organs do not have any contact with the result in the form of the directness of the object or with the nature of its apprehension so that their *prāmāṇya* of the nature of their truth could be ascertained by perception which is produced by the operation of the sense-organs; nor is it ascertained by perception produced by the operation of the mind, as there is the absence

of such an experience. Nor also can *prāmāṇya*, as being the ascertainer of the truth of the producer of these two, which is called the operation of the knower, be ascertained by perception produced by the external sense-organs or the mind, as the sense-organs do not have contact with it. And it has been said that knowledge arising in respect of a thing not connected with the sense-organ cannot be called perception.

Nor can (*prāmāṇya*) be ascertained by inference as the above-mentioned two effects or results are not the *liṅga* (mark of inference) in the determination of *prāmāṇya* characterised by the apprehension of the object as it is. Even though there is the possibility of *liṅga* viz. its own effect of the nature of the two results mentioned above, in the case of the operation of the knower, yet there is not the fact of its being the ascertainer of *prāmāṇya* characterised by being the ascertainer of the thing as it is. For would that *liṅga* called apprehension be engaged in ascertaining it, as qualified by truth or being devoid of any qualifier? In the former case, what is the proof of truth being the qualifier? It has been shown that there is no possibility of proof. If the result devoid of any qualifier be said to prove *prāmāṇya* (validity), then even the result of wrong cognition should be able to ascertain *prāmāṇya*, and this would be too absurd (—*atiprasaṅga*) (—all cognitions would be known as valid).

It may be urged here : The above-mentioned two results, viz. apprehension of a thing (*artha-samvedana*), and the manifestness of the object (*artha prakāṣatā*), are ascertained by experience; as there is the ascertainment of the nature mentioned above intrinsically so there is the ascertainment of truth also; as that being apprehended is apprehended as the apprehension of blue, so there would be the apprehension of it as qualified by truth; for the apprehension of truth is not different from the apprehension of blue. The rejoinder to this is : If this is so, since even the cognition of silver in respect of shell, is of the nature of apprehension of an object it would come to be true. Losing sight of the memory-factor (*smṛti-pramoṣa*)

etc. will be refuted later. So its *prāmāṇya* cannot be determined even by inference. Moreover if perception and inference be accepted as the instruments of the ascertainment of *prāmāṇya*, it could not be said that *prāmāṇya* is ascertained intrinsically. Therefore, *prāmāṇya* cannot be ascertained even by another instrument.

As to the argument, 'Nor is *prāmāṇya* dependent on another for its own determination, for being dependent would it depend on the excellence of the cause, and so on',—that is only a condemnation of what is not recognised even by the other party. He does not hold that *prāmāṇya* is cognised by the knowledge of the excellence of its own cause, because the excellence of the causes cannot be known without the cognition of *saṁvāda* (consistency); and if the excellence of the cause is accepted as being known by the cognition of *saṁvāda*, the ascertainment of *prāmāṇya* will be achieved thereby only, and so it will be unnecessary to make the hypothesis of the determination of excellences. Since there arises the knowledge of excellences after the ascertainment of *prāmāṇya*, their ascertainment would not be useful in the ascertainment of validity. (One method is cumbrous, while the other is simple). Nor can it be argued that having once determined the excellences on the strength of *saṁvāda*, at another time there could be the ascertainment of *prāmāṇya* (validity) of knowledge arising from the *guṇas* by means of their ascertainment or definite knowledge even without *saṁvāda*; because in the case of eyes, etc. which are quite imperceptible, even at another time the persistence of excellences could not be definitely known without the definite perception of the own effect of the *prāmāṇya*. And the persistence of excellences is not uniform in the case of things perishing in a moment, because they would be different in form according to the newer and newer auxiliary causes. And from the cognition of *saṁvāda* of the form of knowledge of successful action, ascertainment of *prāmāṇya* is certainly accepted as occurring as can be seen from the statement of the definition of *pramāṇa*, 'Pramāṇa is non-

inconsistent knowledge' (*pramāṇam avisamvādi-jñānam*). And it cannot be said that *prāmāṇya* characterised by *samvāditva* is known intrinsically as *samvāditva* signifies the potency of *pramāṇa* to produce the notion of *samvāda*; and the potency of the cause cannot be determined without the perception of the effect. It is said, "There cannot be the knowledge of the existence of the cause if the effect is not perceptible." Therefore, by the cognition of *samvāda* which occurs later, the validity of the previous one is established. And it is not proper to say: "There will not be the knowledge of *prāmāṇya* owing to the contingency of *anavasthā* (infinite series), which would occur thus—When the validity of the previous cognition is known from the cognition of *samvāda*, the validity of the cognition of *samvāda* is known from *samvāda* with another and so on infinitely." Since the notion of *samvāda* has the character of *samvāda*, there is not the need of another *samvāda* and so the contingency of *anavasthā* will not arise. It should not be urged that in that case even the first (cognition) will not be in need of *samvāda* as for it *prāmāṇya* consists in being the producer of *samvāda*; if it were not there, *prāmāṇya* itself would not be there. But the knowledge of successful action is directly *avisamvādin* (non-inconsistent), as it has successful action for its object or content; for it, apprehension of its own object is itself the *prāmāṇya*, and that is established by itself, so it does not depend on another. Therefore the statement, 'If any knowledge be accepted as self-valid' — that is only the opponent's prattle. And it should not be said that on there being a doubt as to knowledge of successful activity pertaining to a non-entity, there would be the need of another *pramāṇa* and so on, and so a vicious infinite series would occur,—because the knowledge of successful activity being of the nature of experience of successful activity, there would not be the need for those concerned with successful action alone for the inquiry whether this knowledge arose from a different successful action or in its absence. To wit, just as the inquiry whether successful

activity is accomplished by the whole thing as distinct from the parts, or by it as non-different from the parts or by it having the dual form, or by it having neither form or by the thing constituted of three *guṇas*, or by it of the nature of an aggregate of atoms, or by it of the form of knowledge, or by it of the form of ignorance (i. e. having only empirical reality)—is purposeless for one who is concerned with successful activity alone, since the desired result is accomplished; so is even this inquiry whether apprehension of successful activity arises with reference to a real successful activity or with reference to an unreal one. The result desired is removal of the burning sensation of thirst and the like and that is accomplished on there being the rise of the knowledge of its dissociation, which is self-apprehended, and so the inquiry is of no avail, and also because there cannot be two knowledges pertaining to a non-entity. Where the knowledge of successful activity arises preceded by the knowledge of the instrument (of successful activity), there is in no case any suspicion of its being a non-entity. When one has the knowledge of fire in respect of non fire, there is not the possibility of the knowledge of the efficient activity of burning, cooking etc. in the case of a man who acts upon it. This is well known to all including cow-herds and women. And (only) because knowledge of successful activity in a dream is seen to arise in the absence of successful activity, it cannot be doubted that the knowledge of successful activity in the waking state also is such, as it is its reverse. To wit, the knowledge of successful action in a dream is not preceded by effort, is confused and infirm, whereas that in the waking state is the reverse of this, so how could there be *vyabhicāra* (deviation)? (That is to say, a real object must be there.) And if the knowledge of successful action also were to arise in the waking state without (real) object, which other knowledge could there be which would correspond to its object, and on the basis of which things could be established? He who thinks

that he is doing something unfavourable to the Buddhist who holds the theory of *parataḥ-prāmāṇya* is really doing something favourable to him. For he holds that 'all cognitions are devoid of an objective content as they are cognitions, like dream cognitions'; and when you demonstrate that the waking and dream states are non-different you only help him, for there could be no other cognition which is connected with the object. And when you demonstrate that the two states are equal, it does not help the matter in hand. It is empirical *pramāṇa* that is defined as follows—'*Pramāṇa* is non-inconsistent knowledge; and this empirical *pramāṇa* is only the knowledge in the waking state since as a matter of fact it is only there that all dealings are known to happen in the world; whereas dream-cognitions are well-known in the world as being devoid of objective content and so are not said to be *pramāṇa*; and hence there is no scope for the inquiry whether *prāmāṇya* is *svataḥ* or *parataḥ*. In the cognition of the waking state both are found and so there is scope for the inquiry whether it is *pramāṇa* or *apramāṇa* and whether it is so *svataḥ* (intrinsically) or *parataḥ* (extrinsically). To urge that dream cognition would be a case of deviation (*vyabhicāra*) when the qualification 'it being a cognition of the waking state' is added to the above-mentioned definition, indicates only the ignorance of the other party of the matter in hand.

Moreover, in respect of the definition, "*Pramāṇa* is the knowledge which is the cause of a particular result, viz. attainment of successful activity", the objection cannot be raised viz. 'Its result is not comprehended by the definition of *pramāṇa* so how could the *prāmāṇya* of it also be determined?' As when the seed is defined as the cause of sprout, the sprout also does not come to be of the form of seed, so learned people should not ask the question, 'How is it ascertained that the sprout has the character of seed?' As the character of seed is determined in the case of seed on seeing the sprout, so here also the knowledge of instrument will be ascertained as having *prāmāṇya* on seeing the result of successful activity. And the

fault of *anavasthā* will not be there on account of the *prāmāṇya* of knowledge of successful activity having to be determined from another source, as knowledge of successful activity is established intrinsically as having that character (i.e. as being valid) It is said 'Nature is known intrinsically' (*svārūpasya svatogaṭiḥ*)—STT 1, p.15). And there can be no illusion with respect to the nature of knowledge, because if the nature be absent, self-consciousness being non-different from it would also come to be negated (or absent). The following definitions pertain to *pramāṇa* having a different object, viz. " *Pramāṇa* is non-inconsistent knowledge and non-inconsistency signifies the presence of successful activity" (*Pramāṇa-vārttika* 1.3); as also '*prāmāṇya* (is determined) by empirical behaviour in the form of successful activity'. Therefore the result being one which is the very self of *pramāṇa*, and which is called a *puruṣārtha* characterised by successful activity, and for which intelligent persons make efforts, the urging of *anavasthā* in respect of the knowledge of *prāmāṇya*, which is of the nature of potency of reaching to the fruit whose character is not reflected, in the case of knowledge revealing the instrument (of successful activity)—on the strength of this, is considered as incompatible for the opponent, as it (result) is self-established and one to which the definition of *pramāṇa* cannot apply as it has not acquired the nature of another instrument in respect of another fruit. Hence also is refuted the argument viz. "As intelligent persons, even though they have attained the result, on there being the rise of the knowledge of purposive activity on acting as stimulated by the knowledge of the instrument whose *prāmāṇya* has not been determined, apply their mind to the investigation of the *prāmāṇya* of the knowledge of the instrument, for otherwise there would not be activity elsewhere preceded by the ascertainment of the validity of another knowledge of instrument which is similar to it in character, so they are engaged in the inquiry as to the *prāmāṇya* of the cognition of successful activity also just because they are

intelligent, otherwise there would not be at all the ascertainment of the validity of the previous cognition from the knowledge of successful activity whose validity has not been established". It is also not correct to say that the fact of having attained the result is meaningless, because it has been propounded that knowledge of successful activity has intrinsic validity • whereas the cognition of instrument is valid as it gives rise to it. As to what was said, viz. "If by consistency the validity of the previous one is determined then 'Perception by the ear would be *apramāṇa* as there is no consistency with other cognitions' (Ślv. 2.77)",—that also is not proper, because auditory cognition pertaining to song, etc. being of the form of successful activity, its *prāmāṇya* is established intrinsically. Similarly in the case of the cognition of colour of a variegated thing, *prāmāṇya* is self-established, as it is of the character of experience of successful activity. The cognitions of odour, touch, taste are well-known to be of the character of experience of successful activity. As to the argument, viz. 'Does the knowledge establishing consistency, having the one object or a different object, determine the *prāmāṇya* of the previous cognition...?', since two objects of the character of colour and touch which exist in one aggregate, depend on one causal apparatus and so do not deviate from each other, the cognition of touch etc. which in the waking condition does not arise in the absence of touch, etc. which are desired, though having a different object determines the validity of the cognition of colour about which there is a doubt—that also is not relevant. Hence also on account of sounds being invariably concomitant with the entities, form, etc., on there arising a doubt as to their particularity, at times due to the cognition of the form of the *vinā* (lute) etc., there is the removal of the doubt as to its particularity so ascertainment of *prāmāṇya* due to consistency with the perception of its form also comes to be established. As to what was said viz. 'Does the knowledge enabling one to know consistency (*samvāda-jñāna*) establish the validity of the knowledge of the instrument

(*sādhana-jñāna*) as having the *sādhana-jñāna* as its object or as having a different object?—this also is a statement of one who does not know what the other party wants to say; according to the other party the *saṁvāda-jñāna* does not establish its validity as being its cogniser, but by being a particular effect of it, as smoke establishes fire. As to the fault of *cakraka* stated with regard to the determination of the *sādhana-jñāna* by the *saṁvāda-jñāna*,—that also is inconsistent. This fault would be there if a man were to act after having at the very outset determined the validity of the *sādhana-jñāna* by means of the *saṁvāda-jñāna*; but when on there being the perception of the colour of fire, he once on being tormented by cold and approaching that place for something else, experiences its touch, or experiences its touch when fire is brought to that place by some kind-hearted person, it is then that he cognises the relation between the perception of the colour of fire and the cognition of touch, viz. a thing having this sort of nature serves this sort of purpose. He who has (thus) grasped the connection, at another time, in unfamiliar circumstances acts after having determined the validity of the knowledge revealing the instrument thus, “This cognition of mine must bring about the desired successful activity, because it is a cognition of this colour like a cognition of this character produced before”, so how could the objection pertaining to *cakraka* be urged? Some say that even in circumstances to which he is used a person proceeds to act after having determined the validity of the *sādhana-jñāna* by inference. It cannot be said that inference cannot operate on account of the absence of the consciousness of the operation of positive and negative concomitance in those circumstances, because though it might not be apprehended its operation deserves to be accepted, as when seeing all of a sudden smoke one has the knowledge of fire which is not perceptible; otherwise there should be its cognition on seeing that accidentally, even in the case of one who has grasped and later forgotten. It may be urged: “And the potency to bring about the result of the

sādhana-jñāna is an object of direct apprehension, and so how can inference function in respect of what is directly perceived?" This objection is not tenable, because like presence of imperceptible fire in a place which is seen the potency to bring it about is imperceptible so it could not be determined without the functioning of inference. It is said, "The behaviour of one, who considers the efficiency of cognition, goes on from memory, on account of desire, on there being its perception in respect of perceived things."⁶

Others say, "In familiar circumstances, activity is possible even without inference". It may be urged that activity is seen when there is inference, and is not seen in its absence so it is brought about by inference. Now in this way in familiar circumstances, even on the absence of inference which is of the nature of conceptualisation there is seen to be activity by reason of perception, so how would it not be its effect? To wit, the operation of inference which is of the nature of conceptualisation is not apprehended by the knower and yet there is accomplished activity in respect of the thing that is manifested. It may be asked: In the beginning activity is seen to result from inference, so how could it occur later without it? We rejoin that in the same way behaviour or practical dealing is seen to arise from consideration, and yet later it occurs without consideration, merely on the perception of the thing in front—you must state how this is possible. Moreover, if activity is held never to occur without inference, then by reason of this, it will have to be accepted that inference alone is the stimulator. And in that case, since the *liṅga* (probans) cannot be cognised by perception, there also inference will be the cause of the proposition pertaining to definite knowledge, and there cannot be this inference also without the definite knowledge of another *liṅga* and thus there will be the contingency of *anavasthā* (vicious infinite series) and inference itself will not be possible, and therefore there will never be any activity. Therefore, in familiar circumstances perception should be accepted as bringing about

activity by itself. Inference on the other hand is possessed of the potency to enable us to reach the fire just because it arises from its own probandum (fire) on the strength of the determination of the mark which has the relation of identity or origination from it or necessary connection, and so even before the rise of the notion of *saṃvāda*, it is definitely known as distinct from sham *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇābhāsa*), and hence it is intrinsic only. To wit, what is originated from a thing has the potency to enable us to reach it; as, for instance, perception has the power to enable us to reach the object. And this inferential knowledge of the *liṅgin* (*pakṣa*) is produced from the *anumeya* (*sādhya*) through the perception of the *liṅga* which is connected with it, so it is determined as having the potency to enable us to reach it. The name under consideration is demonstrated to an ignorant person by pointing out the object, because the instruction about the convention is given by acquainting us with the object of convention. To explain, in this way even the talk of *prāmāṇya* in respect of perception also is thus known to be 'only based on non-deviation (*avyabhicāra*) from the object; and the *avyabhicāra* is nothing other than origination from it, and this itself is called the potency of knowledge to enable us to reach (the object). It is said " Since perception is found to be absent when the object is not possible (i.e. not existent), perception also can have *prāmāṇya*. Both these are true when a thing which is connected (with the *sādhya*) is the cause".

Therefore the proposition pertaining to *prāmāṇya* is established on the strength of another, with reference to an ignorant person. In the case of inference, *prāmāṇya* of the nature of *avyabhicāra* (non-deviation) from its own probandum, which is established after the determination of the *liṅga* connected with it is directly established as having arisen from it, and therefore in the determination of *prāmāṇya* by another there will not be involved the contingency of *cakraka* (argument in a circle) as urged. But in the case of perception, it is not possible to ascertain its rise from the object before *saṃvāda*

(is observed), so it is reasonable to say that in unfamiliar circumstances its *prāmāṇya* is dependent on *saṁvāda*. Therefore dependence being established in respect of origination, own function and ascertainment, the *hetu* in the argument, 'Those which are independent of a particular thing are self-sufficient' is *asiddha* (unreal). And since the ascertainment of the validity of the cognition pertaining to the object of doubt, error is proved to be *parataḥ*, there is no unreality of *vyāpti* in the argument, " Those which are subject to doubt, error...". As to the argument that 'the *hetu* is *asiddha* since there is absence of doubt and error with regard to validity in the case of all beings',—that also is not tenable; so it is intelligent persons who are engaged in the inquiry as to *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa*, and not others; and they become suspicious on the perception of inconsistency (*visamvāda*) of certain knowledge-individuals, and do not determine, ' This thing is such only' simply because they have knowledge, nor do they determine the knowledge as having validity; otherwise they would cease to be intelligent. So how could there not be doubt with regard to what is liable to be subjected to doubt? Thus in the knowledge arising from the defect, viz. *kāmala* (overpowering by bile) etc. there is also the character of error and on the strength of this it is but proper that one should have the suspicion of error with respect to other cognitions also; hence the *hetu* in the present argument is not *asiddha*, and by reason of this *parataḥ-prāmāṇya* is established:

The opponent anticipating the argument viz. ' *Pramāṇa* and its *ābhāsa* have the same form...', refuted it by saying, ' In the case of *apramāṇa*, contradicting cognition is sure to occur as also the knowledge of the defect of the cause',—this also is not correct; because the distinction shown that in the case of erroneous cognition the knowledge of the contradiction or the defect of the cause is sure to occur, and it is not found in the case of right cognition—is this known on there being the non-cognition of

contradicting knowledge, or on there being definite knowledge of its absence? In the former case, we have to say that in erroneous cognition, even when it (defect) is present it is found to be one not cognised for some time; similarly it may not be cognised here. Now it may be urged that in the case of erroneous cognition, though it may not be cognised for some time, one becomes aware of the contradicting cognition at a distant time, whereas in the case of right cognition, it is not known even at a distant time. Well, this could be decided by only omniscient persons and not by ordinary men of the world like us. Again, does the definite knowledge of the absence of contradicting factor in the case of true knowledge occur before the activity or after the activity? If the former alternative is accepted that is not proper as this being possible even in the case of erroneous cognition it would come to be *pramāṇa*. If the determination of absence of contradicting factor is said to occur after the activity, that also is not proper, because since activity can arise even without the determination of the absence of *bādhaka* (contradicting factor), this determination is ineffectual. And there is no cause of the determination of absence of contradicting factor which occurs after the activity. If it is urged that non apprehension is the cause, we say it is not so because this is not possible. To wit, is the non-apprehension of the *bādhaka*, as occurring before the activity, the cause of the determination of the absence of *bādhaka*, which occurs after the activity; or as occurring after the activity?—These two alternatives are there. If the former is accepted that is not proper, because the non-apprehension of *bādhaka* which occurs earlier cannot possibly be the cause of the determination of absence of *bādhaka* which occurs after the activity; a non-apprehension of one time cannot bring about determination of *abhāva* at another time, as this would be very absurd (*ati-prasaṅga*)—anything could be proved to be absent at any time. Nor can the non-apprehension of *bādhaka* which occurs after the

activity be the cause of the determination, because previous to activity an ordinary man of limited vision cannot possibly determine that at a later time there will not be the apprehension of *bādhaka*, and so this is not established. Nor is it possible to say that non-apprehension occurring after the activity, being determined then only will become the cause of the determination of the absence of *bādhaka* which occurs at that time, as it has been shown that the determination occurring at that time would be ineffectual. Moreover, is the non-apprehension of *bādhaka* with reference to all, the cause of that determination, or that with reference to oneself?—thus again these two alternatives would be there. If it is one with reference to all, that is not proper, because it is not established—for ordinary persons of limited vision cannot possibly determine that ‘all cognisers do not cognise a *bādhaka*’. If it is accepted that it is one with reference to oneself, that also is not proper, because non-apprehension connected with oneself is not conclusive in respect of the particular operations of other minds. Therefore, non-apprehension is not the cause of the determination of absence of contradiction. Nor is *saṃvāda* the cause because the contingency of infinite series has been pointed out. And it has already been established that absence of contradiction is not a particularity of true cognition. This holds good also of the absence of the defects of the cause, so this also is not its particularity. Moreover, since in the opponent’s view absence of defects of cause and absence of *bādhaka* are propounded as of the form of excellence of the cause and of the form of cognition determining consistency, if in its determination lies its particularity, the determination of *prāmāṇya* comes to be accepted as *paratah*; and even that is not proper as the fault of infinite series has, according to the opponent’s view, already been propounded. As to what is said, viz. ‘Thus three or four cognitions ..’, there since with reference to a *bādhaka*, three states are seen, one and the same knowledge has validity and again invalidity and again validity, or since one would suspect there three states in respect

of that *bādhaka*, etc., how would an inquirer not be dependent on another so that the vicious infinite series would not be there? As to what is said, viz. 'From this dependence it should not be suspected that there is not *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*...', that also is not tenable for this is not a game of deceit so that only a few cognitions would be described. Without a *pramāṇa*, the suspicion of *bādhaka* would not cease and it has been stated that in the opponent's view there is not possible *pramāṇa* that could remove suspicion. Similarly, if one has from the beginning a doubt regarding the knowledge of the defects of the cause, there will be the need for another knowledge of the defects of cause, and thus how could the vicious infinite series (*anavasthā*) be averted?

It might be urged : Since the knowledge of the defect of the cause would be *pramāṇa* only from the absence of the knowledge cognising the defects of its cause there would not be *anavasthā* here. As Kumārila said, "If *prāmāṇya* is accepted to be due to the cognition itself, nothing else is required, because in the absence of the cognition of defects, falsity (i.e. *aprāmāṇya*) becomes precluded automatically." (Ślv. 2.52)—This is not proper and it has been answered before. And from the non-cognition of defect there cannot be inferred absence of defect, because even when defects are existent it is quite possible that there should be their non-cognition. Defect of sense-organ brought about by *timira*, etc. is the factor that brings about wrong cognition as opposed to the potency to produce true knowledge; and that being super-sensuous is not apprehended though it is existent. And defects are not concomitant with knowledge so that the latter not being there they would also be non-existent. And with regard to the knowledge of absence of defects, there would be the same *anavasthā* which has been propounded before, if consistency, etc. are required to determine its validity. This also refutes what has been said by Bhaṭṭa, viz. "Therefore intrinsic validity holds good as a general rule everywhere; it is set aside by contradictory knowledge and the knowledge of the defectiveness of the cause. And though it be dependent

on this, there would not be the contingency of vicious infinite series; this is dependent on *pramāṇa* and it is proved to be intrinsic in character. As a *pramāṇa* is not established by another *pramāṇa*, similarly non-validity cannot be established by a non-*pramāṇa*."

It may be urged: "Though the contradicting knowledge may have its nature of cognition not dependent on another, still it could render another invalid only if it is itself cognised as not being contradicted, not otherwise,—this also is not a fault, for 'The contradicting knowledge is the determination of the thing being otherwise, and that being a *pramāṇa* which is independent sets aside the previous cognition. Even here a contradiction may be suspected at times, and that also is set aside by another in the case of a person who entertains a doubt from the beginning. If in the case of this cognition on further examination there arises another contradicting cognition, then the middle one would be contradicted and this would mean that the first is *pramāṇa*. If even on proper investigation being done with ease there is not another cognition contradicting the contradicting cognition, on account of the absence of the source, then the first cognition would all the more strongly be refuted by it as it is faultless, so by it the validity of it only would be set aside. Thus the inquirer would not have to go beyond three knowledges; and a contradiction not arising, there should not be again the suspicion of contradicting cognition.' (). To wit, this entire text repudiates the contradiction of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* as also *anavasthā* on account of there not being the need for more than three knowledges for the inquirer".—But both these have been urged in the other view by the aforesaid method. Whatever other condemnation there is in the *pūrva-pakṣa* with regard to *parataḥ-prāmāṇya*, that is refuted by non-acceptance of what is urged and so is not condemned at every step by stating it.

[Absence of *prāmāṇya* in the *preraṇā-buddhi*]—*Preraṇā-buddhi* (knowledge brought about by stimulative statement)

does not have validity, as the perception manifesting the instrument has—by virtue of *saṃvāda* (consistency)—as this is absent in its case; nor on the strength of the determination of the *liṅga* which is invariably concomitant with it, as in the case of inference, due to its arising from its own probandum. Moreover, this attempt of the opponent to establish *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* is for the establishing of the validity of the mind (i.e. *buddhi*, cognition) which has *preraṇā* as its source; and according to his theory not only is the validity of the knowledge produced by injunctory statement not established, but it is determined as being invalid. It is thus: knowledge which is produced by defective causes is not valid, as for example, knowledge arising from eyes, etc. affected by the disease of *timira* and the like; and knowledge arising from the sentence 'One must perform Agnihotra' is knowledge produced by the *preraṇā-vākya* which is possessed of faults, thus there is the apprehension of what is contradictory to the cause (of validity). And the reason is not *asiddha*; in the opponent's view there is the absence of a speaker having excellences in the case of the *preraṇā*, so the fact of being produced by defects which are not set aside by his excellences is established in the case of knowledge arising from the *preraṇā*.

It may be urged: This fault might be there if it were accepted that the faults coming in the way of validity are set aside by the excellences of the speaker; whereas, as a matter of fact, the non-presence of defects which are devoid of a substratum even on account of the absence of a speaker is what is accepted. It is said, "It is true that in word the rise of defect is dependent on the speaker; and its absence is at times due to the speaker being one who has excellences. Owing to his excellences, defects would not possibly find access to word, or owing to the absence of the speaker, the defects being devoid of a substratum would not be there."—(Ślv. 2.62-63).

The answer to this is that this would be so if the *apauruṣeyatva* (that the *Veda* has no author) were proved by some *pramāṇa*; but this is not established, as the *pramāṇa*

establishing this will be repudiated. Hence also even this should not be urged : " There in the case of the *Veda*, the assertion of freedom from reproach is very easy to put forward, because there is no speaker, and for this reason there cannot even be a suspicion of the *Veda* being *apramāṇa*." (Ślv. 2.68)

Therefore since the opponent does not accept a speaker having excellences and since *apauruṣeyatva* is not possible, the reason ' being produced by defects which are not set aside ' is established in the case of *cetas* (mind, *buddhi*, cognition) arising from *preraṇā*; and the invariable concomitance of ' being produced by defects ' and ' invalidity ' being determined in the case of erroneous cognition elsewhere, the *hetu* (probans) cannot be *viruddha* (contrary) or *anaikāntika* (inconclusive). By reason of this, absence of *prāmāṇyo* is established in respect of knowledge arising from *preraṇā*

NOTES

- 1 Tathā hi doṣebhyo guṇānām abhāvas tad-abhāvāt prāmāṇyadvayāsattvenā' prāmāṇyam autsargikam āsta iti bruvato na vaktraṁ vakribhavati.
—STT, 1. p. 10.
- 2 Kiṁ ca, apauruṣeyatve preraṇā-vacaso guṇavat-puruṣa-praṇīta-laukika-vākyeṣu tattvena niścitaṁ prāmāṇyaṁ guṇāśraya-puruṣa-praṇītatva-vyāvṛttyā tat tatra na syāt. tathā ca—
"preraṇājanitā buddhiḥ pramāṇaṁ doṣavarjitaiḥ;
kāraṇair janyamānatvāl liṅgā"ptokā'kṣabuddhivat."
(Ślv. 2, 184) ity ayaṁ śloka evaṁ paṭhitavyaḥ—
"preraṇājanitā buddhir apramā guṇavarjitaiḥ;
kāraṇair janyamānatvād aliṅgā"ptoktabuddhivat."—SST, 1, p. 11
- 3 ' Preraṇā-janitā buddhir na pramāṇaṁ na cā'pramā,
guṇadoṣavinirmukta-kāraṇebhyaḥ samudbhavāt.—
ity evaṁ api prāktaṇaḥ ślokaḥ paṭhitavyaḥ —SST, 1, p. 11
- 4 Ata eva yathā—
"doṣāḥ santi na santiti pauruṣeyeṣu cintyate;
vede kartur abhāvāt tu doṣa"śaṅkaiva nāsti naḥ.

(similar to Ślv. 2. 68) ity ayaṁ śloka evaṁ paṭhitas tathaivam api paṭhanīyaḥ—

guṇāḥ santi na santīti pauraṣeyeṣu cintyate;

vede kartur abhāvāt tu guṇā”śaṅkaiva nāsti naḥ.—STT, 1, p. 11

- 5 Atha svarūpaviśeṣakāryo yathāvyavasthitārtha-paricchedaḥ iti nāti-prasaṅgas tarhi sa svarūpa-viśeṣo vaktavyaḥ—kim apūrvārtha-vijñānatvam, uta niścitatvam, āhosvid bādhā-rahitatvam, uta svid aduṣṭa-kāraṇā-rabdhatvam, kiṁ vā saṁvāditvam iti.—STT, 1, p. 12.

- 6 Tad uktam—

“tad-dṛṣṭā v eva dṛṣṭeṣu saṁvit-sāmarthyabhāvinah;

smaraṇād abhilaṣeṇa vavahāraḥ pravartate.” iti—STT, 1, p. 16

- 7 Tad uktam—

“Arthasyāsambhave’bhāvāt pratyakṣe’pi pramāṇatā;

pratibaddha-svabhāvasya taddhetutve samam dvayam”. iti.

—STT, 1, p. 17.

ERRATA

Page	line	Incorrect	Correct
522	16	<i>Svabhavā</i>	<i>Svabhāva</i>
50	31, 35	<i>avyabhicari</i>	<i>avyabhicāri</i>
534	21	objects	object
543	9	vaild	valid
547	1	coginsed	cognised
580	31	indentical	identical
673	10	like	alike
678	1	both	both.
699	23	accept	accept
728	F.N.	<i>pratibandi</i>	<i>pratibandī</i>
731	4	Parārthānumana	Parārthānumāna
734	1	ninth	eighth
737	12, 17, 23, 27	<i>cakṣu</i>	<i>cakṣus</i>
741	1	<i>Kathāvattha</i>	<i>Kathāvatthu</i>
764	9	in	is
764	17	saving	saying
772	7	^o <i>sāmānādhikaraṇyā</i>	^o <i>sāmānādhikaraṇyā-</i>
773	7	<i>vyapti</i>	<i>vyāpti</i>
801	27	seen	soon
802	2	Patañjali	Patañjali
804	25	Vātsyāyana	Gautama
811	2	consequenty	consequently
812	24	dicussion	discussion
833	17	propagater	propagator
838	13	than	then
840	25	aṅkara	Śaṅkara
842	8, 20, 29	Saṅkara	Śaṅkara
852	28	dialecticiam	dialectician
864	24	proble s	problems
907	5	ti e	time

SANSKRIT INDEX

- Akalaṅka 123, 124
 akiñcitkara 291
 akkhevaṇi dhammakahā 41, 45
 ajñāna 31, 86, 210, 236; 238
 Ajñāna-vāda 682 ff, 686
 aṭṭhamukhavāda 36
 atathyatā 533 ff
 atiprasaṅga 29, 501, 534, 566
 ativyāpti 815
 atitakāla 84
 aḍḍasodbhāvana 122, 249 ff
 adhika 48, 49, 82, 103, 210,
 232 ff
 anadhigatārthagantṛ 541 ff
 ananubhāṣaṇa 210, 236 ff
 ananuyojya 81
 anavasthā 29, 482, 487, 524, 547,
 591, 713, 904
 anityasama 146, 179 ff
 anirvancaniyatāvādin 601, 617
 aniṣṭaprasaṅga 482
 anutpattisama 146, 164
 anupapatii 697, 699
 anupalabdhisama 146, 177 ff
 anubhava (intuitive experience)
 883
 anubhūti 631 ff
 anumāna 24, 25, 30, 376 ff
 (pūrvavat, etc.), 572ff
 Anumānapañha 39
 anuyoga, 34
 anuyogi 769
 anuyojya 81
 anuloma 35
 anuloma-sambhāṣa, 87
 anaikāntika 29, 272 ff, 284 ff
 anaucitya 484, 498 ff, 615
 anyonyāśraya 23, 482, 486, 547,
 554 ff, 591
 apakarṣasama 146, 153 ff
 apavāda 29, 484, 495
 apasiddhānta 102 ff, 210, 243 ff,
 531, 563
 apārthaka 210, 226 ff
 apratipatti 26
 apratibhā 26, 31, 210, 238
 aprāptakāla 84, 210, 228 ff
 aprāptisama 146, 160
 aprāmānya 640 ff
 abādhitatva 526 ff
 abhāva (pramāna) 452 ff
 Abhidharmakośa 734 ff
 Abhidharmadīpa 734 ff
 abhyānujñā 85
 amara-vikṣepa (eel-wriggling)
 683
 arthakriyā 537 ff, 635, 639, 885
 arthaśāstra 12, 91, 792 ff
 Arthaśāstra 71, 73
 arthāntara 86, 210, 223, 615
 arthāpatti-pramāṇa 449 ff, 545
 arthāpatti-sama 146, 164, 170
 avacchedaka 763 ff
 avayava 28, 60, 61 (10 avayavas)
 avarṇyasama 146, 153, 156 ff
 avijñātārthā 210, 225 ff
 avinigama 484, 492 ff
 aviruddha 185, 188
 aviśeṣasama 146, 171
 avisamvādi 539 ff, 583, 636 ff,
 639, 885

avyabhicāritva 526 ff, 629

avyākṛta, 32

avyāpti 815

avyāptisama 185, 187

Aṣṭavakra 28

asamśayasama 185, 188

asādhanaṅgavacana 122, 249 ff

asiddha 283

ahetu 83

ahetusama 146, 169 ff

ākṣepa 29

Āgamaḍambara 848 ff

ātmāśraya 482 ff, 485 ff, 547, 558

Ānandavardhana 812 ff

Ānvikṣikī 25

Āyurveda 12

Āryadeva 726 ff

ālambana 532 ff

itaretarāśraya 29, 482, 904

utkarṣasama 146, 153, 154

uttara 79

utsarga 29, 484, 494 ff

Udayana 116, 147, 152, 166 ff

651 ff, 715, 872

udāharaṇa 34

Uddyotakara 105 ff, 165 ff, 375

upacāra-chala 135 ff

upanaya 79

upanayana 34, 37

upapatti-sama 146, 173

upamaṇa pramāṇa 447

upalabdhi sama 146, 174 ff

upādhi 597

Upāyahṛdaya 10, 23, 29, 63,

141, 185, 245, 280, 351

ubhayataḥ-spāśā rajju 26, 29,

500

eka-sambyākaraniya 31

aitihya 45ff

Opamma-kathā 40

kathā, 9, 12, 13, 23, 36, 43, 61

Kathāvatthu, 23, 34, 36, 41

kalpanā-gaurava, 484, 496 ff

kalpanā-lāghava, 484, 496ff

Kātyayana, 797

Kāmaśāstra, 826ff

kāryasama 146, 183ff

kālatīta 277

Kāvyaśāstra 826 ff

Kundakunda 742 ff, 750 ff

Kumārila 716 ff

Kulārka Paṇḍita 307 ff

Kevalādvaitin 519 ff, 601

kevalānvayi 309 ff

Kauṭilya 791 ff

krama 27

khaṇḍana (viparīta, asat,

viruddha) 189 ff

Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya, 116

khyāti 644 ff

Gārgi 21, 26

Gauḍapāda 719

cakraka 29, 482, 486, 487, 547

903

Catuḥśataka 726 ff

Candrakīrti 522

Caraka Saṁhita 12, 13, 14, 24,

29, 71 ff, 868, 879

Citsukha 522

chala 8, 29, 51 ff, 83, 87, 108 ff,

135 ff, 880

Chandogya Upaniṣad 10

Jagannātha 819 ff

Janaka 26, 28

jappa 30, 61

Jayatīrtha 153, 259, 300

jaya-parājaya-vyavasthā 257

- Jayanta 28, 116, 298, 848, 851, 852
 Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa 116, 521ff, 720
 jalpaka 75
 Jalpakalpalatā 860
 jāti (sophistical argument) 13, 14, 79, 87, 108 ff, 122 ff, 144 ff, 195 ff, 879
 jāti-saṅkara 569 ff
 jātyuttara 195 ff
 jīgīṣukathā 45
 Jinabhadra 746 ff
 jñāna 433 ff

 ṭhapanā 34, 35
 ṭhapaniya 31
 takkika 31
 tattva 558 ff
 tattvabubhutsukathā 45
 Tattvabodhavidhāyini 891 ff
 tattvopaplava 529, 547
 Tattvopaplavavādin 523, 547, 601
 Tattvopaplavasimha 116, 521 ff
 tantrayukti 71 ff
 tarka 9, 24, 41
 tarka (hypothetical reasoning) 14, 26, 101 ff, 457, 458, 462 ff, 473 ff, 591, 713
 Tarkatāṇḍava 301
 Tarkaśāstra 189, 193, 247, 281
 tarkābhāsa 49, 502 ff, 591
 Tātparyaṭīkā 104
 tārīka 31, 41
 Tārīkarakṣāsārasaṅgraha 235
 tīrthika 22, 30

 Daśaśloki-mahāvīdyāsūtra 307 ff
 Diṇnāga 193 ff, 249, 280, 281, 731 ff
 dukkathā 33
 dūṣaṇa 185 ff
 dṛṣṭānta 79, 145 ff, 211 ff
 dṛṣṭāntābhāsa 291, 294 ff
 doṣa 61, 824 ff (of kāvya)
 dhammakahā 44, 45
 dhammakathika 32
 Dharmakīrti 121 ff, 195, 249 ff, 296 ff, 731 ff
 Dharmavādin 30
 Dharmasāstra 12, 90 ff

 Navya-Nyāya 15, 16, 759 ff
 Nāgasena 37, 38
 Nāgārjuna 522 ff, 611 ff, 724 ff
 nāta (jñāta=udāharaṇa) 54 ff
 Nārada 28
 niggaḥa 34, 36, 37
 niggama 34, 37
 nīgrahasthāna 14, 26, 28, 30, 31, 49, 62, 83 ff, 101 ff, 209 ff, 245 ff, 253 ff
 nityasama 146, 181 ff
 niranuyoḥjānuyoga 123, 144, 210, 242 ff
 nirūpaka-nirūpita 764 ff
 nirarthaka 210, 223 ff
 Nirukta 22, 795 ff
 nirṇaya 25, 27
 Nyāya 12, 24
 Nyāya-parīṣiṣṭa 147, 152
 Nyāya-parīśuddhi 117, 129, 351, 489
 Nyāya-praveśa 294 ff
 Nyāya-bhāṣya 147 ff
 Nyāyamāñjari 28
 Nyāya-vārttika 147 ff, 165 ff
 Nyāyasūtra 13, 24, 26, 28, 29, 40, 62, 82 ff, 700 ff, 708
 nyūna 103, 210, 231 ff

 pakṣa 95, 101 ff, 597 ff
 pakṣadharmatā 597 ff
 pakṣābhāsa 291 ff
 paṭinīṇa 34
 paṭipucchā-kathā 30

paṭipucchā-byākaraṇīya 31
 paṭisambhida 33
 paṭiloma 35
 paṇḍita 31, 37
 patra 355 ff
 Patra-parikṣā 355 ff
 Patañjali 29, 797 ff
 parataḥ-pramāṇya, 640 ff, 909 ff
 paravādin 34
 parāmarṣa 582 ff
 pariśeṣa 452
 Pariśuddhi 103
 pariśad 75
 parihāra 29, 55, 85
 paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇa 210, 240 ff
 paryāpti 781
 pāpanā 35
 punarukta 48, 210, 234 ff
 Pūraṇa Kassapa 520
 Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra 692 ff, 708
 pūrvavat anumāna 376 ff
 prakaraṇasama 83 ff, 146, 167 ff
 prakaraṇasama (hetvābhāsa) 275
 Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra 247
 pratijñā 78
 pratijñāntara 210, 214 ff
 pratijñābhāsa 291 ff
 pratijñā-virodha 210, 216 ff
 pratijñā-sannyāsa 210, 218 ff
 pratijñābhāni 28, 31, 55, 85, 210 ff
 pratidṛṣṭānta 211
 pratidṛṣṭāntasama 146, 161 ff
 pratibandī 483, 491, 492
 pratiyogi 769
 prativādin 34, 45, 94, 211 ff, 340 ff
 pratiṣṭhāpanā 79
 pratyakṣa 435 ff
 pratyabhijñā 457, 458, 631
 prathamopasthitatva 49, 498
 Prabhāvakacarita 852 ff, 861
 pramā 431, 631 ff

pramāṇa 14, 25, 101 ff, 365 ff, 432 ff, 520 ff, 628, 701 ff, 881 ff
 pramāṇavādin, 14, 15, 628
 Pramāṇa-vārttika 539, 556
 prayojana 27
 pravṛtti-sāmarthya 527 ff, 649
 Praśastapāda 288 ff, 372 ff, 715 ff
 praśna 49 ff (6 kinds)
 praśnabāhulya 185 ff
 praśnālpata 185 ff
 prasaṅgasama 146, 161 ff
 prasaṅgāpādana 616, 698
 prāpti-sama 146, 160
 prāśnika 341

bādhakajñāna 527
 bādhita 278
 Buddha 5, 6, 9, 22, 23, 520
 Budḍhapālita 522, 617, 729
 Bodhasiddhi 147, 172
 Brāhma-sūtra 696 ff, 706
 brahmodya 10, 11, 862 ff
 Bhartṛhari 803 ff
 Bhāvaviveka 522, 617, 729
 Bhāsarvajña 298
 bhedābhedasama 185 ff

Makkhali Gosāla 5
 Maṇḍana Miśra 833 ff
 matānujñā 210, 239 ff
 manana 24
 Mahābhārata 25 ff
 Mahābhāṣya 29, 797 ff
 mahāvidyā 14, 307 ff
 Mahāvidyāvidambana 307 ff
 Mahāvīra 5, 6, 22
 Milinda 37, 38
 Milindapañha 37, 39, 40
 Mudritakumudacandra 856
 mūla-śaithilya 591
 Mṛcchakaṭika 869 ff

- maṇḍakapañha 38, 39
 Yājñavalkya 21, 22, 26
 yāthārthya 526 ff, 629 ff, 639, 885
 yāpaka hetu 50 ff
 Yāska 22
 yukti 24, 368 ff, 463 ff, 466
 Yogacaryābhūmiśāstra 247, 338 ff
 Yoga-sūtra 689 ff, 708
 ropanā 35
 Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra 40, 722
 lāghava 29
 līṅga (dṛṣṭa, etc) 371 ff
 lekha-doṣa 87
 lekha-sampat 86
 Lokāyata 37
 lūṣaka-hetu 50 ff
 Vandin 28
 Varadarāja 235
 varṇyasama 146, 153, 156
 Vardhamāna 147, 651 ff
 Vaṣubandhu 193, 734 ff
 vākchala 52, 53, 83, 135 ff
 vākovākya 10, 11
 vākyadoṣa, 82
 vākyapraśaṁsā 82
 Vācaspati 104 ff, 714, 718 ff
 Vātsyāyana 73, 108, 114 ff, 373, 710 ff
 vāda 9, 10, 13, 23, 24, 30, 45, 61, 78, 101 ff, 123 ff, 338 ff, 881
 vāda-doṣa 47 ff
 Vādadvātrimśikā 353
 vādin 10, 32, 34, 42, 43, 45, 94, 211 ff, 340 ff
 Vādi-Devasūri 124 ff, 299, 338, 344, 856 ff
 Vādi-vinoda, 142 ff, 338, 348 ff
 Vādindra, 307 ff
 Vādopaniṣad 353
 vikalpajāla 616
 vikalpa-sama 146 ff, 153 ff, 158
 vikkhevaṇi-dhammakahā 44, 45
 vikṣepa 210, 236, 239
 vighrha-sambhāṣā 87
 Vighrahavyāvartanī 522, 524 ff, 611, 724
 Vijnānavādin 519
 vitanḍa 37
 vitanḍā 13, 25, 61, 78, 101 ff, 112 ff, 611 ff, 881
 Vidyānanda 355
 vipratipatti 26
 vibhajja-byākaraṇīya 31
 viruddha (dṛṣṭāṇa) 185, 188
 viruddha (hetvābhāsa) 102, 273, 287 ff
 vivāda (6 kinds)-46 ff
 vivāda-pada 93
 Viśvanātha 245, 338
 vitarāgakathā 45
 Venkaṭanātha 117, 129, 215 ff, 300, 338, 351
 vaitanḍika 112 ff, 548, 613
 vaidhārmya 144 ff
 vaidharmyasama 146, 148
 vaiyātya 484, 498 ff
 Vaiṣeṣika-sūtra 371 ff, 690 ff, 708
 vyāmsaka-hetu 50 ff
 vyavasāyatmakatva 526 ff, 629 ff, 636 ff
 vyavahāra 93 ff
 vyavahārapada 93, 94
 Vyākaraṇa-śāstra 795
 vyāghāta 483, 490, 535, 566, 594 ff
 vyāpaka 584 ff

vyāpti 146 ff, 407 ff, 587 ff,
770 ff

vyāpti-sama 185, 187

vyāpya 584

vyāsajya-vṛtti 781 ff

Śaṅkara 719, 720, 833 ff

Śaṅkara Miśra 141, 152, 338,
348 ff

Śaṅkarasvāmin 283, 291 ff

Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10

Śabara 373, 716 ff

śabda pramāṇa 442 ff, 646 ff

śāstrā-vinoda 887 ff

śāstrārtha 9, 15

śūnyatā 521 ff

śeṣavat 40, 376 ff

Śrīharṣa 116, 129, 261, 484 ff,
522 ff, 547 ff

śruti-bhinna 185, 189

śruti-sama 185, 189

śatpakṣī kathā 351

śatpakṣī-kathābhāsa 350

Śaṅmatanātaka 848

Sakavādin 34

samkhyā 27

Sañjaya Belatṭhaputta 6, 520,
679, 682, 686

sabhā 91 ff

sabhāpati 340 ff

sabhya 91 ff, 340 ff

sama 146 ff

samavacana 500

savyabhicāra 81, 273

sambhava 451

sambhāṣā 9, 13, 74, ff

samvāda 9

samśayasama 84, 146, 166

Sāṃkhya-kārikā 708 ff

sādhana 95

sādharmya 144 ff

sādharmya-sama 146, 148

sādhyā 95

sādhyasama 146 ff, 153, 159,
275

Sānātani 116

sāmānya-chala 53, 83, 135 ff

sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna 376 ff

sāmānyalakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti
587 ff

siddhasādhana 594, 841 ff

siddhānta 29, 80

Sulabhā 26

Suśruta-saṃhitā 71 ff

saukṣmya 27

Sthānāṅga-sūtra 29

sthāpaka-hetu 50 ff

sthāpanā 29, 79

sthāpanā-hetu 146

smṛti 457, 544, 631, 637, 639

Syādvāda 686

svataḥ-prāmāṇya 632 ff, 640 ff,
891 ff

svataḥ-siddha, 524 ff

svarūpa-sambandha, 768

svavyāghātaka 146

hetu (hetu) 50

hetu 79, 367 ff

Hetuvidyā 25

hetusama 185, 187

hetvantara 85, 210

hetvābhāsa 14, 25, 210, 244,
245, 271 ff, 881

Hemacandra 125

ENGLISH INDEX

- Abelard 5
 Absolutists 14
 Aristotle 1, 2, 4, 6
 assembly 32, 75 ff
 Āgamas 10, 22, 60

 Brāhmaṇas 21, 25,

 Checks (in debate) 209 ff
 Collingwood 521, 614
 contradiction 7
 controversy 1, 2, 7, 9, 15, 21,
 23, 24, 833 ff
 conversation 1, 8, 23
 criteria of truth 526 ff
 criteria of validity 538 ff
 critical examination 9
 critique of Reason 616

 Dasgupta 12
 debate 1, 12, 13, 15, 17, 21,
 25, 338 ff, 602 ff, 833 ff
 debater 24
 definition 612
 dialectic 1 ff, 519 ff
 dialectical criticism 9, 11, 14,
 16, 519 ff, 672 ff, 791 ff
 dialectical discourse 8
 Dialectical Materialism 4
 dialectician 3
 dialogue 5, 9, 10, 25
 discourse 13
 discussion 6, 9, 17, 23
 disputation 1, 2, 5

 eel-wriggling 683 ff
 Eleatics 3

 Engels 4
 empirical experience 519
 empirical knowledge, 521
 epistemology 16
 eristic 2

 fallacy 83 ff

 Greece 5, 23
 Greek 4, 21

 Hegel 4
 Higher Reality 519
 Hiuen Tsiang 865 ff

 Ideas 2
 idealistic 519
 Idealists 519
 inference 562 ff, 572 ff

 Kant 3, 7

 logic 1, 3, 6, 11, 12, 16, 21
 Lokāyatikas 602, 687, 720, 723

 Marx 4
 Mādhyamikas 6, 519 ff, 601 ff
 methodology 15
 Mīmāṃsakas 11, 12

 Piṭakas 9, 10, 22, 30
 Plato 1, 2, 23
 polemical method, 7, 8,
 prāsaṅgika method 520 ff
 Protagoras 5

 Reasoning 2, 3, 14
 ,, (dialectical) 2
 ,, (demonstrative) 2
 ,, (probable) 2
 ,, (valid) 355 ff
 rhetoric 3, 6

sceptics 4, 519 ff, 617, 686
 Scepticism 6, 15, 521 ff, 685
 Scholasticism 2
 Socrates 1, 2, 6, 23
 Sophists 1, 3, 5, 6, 23
 Stoics 3
 syllogism 12, 24, 400 ff
 Śramaṇas 5

 Theory of truth 14
 Tirthaṅkaras 10, 43
 Topic 3
 truth 14, 628 ff

Ultimate Reality 519
 umpire 24
 Upaniṣads 21

 valid knowledge 14, 538 ff,
 548 ff, 881 ff
 validity 14, 15, 538 ff, 881 ff
 Vidyās 16, 791

 wranglers 4

 Xenophon 2
 Zeno 1
